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Nikolai Genov (Ed.)

Patterns of Interethnic
Integration

Freie Universität Berlin

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**PATTERNS
OF INTERETHNIC INTEGRATION**

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Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin
Garystr. 55
14195 Berlin
www.oei.fu-berlin.de
Tel.: ++49-30-838 52061
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COMPARING PATTERNS OF INTERETHNIC INTEGRATION

Nikolai Genov¹

1. Introduction

Decades after the Second World War, it seemed that the issues connected with interethnic relations and ethnic policies belonged to the past – at least in Europe. More precisely, they were regarded as belonging to the uncivilized past of interethnic wars, which had to be overcome fast and forever. This normative expectation had a specific background, since the issues of ethnicity used to be immediately related to nationalism. Due to historical circumstances, nationalism could be easily interpreted as fascism at that time. Simply raising the topic of ethnicity in the scientific discourse could therefore be misunderstood as a revival of primordial ghosts and tribal hostilities. Thus, there were no favourable social conditions for serious debates on ethnicity in the European social sciences.

There was one more powerful reason why the scientific analysis of ethnic diversity and interethnic relations had a rather limited or no social space. The reason lay in the specifics of the two grand ideologies which marked both sides of a divided post-war Europe.

The ideological vision of a bright future of the proletarian and later socialist internationalism dominated the eastern part of the European continent and precluded debate on the content and relevance of ethnicity. The very mention of the topic typically provoked restrictive political reactions from state institutions. The reactions had their background in the fresh memories about ethnic movements and bloody interethnic clashes. Below the surface of political stability and homogeneity these memories were alive and could find a sudden political revival in movements for ethnic autonomy or independence. The rulers were well aware of the fragility of political arrangements, which included an imposed ban on the objective and scientifically critical discourse on ethnic issues. It was not difference but unity that mattered politically. In the desirable future society, social homogeneity had to dominate by excluding the ethnic stratification of society by definition.

However, the topic of ethnicity was not welcome in the social scientific discourse in the

western part of the European continent either. The announced triumph of the liberal universalistic individualism could hardly be combined with any attention to the collectivistic ethnic identities. The very idea of a liberal, meritocratic economic and political order was actually incompatible with the collective ethnic preferences. The raising of ethnic issues could undermine efforts to establish peace in the Western part of the continent by suppressing the traditional ethnic divisions and the memories about centuries-long traditions of interethnic wars. In fact, exactly this was one of the key ideas guiding the efforts to develop the institutional framework of western European integration.

In their everyday activities, the politicians remained closer to reality, however. For the sober proponents of *Realpolitik*, it was a common knowledge that ethnicity and nationalism shaped modern history and could not disappear as major political factors over night. Indeed, they were most probably not bound to disappear at all, as the violent activities of Basques in Spain and in France, the division of Cyprus in 1974, the ethno-nationalist policies of the Ceausescu regime in Romania or the permanent ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union demonstrated. But it was not politically correct to openly lay the stress on ethnic issues in political debates. Other political and ideological concepts covered the widespread use and abuse of ethnic identities, affiliations and preferences.

This style of consciously suppressing the issues of ethnicity and interethnic relations in the public discourse, while permanently keeping a careful eye on them in practical politics, was a mostly European phenomenon. Political movements, parties and states in Latin America, Africa or Asia were proud to refer to their ethnic affiliations and openly used ethno-nationalist arguments and emotions in the political discourse and in legitimating political action. The pressure to shift European discourse in the same direction came from the reform processes in the Eastern part of the continent. The “soft” division of Czechoslovakia and the turbulent collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia provided abundant evidence for the rapid and efficient manner in which the latent

interethnic tensions and conflicts might become manifest and take the lead in the political decision-making and action. Nevertheless, hardly anybody could believe at the beginning of the Eastern European reforms that hundreds of thousands of Europeans would be killed or forcefully resettled at the end of the twentieth century as this happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other parts of former Yugoslavia. The powerful and obvious ethnicisation of politics and politicisation of ethnicity made its comeback in Europe and confronted researchers and politicians alike with challenges that seemed to be revivals of old-fashioned issues. In reality, they had new features in the contemporary context, in which the topic of ethnicity and interethnic relations gained new momentum in both practical politics and the social science discourse.² The scientific analysis and the practical management of interethnic relations and interethnic integration returned to the forefront of public interest.

This change of political situations and cultural interpretations of ethnicity is the background of the research project *Comparing Societal Integration of Turkish and Related Minorities*, a project supported by funds from the European Union.³ Its major aim is to make a diagnosis concerning the specifics and changes of ethnic stratification under rather different conditions on the basis of a common conceptual framework. The task then is to compare these particular situations and processes with the intention to elaborate on typological similarities and differences. Five specific constellations of interethnic relations and interethnic integration were selected to provide primary information for comparative analysis and conclusions.

- The Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan in the framework of the *Russian Federation* has experienced a complicated, but basically peaceful and successful process of mutual understanding and cooperation of the local Tatar ethnic majority with the local Russian ethnic minority in the Republic and with the Russian ethnic majority in the Federation.
- The achievement of a relatively stable situation cannot yet be claimed concerning the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the *Ukraine*. Crimea is currently predominantly populated by Russians and russified Ukrainians. However, the Tatars who were deported from Crimea to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Siberia

in 1944 have already returned or are currently in the process of returning back to the peninsula. The future of the local arrangements is difficult to foresee, since the intention among the Crimean Tatars to re-establish their ethnic dominance there is widespread and politically influential.

- In *Moldova*, the Autonomous Gagaouz Republic is still another special case of the ethnicisation of politics after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. In order to avoid additional interethnic tensions after the bloody conflict in Transnistria, the government in Chisinau agreed to include the political autonomy of the Gagaouz people (Turkish speaking Christians) in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. But the situation in the Gagaouz Autonomous Republic still very much depends on developments in and outside of the country.
- In *Bulgaria* the Turkish ethnic group is a traditional (autochthonous) minority. Given the interethnic tensions during the eighties and the complicated social differentiation thereafter, one may notice rather positive developments of mutual understanding of the two major ethnic groups in the country. The political arrangements concerning the representation of the Turkish ethnic group in the state institutions seem to be quite successful. However, recent events involving the development of nationalist movements and parties are indicative enough of latent interethnic tensions in Bulgarian society.
- Turks constitute a new (allochthonous) ethnic group in *Germany*. Because of this status, the group is not constitutionally recognized as an ethnic minority. But the massive Turkish (and Kurdish) ethnic presence in the country and the specifics of the cultural traditions, the economic situation and the political representation of this ethnic group put the societal integration of German society under strong pressure. Most probably, German society is going to have to face further challenges in order to achieve the integration of the Turkish ethnic group in the mainstream German society.

The wide variety of local situations and the rather different position of the ethnic minority under scrutiny in each of the above societies notwithstanding, a series of questions with common relevance guide the research programme: What are the local factors determining mutual

understanding and institutional adjustment of the ethnic groups under scrutiny? What are the local factors determining mutual mistrust and institutional conflicts of the ethnic groups under scrutiny? What types of institutional arrangements seem to facilitate the interethnic integration in the local context and why? What types of institutional arrangements seem to facilitate interethnic disintegration in the local context and why? What might be the prospects for cooperative interethnic institutional arrangements? What measures could be promising for resolving manifest or latent interethnic tensions and conflicts?

The success or failure of the efforts to satisfactorily answer such complex questions in a comparative perspective very much depends on the quality of the theoretical assumptions guiding the comparisons.

2. Theoretical Framework

Given the historical experience, it is most realistic to theoretically approach interethnic relations in terms of unequal access to resources – be it economic, political or cultural resources – by ethnic groups. The change in the interethnic relations is usually identical to the change in the stratification of society due to the change in the access of ethnic groups to various resources. This understanding of the structure and dynamics of interethnic relations has its roots in Max Weber's idea of multidimensional stratification of society on the basis of the varying levels of access of individuals and groups to resources, which are always limited. As to ethnic groups themselves, Weber briefly defines them in terms of their specific traditions, customs, language, blood relationships, common history and ethnic honour.⁴ But his remarks on ethnicity are rather vague and are not developed into a programme for empirical studies and systematic explanations of interethnic relations and their dynamics.

The pioneering sociological studies on ethnicity were carried out by representatives of the Chicago School of sociology. Focusing on the specific US-American experience of societal integration of waves of immigrants with the most various ethnic backgrounds, Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess interpreted the dynamics of interethnic relations in terms of steps in the *assimilation* of the newcomers

by the already established culture of the majority. The “melting pot” of the American societal integration was praised as working efficiently by means of *acculturation* (learning the dominant English language, the values and norms of mainstream American society) and *amalgamation* (ethnically mixed marriages). As a result, the third generation of immigrants was typically expected to be fully integrated (assimilated) in the social structures, values, norms and behavioural patterns characterizing the US American society.⁵

This interpretation of interethnic relations was increasingly called into question by the difficulties in the integration of the large group of “Hispanics” in the United States. The change of views concerning human rights became another factor in rethinking the issue. The new approach was influenced by the Canadian tradition of multiculturalism. It includes patterns of recognition of both ethnic similarities and differences, respect (tolerance) of differences and efforts to achieve mutual cultural enrichment on the basis of the recognized ethnic differences.⁶ The relevance of multiculturalism for the recognition of universal human rights notwithstanding, the stress on the cultural dimension of interethnic relations is a sign of one-sidedness. This is the background of the current criticisms on multiculturalism. The point is not that it is basically false as normative vision and institutional reality but that it is not multidimensional enough in order to institutionally secure long-term stability in ethnic relations and interethnic integration.⁷

Against the background of the empirical evidence and the efforts to conceptualise issues of interethnic integration, it is more and more often interpreted as mutual adjustment of various ethnic groups in the major sectors of social life:

- Interethnic integration undoubtedly presupposes the recognition of the need for *equal economic opportunities* for representatives of all ethnic groups in a given society. The basic elements of these equal opportunities are the access to jobs, in particular to good quality jobs, together with the equal opportunity for private economic activity.
- Another key dimension of the so understood interethnic integration is the *equality of rights and opportunities for political participation*. In practical terms, this means equality in legal regulations and in practicing active and passive

election rights and equal opportunities for representatives of ethnic groups to be placed in institutions.

- The third component concerns the equality of *involvement in the cultural life* of the society under scrutiny. Undoubtedly, the key condition for realization of this equality is the command of the common language or languages, together with the development of shared cultural institutions.
- Last but not least, interethnic integration presupposes the development of a widespread *value-normative identification* with the given society, crosscutting the boundaries of ethnic groups. This is possible when they develop shared traditions and an understanding of shared challenges and a shared future.


The above understanding of interethnic integration does not rely on any harmonious vision of society and its development. To the contrary, it recognizes the open horizon for the rise, decline or revival of ethnic identity and self-confidence of particular ethnic groups, for the development of trust and mistrust, cooperation and conflict between ethnic groups.⁸ Thus, interethnic integration might include mutual understanding, respect and adjustment but also inequality, tensions and coercion. Even today, it could be peaceful or accompanied by interethnic violence and even wars.

Thus, the belonging to an ethnic group is an ascriptive feature of individuals. It might be or might become an important or even a crucial factor

in determining the social status of individuals. This could be the case even in societies that are basically organized around universalistic and meritocratic principles. More often than not, this is the case in societies in which ethnic divisions are strong in economy, politics and culture. But ethnocentrism might even become one of the major organizing factors or the crucial organizing factor of society. There are numerous historical instances demonstrating that a small ethnic minority of conquerors could totally dominate a large, conquered ethnic majority. The ethnic dominance of the Mongols in conquered China or of the Spaniards in conquered Latin America are telling examples for situations, in which the ethnic minority is not the suppressed group as this is quite often understood to be the rule. Moreover, the period of ethnic dominance of Mongols over Han Chinese during the Yuan Dynasty (1261-1368) shows that centuries of stable dominance of one ethnic group might be rapidly replaced by a situation in which the same ethnic group becomes ethnically dominated in the newly established system of social stratification. In their essence, changes of this type first of all imply change of access to economic, political and cultural resources. Since the competition for scarce resources is universal feature of social life, ethnic groups might experience abrupt improvement or catastrophic decline in their capacity to secure access to desirable resources. The history of human civilizations has recorded many dramatic turns in the fate of ethnic groups. This experience might be analytically summarized as follows⁹:

Table 1

Changes in the ethnic stratification of a societal system



Changes in the ethnic stratification might come about due to internal processes in a given society, to the influence of processes in its external environment or to the combined impact of internal and external factors. In all cases under scrutiny in the INTAS project, it is the combination of internal and external factors that determines the current

situation of the interethnic relations and their change. The key issue in this complex context concerns the way in which the ethnic minority elites perceive, interpret and try to manage the changes. Two dimensions of this problem are particularly relevant for the following discussion. *First*, do the ethnic minority elites stress short-term

gains or avoiding potential losses? Or, do considerations of long-term rationality dominate their calculations and reactions? *Second*, do the representatives of the ethnic minority elites stress individual achievement and avoiding individual deprivations? Or, do strong collective ethnic identity and solidarity dominate their calculations of potential gains and losses?


The special focus on the perceptions, discourse, decisions and actions of ethnic minority elites does not imply any underestimation of societal and regional processes. These processes could shape interethnic configurations in a way independent of the interests, desires and actions of ethnic minority elites. The guiding assumption of this analysis will be the existence of various situations and trends that might bring about, activate and intensify cooperation or conflict between ethnic groups. However, in most synthetic forms, the dynamics of accumulation and/or intensification of these potentials can be best conceptualised and operationalized along two continuums. *First*, this is the continuum of structural integration or disintegration in economic and political terms, namely on the labour market and in political decision-making and implementation and control of decisions. *Second*, another crucial continuum is defined by the polar definitions of value-normative universalization and value-normative particularism. In the first case, which is characterized by the strong focus on the universal

rights of human individuals, the differences in the ethnic stratification continually loose their relevance in the course of the societal development. The additional legal and institutional stress on collective ethnic rights might fully support the declining relevance of ethnic differences; if the definitions and practices concerning collective ethnic rights support policies aiming to decrease the stratificational relevance of ethnic differences. However, the particular stress on the legal recognition or non-recognition of the collective rights of an ethnic group or of ethnic groups might also lead to a strong value-normative particularism as a background for ethnically dominated politics and/or ethnic segmentation of the labour market.

Both polar alternatives are presented in *Figure 1*. Trends towards the structural integration of ethnic minorities on the labour market and in political life, together with the trend of value-normative universalization might bring about positive processes in the area of the interethnic cooperation (Area A: Potential for cooperation). To the contrary, trends towards separation (disintegration) of ethnic groups in economic and political structures, together with the strengthening of the value-normative particularism, might bring about or intensify the destructive potential for interethnic tensions and conflicts (Area B: Potentials for conflicts).¹⁰

Figure 1

Potentials for cooperation and conflict between ethnic groups




3. Operationalizations and Tools

The above *Figure 1* schematically presents the social-structural and value-normative predictors of orientation and action concerning interethnic integration. This guiding idea is developed in more detail in *Figure 2* below, which contains the key elements of the operationalization of the theoretical framework of the INTAS research project. The starting point of the operationalization is the current situation of interethnic relations in the locality under scrutiny. At the beginning, we have to explain this situation by referring to the factors by which it has been brought about. These factors are conditionally divided into two sets. The first one includes institutional factors like changes in property relations, income structures, labour markets and in the legal and institutional structure of business opportunities. In addition, changes in

the conditions of political representation of ethnic groups, in the modalities of their participation in political life and the social-structural effects of educational policies undoubtedly belong to these factors. The second set includes value-normative determinants of the currently existing system of interethnic relations. We conceptualise them under the heading of “aspirations”. The type and intensity of the value-normative aspirations of the ethnic groups studied provides us with the explanatory key for identifying the background reasons of the current situation. Specific aspirations for property acquisition, increase in incomes, for well paid and challenging jobs, for better political representation and participation of ethnic groups and for favourable educational policies guide preferences, decisions and actions and thus the establishment of the observable structural constellations and value-normative orientations:

Figure 2

Dynamic of social-structural and value-normative processes in determining potentials for interethnic integration and disintegration



The social-structural and value-normative factors for the change in the currently existing system of interethnic relations and the corresponding values and norms are the same as above. The combined influence of all these factors brings about the deepening of structural interethnic integration or trends towards social-structural separation of ethnic groups. Another effect of the interaction of the above factors is the strengthening of the trend towards value-normative universalization, which diminishes the contrasts in the ethnic stratification of a given society, or, alternatively, the strengthening of ethnic particularism and thus of the contrasts in the ethnic stratification of society.

The above operationalizations form the basis of the research tools developed for the field studies in the InterEthno project. In order to systematically describe, explain and prognosticate situations and changes in the interethnic integration, the following research tools were elaborated and applied:

- *Monitoring of events relevant to the study of interethnic relations and of reactions to these events.* It was agreed upon that up to 18 publications, selected according to their relevance in covering interethnic relations, had to be systematically analyzed in each country. The analytical scheme for the description and interpretation of events and of reactions to them includes three key parameters describing the event under scrutiny. The first parameter concerns the identification and characterization of the *actor* or *actors* involved in the event (individual or collective actors and their positions in the social structures and in the chain of events). The second parameter is the special and temporal location of the event (its relevance at a local regional or national level in a society, its nature as a one-time event or repeated event, short-term or long-term event). Given the specific aims of the comparative research project, the third analytical parameter of monitoring of events and of reactions to them include description and interpretation of their content in terms of the presence of conflict (no conflict, low intensity conflict, high intensity conflict). The combined analysis of events on the basis of these three parameters renders the possibility for the broad identification and interpretation of events in the locality under scrutiny.
- *Content analysis of leading newspapers representing the official point of view in the relevant political space.* This research tool is intended to collect the information needed for the comparative study by focusing on the point of view of the state institutions in the locality under scrutiny. This point of view might belong to the nation-state or to the government of an autonomous part of the nation-state. The structure of the tool refers to selected parameters of the interethnic situations. The first parameter for the comparison of information items on interethnic issues concerns the form of the item published in the newspaper (brief notice about a fact or facts, commented notice, report on the issue, analytical article, interview, etc.). The second line of the content analysis concerns the aim or aims of the publication of the item (neutral information, attempt to form or change public opinion on the issue or suggestion for resolving the issue). Other parameters of the content analysis refer to the type of politics treated in the item (national or regional, economic, social or cultural, etc.); the presentation and interpretation of interethnic conflicts in the published item; intentions of political manipulation through the publication.
- *In-depth interviews with successful representatives of the ethnic minority under scrutiny.* The background of the decision to carry out the interviews is twofold. On the one side, it is quite typical to approach the issues of interethnic relations, and particularly the situation of ethnic minorities, with the assumption of suppression and domination. In fact, this is very often the case. But even under precarious conditions, there are representatives of the ethnic minorities who manage to attain higher positions in economy, politics and in cultural life. It is a highly intriguing task to establish the ways in which this is achieved under the varying local conditions. Moreover, it is a challenging task to establish cross-national comparisons of these ways in the search for typologies. As seen from another point of view, the successful representatives of the ethnic group under scrutiny might serve as the best qualified experts for assessing the situation and prospects of the societal integration of the ethnic group under scrutiny. In each country, in-depth interviews were carried out with 30 successful representatives of the studied ethnic group from the fields of business, politics and culture. The interviews are structured around three key points. At the beginning, the respondents are approached with questions

about their own biography. Then the current situation of their ethnic group of origin is discussed. The third step in the interview is focused on prospective questions elaborated as vignettes about the desirable ethnic characteristics of collaborators, the official status of the mother tongue of the respondent and the desirable political status of his/her ethnic group of origin.

4. Concluding Remarks

The initial guiding idea of the research project was to acquire empirically sound and theoretically useful information about the present day modalities of adaptation of ethnic minorities to the mainstream society in five specific cases. The next task was to compare these modalities of adaptation in order to develop well substantiated typologies. This idea is still valid. The articles in the present collection are basically guided by it. But the close examination of the specific cases and the efforts to specify typological hypotheses on the basis of the comparison of patterns of societal integration of ethnic minorities brought about unexpected results. They are quite relevant theoretically, but mostly relevant in terms of practical politics.

First of all, it turned out that the famous concept of assimilation of ethnic minorities in the mainstream society widely used by the Chicago School sociologists and their followers applies less and less to present day societies. The concept of the 'melting-pot-society' functioning by means of acculturation and amalgamation has clear limitations, which are obvious in the present-day interethnic situation in the United States itself. Indeed, the concept is hardly applicable to the present-day situation of autochthonous ethnic minorities like the situation of the Tatars in the Russian Federation or the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. These ethnic groups, like many other in a similar situation, have managed to preserve and reproduce their ethnic identities over centuries and tend towards a continuation of this process. The expectation regarding their assimilation into the mainstream society in the course of two or three generations is an illusion with far reaching political consequences. The dramatic failure of the Bulgarian government to accelerate the assimilation process of the Bulgarian Turks in the mid eighties remains a clear signal about the dangerous outcomes that come about when such illusions are transformed into practical actions. The experience of the survival of the Tatar ethnic identity after long periods of restrictions imposed

on their ethnic language and culture is just another telling verification of the same argument.

The assimilation thesis is less and less persuasive even with a view to situations which seem to be rather similar to the American melting-pot society. Representatives of the third and fourth generation of Turkish migrants to Germany do not forget their identity with the country of origin of their grand parents and resist the assimilation in the mainstream German society. The explanation of this phenomenon, which is not unknown among Polish or Jewish immigrants in the United States, is multidimensional. On the one side, the geographical isolation of the United States in the ninetieth and early twentieth centuries and the underdevelopment of the means of transportation and communication made emigration to the United States, as a rule, a one-way journey. Immigration in the United States typically meant no-return to the country of origin. Assimilation into the mainstream society was the only rational personal and institutional strategy. Now, we are confronted with a variety of migration patterns in Europe which do not include ethnic assimilation as a matter of survival. Shorter geographic distances, available means of mass transportation and transcontinental means of mass communication make the preservation of links to the society of origin much easier. Turks in Berlin can read the original Turkish newspapers on the same day they appear in Turkey, may regularly watch Turkish TV by satellite, may call friends and relatives in Turkey on regular basis and may travel to Turkey and back to Berlin regularly. This is what they actually do, according to their personal interests or to the well-being of their households. Thus, Turks in Berlin develop a double ethnic identity and this is certainly the case with the representatives of many other representatives of the "new migrants" in Germany and in countries all over Europe.

Undoubtedly, the "new migrants" more or less successfully learn, articulate and internalize the culture of the host country together with its language, adapt to the local labour market or try to establish their niches in it, increasingly develop interest in the local politics, etc. But this is just one side of the story. The innumerable pizza restaurants or doener shops already established as part of the local culture and services in Berlin provide the obvious evidence that the adaptation does not concern the ethnic minorities but the ethnic majority as well. We observe learning processes performed by all participants in the interaction of ethnic groups. Undoubtedly, this

learning is difficult or even painful from time to time. But it is obviously unavoidable, together with the unavoidable acceptance of the presence of other ethnic groups on the same territory and with the unavoidable acceptance of the need for mutual understanding and cooperation.

In other locations, the learning process leads to the same conclusion of mutual adaptation of ethnic groups by using different argumentation. The Tatar elite in Tatarstan increasingly avoids stressing the difference of their ethnic group to other ethnic groups and to the ethnic majority in the Russian Federation. To the contrary, the current discourse lays the stress on the substantial contribution of the Tatar ethnic element in the development of the Russian statehood and the multiethnic society in the Federation. Tatars in the Crimea repeatedly stress the necessity to accommodate their ethnic interests with the interests of other ethnic groups on the peninsula. Turks in Bulgaria and in Germany have learned that interethnic cooperation is more promising for the future of everybody than interethnic confrontation.

This objective trend of mutual learning, mutual adaptation and cooperation leads to the need to rethink the guiding idea of the present research project. The rethinking has two directions. First, one has to acknowledge that *the societal integration of ethnic minorities in mainstream societies* is a process which definitely deserves and will deserve a close scientific analysis because it is highly important both as a subject of social studies and a subject of political management. Second, in the course of this process, we also repeatedly observed mutual learning and mutual adaptation performed by all participants in the interaction of ethnic groups. Together with the growing relevance of the individual and collective human rights, this second process of *interethnic integration* will unavoidably gain momentum and importance.

The stress on interethnic integration stems from the learning process implemented in the course of the work on the research project under scrutiny. The work on the project also provides us with plentiful evidence that interethnic communication, cooperation and integration might be rather difficult and full of risks. Therefore, the stress on the growing relevance of the interethnic integration does not imply any illusion about easy solutions of the current interethnic problems or any end of the history of interethnic tensions and conflicts. On the contrary, we learned that both the potentials for

interethnic integration and disintegration are present in the current ethnic interactions and processes of interethnic integration under scrutiny. These potentials should be studied intensely by the social sciences in order to attain the knowledge needed for the effective management of the processes of interethnic integration and disintegration.

NOTES

- ¹ Prof. Nikolai Genov is head of the Department of Sociology at the Institute of Eastern European Studies of the Free University of Berlin.
- ² See Bös, Mathias (2004) 'Reconceptualizing Modes of Belonging: Advancements in the Sociology of Ethnicity and Multiculturalism'. In: Genov, Nikolai. Ed. *Advances in Sociological Knowledge over Half a Century*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 221-244.
- ³ The INTAS Research Project 04-79-7018 (2005-2007) is coordinated by the author and involves national teams from Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria and Germany. The leader of the team in the Russian Federation is Prof. Nikolay A. Golovin from the University in Sankt Petersburg; the leader of the Ukrainian team is Prof. Olga D. Kutsenko from the National University in Kharkiv; the leader of the Moldovan team is Prof. Valentin Tsurcan from the Chisinau National University; the leader of the Bulgarian team is Prof. Yantsislav Yanakiev from the Research Centre REGLO in Sofia. The German team also includes Dr. Tessa Savvidis and Marina Schwedler. Ina Mischke assists in the coordination of the project and in the publishing process. John-Thomas Eltringham improved the language of this publication.
- ⁴ See Weber, Max (1978) *Economy and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Pres, pp. 394-398. See also Quah, Stella R. 'Conceptualizing Ethnicity: In Search of Cognitive Innovations'. In: Genov, Nikolai. Ed. (2004) *Advances in Sociological Knowledge over Half a Century*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 245-266.
- ⁵ See Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burges (1924) *Introduction of the Science of Sociology*. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press.
- ⁶ See Zachariach, Mathew, Allan Sheppard and Leona Barratt. Eds. (2004) *Canadian Multiculturalism: Dreams, Realities, Expectations*. Edmonton, AB: Canadian Multicultural Education Foundation.
- ⁷ See Luft, Stefan (2006) *Abschied von Multikulti. Wege aus der Integrationskrise*. Gräfelting: Resch.
- ⁸ See impressive examples in Hakim, Rafael' (2005) *Metamorfozy duha. K voprosu o tyurko-tatarskoy civilizacii* [Metamorphoses of the Spirit. On the question about the Turkish-tatar civilization]. Kazan': Ideapress.
- ⁹ See also Noel, Donald L. (1968) 'A Theory of the Origin of Ethnic Stratification'. *Social Problems*, Vol. 16, N 2, pp. 157-172.
- ¹⁰ See also Genov, Nikolai (2006) 'Ethnicity, Politics and Mass Media'. In: Genov, Nikolai. Ed. *Ethnicity and Mass Media in South Eastern Europe*. Münster: LIT, pp. 7-23.

MONITORING OF EVENTS IN THE INTER-ETHNO INTAS PROJECT

Olga Kutsenko¹

1. Introductory Notes

In the course of the InterEthno INTAS project, designed to study the strategies used by Turkish and related minorities as a tool for societal integration, the monitoring of events presented in periodicals was carried out and two other methods were applied: in-depth interviews with successful representatives of the minorities and a content-analysis of the print media. This methodological option met the requirements of the triangulation strategy, putting the research subject under trilateral scrutiny and making it possible to achieve reliability in the research results. Despite considerable progress in the development of large-scale, harmonized international databases, which tend to give the impression that quantitative comparisons are almost always unproblematic, attempts at cross-national comparison are often inefficient due to the lack of a common understanding of central concepts and of the societal contexts, within which phenomena are observed. For example, the demographic and employment statistics compiled at European level are socially constructed and often conceal quite different national situations.² This issue has been acknowledged in the InterEthno project as well. Thus, the preliminary analysis of the interpretations of 'a minority' by representatives of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine and the Turkish related groups in other countries highlighted the principal differences possible in such interpretations. Unlike other Turkish and related ethnic groups, from the point of view of the Crimean Tatars, the designation of this group as an 'ethnic minority', as it was proposed in the questionnaire, was considered to be a discriminatory practice:

"The Crimean Tatars are the native people of the Crimea. In this sense, it is not appropriate to use the description "ethnic minority" with reference to the Crimean Tatars. It would be more correct to refer them as representatives of ethnic groups living inside or outside Ukraine and having ethnic organizations... This is a crucial point".

(from an interview with the Head of the Crimean Tatars' Majlis, September 2005)

It would be difficult to compare social events and processes cross-nationally without the data provided by special case studies. The ranking of quality of life, life standards, and social memory patterns, for example, should be based upon case studies of specific states and regions. By the same token, however, cross-national studies indicating a link between economics, political regime and social integration and cohesion have, for example, encouraged area specialists to explore these relationships in their studies of specific countries.

The *main goal of the monitoring* is the systematic registration and analysis of both events and reactions to those events that are relevant to the interethnic relations involving Turkish and related minorities in the countries under scrutiny and which were represented in the publications within the period of study. Taking into account the dependence of the information published on the social and political orientation of the sources of publication, the national samples of the sources were selected with consideration given to their relation to the following axes:

- National – regional – local status;
- Official – oppositional status;
- Tribune of the ethnic minority under scrutiny or unrelated to this ethnic group.

Concerning the form of the publications, it was taken into account that there is a substantial variation between the information sources. The top-rated informative and analytical newspapers and the weekly analytical journals have different contents and a style of presentation then do bulletins and other publications reporting the results of public opinion polls carried out by research institutions at the national and regional level. In addition, scientific monographs and collections of articles published during the period under scrutiny were also referred in the monitoring. The total amount of the national data sources used in the InterEthno monitoring was not expected to exceed eighteen items.

The main difficulties in choosing the published texts for the national samples were connected with

the definition of *an event*. The sociological tradition of this definition can be traced back to Alfred N. Whitehead's 'method of extensive abstraction', event-history or life-course analysis, as well as the symbolic interpretation approach. They all underline the discontinuity of sociality and its action-based origin. Thus, the definition used for "event" took into account demarcated change or other circumstances in social interaction identifiable at a given time and place. According to Niklas Luhmann³, events should be considered as objects of communication containing remembrances and owing their eventual character to their location in time and space. In this way events constitute a 'consentient set'. These features of an event determined the interpretation used in the monitoring. In order to reduce difficulties related to the distinction of overlapping events, the non-duplication principle was applied in the text analysis. The principle states that x-events and y-events are to be analysed separately if there is one member of "x" that is not a member of "y" (or vice versa).

One more challenging issue related to the monitoring and textual analysis concerns the distinction between the manifest content of an event (what an author has written about it) and the latent meaning of the text (what an author actually intended to convey to the readership). Typically textual analysis can only be applied on the manifest content of the words, sentences, or texts rather than on their meanings. However, researchers often try to coax other meanings out of the manifest texts and to develop their own interpretation by means of "prescriptive" and "open" analyses. In his famous work *Measuring your Media Profile*, Dermot McKeone highlighted the differences between these analytical approaches⁴, which can be divided only relatively:

- In prescriptive analysis, the context is a closely-defined set of communication parameters (e.g. specific messages, subject matters);
- Open analysis identifies the dominant messages and subject matter within the text.

In order to mutually strengthen the advantages of these approaches and to analyze the manifest content together with the latent content, the structure of the monitoring tool was designed to follow the requirements of the comparative monitoring methodology. The monitoring tool includes two blocks of questions. One of them is oriented towards the narrative description of the

events presented by a specific source. Another one is intended to guide the structured description of the events and the reactions to them.

Actor and conflict oriented approaches were used in the interpretation of events and reactions to them, which represented a large variety of inter-ethnic relationships. Against this background, indicators characterizing events were developed as a part of a structured monitoring tool:

- (i) description of the *major participants* of an event, i.e. ordinary individuals or leaders, non-organized ethnic group(-s), ethnic groups organized in movements, parties, NGOs, other organized interest groups, national or local public institutions and authorities and international actors;
- (ii) description of an event with respect to its scale (international, national or local), its length (one-day, several days or longer) and frequency (one time or recurring);
- (iii) description of conflict features of an event (non-conflict, low or high intensity conflict) referring both to the form of the conflict (non-violent or armed conflict, isolated incidents or wide spread clashes) and the conflict resolution (constructive proposal, willingness to develop and apply a conflict resolution strategy or absence of such willingness).

The events analyzed in the publications quite often generate feedback, which differs depending on the importance of the event for society and for social groups. Other factors influencing the feedback are the characteristics of the public representations, the idiosyncrasies of the public policy of state and regional authorities and publishers. In evaluating the reactions to the events published by the sources analyzed, the following indicators were used:

- *the form of the published reaction* and the *actor* whose reaction is presented ('ordinary people', a representative of an ethnic group or its organization, a religious organization, a corporation, a local, regional or national authority, an international organization, a journalist or a publisher);
- *the content evaluation* of the reaction, including its *emotional colouring* (positive, neutral or negative), its position with respect to *support of or protest against* the event or its representation (basic or partial support, neutrality, objection or protest) as well as regarding the *use of ethnic stereotypes*, including historically based

stereotypes, and the presence or the absence of constructive and critical opinions;

- *the assessment of the level of risk* of the event on a local, national or international scale (a high, middle or low level of risk, or the absence of risk), of *areas* of social interaction (geopolitical or domestic policy, economic, cultural, humanitarian or environmental area) and of its *causes* (the same or another ethnic group, its leaders or organization, a religious organization, an enterprise, a local, regional or national authority or international circumstances).

The application of these sets of indicators in the analysis of the published texts makes it possible to compile a database that can be used for the purposes of the comparative quantitative and qualitative analyses. The data collection was carried out in the period between 1 October, 2005 and 31 March, 2006. Taking into account their circulation and popularity as well as their involvement in the discussion of interethnic relations, 6 to 11 periodicals were chosen by each national team to be the focus of the monitoring. During the period under scrutiny, a total of 629 events were documented. Among them were 98 events related to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 9 events related to the Turkish-speaking minority in Berlin, Germany, 269 related to the Gagauz minority in Moldova, 84 events related to the Tatars in Tatarstan/Russia and 165 related to the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea/Ukraine. Further on, some preliminary research outcomes will be considered.

2. Individual and Institutional Preconditions of Social Integration

The description of events was conducted within a general conceptual framework, which defines *social integration* as a process involving persons, ethnic groups and society. We understand social integration as the inclusionary process of the development and application of equal opportunities and rights for all human beings in any given society. By becoming better socially integrated, individual and collective actors improve their opportunities in life, create or strengthen their identities and develop conditions for further cooperation. By using the concept in this way,⁵ we assume its closeness to concepts of social justice, equality, material well-being and democratic freedom.

As a result of a human intention and action, social integration is attainable at *individual, societal and institutional* level of social interaction. The understanding of a set of issues accompanying social integration at any level is impossible without taking into account their historical background and the particularities of social relations. Following Allardt's theory regarding the preconditions of solidarity⁶, we may assume that one dimension of satisfaction of basic human needs is *having* (possessing resources and attaining a certain standard of living, as well as prerequisites for its maintenance, such as employment and income). Another dimension might be identified as *loving* (in the sense of social networks and emotional support, family, children, friends, etc.). The third dimension elaborated by Allardt is *being* (general recognition and participation).

Allardt's conclusions were elaborated upon in the *Quality of Life in Europe* research project by Petra Bohnke.⁷ Her interpretation reads that *having* designates resources such as jobs, dwellings or quality education as factors facilitating social integration and a high quality of life in all European countries. Despite a lower average percentage in the EU states, the rankings for *loving* are basically the same. Family life (living with a partner and having children) is reported to be very important in the acceding and candidate countries, while the citizens of the EU member states also place a strong emphasis on social integration outside of the family (leisure time and seeing friends) as well as on participation and recognition (on the feeling of being recognized by society, together with participation in associations). Overall recognition (*being*) is not important to citizens who are likely to face economic problems, either in the acceding countries or in the EU member states⁸. The outcomes of the InterEthno project point to trends that establish important differences in the strategies of institutional integration prevailing among ethnic groups and in the corresponding countries under scrutiny. For example, according to research data verified by expert interviews, the most painful problems that the repatriated Crimean Tatars experience are unemployment and poverty, the low quality of basic living conditions of thousands of people, the lack of an allotment of land for more than 80% of the Crimean Tatars, who had lived in villages, and the loss of the professional and social status on the part of most repatriates⁹. Unlike they were regarding the Crimean Tatars and the Crimea/Ukraine case, these

problems are not so significant for the Tatars in Tatarstan/Russia. They are the dominant ethnic group in a region where the intensification of oil production has been accompanied by an increase in world prices. Successful regional policy has contributed to the significant economic and social development of Tatarstan and its population.

Furthermore, social integration depends essentially on both the institutional quality of a society and the nature of social interests and conflicts. The countries involved in the InterEthno project are marked by great differences with respect to the indicators of their institutional quality:

Table 1

Population and National Institutional Quality, 2005-06¹⁰

<i>Selected indicators:</i>	Bulgaria	Germany	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine
Population (millions)	7.8	82.5	4.2	143.0	48.4
Income Category	Lower middle	High income	Low income	Upper middle	Lower middle
GNI per capita	2,740	30,120	710	3,410	1,260
Informal economy (% GNP)	36.9	16.3	45.1	46.1	52.2
Political stability 2004	51.5	79.1	29.1	21.8	37.9
Governance Effect., 2004	54.8	88.5	25.0	48.1	28.4
Life Expect. Change (1989-2002)	0.31 years/0.44%	-	-0.55 year/-0.81%	-3.57 year/-5.16%	-0.59 year/-0.86%

The interplay of institutions, individual and group interests and actions that have brought about social integration do not imply a causal relation. An individual is relatively free to make personal choices within the framework of structural and cultural restriction and opportunity. If social institutions are not able to serve personal interests and needs, people find ways to create new facilities, which are able to indemnify against institutional failures in everyday life. Formal institutional and the informal practices co-exist and are reproduced in every-day life. They are able to duplicate social reality thus leading to the development of 'parallel societies' with their own regulative and supporting mechanisms. The duplicated social reality cannot remain consistently stable, but in some periods, such a state of reality may make it possible to satisfy various interests and needs more efficiently in the face of formal institutional deficit in a society.

This is indeed the case with the Crimean Tatars' community in the Ukraine. The strong self-government and ethnic-based system there is the institutional 'emanation' of the Crimean Tatars ethnic movement. This system mediates between the Tatar community and the Crimean and

Ukrainian power centres, but can also duplicate and replace the local authority and other institutional bodies if the latter fail to serve the needs of the Crimean Tatar population.

3. Actor-centred Description of the Events

The research project on institutional strategies for ethnic-based societal integration was focused on the relationship between actors, actions and institutions in the attempt to explain their performance from both the input and output side. The changing institutional arrangements in society are to be considered as a filter, through which the relevant actors deal with challenges and problems. An event becomes a spatially and temporarily located point in the communication between the actors and institutions. Thus, the event might be a clash between the actors' interests and the ensuing actions defined by the rules. The perception of events through the prism of the actors involved leads to the revelation of the structure of the dominating social interests and the positions of domination within the area of communication. The comparison of various national cases helps to elaborate on the particularities of the agency and the context of the actor-institutions' interaction.

Which actors are the focus of the observed events under scrutiny? The analysis of the data presented in Table 2 and Figure 1 shows the

differences between the countries participating in the comparative research project:

Table 2

Major participants in events (multiple alternatives, in per cent)

<i>Major participants:</i>	Bulgaria	Germany	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine
1. Ordinary individuals from the Turkish/Tatar minority	9.1	88.9	36.4	24.3	27.6
2. Leaders, successful representatives of the ethnic minority	35.4	44.4	24.2	25.7	25.8
3. The Turkish / Tatar ethnic group(-s)	3.1	11.1	11.9	0	3.7
4. Other ethnic groups	3.2	33.3	2.2	2.9	5.5
5. Ethnic-based parties, movements	9.3	33.3	1.5	10.0	9.2
6. Other political parties, social movements, etc.	11.8	11.1	1.1	7.1	9.8
7. Religious organisations, movements	9.1	22.2	0	10.0	1.8
8. Firms, enterprises, etc.	0	0	8.2	2.9	8.0
9. Local authorities	3.0	11.1	51.3	27.1	27.6
10. National or regional public institution(-s)	11.1	11.1	22.3	27.1	38.7
11. International actors.	5.1	0	6.7	7.1	8.6
<i>Total:</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The sharp distinction of the German case can probably be explained by the small sample of cases. Despite the growing interest in the Turkish-speaking ethnic group on the part of the German media, the research conducted has proven that this interest has not yet been materialized in large number of publications, at least during the period of monitoring. In Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine, the major participants in the ethnic-related events can be tentatively split into two types. They are either 'public institutional actors' (the local, regional/national authority and public institutes) or 'individual actors' (successful representatives, as well as ordinary individuals related to the Tatars/Gagauz minority). According to the publications, all mediators between the state or the public authorities and individual representatives of the minority remain rather peripheral to the interethnic relations. This pattern applies to the ethnic minority group as a whole, to other ethnic groups, as well as to political and religious organizations, to firms and enterprises. Despite the fact that a number of historical and cultural events were represented in the national

samples, the voice of the cultural elite is not influential in the analyzed publications.

In comparing the national cases, the case of Bulgaria is of particular interest. The public authorities and institutions at the national, regional and local level rarely play a dominant role in the ethnic-related events in the country. Successful representatives of the minority take a more active role in the cultivation of interethnic relationships. An active position, but perhaps not one of such significance, is also occupied by the political parties.

The analysis highlights a principle question concerning the degree of correspondence between the events and their representation in the published discourse. There can be certain doubts about the cases of the Crimean Tatars in the Ukraine and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Their ethnic based non-governmental and political organisations have strong institutional traditions of intermediation between the state and the respective ethnic group. This assumption was verified by the in-depth interviews with experts and by the analysis of

events. In this respect, the Ukrainian case turns out to be rather indicative: there are no publications about the activities of the Kurultai and Mejlis as supreme bodies of regional and local self-government, despite the fact that they were elected by a vote amongst all adult Crimean Tatars in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The analysis of events in Bulgaria offers a rather different picture: the bulk of publications concerns the activities of the Turkish Democratic Party and the “Millet - Trakia” movement with their demands of Turkish as the second official language in Bulgaria. Together, both cases highlight two varying or overlapping strategies in the printed media

discourse. One of them aims at ignoring certain public figures who can be ‘inconvenient’ in the dominant public discourse. The second aims at revealing scandals rather than at discussing at depth the issues of interethnic relations and the real problems of societal integration of the Turkish and related minorities.

4. Non-Conflict Events or Discourse Concealment Principle?

The analysis of national data urges us to consider the predominant number of the discussed events as non-conflict events:

Table 3


Nature of conflict in events: national media discourse, in per cent and index

<i>Type of the event:</i>	Bulgaria	Germany	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine	<i>Total</i>
Non-conflict	73.7	33.3	92.9	79.3	52.1	76.3
Low-intensity conflict	24.8	55.6	5.2	8.0	30.9	15.0
High-intensity conflict	1.5	11.1	1.9	12.6	17.0	8.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Index of conflict, 0<I<1	0.139	0.389	0.045	0.166	0.324	0.162

Presented in a graphical form, the same data appears as follows:

Figure 2

Nature of conflict in events: national media discourse, in per cent



It is apparent from the data that when a conflict is registered, it is typically a conflict of low-intensity. At the same time, the conflict intensity represented by the publications tends to differ among the national cases. The highest interethnic conflict potential can be seen in the integration of the Crimean Tatars' in the Ukraine and the Turkish-speaking ethnic group in Germany. Both cases are related to migration effects (repatriation and immigration accordingly), which are largely absent in the cases of Tatarstan, Moldova and Bulgaria.

In this context, the following dilemma surfaces: Does the given discrepancy have something to do with tolerance in the printed media or does it simply hide the reality of the conflict by propagating a seemingly tolerant printed discourse? Another crucial question follows: Can the answer be provided by the analysis of the database compiled during the monitoring? It is difficult to precisely answer to the first question, however, using the monitoring and other data concerning the Ukrainian case, we may try to develop a fitting answer to the second question. The intensity of the conflict concerning interethnic relationships in Ukraine is relatively high, but the national and regional press, as well as governmental and non-governmental presses present a significantly different picture in their textual interpretations. Thus, references to non-conflict events dominate in the official periodicals, while the non-governmental and oppositional press reflect conflicts more often. The regional press tends to filter materials to an even a greater degree than does the national press. Consequently, it strives to mitigate the reflection of controversial topics: high-intensity conflict events in the regional press are less numerous than those in the national press (8% and 34% respectively). Concealment and unwillingness to aggravate the situation in the Crimea are typical approaches to the interethnic issues, both on the part of the oppositional and official press. The ethnically based press articulates more radical attitudes and assessments.

On the other hand, even though the Ukrainian case is marked by a relatively high level of conflict


potential, neither the national nor regional press placed any emphasis on publications related to the crucial point of contention concerning the Crimean Tatars' aspirations for political independence. Both the national and regional press demonstrate a kind of alienation from the problems of confrontation by tending to cover predominantly non-conflict or low-intensity conflict events. The main motivation lies in their strivings not to aggravate the situation of complicated inter-ethnic issues in the Crimea. Events indicate that the Crimean Tatars desire more independence when they participate in socio-political and national-cultural events or celebrate anniversaries of their outstanding ancestors. Editors camouflage the issues by trying not to attract too much public attention to the Crimean Tatars' aspiration for independence. They even prefer not to refer to a number of events that point out the Crimean Tatars' discontent with their status and with their struggle for independence. The concealment principle is promoted by national and regional publications in their presentation of the relationship between the ethnic groups and other social actors, as many conflict events remain intentionally unnoticed. This can be explained by the desire to exercise the freedom of the press without hurting the interests of parties and coalitions¹¹.

In the context of the monitoring of interethnic events, some issues were identified that transcend the boundaries of specific national cases:

- How is it possible to combine the strong tendency towards societal integration based on growing interdependency at different levels of social interaction and the aspiration to be more independent in a cultural as well as in political sense? The very different cases of Tatarstan and the Crimea, where the aspiration of the Tatars and Crimean Tatars to national political independence remains quite significant, and of Moldova and Bulgaria, where the relevance of independence in a cultural and linguistic sense is more important (see Figure 3), make it clear that a simple solution to such a core problem is impossible. It seems that the blending of issues will cause a constant societal tension.

Figure 3

Major kinds of issues provoking the conflict events, in per cent



- Social integration is a multidimensional process which is predominantly based on historical and cultural interconnections, as well as on economic and social situations. The unresolved economic and cultural issues of minorities can provoke interethnic and intraethnic conflicts. Moreover, the integration process cannot be 'free' from the influence of power relationships, personal and group ambitions and the aspiration to dominate or to achieve independence. These aspirations penetrate all areas of ethnic interaction. Thus, one has to answer the following crucial questions: In what way is such a penetration able to trigger interethnic conflicts? What kind of institutional arrangements can become a restrictive factor for growing interethnic conflicts?
- In the case of co-existing ethnically-based 'parallel societies', another set of questions should be answered: What scenarios for further development are possible within a given space and time? What kind of public policy could be more appropriate for reducing the social and cultural alienation of the non-dominating part of the 'parallel society'?

These questions concern all societies under scrutiny and refer to a delicate area of social relationships by focusing on the spatial and historical roots of social integration. The issue is and will remain a major challenge to European integration and to the public policy. The comparison of national cases in the context of the greater process of European integration should provide a more in depth view into these complicated issues.

NOTES

- ¹ Prof. Olga Kutsenko is the head of the Department of Sociology of Politics at the Kharkiv National University, in the Ukraine.
- ² See Hantrais, Linda and Stephen Mangen. Eds. (1996) *Cross-National Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. London and New York: Pinter.
- ³ See: Luhmann, Niklas (1984) *Soziale Systeme. Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
- ⁴ McKeone, Dermot. (1995) *Measuring Your Media Profile*. Gower Publishing Company, p. 235.
- ⁵ See, for example *Social Integration: Approaches and Issues* (1994) World Summit for Social Development. UNRISD Briefing Paper No. 1, March, p.5-6.
- ⁶ See Allardt, Erik (1993) 'Having, loving, being: An alternative to the Swedish model of welfare research'. In Sen, A. and Nussbaum, M. Eds. *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 89-94; Allardt, Erik (2006) 'Fruitful Contradictions Alapuro'. *Acta Sociologica*. Vol. 49, No. 2, p. 139-147.
- ⁷ Bohnke, Petra (2004) 'Perception of Social Integration and Exclusion in an Enlarged Europe'. *Quality of Life in Europe*. EFILWC, p. 57-58.
- ⁸ Ibid., p. 57.
- ⁹ Chubarov, Refat (2005) 'Interview'. *Zerkalo nedely* [Mirror of the Week], 22 February, p. 2.
- ¹⁰ See: Kaufmann, D., A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2006) *Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005. Doing Business*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank Group. <http://www.doingbusiness.org/EconomyRankings> (29.08.2006)
- ¹¹ This was noted in a popular Ukrainian weekly: 'the struggle for information space in the Crimea goes on. Journalists have made it clear to politicians that they prefer not to get involved in political struggles'. (Samar, Valentina (2006) 'Freedom of speech as political engineering?' *Zerkalo Nedeli* [The Weekly Mirror], No. 7 (586), February 25 <http://www.zn.kiev.ua/nn/show/586/52710/>

PRESS IN THE INTERETHNIC INTERACTIONS: INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE CONTENT-ANALYSIS

Nikolay A. Golovin¹

This article discusses results of comparative research on the manner in which the German, Bulgarian, Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian press discuss ethnic issues in their respective countries. The research was conducted within the framework of the international sociological project “Comparing Societal Integration of Turkish and Related Minorities”. The press is considered to be one of the strategic factors facilitating or hindering interethnic integration.

The interpretation of the newspaper articles subjected to content-analysis was based on the acknowledgement of both the historical and contemporary differences between the countries under scrutiny. For instance, problems with the integration of Turks in German society are the consequence of the West-German “economic miracle” during the 1960s. The rapid economic development of the country urged the invitation of guest-workers of mostly Turkish origin. Due to the historical circumstances and contrary to the conditions of the invitation, most of them remained in Germany. The case of the Russian Tatars is entirely different. In the Russian Federation as a whole, the Tatars make up 5.5 million of 144 million total residents. However, in the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan, the share of the Tatars is 53% while the Russian population makes up 41%. In other words, the traditional Tatar ethnic minority in the Russian Federation is the ethnic majority in the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan. In addition, while in Germany the Turkish ethnic group is not even recognized as an ethnic minority, the ethnically defined Republic of Tatarstan enjoys a high level of political autonomy in the Russian federation.

In Bulgaria and in Moldova, the relations of Turks and the Gagauz people to the titular nation are historically linked to the expansion of the Ottoman empire into Europe in the Middle Ages. Apart from that, Moldavian Gagauz people are orthodox Christians, while the Bulgarian Turks practice Islam. In order to make the comparisons even more complicated, the current ethnic situation in the Crimea (Ukraine) is informed by the

centuries-long struggle for the peninsula between Russia, the Ukraine, Turkey and the Crimean Khanate. Therefore, it is necessary to specify a common framework for the international comparison of press coverage of ethnic relations under rather different conditions.

A common ground for the comparison can be found in the structure of modern society. In all of the abovementioned countries, ethnic relations make out a rather specific subsystem with many similarities in its structure and functioning. Basically, the structure of the key institutional arrangements of interethnic policy is rather similar in all countries. Precisely this is one of the major lines of the following comparative analysis. Another axis is set by the substantive side of the interethnic policy. These two directions have in common that ethnic policy regulates the relationship between the title nation and the minorities, thus resolving the problem of the consolidation of society by managing the ethnic and religious diversity in it. This common basis of comparison makes it possible to present the press as an element of ethnic policy in a systematic fashion, allowing certain generalizations across local specifics.

The primary sources of information for the content-analysis include the governmental printed media of the two autonomous republics Tatarstan and Gagauz Eri – the Russian language newspaper *Respublika Tatarstan* [Republic of Tatarstan] and the Moldovan, Russian language newspaper *Vesti Gagauzii* [Gagauzia News]. The two newspapers from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Ukraine) cover problems connected with the intensive flows of migrating Crimean Tatars. In many respects, both publications express the political position of the local authorities. In Germany, the choice fell on the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* [Berlin Newspaper], which is popular among the educated middle class of the German capital. The widely read all-Bulgarian newspaper *Trud (Labour)* was chosen because of its interest in public issues and the problems of the interethnic relations in the country.

The first sample for content-analysis consisted of units of information published within 6 months between October, 2005 and March, 2006. The sample, which included 624 units of analysis, ensured the identification of statistically significant regularities in the distributions of the characteristics of newspaper materials, even under the conditions of unavoidable disproportions of subsamples in some countries. The statistical regularities were subjected to sociological interpretation using information about the formal characteristics of the published units of

information, their major content, emotional orientation, ideological function and persuasiveness of the published material.

The comparison of the *formal characteristics* of articles dealing with attitudes of the ethnic majority towards the ethnic group under scrutiny shows that, in all newspapers analysed, this topic can be found on the front pages of the larger publications, indicating the importance attached to the ethnic issues. In more general terms, there are both similarities and differences in the form of presentation of ethnic issues in the five countries:

Table 1

The form of the published unit (number of units, in %)

Form of presentation of the material	Bulgaria		Germany		Moldova		Russia		Ukraine		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Reported facts	41	53	40	26	78	44	43	24	8	25	210	34
Documents	0	0	1	1	12	7	2	1	0	0	15	2
Commented reports	25	32	14	9	50	28	58	32	14	44	161	26
Analytical articles	5	6	55	36	13	7	17	9	0	0	90	14
Interview, public address	6	8	6	4	24	13	54	30	5	16	95	15
Other	1	1	38	25	2	1	7	4	5	16	53	8
Total	78	100	154	100	179	100	181	100	32	100	624	100

Obviously, the depersonalized (34%) and commented (26%) reports of facts prevail, i.e. exactly 60% of the units represent an account of facts. Documents are published quite rarely by nearly all newspapers since laws and other state and political documents are published in specialized editions. An exception in this respect is the newspaper *Vesti Gagauzii* (Moldova), which publishes documents (7% of the local sample of information units), thus continuing the Soviet tradition. In the soviet times, the newspapers used to inform the population about important official decisions. In a small autonomous political unit in a post-Soviet country, this still makes sense under the conditions of on-going series of political and institutional changes.

The variety observed in the form of presentation of information units makes it possible to assume that, while informing about events or facts, the press mostly aims at setting up the "agenda" for public discussion. This is being done with a strong emphasis on the political views of the ruling elites. This is particularly the case in the post-Soviet countries. In order to verify this hypothesis, it was decided to consider the purpose of the publication of information units. Since some units use to contribute to several functions, the number of the purposes identified turned out to exceed the number of articles and amounted to 699 units of analysis:

Table 2

Purpose of publication of material (number of articles, in %)

Functions of the unit	Bulgaria		Germany		Moldova		Russia		Ukraine		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
To inform about a problem or event	40	55	128	54	141	77	129	72	19	73	457	65
To form critical attitude towards a problem or event	27	37	63	26	19	10	13	7	3	12	125	18
To suggest a solution to a problem, a way of action	6	8	47	20	22	12	38	21	4	15	117	17
Total	73	100	238	100	182	100	180	100	26	100	699	100


The data presented in Table 2 confirm the assumption that the typical purpose of the publication of an information unit is to set a public “agenda” in relation to a specific issue. The relevant indexes have high values in all countries: over 50% in Bulgaria and Germany (based on the example of Berlin); over 70% in Moldova, Russia and Ukraine (judging from the content of regional

newspapers). In the EU countries (Bulgaria and Germany), the critical function of the press is quite significant, being represented by 1/4 to 1/3 of the articles. The third place belongs to the pragmatic task of suggesting to the public a way of resolving a problem. Regarding this function, the situation in all countries was approximately the same (the difference was no more than 10-20%).

Figure 1

Purposes of publications in selected newspapers

Purposes (functions): informative, critical, pragmatic



At a first glance, newspapers expressing the official point of view in the post-Soviet countries or addressing the middle class in the EU countries aim at a wide and thorough representation of the position of the ruling elite in the region or in the country. However, the same newspapers also

allocate much space for the opinion of the “average man”, as well as for the traditions of the ethnic minority groups. It is interesting to observe the political nature of materials, to define the political figures reported upon and the proportion of this type of coverage:

Table 3

Political characteristic of the printed information units (number of cases, in %)

The unit presents the point of view of:	Bulgaria		Germany		Moldova		Russia		Ukraine		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
The regional ruling elite	7	11	2	1	90	53	122	56	16	42	244	36
The public at large	6	9	135	85	17	10	12	6	8	21	178	26
The representatives of an ethnic group	26	41	20	13	31	19	43	19	11	29	148	21
Prominent journalists, publicists, scientists	12	19	2	2	15	9	24	11	2	5	59	8
The ruling elite of the country	13	20	0	0	17	10	17	8	1	3	48	7
Total	64	100	159	101	170	101	218	100	38	100	677	98

Although the political reality in all 5 countries is different, the largest share in the information stream belongs to the regional ruling elite. The second largest share belongs to the “average citizen” (the public at large). The third largest share concerns issues raised by representatives of the Turkish or Tatar community in the region being examined. The Bulgarian newspaper *Trud* actually maintains a balance between statements of the ruling elite and the intelligentsia, as well as between the opinions of the “average man” and of representatives of the middle class. The newspaper also informs its audience about the problems of the Bulgarian Turks by publishing positions of prominent representatives of this ethnic group. In Berlin, the voice of the public sounds even more prominently (85% of articles). There is no special stress on the point of view of the institutions of the state power. At the same time, there is a significant presence of accounts concerning the needs and problems of the Berlin Turkish Diaspora (13%). Both in Bulgaria and in Germany, the problems of the Turkish ethnic groups are discussed openly and democratically.

Post-Soviet Gagauzia (Moldova), Tatarstan (Russia) and the Crimea (Ukraine) are also characterized by multilateral polemics, but in these countries, the disputes are characterized by the domination of representatives of the local authorities (53%, 56% and 42% accordingly). Thus, the formal characteristics of the published materials show structural similarities to the functions of the press in describing ethnic policy among both the EU members and the post-Soviet countries. The difference consists in the fact that the public, the local ruling elite and the Turkish/Tatar ethnic community have different levels of access to the press in the respective countries. The position of journalists, publicists and scientists expressed by the press also has an impact on ethnic policy (see Table 2).

Content-analysis on the topics published shows that ethnic policy issues are associated with the following significant spheres of regulation of public life:

Table 4

Priority spheres of policy associated with ethnic relations (% of occurrences in articles)

Spheres of policy	Bulgaria	Germany	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine
Local	67	4	3	35	19
Regional	8	32	8	56	31
Economic	4	2	29	34	13
Social	7	12	21	26	25
Legal	9	10	1	11	22
Science and education	3	26	13	19	6
Cultural	8	44	27	25	66
Language	12	17	4	5	16
Mass media	8	22	3	8	3
Religious	24	20	4	26	3

The publications under scrutiny are focused above all on the local and regional policy. This applies for all national cases, except for Moldova. In this small country the Gagauz people have recently achieved a high political status. In 1994, they managed to conclude a political treaty “On special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri)” with the titular nation. Consequently, the issues connected with the political autonomy of this ethnic group were elevated by legal means to national issues of the Republic of Moldova.²

In Moldova and in Russia, special attention is being paid to the economic policies related to the ethnic group under scrutiny. This interest seems to be connected to the expectations of the middle-aged population who grew up under socialism and were accustomed to a system that set excessively high expectations concerning economic justice. The problem of unemployment, which is common to all minority ethnic groups being observed, is treated primarily as a social problem. For instance,

in Berlin, the high level of unemployment among the ethnic Turks is usually interpreted as a factor of their insufficient command of the German language and the low level of education.

The unusual concentration of the publications in Ukraine on cultural policy could be easily explained by the special situation on the Crimean peninsula. There, the cultural revival of the Crimean Tatars is regarded as a key condition for attaining political autonomy and possible sovereignty. This leads to an “outburst” in the cultural policy indexes of the Ukrainian (Crimean) publications. In Berlin, the problem of the Turkish Diaspora is discussed in a wide range of political contexts. In Bulgaria, ethnic issues are often discussed in the context of policies concerning religion, as is the case in Tatarstan as well.

The discussion of above policies in the context of interethnic relations is often connected with references to interethnic tensions and conflicts:

Table 5

Press coverage of conflicts involving the ethnic groups under scrutiny
(One unit may refer to several conflicts)

	Bulgaria	Germany	Moldova	Russia	Ukraine	Total
Total number of publications	32	54	14	56	16	172
Ethnic conflicts	6	0	1	17	4	28
Political conflicts	20	6	9	25	3	63
Religious conflicts	6	11	1	21	0	39
Economic conflicts	7	1	5	34	2	49
Other conflicts	8	39	0	21	15	83

In all of the countries listed above, ethnic conflicts are typically presented as having many aspects. In Bulgaria, the political aspect of interethnic tensions and conflicts seems to have been most relevant during the period of observation. In Berlin, direct reference to ethnic conflicts is typically unusual. Instead, there is a high concentration under the rubric "Other conflicts". The press obviously reflects an accumulation of latent conflict potential, the most vivid example of which can be observed in the problem of unemployment. As represented by the high percentage of "other" conflicts, the Crimea also experiences structural discontent with the changing ethnic situation due to the return of the Crimean Tatars from deportation. According to the newspaper *Vesti Gagauzii*, the political aspect of *this* ethnic conflict is most prominent. This can easily be explained by the history of conflict in the establishment of the Gagaouzian autonomy. Judging from the official newspaper, the press in Tatarstan covers all aspects of the conflicts approximately equally.

Thus, the analysis of the content of publications shows that ethnic relations are linked in each case to the local and regional policy, although Moldova and Crimea have experienced some relevant

developments at both the state and foreign-policy level. The linkage of ethnic relations to social policy is characteristic for the press in the post-Soviet countries. The press reflects both the growing relevance and the contradictory nature of ethnic relations. However, in Berlin, the ethnic conflicts' index is equal to zero, which is most probably due to the terminology used in German legislation and by the German press in speaking not about foreigners, but about "people with a migration background". This type of terminology tends to obscure the ethnic component of conflict potential.

In addition to performing functions in politics, the press also appeals to the feelings and emotions of its readers. Therefore, the next criterion for comparison concerns the *emotional orientation* of publications. This orientation can be evaluated by means of the quantitative analysis of political statements that provoke emotions and feelings and thus become part of social attitudes, alongside of their rational and behavioural components.

Political evaluations of events, facts, and individuals are present in almost half of the publications. On average, each article contains 6-7 political evaluations.

Table 6

Political evaluations in publications covering ethnopolitical issues (N = 624)

Countries	Publications featuring evaluations, in total, %	Average number of evaluations in one publication		
		N	positive	negative
Russia	57	9,6	7,8	1,8
Ukraine	53	3,8	1,6	2,2
Bulgaria	38	1,5	0,5	1,0
Moldova	33	4,2	3,0	1,2
Germany	30	2,5	0,7	1,8
Total	41	6,6	4,0	2,6

Both in terms of the percentage of articles featuring evaluations and of the number of evaluations per publication, the newspaper *Republic Tatarstan* is definitely in the lead. In many respects, it expresses the position of the regional authorities, who hope to inspire optimism among the public of the region. *Vesti Gagauzii*, in Moldova, is also emotional in a positive way, reflecting the success of the Gagauz people in their autonomisation. The Crimean press is also rather

emotional, but here, negative evaluations of the complicated situation prevail. The Bulgarian and the German newspapers are reserved concerning evaluations.

The content-analysis of the press was also focused on the issue of its *ideological functions* and its manipulatory potential, which can be used by those involved in the design and the implementation of the ethnic policy. The

aggregated data concerning the ideological function of the press (Table 7, column "Total") demonstrate that, decades after the end of the "cold war", the press has not undergone any deideologisation. Slogans are still widely used. They often set "our people" apart from any "other people"—which is, probably, the strongest form of mobilization in inter-ethnic conflicts—thus

cultivating semantic primitivism. This leads to the simplification of phenomena, such as the reduction of the struggle between political parties to a mere conflict between "right" and "left", without any analysis of political parties' programmes, or the use of clichés like "this is a good idea" without proper justification. Articles are saturated with metaphors and emotional statements.

Table 7

Share of ideologemes and linguistic manipulation techniques in newspaper publications on ethno-political problematics

Ideological technique	Bulgaria		Germany		Moldova		Russia		Ukraine		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Use of slogans and ideologemes	2	20	-	-	25	29	78	44	16	26	121	44
Contraposition of "our" and "other"	1	10	9	26	11	13	21	12	2	4	44	23
Semantic primitivism	1	10	2	6	-	-	50	29	12	20	65	21
Metaphoricity	-	-	4	12	30	35	7	4	16	26	57	17
Use of emotionally coloured vocabulary	6	60	14	40	5	6	7	4	2	4	34	16
Speech implicatures	-	-	1	3	8	10	9	6	4	7	22	9
Use of euphemisms	-	-	4	12	7	9	3	2	1	2	15	4
Depersonalisation	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	1	7	12	9	4
False parataxis	-	-	1	3	-	-	2	2	2	4	5	2
Total	10	100	35	100	87	100	178	100	62	100	372	100

The publications do not typically feature speech implicatures, depersonalization, false parataxis or euphemisms, although this is sometimes the case. There is a structural similarity between ideological and manipulative techniques in Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. The examples below help to describe their original source. This source is the Soviet newspaper language, which is still used by today's politicians who often only touch upon problems which they are reluctant to discuss and handle. The following examples come from the Tatarstan newspaper: "Sovereignty of the people is the basis of democracy"; "Common success requires a shift in people's consciousness"; "... human rights activists from happy and prospering Europe". The following are examples of slogans from the Crimean newspapers: "Crimea confidently advances on the path of social and economic

progress" (title of an article); "Ukrainian and Crimean peoples have been brothers from time immemorial". The Bulgarian newspaper *Trud* still uses political vocabulary from previous times. This applies about some articles in the Berlin newspaper, although the emotional component of the articles is rather weak.

The *persuasiveness* of the press depends on the degree of trust in certain printed media and to the sources of information cited. If the source is a prominent and respected political figure, the persuasiveness of the publication might be high. Even the mere citation of statements from such political figures may generate trust and ensure high degree of persuasiveness of the publication. In the articles examined, such politicians are cited frequently in more than 50% of articles.

Table 8

Political status of actors most frequently cited in press (number of citations, %)

Political status	Bulgaria		Germany		Moldova		Russia		Ukraine		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Head of region, representative on the regional level, prominent figure from the regional elite	13	16	28	16	20	43	100	57	5	36	166	35
“Average” man, depersonalized statement (“they say”...), with reference to history, tradition, etc.	4	6	73	44	9	19	16	9	4	29	106	22
Popular scientific publications and speeches of scientists	2	3	20	12	7	15	13	7	1	7	43	9
Head of state, deputy of all-national level, representatives of the ruling elite	16	20	4	3	4	9	21	12	1	7	46	10
Representatives of artists and intellectuals from the minority	4	6	24	14	3	7	4	3	3	21	38	8
Islamic religious activists	11	14	1	1	-	-	4	3			16	3
Prominent journalists and publicists – representatives of ethnic minority under scrutiny	2	3	1	1	-	-	8	5	-	-	11	2
Other	26	32	14	9	3	7	7	4	-	-	50	11
Total	78	100	165	100	46	100	173	100	14	100	476	100

The most frequently cited political actors are the following: heads of regions, heads of state, representatives of the Islamic clergy, prominent journalists and intellectuals. References to the opinion of the “average man” and to historical traditions are also frequently found. Statements of other actors are cited rather rarely (2% or less in each country, 11% in total). Nevertheless, the press seems to maintain a real dialogue between the elite and society.

In Tatarstan, the official press most frequently cites the head of the region and the head of the state, whereas “average man’s” and all others’ opinions are rarely cited. This structure of political communication cannot be understood without knowledge of the internal norms that were valid in the times of the Soviet journalism. Though these norms no longer officially apply, this method continues to be practiced by many journalists with Soviet professional socialization. Regional heads enjoy privileged positions on the pages of local press, whereas opinions of the “average man” are rarely referred to by these newspapers. The similar structure of citation in Gagauzia can be explained in approximately the same manner. In Crimea, the voices of the “average man”, the Crimean Tatar intelligentsia and the Ukrainian president can be heard. This could be explained by the tense nature of the debates referring to the problems of the

Crimean Tatars, who have returned to the peninsula after the deportation. The Crimean Tatars succeed for the most part in making their political and social interests public.

The opinion of the “average man” as educated representative of the middle class is most often referred to in Berlin. This fact may lead to the conclusion that publications of this type are trusted. The public vividly discusses the problem of Turks and their integration into German society. The opinions of politicians and scientists parallel the opinions of Turkish intellectuals, which also increases the degree of trust in the press. The analysis of the Bulgarian press (on the example of the newspaper *Trud*) reveals similar results.

The analysis of the ideological function of the press leads to interesting comparisons between the countries. The comparison concerns primarily those actors who shape ethnic policies. The calculation provides 1059 answers to the given issue. Unlike the case concerning the citation of participants in policy making and implementation, the issue at hand concerns the specific reality of political processes in countries and regions. These processes are not related to each other in the countries under scrutiny. Therefore, instead of interpretation of generalized data, it is more useful to consider the processes at the level of countries and regions:

Table 9

Who determines the ethnic policy in the country or in the region?
(Number of references in newspaper publications and percentage)

Political status	Bulgaria		Germany		Moldova		Russia		Ukraine	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. Head of the state	5	3	3	2	8	4	52	11	2	4
2. Head of the region	10	7	6	3	41	21	97	21	3	6
3. Executive authorities of the country	8	5	2	1	18	9	42	9	5	9
4. Executive authorities of the region	10	7	32	17	47	24	83	18	16	30
5. Legislative authorities of the country	18	12	1	1	4	2	35	7	4	8
6. Legislative authorities of the region	6	4	5	3	19	10	61	13	6	11
7. Judicial authorities of the country	2	1	4	2	0	0	10	2	1	2
8. Judicial authorities of the region	2	1	20	10	4	2	10	2	2	4
9. Oppositional political parties and movements at the state level	13	9	4	2	0	0	3	1	0	0
10. Pro-governmental parties and movements of national unity	8	5	5	3	1	1	7	1	0	0
11. Parties and movements of the ethnic minority under scrutiny	41	27	15	8	0	0	8	2	3	6
12. Right-wing (neoliberal) parties and movements in the region in question	2	1	6	3	1	1	2	0	0	0
13. Leftist (socialist and communist) parties and movements of the region in question	8	5	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
14. Ecological parties and movements of the region in question	0	0	3	2	2	1	0	0	0	0
15. Islamic religious activists	16	11	11	6	0	0	8	2	0	0
16. Prominent journalists in the country		0		0		0		0		0
17. Prominent journalists from a minority-dominated region	1	1	2	1	0	0	6	1	0	0
18. Scientists and representatives of research institutions	0	0	1	1	5	3	14	3	1	2
19. Representatives of artists and intellectuals of the ethnic minority under scrutiny	1	1	28	15	21	11	12	3	3	6
20. "The average man", the people, traditions	1	1	41	21	23	12	17	4	7	13
Total	152	100	191	100	195	100	468	100	53	100

In Tatarstan, the press is indicative of the structure of authority. The political leadership is represented by the local ruling elite (positions 2, 4 and 6 in *Table 9* make up a total of 70% of the references to regional policy-makers). References to the federal authorities make up 20 % of all citations (positions 1, 3 and 5). The share of all other participants in the decisions-making process concerning ethnic policies is 10%, including a 4% share for the “average man”. This is most probably a realistic picture, reflecting the political culture of the region. It is noticeable that ethnic policy in the Crimea is determined by the regional authorities and the supreme bodies of state power in the Ukraine, together with the representatives of the Crimean Tatar minority. In Moldova, this policy is obviously determined by both the regional authorities and the Gagauz ethnic community. In Bulgaria, the ethnic policy is determined by the state, taking into account the positions of the political representatives of the Turkish ethnic minority. In Berlin, the policy regarding migrants is the result of efforts by city authorities, the public, and the Turkish Diaspora.

Thus, the formal analysis of the press as factor in ethnic policy-making in the 5 countries has demonstrated the universal importance of the ethnic problematics and the intensity of the efforts to set the agenda for the public discussion on the issue through the press. Newspapers in the post-Soviet countries and in the EU countries differ in their discussion of the interethnic relations primarily in the degree of criticism and the level of

pragmatism in approaching the issues. The various functions of the press are used by political actors to a different extent in the countries and regions in question. The content-analysis also established a tendency towards the transfer of ethnic policy from the local and regional to the state and even international level. The connection of ethnic policies with economic, social, cultural, and other policies also varies significantly from region to region and from country to country.

The analysis of the ideological and manipulatory content of the press publications revealed the strong influence of Soviet political discourse on newspapers in Tatarstan, Crimea, and Gagauzia. This discourse often obscures the issues with the help of integrative slogans. This is not the case in the Bulgarian and German newspapers, where the basic manipulative technique is emotional influence. The analysis conducted on the press helps to establish the contributions of major actors to the political process. It also helps to identify the historical continuity of relations between the state and society, between the press and the state authorities, as well as the transformation of these relations

NOTES

¹ Dr. sc. Nikolay A. Golovin is Professor of Sociology at the Saint-Petersburg State University

² Concerning this legal regulation-see: <http://www.e-democracy.md/files/elections/gagauzia2006/special-legal-status-gagauzia-en.pdf> .

POTENTIALS FOR INTERETHNIC INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION

Nikolai Genov

1. Introduction

The following analysis and interpretation is based on the primary data from 156 in-depth interviews. They were carried out with successful representatives of the five ethnic groups studied within the framework of the InterEthno comparative research project in the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria and Germany (Land Berlin). According to the organizational plan of the study, each national team was to carry out at least 30 in-depth interviews in the period between 01 October 2005 and 31 March 2006. In each country, the target group was to consist of the following 3 subgroups: successful business people, politicians and representatives of the cultural elite of the ethnic group in the studied locality (nation-state or administrative unit of a nation-state).

No strict definition of “success” could be given in advance, since success has rather specific quantitative and qualitative parameters in the localities studied in the comparative project. A pragmatic approach was agreed upon for resolving the issue. The first group to be approached was the group of politicians who had their ethnic background in the group under study. They could be political representatives of this ethnic group or not. More important was the fact that they were clearly identifiable, since “success” could be directly connected to the position in elected bodies (parliaments, regional governments, community councils, etc.). Further on, the snowball technique was applied. The politicians approached first readily gave information about other successful representatives of the ethnic group active in politics, business and in cultural life. The successful business people approached in turn gave information about other successful politicians, business people, artists and university professors stemming from the same ethnic group. This information was cross-checked many times using various starting points for the “snowball” approach. The aim was to reach an optimal selection of truly successful representatives of the ethnic group confirmed as “successful” according

to the local criteria by maximum number of available sources.

As a result of this preparatory process, each team produced a list of the 30 “most wanted” interviewees and nearly the same number of replacements. The national teams carried out the interviews in the vast majority of cases with their first choices interviews with the replacements were exceptions. The interviews took place under various conditions, but were conducted, in most cases, in the offices of the persons interviewed. There was no time limit set for the interviews. On average, they took 45-50 minutes. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. There were no refusals to record the interviews, since the interviewers had all credentials from an international research project requiring the recording. The interviewers were typically members of the local scientific teams.

The in-depth interviews are structured around three topics. The first one concerns the biography of the respondent and his/her family relations. The second topic is the relationship of the interviewed person to his/her ethnic group of origin. The third part of the interview consists of three projective questions (vignettes) requiring selection from among varying imaginary options. The first vignette involves the interviewee’s choice of a collaborator from among representatives of five ethnic groups. The aim of the test is to establish the predominance of universalistic or ethnic-particularistic preferences in the selection of collaborators. The second vignette is intended to measure the intensity of the desire to have the mother tongue of the respondent designated as the officially dominant language in the locality. The third vignette aims at measuring the intensity of the desire to see the ethnic group to which the person belongs as the dominant ethnic group in the locality under scrutiny. In the analysis that follows, only primary data from the third part of the interview, i.e. only the elaborations on the three vignettes, are included.

The tool of the in-depth interview had to be conducted using quite different definitions of

“locality” and on successful representatives of ethnic groups having a very different economic, political and cultural status in the locality.

2. Local Patterns of Interethnic Relationships

The five cases under scrutiny are indicative of a large variety of structural and value-normative patterns of interethnic relationships as well as of their dynamics.

Tatarstan already has a relatively stable tradition of autonomy within the framework of the Russian Federation. The strengthening of ethnic identity, cultural autonomy and the role of ethnic elites largely coincided with the *Perestroika* period in the Soviet Union in the eighties. As a result, *Tatarstan* declared sovereignty together with Chechnya in 1992. But unlike the Chechen political leadership, the leadership of *Tatarstan* managed to avoid violent interethnic clashes and to flexibly adapt its policies to accommodate rapidly changing conditions. The Republic currently enjoys the highest level of autonomy among all constituent subjects of the Russian Federation. The economic basis of the political autonomy is well developed. The standard of living is high relative to the conditions of the Russian Federation. There is a wide variety of options open to both the Tatar and the Russian ethnic elites and citizens of Tatar and Russian ethnic origin in the Republic. It appears as if political realism guides the acceptance of the geo-strategic situation and the existing administrative arrangements by all sides involved in the management of interethnic relations. Most likely, this will remain the case in the short run and probably in the medium and long run. This assumption is plausible today, but might proven tomorrow by the decisions and actions of both the leadership of the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of *Tatarstan*. Changes in the management of the interethnic relations in *Tatarstan* might also be the outcome of broader regional or global processes.

Contrary to predictions concerning ethnic stratification in *Tatarstan*, predictions concerning *Crimea* should be made with care or, better yet, avoided. The peninsula is currently an Autonomous Republic in the Ukraine, which is actually defined as a Unitary state by its Constitution. The Russian ethnic domination on the peninsula is being increasingly challenged by the Crimean Tatars, who have already returned or

are still returning from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Siberia, where they were deported in 1944. Tatars currently make out some 14 percent of the Crimean population, but the trend is toward an increase in the relative share of this ethnic group due to the continuing repatriation of Tatars, their higher birth rate as compared to other ethnic groups on the peninsula and the decreasing but still continuing emigration of Russians from this Ukrainian territory. Despite having migrated back to the Crimea just recently, Tatars have the self-consciousness of being *the* autochthonous population of Crimea. They openly question the *status quo* by referring to their systemic deprivation in the economic, political and cultural sectors during the deportation. Given the difficulties facing the Crimean mono-cultural economy, the fragile arrangements between Russia and the Ukraine concerning the naval facilities of both countries on the peninsula, the political aspirations of the Crimean Tatars and the unstable situation in the Ukraine itself, stabilization or changes in the ethnic stratification on the Crimea might be initiated or supported by various domestic and international factors.

The same holds true for the *Autonomous Republic of Gagauzia* (Gagauz Yeri) in the framework of the Republic of Moldova. The autonomy of Gagauz Yeri came about in the context of violent clashes between the central government of Moldova and the separatist Transnistria during the first half of the nineties. However, economically and culturally, the population of this Autonomous Republic is more closely connected to Transnistria and to Russia than to Moldova, which is dominated by the Moldovan (Romanian) ethnic group. Since the Republic of Moldova has experienced a catastrophic economic decline during the transformation period and the prospect of economic recovery has been substantially delayed, the ensuing problems can be easily used and abused for the purposes of constructive or destructive ethnic policies. The unresolved issue of Transnistria and the yet unclear geo-strategic situation of the country also offer a variety of options for further changes.

Turks make out the largest traditional ethnic minority in *Bulgaria*. The group has experienced a variety of policies, ranging from strong support to strong suppression of their ethnic identity after the Second World War. The culmination of efforts to assimilate the ethnic minority was marked by the forceful change of the Turkish-Arabic names of the

members of this ethnic group during the eighties. Against the background of this traumatic experience, there were widespread fears at the beginning of the political changes in the country that the development of a democratic political system and cultural pluralism might be endangered due to interethnic tensions and conflicts. This negative scenario was not unrealistic, as events in the Western Balkans clearly confirmed. But due to the ethnically sensitive politics of all domestic forces, the interethnic tensions have not yet materialized in interethnic clashes in the country. Moreover, the stabilization of its geo-strategic situation, together with the stabilization of the national economy and democratic politics, seems to have stabilized interethnic relations as well. Recent events indicate, however, that the interethnic relations are not that stable as they seem at first glance. Some nationalist elements have already mobilized with the goal of ethnicising politics. It is difficult to predict local developments in the process. However, given the experience of other members of the European Union, one might expect successful political management of the issues.

Turks represent a new, but already a rather numerous and well settled ethnic group in *Berlin*. However, it took decades before politicians officially recognized the existence of this ethnic group as an integral part of present day German society. Now, the time has come to openly discuss the achievements and the difficulties related to interethnic integration in the country. The issue has become a burning one in the context of the demographic development of the ethnic majority and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the German economy under the conditions of a growing proportion of population of non-German ethnic origin in the country. These challenges make the continuation of the liberal negligence of the acute problems or the spread of overoptimistic expectations about the integrating power of multiculturalism impossible.¹ Decisions and actions are very much needed in order to accelerate interethnic integration and to limit the possibilities for the spread of the phenomena of ethnic disintegration.

3. Desirable Future for Successful Representatives of Ethnic Minorities

The “vignettes” technique of projective questioning is particularly useful in interviews with competent and receptive persons who avoid

evaluations of “is” situations, but are much more inclined to openly speculate about “could be” or “should be” situations related to a desirable future.

The first projective question reads as follows:

Vignette I

Imagine you have to choose between five candidates for collaborators of yours – an American, Chinese, German, Russian and Tatar (or Turk, according to the country). They all have nearly the same professional qualification. Who would you choose? Why?

Given the relatively stable economic, political and cultural situation at present in *Tatarstan* and the long tradition of interethnic cooperation between the Tatar and Russian ethnic groups there, one may assume the predominance of universalistic attitudes in the selection of collaborators by the representatives of the Tatar elite. In fact, professionalism and loyalty were particularly stressed by the respondents as criteria for the selection of individuals, without ethnic preferences or prejudices. Nevertheless, half of the respondents made their choice in favour of the imaginary Tatar collaborator because of the expected cultural affinity and potential for mutual understanding. This is obviously not a special issue in the communication with Russians since, *ceteris paribus*, one third of the successful representatives of the Tatar ethnic group interviewed would prefer to work with a Russian. Consistent with widespread positive stereotypes concerning punctuality, honesty and efficiency, there was an openly stated preference for a collaborator of German origin. Due to positive stereotypes of industriousness and accuracy, two of the interviewed persons made their choice in favour of a collaborator of Chinese ethnic origin. This openness to ethnic options is a certain sign for a general stability of the interethnic relations in *Tatarstan*, which limits the intensity of excessive preferences with regards to ethnic factors in the choice of collaborators.

One may assume that the complicated history of the *Crimean Tatars* after the Second World War and their unsettled economic and political situation would lead to their particularly strong focus on ethnic preferences. At the first glance, this is not the case, since one third of the representatives of the Tatar elite interviewed in *Crimea* definitely opted in favour of the professional qualities of the potential collaborator without ethnic preferences. This might be interpreted as an indicator of

universalism. In reality, the situation is more complex, given the ethnic composition of the Crimean peninsula. The majority there are ethnic Russians. However, only two of the interviewed 32 representatives of the Tatar elites would eventually make a choice in favour of a collaborator of Russian origin. At the same time, half of the persons interviewed clearly opted in favour of a Tatar collaborator. Ethnic affinities and ethnic distances are openly defined. They would hardly support interethnic integration, at least in the short run.

In terms of specifics, the case of the successful Gagauz politicians, business people and representatives of the ethnic cultural elite turns out to be particularly intriguing. The autonomous republic of this ethnic group is situated within a society that is increasingly moving away from Russian political and cultural domination. Gagauz elites, however, definitely have a strong preference towards cooperation with persons of a Russian ethnic background. This option was selected by fourteen out of 32 interviewees from the Gagauz elites. Besides the strong affinity to an ethnic group with diminishing influence in Moldovan society, another striking finding is the low level of affinity to their own ethnic group. Deviating from the usual pattern, only one fifth of the Gagauz respondents would decide to collaborate with representatives of their own ethnic group. This fact might be interpreted as a strong preference towards universalistic (cosmopolitan) value-normative orientations. However, another possible explanation might be the relatively low level of cohesion within—the ethnic group itself. If this assumption is correct, then the strong affinity to the Russian ethnicity should be interpreted as a very specific form of ethnocentrism. It is not focused on “our” ethnic group (the case of the Crimea Tatars) but on “another” ethnic group. The implications of this specific situation for the societal integration of Moldovan society present a special case for detailed studies further on.

One has to take into account the specifics of the local situation of Turks in *Bulgaria* in order to understand why the representatives of the Turkish ethnic elites are represented the way they are in the interviews. Turks live predominantly in the rural areas of the country and generally have a lower level of education than ethnic Bulgarians. On the contrary, the representatives of the Turkish ethnic elites are typically well educated, have extensive domestic and international experience and live in


big cities, mostly in the capital city. Thus, it would be risky to generalize their preferences for collaboration in order to make a statement about the average preferences of the Turks living in Bulgaria, given their level of education and traditional habits. The choice in favour of a Turk from Turkey is also risky since the cultural differences between the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the Turks living in Turkey are substantial, a fact openly stated by the interviewed persons. Thus, what remains as a clear regarding the choice made by the successful representatives of the Turkish minority group in Bulgaria is the stress on the professional qualities of the potential collaborator. More than the half of the respondents declared this type of universalistic preferences. The second most widely expressed preference was in favour of a collaborator of German origin, followed by the ethnic preference of Turks as collaborators. As in other cases (Moldova), the respondents noticed the lack of an option to collaborate with the ethnic majority in the country. As confusing as it is, the lack of this option has a clear background. It is the necessity to universalise the research tool.

While the Turks in Bulgaria represent a typical “old” (autochthonous) ethnic minority, Turks in the *Land Berlin* or in Germany as a whole represent a typical case of a “new” (allochthonous) ethnic group. The elites stemming from this group experienced the advantages and the limitations of universalism. It’s no wonder that the strongest preference (13 out of 30) was in favour of the professional and personal qualities of the potential collaborator without special ethnic preferences. Nevertheless, due to the specifics of the professional activity or other reasons, 5 would prefer an ethnic Turk and the same number would decide between a German and a Turkish collaborator according to their professional and personal qualities. Thus, the predominance of universalism is obvious, but ethnocentrism is also easy to detect. In the given context, there is one special issue which cannot be dealt with properly on the basis of the available primary information. One third of the interviewees whose country of origin was Turkey turned out to ethnic Kurds. Thus, the preference towards universalism might have been influenced by the absence of the choice “Kurd” among the five suggested choices.

The schematic presentation of the above discussed preferences in the choice of collaborator appears as follows:

Figure 1

**Ethnocentric or universalistic (cosmopolitan) preferences
in the choice of a collaborator**



Vignette II

Imagine you have the possibility to regulate the official language use here and now. Which language system would you choose: One official language (not yours), bilingual system (your native language being one of the two official languages) or your native language as the only official language? Why?

Both the Russian and Tatar languages are state languages in *Tatarstan*. This is a constitutional solution according to the second option stated above. Since this is an achievement in the framework of the Russian Federation, the option is overwhelmingly seen as the only realistic, functional and desirable one in the local situation. Given the geo-strategic situation and the constitutional requirements of the Russian Federation, the third option above is not regarded as realistic and not even as desirable in terms of practical considerations for participation in the economic, political and cultural life of the Federation. However, in ideal terms and in the long run, sentiments about making the Tatar language the only state language in Tatarstan are also expressed. One of the reasons for this desire is the fear that the influence and the use of the Tatar language might steadily decline in the context of the dominant administrative and everyday use of the Russian language. This was signalled by only one tenth of the interviewed persons, but it has to be taken seriously. The recent history of the Baltic states shows how fast the turn from bilingualism towards mono-lingualism might come about.

The decision regarding personal preferences concerning the use of languages was particularly difficult for the representatives of the *Crimean Tatars*. With only two exceptions, they strongly

advocate the official use of the Tatar language. At first glance, this does not seem to be an issue for discussion, since the official documents in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea are usually published in Ukrainian, Russian and Tatar language. In reality, as it was particularly stressed in the interviews, the official use of the Tatar language comes as an exception. Thus, the acceptance of the legislative but not necessarily practical *status quo* actually signals a desire for the implementation of a real tri-lingualism. However, the current official regulation stipulating Ukrainian as a state language together with the Russian and the Tatar as official languages was openly questioned by seven out of 32 interviewed persons. They opted for the official use of Ukrainian and Tatar languages alone. Thus, beyond the predominant acceptance of the current situation, marked by the official dominance of the Ukrainian state language and the practical prevalence of the Russian language, one can recognise influential desires for change, which might have important cultural and political consequences for the autonomous Republic of Crimea in the framework of the Republic of Ukraine.

The language preferences of the *Gagauz* elites reveal a rather pragmatic approach to the issue. At the same time, the approach is problematic. Only one respondent would prefer a monolingual solution with the Gagauz language as the only official language. Given their affinity for collaboration with Russians, the widespread preference towards a bilingual solution raises sensitive questions about the desired second language (Russian or Moldavian). In practical terms, Gagauz typically have a good command of the Russian language and are considerably less proficient in the Moldavian state language. The

choice in favour of trilingualism (Gagauz, Russian and Moldavian) raises even more complicated practical problems, since the policy of the Moldavian authorities is definitely focused on the use of the state language as the major or only means of communication. Thus, Gagauz people realistically abstain from insisting on a one language solution with the Gagauz language as the official language. However, they are facing difficult long-term choices in establishing a practically functioning bilingual system in the current environment of a strong administrative preference towards the Moldavian language. Undoubtedly, Gagauz society is facing tensions in resolving these issues in the current and will most probably face them in the future context of interethnic relations and societal integration.

Given the local traditions and current realities, there is no preference expressed on the part of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria for the domination of their ethnic language in the country. Even the bilingual option (Turkish as a second official language) is questioned because of local political and cultural considerations. They also take the sobering experience of other Balkan countries into account. Considerations about the professional development of the young generation determine the expressed preferences as well. It is typically assumed that younger people of Turkish origin would be disadvantaged provided they received their education predominantly in the language of the


Turkish ethnic minority. Thus, the clearly predominant preference is towards the acceptance of the current *status quo*. It includes the recognition of the language of the Bulgarian ethnic majority as state language with an option for education in the languages of the ethnic minorities. This is a point of agreement and simultaneously a point of criticism, since the quality of education in Turkish language was subject of various critical remarks and suggestions on the part of several respondents.

With one somewhat exotic exception, the Turks (and Kurds) in *Berlin* unanimously accept the dominance of the German language. The option including official bilingualism with Turkish as a second language was not an issue for the interviewed persons. But half of the interviewed persons in Berlin stressed their desire to preserve their mother tongue, to use it actively as far as possible, and to pass it to the next generation. Moreover, they insist on the advantages of multilingualism. In addition, they notice in several cases the universalistic need to develop a good command of the English language, together with a command of the German and Turkish (Kurdish) languages.

The schematic presentation of the language preferences of the interviewed persons appears as follows:

Figure 2

Desirable domination of the ethnic language or acceptance of the *status quo*



Vignette III

Imagine you could choose between your current situation and life in a sovereign state governed by your ethnic group. How strongly would you prefer the second situation – very strongly, strongly, to some extent, not at all? Why?

The current legal regulation of the relationships between the Russian Federation and the Republic of *Tatarstan* is widely regarded as the greatest possible decentralization, both in Tatarstan and in the Russian Federation. Therefore, the establishment of the full sovereignty of Tatarstan is currently regarded as a utopian project, although the *Declaration of the State Sovereignty* of the

Republic of Tatarstan (August 1990) might be regarded as a step in this direction. A number of agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan specified the meaning of the Declaration in terms which make the sovereignty an ideal rather than practical reality. This is the reason why just one fifth of the interviewed representatives of the Tatar elites hold this ideal as their personal preference. Seldom, but explicitly enough, rational calculation appears in their argumentation that real sovereignty would mean benefits for the interviewed person. Other representatives of the Tatar elite stress the potential benefits of sovereignty in the development of the ethnic traditions, language, education and culture.

Unlike the Tatars in Tatarstan, the *Crimean Tatars* refer to the obviously unstable situation when answering the question. The answers concerning the intensity of the desire to establish and maintain their political sovereignty are uncertain or include an unusually large number of seven "don't know" answers. They cannot be clearly interpreted. On the one side, they might indicate real difficulties in defining the desirable future. However, it seems more realistic to assume that the interviewed persons would like to avoid clear answers to the question. Some of these answers might include visions about a sovereign Tatar state on the Crimean peninsula. This assumption is not just hypothetical. Seven interviewed persons openly opted for this preference of an independent Tatar state on the peninsula as a desirable future. Given the answers of one third of the respondents, in the sense that they would like to see an autonomous Tatar republic in the framework of the Ukraine, the picture becomes more transparent. The present day political situation on the Crimean peninsula is unmistakably unacceptable for the Tatar elites. They want and expect political changes strengthening their position as autochthonous population on the peninsula. More or less openly, they insist on their right to constitute their own statehood either on the basis of autonomy in the Ukraine or on the basis of full sovereignty. The level of acceptance of the current *status quo* is low. It is acceptable only on the condition that the Tatar ethnic group is still not prepared to take the political lead on the peninsula.

Only three of the interviewed representatives of the *Gagauz* elites insist on the political sovereignty of their ethnic group. The number is small, but it


actually means one in ten. As seen from this point of view, one might recognize some potential for political self-assertion in this rather small ethnic group. The realistic assessment of this potential leads the rest of the sample to the conclusion that the constitutionally achieved autonomy in the framework of the Republic of Moldova is currently sufficient. This assessment relies on the available information and cannot foresee geo-strategic developments which might change assessments, attitudes and behaviour.

The question about the potential political domination of the Turkish ethnic group puts the representatives of the Turkish ethnic elites in Bulgaria in a difficult situation. They immediately refer to the option of living in a neighbouring country already dominated by their own ethnic group. The move to this neighbouring country is a matter of personal decision and thus solution to the problem indicated in Vignette III. Many ethnic Turks opted for this solution before or after the start of the democratic changes in Bulgaria. The Turks who remained in the country typically did so because of the decision to connect their own future and the future of their children with the development of a society in which they are in the ethnic minority. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that the interviewed persons would clearly opt for the domination of their ethnic group in this society. However, the option of moving to another society dominated by the Turkish ethnic group always remains open for them.

Successful Turks (and Kurds) in Berlin typically have personal histories of emigration from Turkey to Germany due to economic or political reasons. Only two of the interviewed persons were born in Germany. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the respondents from this ethnic group have made a choice about their country of residence. The obvious implication is that the option of a political system in the country of residence dominated by the immigrant's ethnic group is not a reasonable subject for discussion. Some wishes on the part of the Kurdish immigrants to live in a state dominated by their own ethnic group do not refer to Germany as their current country of residence but to the desirable sovereign Kurdish state, which does not exist.

The schematic presentation of the preferences of the elites concerning the political domination of their ethnic group appears as follows:

Figure 3



4. Concluding Remarks

The first conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis of desires and preferences is obvious: the analysis is confronted with rather specific local cases. This applies to all three imaginary choices - to the preferences concerning the ethnic origin of the preferred collaborator, the desirable status of the language of the ethnic group and the desirable status of the ethnic group of origin of the respondent. Another obvious conclusion concerns the dynamics of the local situations. Some of them tend to reproduce stability in interethnic integration while others bear the potential for changes in the local ethnic stratification.

In all projective situations (*Figures 1 to 3*), the balance between the extremes seems to be best achieved at present in the Republic of Tatarstan. So far, this is the case that best corresponds to the idea of interethnic integration (the middle position on the three scales). In fact, in terms of the internal arrangements regarding interethnic relations in the republic and of the status of the ethnically defined political unit Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, there are good prospects for a further strengthening of the constructive and for reduction of the destructive potentials in interethnic integration. Roughly said, this is a “win-win” situation marked by the “Potential for cooperation” because of trends towards the structural desegregation of ethnic groups and the strengthening of universalistic attitudes among the participants in the interethnic interaction.² We characterize this pattern of interethnic integration as *inclusive*. However, no trend or solution to the problems of

interethnic integration can be totally satisfactory for all participants, since the issues involved are rather sensitive. Thus, each “win-win” situation can be only “the second best” in the given context and does not preclude trends deviating from the pattern of sustainable economic, political and cultural development.

In the case of the Crimean Tatars, one may notice indications of uncertainty and of latent or manifest conflicts. The common trauma of the deportation and the difficulties of the new arrangements in Crimea have brought about a strengthening of the collective ethnic identification of Crimean Tatars to an extent that might easily bring about both constructive and destructive consequences concerning interethnic integration. The representatives of this ethnic group definitely keep to ethnic preferences in the selection of collaborators. This is a signal for both a possible self-imposed, structural ethnic segregation and for particularistic value-normative orientations. Taken together, both characteristics mark a trend towards interethnic tensions and conflicts.³ The predominant tendency among the Tatars on the Crimean peninsula is to accept the officially supported trilingualism, but with reservations. On the one side, this tendency is based on the desire for the practical implementation of the official regulations involving the Tatar language in administrative communication. On the other side, the reservations are a result of the desire for a gradual upgrading of the status of the Tatar language to the position of the second most important language of communication in Crimea after the state language Ukrainian. Given the

present day predominance of the Russian language in the everyday and official communication in Crimea, the materialization of the linguistic desires of some representatives of the Tatar elite would imply substantial changes in the cultural situation on the peninsula. The same holds true for the explicitly articulated desire to reach a situation in which the Tatar ethnic group would become the dominant ethnic group on the peninsula. We describe this pattern of desirable development of the interethnic relations as *exclusive*. In this particular case, we might realistically expect tensions and conflicts in the course of the change in ethnic stratification of the population of Crimea.⁴

The situations of the Turkish ethnic groups in Bulgaria and in Land Berlin are rather different and quite similar in the same time. They are rather different, since the Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria is constitutionally recognized as an autochthonous ethnic minority. The Turks are new migrants to Berlin. However, the statements by successful representatives of both groups provide evidence that their realistic strategy is mostly focused on adjustment to the linguistic predominance of the language of the ethnic majority and to the ethnic dimensions of the political *status quo*. In both cases, there is a clear rational calculation lurking behind this strategy, which we describe as *adaptive*. The rational calculation in question concerns the personal and collective prospects for development in countries that are members of the European Union and promise economic, political and cultural stability despite some outbreaks of xenophobia.

The situation of the Gagauz ethnic group manifests still another pattern of managing interethnic relations. The substantial autonomy of the Gagauz people in Moldova is currently fully satisfactory for them. However, it was achieved in a precarious context for the Moldovan statehood due to the conflict in Transnistria. The conflict is not yet settled and there are continuing uncertainties concerning the stability of the Moldovan statehood. But this situation of uncertainty cannot continue forever. Whatever the future solutions, they will reflect on the forms and the prospects of Gagauz autonomy. In other words, it will have to be adapted to new circumstances, which can hardly be influenced by the forces of the Gagauz autonomy itself. Thus, we are dealing with a case of *reflexive* management of the problems and prospects of the interethnic integration.

The above typology of patterns of interethnic integration will be tested and developed further on the basis of the analysis of other individual cases.

NOTES

- ¹ See for instance: Luft, Stefan (2006) *Abschied von Multikulti. Wege aus der Integrationskrise*. Gräffeling: Resch.
- ² See Genov, Nikolai (2007) 'Comparing Patterns of Interethnic Integration' in the present collection, Figure 1, Area A.
- ³ See *ibid.*, Area B.
- ⁴ See the schematically presented mechanisms of this type of change in Genov, Nikolai (2007) 'Comparing Patterns of Interethnic Integration' in the present collection, Figure 2.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE TURKISH ETHNIC GROUP IN BULGARIAN SOCIETY

The Point of View of Successful Representatives of the Ethnic Group¹

Yantsislav Yanakiev²

1. Ethnic and Cultural Diversity of Bulgarian Society

The Republic of Bulgaria has a multiethnic and multicultural population. According to the last national census of March 2001, Bulgarians make out 83.6% of the population in the country. The two major ethnic minority groups, Bulgarian Turks and Roma, represent 9.5% and 4.6%, respectively, of the entire population. Small ethnic groups like Tatars, Armenians, Jewish and others represent 1.5% of the population. The remaining 0.8% did not indicate their ethnicity.

Christianity in the Republic of Bulgaria is comprised of the Eastern Orthodox, the Catholic and the Protestant (Evangelical) religions. They number 6 638 870 persons, or 83.87% of the population. The Muslim religion is comprised of the communities of Sunnites (90%) and Shiites (10%) in the country. They number 966 978 persons, or 12.1 % of the Bulgarian population. Other religions were indicated in the census by 14 937 persons and 283 309 persons did not indicate any religion.

According to the 2001 census data, the Bulgarian Turks are concentrated in two regions of the country – South-Eastern and North-Eastern Bulgaria. The largest Turkish population in South Eastern Bulgaria is located in the Kardzhali district (64.7% of the population of the district). In North-Eastern Bulgaria the Turkish minority is concentrated around the towns of Razgrad (47.5% of the population in the district), Targovishte (33.6%), Silistra (32.8%) and Shumen (29.4%). Bulgarian Turks live for the most part in rural areas: 68 out of 100 Turks live in villages and 32 in towns. Concerning ethnic Bulgarians, this ratio is 28:72.³

Bulgarian is the mother tongue of 6 662 850, or 84.8 % of the population in the country. Turkish is the mother tongue of 720 136 persons, or 9.6 % of the population. Romani (Gypsy) is the mother

tongue of 319 821 persons, or 4.1 % of the population. Other mother tongues were declared by 71 084 persons, whereas 45 454 did not indicate any mother tongue.⁴

The distinction between Bulgarians, Bulgarian Turks and Roma is on an ethnic basis. On the basis of religion and language, we should distinguish two more groups: Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) and Gagauz (Turkish speaking Christians). There are no figures concerning Bulgarian Muslims in the census. Their number is estimated by experts to be about 200 000 to 280 000. The Muslims, whose mother tongue is Bulgarian, are concentrated mainly in the Rhodope mountain region. Around the town of Smolyan, they exceed 50 % of the population. They are also to be found in the districts of Kardzhali, Blagoevgrad, Pazardjik and Plovdiv, as well as in several settlements in the districts of Lovech and Veliko Turnovo.⁵

2. The Integration of the Turkish Ethnic Group in Bulgarian Society: A Retrospection

In the past century, the Bulgarian state has not had a well-grounded and consistent policy regarding the Turkish minority. Periods of recognition of the rights of lingual, religious and cultural self-identification and development of the Turkish community alternated with periods of highly restrictive measures breaching the freedoms and rights of this part of the Bulgarian population.

The first tendency found expression in a powerful education campaign and a quota system for the representation of the minorities in the governing bodies of a number of state institutions after the Second World War. Even after the nationalisation of education in 1946, the Turkish schools' special status was preserved and their number increased to 1199 in 1950.⁶ A positive

result was the liquidation of illiteracy in the Turkish community.

After the end of the fifties, a series of restrictive measures were launched against the Turkish minority. In 1964, the instruction of the Turkish language in schools was suspended. In 1974, the Turkish Philology Department at Sofia University was closed down. The most extreme expression of this discriminatory policy towards Bulgarian Turks was the forcible change of Turkish and Arabic names in the winter of 1984-1985. The official explanation was that the descendants of Bulgarians forcibly converted to Islam during Ottoman rule (1386-1878) were to regain their Bulgarian identity, hence the name "Revival process". As a reaction to the ethnic oppression, about 300 000 Bulgarian Turks left the country in the Summer of 1989, trying to attract international support for their minority rights. This was the most serious and deepest conflict in the interethnic relations in recent Bulgarian history.

Following the democratic changes in Bulgaria after November 1989, one of the first political acts of the new political elite was to condemn the "Revival process". The first steps of the democratic state leadership were linked with the restoration of the ethnic and religious rights for the Turkish minority. In December 1989, the Communist party and the State leadership made the decision to restore the names of all those, who had been forced to adopt Bulgarian names during the years of totalitarian rule. On 15 January 1990 the National Assembly adopted a declaration on national issues, assessing the forcible change of names as one of the greatest crimes of the totalitarian regime. According to the Law on Names of Bulgarian Citizens of March 1990, a procedure of court registration was established, which was subsequently replaced by a lax administrative procedure.

3. Institutional Strategies for the Societal Integration of the Turkish Ethnic Group in Bulgarian Society: Results of the Field Study

3.1. Methodology

The following paragraphs will present some of the results from structured interviews with successful representatives of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The interviews were carried out in the period

between November 2005 and March 2006. According to the preliminary criteria, the respondents were selected from among three main groups: businessmen/businesswomen, politicians and representatives of the Turkish culture. Each group makes up approximately one-third of the sample of 32 interviewed persons. The respondents come from Sofia, from the second largest city in Bulgaria, Plovdiv, and from the ethnically mixed regions of the towns of Kardzhali, Haskovo and Harmanli.

The selection of politicians included representatives of different political parties: The Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), with the right side of the political spectrum represented by former members of the Parliament (MPs) of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Furthermore, politicians at national and local level (districts and municipalities in ethnically mixed regions) were interviewed. The sub-sample of politicians was comprised of: acting MPs and leaders of the MRF, National Movement for Rights and Freedoms (NMRF), governors and mayors from ethnically mixed municipalities, former MPs, current active politicians from the MRF, the BSP and the UDF and regional leaders of the MRF.

Regarding the representatives of business, the sub-sample was comprised of persons working at both a national and local level. Among the respondents were presidents of business associations, owners/managers of construction firms, transportation firms and textile manufacturing companies in Sofia, Haskovo and Kardzhali; a vegetable oil company and translation/interpretation firms in Sofia.

The representatives of the Turkish language culture live for the most part in Sofia. Respondents from the capital city predominate in the sub-sample. It included two full professors and one associate professor, three doctors, journalists from the Turkish language media (the current and the former editors in chief of the magazine "Muslims" which is the official publication of the Office of the Chief Mufti), journalists from the newspaper "Rights and Freedoms" (an official publication of the MRF), from magazine "Kaynak", representatives of regional Muslim Mosque organizations in the cities of Plovdiv, Sofia and in the town of Harmanli, a department chief in the Ministry of culture, a Turkish language

singer/musician, writers/poets and representatives of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

3.2. Results

3.2.1 Socio-political background of the successful representatives of the Turkish minority

Having in mind the elite character of the sample, it is understandable that the respondents have a high level of education. Most of them graduated from universities with masters' degrees in economics, law, languages (Bulgarian and Turkish philology), journalism, history or psychology. There are also several engineers. Some respondents have graduated from two different universities and obtained a second master's degree. The second degree is usually in law or economics. Five respondents have a doctorate. Three respondents have only high school education and one, a college level education.

The situation described is indicative of the extremely high assessment of education in the respondents' value system as a factor for personal development and successful social realization. This fact was mentioned many times in the interviews.

The respondents demonstrated a broad scope of linguistic skills. Without exception they claim proficiency in the Bulgarian language. In addition, most of them claimed a good command of the written Turkish language. About two-thirds claimed to have a good command of Russian. This is the view shared by most Bulgarians, particularly those who studied the language in school before 1989. Next, roughly one-fourth of the sample claimed command of English, French or German. Lastly, some of the respondents have direct experience in using foreign languages, having spent years abroad. One should be aware of the fact that the situation described has nothing in common with the general level of language proficiency of the Turkish minority in the country.

More than half of the respondents' extended families used to live or still live in villages. The second largest group, representing about one-third of the respondents' families, consists of people living in small towns. A handful of the extended families of the respondents live in large towns like Plovdiv, Haskovo, Kardzhali, Shumen and Russe. Just three respondent's extended families live currently in Turkey after the massive emigration in 1972 and 1984-1989. Despite the fact that the respondents of rural origin dominate the elite

sample, the share of respondents coming from small and large towns is larger in comparison to the share of the urban Turkish population in the Turkish population of Bulgaria as a whole.

The level of education of the respondents' parents is comparatively low. About one-third of the fathers have elementary education. In addition, about one-third of the parents are illiterate. One-fifth of the respondents stated that their parents have a college degree (elementary school teachers, medical auxiliary, Muslim religious school). A few parents obtained high vocational education and only one a University degree.

The respondents are divided almost evenly when they assess the economic background of their parents. The assessments vary between the description "average for the people in our ethnic group" and "low". Those who assess the economic background as "average" exemplify this with the words "we have our own house, jobs and a car". The low living standard is explained by the fact that the parents are agricultural workers without any land of their own, primarily engaged in growing tobacco or working as craftsmen. Only four respondents evaluated the economic situation of their parents as "good" or "very good" because they currently live in Istanbul, Turkey and have their own shop, apartment, etc., or they are currently engaged in the business activities of their sons.

The vast majority of the respondents (about two-thirds) describe their parents as not being party aligned or being apolitical. Second largest group (about one-fifth) is the group of those were members of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP) before 1989. One respondent identifies his father's political orientation as social democratic, one as a member of the Bulgarian Agricultural Union, one as member of the UDF. Some of the respondents pointed out that their fathers are currently sympathizers of the MRF but not regular members.

Most respondents are married. Two are divorced and two are single. One-sixth of the respondents have mixed marriages. Most respondents in this group are married to Christian Bulgarian women and one is married to a Bulgarian Muslim woman. According to one of the respondents, "the mixed marriages were a relatively common practice before the so called "Revival process" of 1984-1985, when the Turkish-Arabic names of the Bulgarian Turks were

forcefully changed to Bulgarian names. A sharp decline in the number of mixed marriages was registered until 1995. Today, we can again observe a revival of mixed marriages between Bulgarian Turks and Bulgarian Christians”.

3.2.2. *Links to the culture of origin*

The vast majority of the interviewees (about 90%) claim that they have excellent command of the Turkish language. This is understandable, considering the fact that the sample is comprised of people with university degree in Turkish philology, writers, poets, journalists, researchers and teachers. They are all professionally engaged with teaching, study and active use of the language. The remaining 10% assesses the level of their command of Turkish language as “good” in the sense that they are able to communicate orally, to write and to read in Turkish. Only one respondent evaluated his level of command of the Turkish language as “poor”, because he can only speak but cannot read and write in Turkish.

The main channels and methods to improve proficiency in the Turkish language are the political, cultural and business contacts with people from Turkey as well as Turkish television, literature and newspapers in Turkish language. Most respondents distinguish between the contemporary dialect they speak in Bulgaria and the standard/literary Turkish used in Turkey. In order to increase the opportunity of contact with people from Turkey, the respondents improve their command of the language in speaking, reading and writing.

The transmission level of the Turkish language to the children is quite different from the personal level of command. About two-thirds of the respondents declared that they have partially transmitted the Turkish language to their children. The children are able to speak the local Turkish dialect but they have difficulties in reading and writing. Two respondents declared that they have not transmitted the language to their children at all. One of the main reasons is related to the lack of interest and motivation on the part of the children to study Turkish as an optional subject in public schools. The remaining one-third of the respondents considers that they have transmitted the language fully. According to them, a good opportunity for the children to improve their standard Turkish is the possibility of watching Turkish television.

The vast majority of respondents participate in cultural events of the Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria “regularly” and “often”. This means that they attend folk festivals, participate in television and radio broadcasts, religious celebrations, scientific events, the publication of books, newspapers and magazines, etc. Some respondents participate in these events actively due to their position as public figures, e. g. mayors, MPs, governors, etc. Another group is directly involved in the organization of the events or belongs to their sponsors. A problem noted by several respondents is that “there are not many events, due to the lack of funds”. This is particularly true for the publication of books and other printed materials in Turkish language. Some respondents share the view that cultural events are “abused by some political leaders (primarily from the MRF) aiming at political advertisement”. Few respondents declare that they seldom participate in the cultural activities of the Turkish minority and only two respondents have never participated. The reasons are that “there are no well organized activities, which can motivate people to join”. Another explanation is the lack of time.

Most of the successful representatives of the Turkish minority interviewed in Bulgaria (about two-thirds) declare that they maintain “regular” contacts with representatives of the Turkish ethnic group abroad. About one-third state that they “often” contact relatives living in Turkey, the US and in European countries. Due to public positions, business or scientific exchange, some of the respondents also “maintain regular contacts with their counterparts not only in Turkey but also in Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo and Cyprus”. Only two people have no contacts with representatives of the Turkish ethnic group abroad.

Watching television in Turkish is a common practice among the respondents. Only 7 out of the sample of 32 claim that they have “never” or only “occasionally” watched Turkish television. For that last group the reasons are: “lack of—access to cable/satellite TV” or “no interest”. The majority of the respondents explained that they watch Bulgarian and Turkish television roughly in the ratio 2:1. Almost one-fourth claims to watch “predominantly” Turkish TV. No one states that he/she watches Turkish TV exclusively.

Most respondents are interested in political commentaries as well as in the possibilities to

compare the interpretation of the news on Bulgarian and Turkish TV. According to some respondents, “it is very useful, particularly for politicians, to have another viewpoint about the situation in Bulgaria”. One opinion regarding watching TV in Turkish differs from the common view of the respondents. The interviewee said that “watching Turkish TV hampers the process of social integration of the children, particularly at a young age, because they mix the languages. In the words of one of the respondents, “the children have to learn Bulgarian first and after that Turkish. Therefore, I try to make them watch Bulgarian TV along with Turkish.”

One of the most discussed issues concerns the Turkish language news on the Bulgarian National Television (BNT). The opinions of the respondents vary from “only 10 minutes, but it is at least something that was done for the Bulgarian Turks” to “there is no sense to have this news broadcasted on the BNT”. The second opinion prevails. The reasons are related to the “quality of this broadcasting in terms of content and command of the Turkish language by the journalists”, as well as the “inappropriate time slot allotted the broadcast – 5 p.m. – when people are usually returning from their jobs and therefore have no opportunity to watch TV”. Some experts, journalists as well as writers, state that “there is no reason to continue this broadcasting. What we need is a program in Turkish language that presents the real problems of the minority, and not just one that translates the news from Bulgarian into Turkish”. The major argument is that “this broadcasting is just to show to Europe that there is some news in Turkish language in Bulgaria.”

The written media in Turkish language is not as easily accessible for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria as TV. Therefore, the vast majority of the respondents state that they “seldom” read newspapers in Turkish language. Most of them rely on the Internet to get access to electronic versions of the Turkish publications. Only 3 respondents acknowledged that they have the opportunity to read newspapers “predominantly” in Turkish. These are businessmen and politicians who receive the newspapers regularly in the office or buy them on trips to Turkey. No one claimed that he/she reads newspapers “exclusively” in Turkish. Finally, 7 respondents stated “I never read newspapers in Turkish language”. The reasons are

“difficult access” and “difficulties in reading Turkish”.

Regarding the Turkish language media published in Bulgaria, the options are very limited. Only the newspaper *Zaman* is published and distributed in Turkish and in Bulgarian. This is an international publication owned by Fethullah Gyulen.⁷ There is also the magazine “Muslims”, published monthly by the Office of the Chief Mufti. There used to be a newspaper “Rights and Freedom” and magazine “Kaynak”, but their publication was suspended in 2002 due to a lack of funds. Keeping in mind this situation, it is understandable why most of the respondents share the view that the media published in Turkish in Bulgaria is insufficient. As to the role of the newspaper *Zaman*, the opinions of the respondents differ significantly. A small group considers the role of the editor’s work “very important because they produce a high quality publication and there is no other newspaper published in Turkish in Bulgaria”. On the other hand, a large group considers this newspaper to be “a mouthpiece of Fethullah Gyulen’s policy of moderate Islamism.” Some respondents do not consider the media to be Bulgarian “because it is international and does not reflect on the problems of the Turkish minority in the country. Now the people just read it because there is no other newspaper. If our newspaper “Rights and Freedom” was published, they would read it.”

3.2.3. *Religious practices*

Only one respondent in the sample identified himself as Shiite. According to the religious practices of the interviewees, they have been divided into three basic groups. About one-third declared that they “seldom” go to the Mosque, which means only on the occasion of the most important Muslim festivities – Kurban Bayram and Ramazan Bayram. The next group of respondents (also about one-third of the sample) stated, “I have never gone to a Mosque in my life because of a lack of tradition during the socialist times and the socialization in atheistic values”. Nevertheless, some respondents shared the view that, “despite of the lack of tradition of going to the Mosque, we are Muslims and we respect the customs and traditions belonging to the Muslim culture.” Some added that, “It is a shame because I do not know what to do when I enter the Mosque. Their religion is very complicated.” Lastly, some respondents expressed

the view, “I am not a religious man and I do not know prayers, but I am believer. Everyone needs to believe in something, everyone needs faith.” The last third of the respondents declared that they go “regularly” and “often” to the Mosque/prayer house and follow the Muslim religious practices strictly. Among them are people middle aged and older. Some of them clarified that, “I used to be atheist and active Communist party member during the socialist period, but now I am strict Muslim”.

The view of some of the respondents regarding the role of Islam in the contemporary world is very important in the context of the ongoing radicalization of the Muslim communities in Europe: “If people are well educated in Islam, if they knew better the essence of the religion, they would never become fundamentalists. Only one who is not educated can become a fundamentalist. Therefore, the religious instruction in public schools must be broadened and improved.” In addition, one expert mentioned, “the level of education of Islam in Bulgaria declines; we lack well educated imams which presents a risk of the propagation of non-traditional Islam and fundamentalist ideas. Therefore, the state must take an active position in and responsibility for education of Islam in Bulgaria, a typical practice in many European countries and in the USA.”

3.2.4. The representation of the Turkish ethnic group in political decision-making

The overwhelming majority of the respondents (about three-fourths) share the opinion that the Turkish ethnic group is well represented in the political decision-taking process, through the MRF at the national level in the Parliament and the Council of Ministers as well as at the local level in the governors’ offices and in the municipalities. In the same time, many respondents shared a common criticism of the quality of the representation and doubts regarding the efficiency of the work of a number of political leaders. Typical arguments in support of opinion were the following:

- “We have more than 30 MPs out of 240 in the Parliament. Another question is how much they care about the population that they are supposed to represent and how much they are engaged in solving their severe problems”;
- “We have been represented as a group in all Parliaments since the democratic changes in Bulgaria in 1989. We have at least 30 mayors and governors. What more can we expect? The

selection of cadres is very good. Ahmed Dogan⁸ controls the situation very well and makes accurate decisions about the development of cadres, so the most qualified people are appointed at right positions”;

- “We have 34 MPs: and we are well represented at local level as well. The MRF is being developed as a national party in which about 25% of the members are ethnic Bulgarians”;
- “Keeping in mind the number of MPs from the MRF in the Parliament and the strong voting behaviour of the Turkish minority in support of the MRF, we cannot have any complaints. But at the same time, regarding the quality of political representation, I am not satisfied. I can provide many arguments in support of my thesis. First, we have no real representation in the cultural institutions. Second, the leaders do not understand the need to preserve cultural diversity and to present the culture of different ethnic communities in the museums; third, I don’t have the impression that real efforts are being made regarding the improvement of the social status of the minority in the region”;
- “The representation is sufficient in terms of numbers but the people in the Parliament do not really represent and defend the interests of the Turkish population as a whole”;
- “On the surface, the Turkish minority appears to be well represented in the legislative and executive power, but this is an oligarchic representation. The MPs from the MRF are much more interested in their own business than in the problems of the Turkish minority”;
- “The MRF has 34 MPs and can exercise strong influence on the voting and adoption of laws. In that sense, there is no problem. The problem is that some of the MPs are passive. Others make public statements and speeches according to their own interests, not according to the interests of the community that they are supposed to represent”;
- “We were not represented before the MRF came into political power. Now the situation has changed significantly. Of course, there is room for improvement regarding the quality of the people in the Parliament. But tell me where we can find better-prepared people. Ahmed Dogan proved to be one of the best Bulgarian

politicians and statesmen. I am saying this without being a member of the MRF”;

- “As a quantity, the number of representatives in the Parliament is enough. We are about 10% of the population of Bulgaria and the third place in the Parliament is not bad. I am not as sure about the relations of the representatives with the ordinary people, whether they really defend and represent their interests.”
- “I do not want to comment on the number of the MPs in Parliament. I would prefer to comment on their real contribution to problem solving in the ethnically mixed regions. Concerning real policy for improvement of the infrastructure, employment and quality of life in these regions, almost nothing was done”.

The opinion that the Turkish minority is not well represented in the political decision-taking process is supported by those who think that representation through the MRF alone is not enough and that they would like to see more representatives of the Turkish ethnic group on the list of other Bulgarian parties. It is important to underline the fact that both the MRF supporters and respondents with other political orientations share this opinion. Some of the typical arguments presented in the interviews in support of this position are the following:

- “In some regions where the Turkish population is the majority, the MRF gets more votes. The people believe in only one political party and thus only the MPs from the MRF represent the Turkish minority. Why don’t the other political parties allow representatives of the Turkish minority to get to the highest positions in their hierarchy?”;
- “If other political parties provided equal opportunities for the people from the Turkish ethnic group to participate in political decisions, the MRF would not have a monopoly on the Turkish votes. There exists is a situation now in which the MRF has a monopoly on the representation of all Bulgarian Turks. This is an unfortunate policy. In the ethnically mixed regions, the leading role of the Bulgarian Communist Party was replaced by the leading role of the MRF”;
- “The problem with the political representation of the Turkish minority is not in the MRF but in the role of the other parties. They have neither

real policies concerning ethnic issues nor programmes and visions. Nothing has been done to attract people from the Turkish minority. It is a common opinion that the problems of the Turkish minority are the sole responsibility of Ahmed Dogan”;

- “I do not think that the minority has to be organized politically. The normal situation is that the socialists join the Bulgarian socialist party; the people with a conservative political orientation join the rightwing parties. I do not think it is normal for all Bulgarian Turks to share liberal values and to participate only in a party with liberal orientation”;
- “There are enough representatives of the MRF in the Parliament but they do not represent the entire Turkish minority”.

3.2.5. Perception of the opportunities for integration of the representatives of the Turkish minority in state institutions

About two-thirds of the respondents are of the opinion that it is still difficult for the representatives of the Turkish minority to take positions in state institutions at central and local level. Two groups of arguments support this opinion. The first one is related to the negative prejudices and stereotypes motivating representatives of state institutions to decline applications from Bulgarian Turks and other minorities. Some typical arguments are:

- “If we look at the armed forces, the police and security services, I can not understand why we are confronted with such hysteria when we ask for the appointment of our people in these structures. They disregard us. I do not support the quota principle but when there are no representatives of minorities at all, that is not a proper situation”;
- “Except for the positions gained as a result of the vote of the electorate, what other positions we have: two governors in the towns of Dobrich and Gabrovo. We are part of the ruling coalition and equal opportunity must be established for the appointment of our representatives to positions in the state institutions. In this respect we are under a strong pressure. The reaction to the attempt to appoint a deputy governor from the MRF in the city of Varna is a clear example. We understand the situation and are trying to be more flexible.

Let the other parties demonstrate willingness for cooperation and compromise as well.”;

- “Besides the MRF, other parties are not psychologically prepared to appoint representatives from the Turkish minority in state institutions. The situation was the same under the governments of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces”;
- “There exists a fear of competition from the Turkish population, a fear of their occupation of positions that Bulgarians currently hold as well as the fear that Bulgaria will be ruled by Turks. These prejudices are still alive. I can say without doubt that the state does not create equal opportunities for appointment to the state institutions.”
- The second group of arguments focuses on the role of the MRF, which provides political support for the appointment of representatives of the Turkish minority to the state institutions at the national and local level:
- “People are being appointed because of their political loyalty, neglecting the level of education and fitness for the position. There is no state policy but party policy. This is typical not only for the MRF but for all other Bulgarian parties”;
- “Today, it is not difficult for a representative of the Turkish minority to take a position in the civil services provided he/she is included in the quota of the MRF. If you are not a party member, there is no chance. Each appointment is made on the instruction of the MRF head quarters”;
- “The state policy regarding minorities is wrong. There is no unified policy on the minority issues. Today, if you are not a member of the MRF, you might be the most clever Turk but you will not be able to find a position in the state administration because everybody says there is no suggestion from the political party. All other parties expect the MRF to resolve the problems of the Bulgarian Turks, which is a serious mistake”;
- “There is no chance for those Turks who are not members of the MRF to work in the state administration”.

• The group of people who think that there are no longer barriers preventing representatives of the Turkish minority from taking positions in civil services provide the following arguments:

- “The first breakthrough was made by Ahmed Dogan who incorporated representatives of the Turkish minority at all levels of the state administration. This is real proof of the democratization. At the same time, we have to remember that this is a continuing process”;
- “If one is well educated and skilled, there are no problems. For example, when I have to choose a worker, I do not consider his/her ethnic background. I need qualified workers and I think the same is true for other colleagues in the business sector”.

3.2.6. Perception of opportunities for the development of the Turkish language and culture

An overwhelming amount of respondents (more than three-fourths) do not share the view that “the development of the Turkish language and culture is intentionally suppressed”. Three groups of problems can be identified on the basis of the statements made by the respondents. The first group concerns the lack of initiative and financial support for the development of the Turkish minority culture. Some of the typical arguments are:

- “There are no real concerns about the preservation of the Turkish minority culture. The politicians do not care about it. In the Ministry of Culture, they must make special efforts for the development of our culture, which is different from the culture of the Turks in Turkey”;
- “Everything depends on funding. If you have funding, nobody causes problems or poses obstacles to the publishing of books, newspapers, etc.”;
- “I have the perception that we, as an ethnic group, do not demonstrate enough initiative to develop our own culture. Currently, people are much more interested in their physical survival than in culture, politics or ethnic relations”;
- “The problem is that there are a few talented people who have the opportunity to develop their talent. Most of them are far from here (from the ethnically mixed regions). You can

find them mostly in Sofia and in the big cities. Bulgarians know more about them than we do”;

- “Unfortunately, the state does not do enough for the development of the Turkish minority culture. The problem is both in the lack of money and in the lack of a positive attitude and understanding. If positive approach is taken, funding can be found. All these people are taxpayers and they deserve to have their culture preserved. Society will benefit from the preservation and development of a bouquet of different cultures. This is the real wealth of Bulgarian society”;
- “There is no Turkish media. The newspapers and magazines have been suspended due to lack of funds. There is not even support on the part of the Turkish businessmen”;
- “The MRF is in power, but there are few publications for their electorate. There was a newspaper and it was suspended. Now, if they decide to re-establish the media, they have no cadres with which to restart the process;”
- “Bulgarian democracy is still in debt to the culture of both the majority and the minorities. Nowadays, the state behaves as a stepmother. Care is needed for the development of the culture because this is a richness that we must preserve and hand over to the next generations.”
- The second group of problems is related to the use of Turkish in public spaces. About one-third of the respondents perceive negative reactions on behalf of the Bulgarian population. Several respondents have expressed concerns in the following way:
- “Officially there is no problem to speak Turkish in public places, but when I speak to my friend in a restaurant, for example, some people get annoyed. I think this is a remnant from the recent past and I hope it will change soon in a favourable direction”;
- “If somebody speaks in English, German, French or Russian, there is no problem. But if I speak Turkish, something happens with my Bulgarian friends. They are not willing to accept my right as an individual whose mother tongue is Turkish. I can not understand why”.

The third group of identified problems is related to the possibility for children to study the Turkish language. The respondents do not accept the

current situation of Turkish language as an optional subject in public schools. They express sharp criticisms and make important suggestions:

- “According to the law, we have the right to study the Turkish language, but the state does not stimulate this process. In 1991 there were 96 000 pupils studying the Turkish language. Now there are 21 000. Parents also participate in this process unconsciously, but the main actors are the teachers. They persuade pupils that it would be better for them to learn Western languages because of the upcoming EU membership. Some think that they do not need to study Turkish because it is their mother tongue and they have learned it from the parents. I suppose there is a campaign against the study of Turkish in schools”;
- “In the textbooks, there are texts both in Bulgarian and Roma, but not one original text in Turkish. The Turkish story is translated in Bulgarian. This does not make sense. In the 50’s, when the Turkish schools were in operation, we brought textbooks from Turkey for the students from the 1st to 7th grades and adapted them to the Bulgarian situation. We included Bulgarian and Russian authors along with the Turkish authors and the quality of these textbooks was very high. We need such an approach now”;
- “There is a real problem with the study of the Turkish language as an optional subject. This practice has to be terminated. Turkish must become an obligatory subject and the pupils from the Turkish minority should have to study the written and spoken language until the end of high school, like other foreign languages.”

3.2.7. Perception of the freedom of religious self-identification and practice

Only one of the respondents stated the opinion that, “the Muslims in Bulgaria have to hide their religious affiliation”, because of the nationalistic acts of some Bulgarian parties. The rest of the interviewed persons claimed that there is full freedom of religious self-identification and choice in the practice of Islam. The same holds true when the individual is an atheist. There are no obstacles to the free declaration of one’s position. At the same time, there are some issues deserving attention. Some respondents stated that, “it is difficult to practice the religion because of the lack of Mosques and imams in close vicinity to our

place of residence (30-35 kilometres). Therefore, one has to travel to the regional centre.”

Another observation is related to the attitude and the reactions of some Bulgarian Turks to the religious practices of the respondents. Several interviewees stated that, “I go regularly to the Mosque each Friday, but I receive reproaches and ridicules from our people.”; “I was active Communist party member. Now I am strict Muslim believer. Some of my close friends and relatives cannot understand this change. They ask me how it is possible to switch suddenly from communist to Muslim. We did not have the opportunity to practice Islam before 1989, now we are free to make our choice.”

Finally, several respondents defined clearly the need to improve the intercultural dialog between Islam and Christianity as well as the need to get to know each other better. They consider this to be the best way to preserve peaceful coexistence: “In order to overcome difficulties, both sides have to be open. The problem is that we do not know the culture of the others or we only know the negative sides, presented through the media. If we would learn more about the religion and the culture of the others, it would be much better”. Another argument reads as follows: “It is quite rare that somebody from the Bulgarian ethnic group pronounces my name correctly. This is a clear example how well we know each others’ culture.”

4. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats in the Societal Integration of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria

4.1. Strengths

One important strength of the current situation is the common understanding among all interviewed representatives of the Turkish minority that the Bulgarian nation is – as seen from civil and political point of view - one composed of all citizens despite ethnic, cultural and religious differences among them. A clear indicator for the acceptance of the unitary character of the Bulgarian state is the fact that the respondents unanimously regard the Bulgarian language as the only official language. Another significant strength of the process of societal integration of the Turkish minority is the fact that the respondents demonstrate open-mindedness towards different cultures and national traditions. Lastly, the strong

sense of belonging to the Bulgarian nationality is widespread among the respondents. Not one of them aspires to live in a “sovereign state governed by the Turkish ethnic group.”

4.2. Weaknesses

Many respondents expressed criticisms regarding the quality of the representation and doubts regarding the efficiency of the work of some of the MRF leaders. Political representation through participation in the MRF alone is perceived as not enough. They would like to see more representatives of the Turkish ethnic group in other Bulgarian parties.

There is a commonly shared view that the Turkish minority is still in an unequal economic position in Bulgarian society. This is due to a combination of geographical and other factors. The Bulgarian Turks live predominantly in villages in mountainous and semi-mountainous regions, where the opportunities to find a job are limited. They have a specific mentality. In the words of the respondents, it is characterised by a “self-restriction of the horizons and the aspirations in thoughts and dreams”, “lack of ambition and satisfaction with low standards”, “lack of initiative for economic and social prosperity”, “lack of a developed sense of competition”, etc.

There still exists a perceived lack of equal opportunities among the representatives of the Turkish minority with regard to positions in state institutions at central and local level, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Armed Forces, the Security Services, the Prosecutors’ office, the Courts, etc. About two-thirds of the respondents hold this opinion.

There exist social-psychological factors, which could prevent the integration process and the personal prosperity of the representatives of the Turkish minority. They are characterised by the maintenance of certain stereotypes and prejudices among the ethnic majority towards the Turkish minority as well as among the Bulgarian Turks towards the ethnic Bulgarians.⁹

Another important weakness of the current situation is related to the perceived restriction of opportunities for the preservation and development of the Turkish language and culture. This is mostly due to the lack of financial support from the state as well as from business. However, there is also a lack of initiative on the part of the minority leaders

to develop the Turkish minority culture. The most criticized issues are the ineffectiveness of the current system for the study of the Turkish language as an optional subject in public schools and the broadcast of only 10 minutes of TV in Turkish on the BNT.

4.3. Opportunities

A vital opportunity for societal integration of the Turkish minority is the guaranteed equality of Bulgarian citizens before the law, one of the basic prerequisites for introduction of equal opportunity policies in the public sector. The development of the MRF as a national party with broad participation of representatives of other ethnic groups in the governing bodies of the party is seen as a key opportunity for the improvement of the societal integration of the Turkish minority in Bulgarian society.

Another opportunity for the improvement of the process of societal integration of the Turkish minority is the development of programmes by the other Bulgarian parties concerning inter-ethnic relations and the attraction of more representatives of the Turkish minority to participate in their governing bodies at national and regional level.

The promotion of inter-religious and intercultural dialog between Islam and Christianity in response to the need to get to know each other better is another key factor for facilitating the societal integration of the Turkish minority in Bulgarian society. As seen from this point of view, the education in Islam is of high importance. The state must take an active role in and more responsibility for the education in Islam in order to prevent influences of non-traditional Islam and the possible radicalization of the Muslim community.

4.4. Threats

Among the most important threats regarding the societal integration of the Turkish minority is the trend to preserve and to broaden the social inequalities that could increase the conflict potential in the inter-ethnic relations. This could lead to a conversion of social problems into ethnic ones, which in turn could be exploited for political purposes by nationalistic parties or interest groups.

Currently, the influence of non-traditional (radical) Islam among the Bulgarian Muslims is comparatively weak. But the lack of well educated imams and the lack of a Muslim tradition present a

potential risk for the propagation of non traditional Islam and fundamentalist ideas.

The common understanding of the successful representatives of the Turkish minority concerning the Bulgarian nation is that it is a civil/political entity. However, in the context of the geographical proximity to an alternative homeland (Turkey), some Bulgarian citizens with a Turkish background consider the nationhood (membership to a nation in terms of religious, linguistic or ethnic ties) as the most important component of the national idea. This dual perception of the nation (nationhood versus citizenship) and the proximity of the alternative homeland could be a potential barrier for the integration of the Turkish minority into Bulgarian society. The above-described economic reasons as well as the existing trends towards a politicisation of the ethnic/cultural differences could hamper the process of societal integration of the Turkish ethnic group into Bulgarian society.

NOTES

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- ¹ The paper is based on results of the INTAS Research Project 04-79-7018 "Comparing Societal Integration of Turkish and Related Minorities", carried out simultaneously in Bulgaria, Germany, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine in 2005-2007.
 - ² Prof. Yantsislav Yanakiev is vice-president of the Research Centre REGLO in Sofia.
 - ³ *Results of the Population Census 2% sample (2001)* Sofia: National Statistical Institute.
 - ⁴ *Education in the Republic of Bulgaria (2004)* Sofia: National Statistical Institute, pp. 22-24
 - ⁵ Krasteva, Ana. 'Ethnic Minorities'. In: Genov, Nikolai and Anna Krasteva. Eds. (1999) *Bulgaria 1960-1995*. Sofia: National and Global Development, p. 452.
 - ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 455
 - ⁷ <http://en.fgulen.com/>
 - ⁸ The leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF)
 - ⁹ Yanakiev, Yantsislav. "Public Perceptions of Interethnic Relations in Bulgaria", In: *Ethnic Relations in South Eastern Europe*, Nikolai Genov (Ed.), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Free University of Berlin, Berlin – Sofia, 2004 pp. 47-65

MONITORING OF MEDIA REPORTING ON THE TURKISH MINORITY OF BERLIN¹

Tessa Savvidis²

1. Subject matter of the monitoring

The monitoring focused on mass media (printed and online) publications on the Turkish minority of Berlin. One main source was the daily newspaper, *Berliner Tagesspiegel*, which complimented a content analysis conducted during the same period (October until December 2006) on the second independent regional daily in Berlin, *Berliner Zeitung*.

The media coverage of the Turkish community in Berlin is embedded into a larger context of related themes. Insofar as this minority is closely linked with Turkey as a country of origin and as an alleged or genuine protector of the 'Turkish interest', the related media coverage of the themes 'Turkey' and 'Islam' was also included in the monitoring. The religious angle was chosen, since the majority of the Turkish residents in Germany define themselves as Muslims. Religion is a distinct feature of the Turkish identity, both in self-perception and in the perception by non-Muslims/ethnic Germans. A further reason for the thematic extension of the monitoring was the assumption, that the perception of the Turkish minority in Berlin is influenced both by the perception of Islam and of Turkey as a country of origin.

In the first part of this article, the news items (events) covered by the media and the monitoring will be presented. The second part will analyze the public discourse of minority rights, integration and interethnic/inter-religious relations and the ways in which this discourse is reflected in mass media coverage.

2. News items

Nearly all news items related to events in which members of the Turkish minority in Berlin, Turkey or Islam were involved had a negative connotation. Contrary to the negative connotations of the subject matter, the style of reporting is neutral in most cases. As a rule, journalists and/or commentators avoided judgments in their statements or comments. In just one case, the

reporting was ironic. The items under scrutiny are the following:

i) The first home for Turkish migrant seniors opens in Berlin.

Context: The home opens as a result of the previous failure of an inter-cultural home for pensioners.

ii) The Berlin Senate's Commissioner for Migration and Integration, Günther Piening, appeals to young migrants in Berlin to apply for posts in the civil service.

Context: The appeal causes protest (letter to the editor) against "privileges" for migrants from Turkey and the Near East.

iii) Interview with two Berlin judges about crimes committed by adolescents.

Context: In their interview, the two judges deplore the increase of youth violence among the Turkish and Arab migrant populations in Berlin. The victims of these perpetrators, in most cases young people of the German minority in Berlin's 'migrant quarters' are terrified and frustrated.

iv) Tensions between 'quarter manager' Gilles Duhem and the Berlin Senate's department for city development.

Context: In order to better cope with the problems of city quarters with a large percentage of ethnic non-Germans, the city administration introduced a system of so called 'quarter managers'. Gilles Duhem from Paris and his international team are described as the most prominent and successful of them, working in the once notorious Rollbergviertel (Berlin-Neukölln). However, Duhem's proposal for 2007 has been rejected by the Senate and subsequently lacks funding. The media coverage suggests personal tensions between Duhem and a representative of the Senate, who has criticized him for lack of qualification.

v) No further funding for 'quarter couriers' by Berlin Senate.

Context: ‘Quarter runners’ are part of the administrative attempt to better manage residential areas with high migrant percentages. Despite visible successes in a previously problematic residential area, the two ‘quarter runners’ of Berlin’s Soldiner Kiez (Berlin-Wedding) will no longer be paid after the end of 2006.

vi) The leader of the Christian Democratic parliamentary faction, Volker Kauder demands an increase in the number of school teachers with Turkish origin and language knowledge.

Context: This article uses the demand of the conservative federal politician Kauder only as a pretext to discuss domestic problems, such as recent debates in the Berlin administration and labour unions about ways to increase the number of younger male teachers with Turkish background in Berlin schools. One obstacle is the recent EU anti-discrimination law, which allows female German teachers to successfully file a court case, if a younger male Turkish colleague is privileged in the employment process.

vii) Revived debate on the increase of the percentage of Non-Germans among Berlin’s police force.

Context: After the 2006 clashes between the Berlin police force and approx. 100 young Turkish migrants, the debate about an increase of Non-Germans among Berlin’s police force was intensified. However, all such attempts have so far failed, due to the lack of command of German among Turkish migrants.

viii) Clashes between migrants and the Berlin police force.

Context: An increasing number of clashes between migrant residents of Berlin and the police forces have been reported. The last incident was caused by up to 80 Turkish migrants who prevented the hospitalisation of a boy injured in a car crash. In 2006, there were more than ten clashes registered.

ix) Interim headmaster’s critical conclusions.

Context: After an administrative crisis at Berlin’s Rütli School earlier in the year, the provisional headmaster Hochschild summarised his experience at the end of his term of service. In particular, he criticized the lack of teachers with a command of Turkish or Arab in German schools with a high percentage of migrants. He also

demanded special training for teachers in such schools.

x) Food scandal in Germany hits Turkish shish kebab (‘döner’) shops.

Context: According to Turkish newspapers, the food scandal in Germany caused by spoilt meat hits Turkish shish kebab (döner) shops.

xi) Book launch of “Farewell to Multiculturalism”.

Context: Stefan Luft’s publication discusses the major failures of German policy to integrate migrants as a combination of a longstanding indifference and a romanticized perception of integration. According to the author, emigration to Germany was helpful for Turkey, as it reduced the consequences of Turkish population growth (explosion) and brought Turkey the benefits of remittances. In Germany, the consequences were the development of ethnic colonies of millions of people from pre-modern societies with incompatible values and behaviours. As early as 1973, the *Catholic Bureau* mentioned the development of ghettos and subcultures, but did not succeed in attracting the attention of political and opinion leaders.

xii) The genocide and demography scholar and sociologist Gunnar Heinsohn comments on the consequences of recent demographic trends in Germany: The decrease of the ethnic German population and the emigration of highly skilled Germans will automatically lead to the numeric dominance of ethnic non-Germans in Germany, resulting in turn in a decrease of those parts in the population which rejects foreigners: “Demography will lead to results, for which today the most expensive programs are developed, in vain!”

Context: The comments are made against the background of a public debate on integration and Islamic issues, which Heinsohn discusses as a phenomenon of demographic unbalance. According to Heinsohn, there is a considerable potential for frustration and aggression among the ‘superfluous sons’ in the disadvantaged states of Africa and Asia. In a TV debate on October 29, 2006, Heinsohn defined the future tasks of Western societies as ‘civilising work in demographically troubled areas’ and ‘decrease in the birth rate.’³

xiii) At the opening of an ‘integration congress’, organized by the Catholic Caritas

charity, the German Minister of the Interior Schäuble rejected the demand to change German policies concerning ethnic integration.

Context: The old dogma of the conservative Christian Democratic Party that Germany is no immigration society is still repeated. Nevertheless, the opinion is gaining momentum that ethnic integration is a ‘two way street’.

xiv) Interview with Flemming Rose one year after the start of the so-called ‘cartoons controversy’ with conclusions about the failure of “multiculturalism”.

Context: The publication of cartoons of the Muslim prophet Muhammad in the Danish paper “Jyllands Posten” caused international Muslim protest against an alleged ‘blasphemy’. Flemming Rose, the man responsible for the cartoons’ publication, explains his conclusions from this experience.

3. Migration, integration and interethnic relations: the legal discourse

In the legal understanding of the German state, the concept of (ethnic or national⁴) demographic minorities relates only to the autochthon minorities of Germany: to the *Frisians* [2003: ca. 12,000⁵], the *Danish-speaking people in Schleswig-Holstein* [ca. 50,000] and the *Sorbs* [60,000], a Slavic people in Brandenburg.⁶ These ethnic groups are described as traditional minorities. At places, they form local or even regional territorial majorities. In addition, the *Sinti* and *Roma* [ca. 30,000], whose history in Germany dates back at least 500 years, are also recognized as an official ethnic minority. On the contrary, the *Jenischen* [200,000], with a background of a distinct travelling culture, are not recognized as a national minority despite the fact that their number in Germany is far higher than any of the recognized, “traditional” minorities. The rights of the traditional minorities are protected by the constitutions of several German Federal States (‘Länder’)⁷ and by international agreements such as the *Concluding document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (CSCE – now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) of 29 June 1990, approved unanimously, which sets out collective and individual rights for minorities across the CSCE region. Sometimes the ethno-religious group *Jews*

is included in this definition of minorities in Germany.

According to the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*⁸ (5 November 1992), which has been valid in Germany since 1999, the following languages are protected as minority languages in Germany and at the same time as part of Europe’s cultural heritage: Danish, High and Low Sorbian, North and Sater (South) Frisian; the *Romanes* of the German Sinti and Roma. As a regional language *Niederdeutsch* (Low German) is protected and sponsored.

The bulk of the *de facto* members of ethnic minority groups in Germany – seven million people - however, are allochthone and most of them of foreign citizenship. As citizens of another country, immigrant minorities do not fall under the definition of minorities as defined in the draft of the *European Convention for the Protection of Minorities* (1991)⁹, but are considered to be “foreign residents” of Germany¹⁰, regardless of the fact that a second and third generations of descendents of foreign migrants were born in Germany. Many of the immigrants came to Germany for work and/or study purposes at a young age and subsequently spent most of their life in the country. In the European legislative debates on the definition and protection of ethnic and/or national minorities, various CSCE member states, in particular Turkey and France strongly opposed the standards of minority protection spelled out by the Copenhagen agreement. With regards to their own domestic situations, they refused to accept a definition of national minorities, and crafted, during a meeting of experts from CSCE member states in Geneva in July 1991, the following statement in the concluding document: “[the states] take into consideration that not all ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences necessarily lead to the creation of national minorities”.

Besides the flaws in the existing European legislation on minority protection, there are also historic reasons for the current situation in Germany. For decades, the German institutions and policymakers refused to recognize the fact that there is immigration into Germany. The foreign labour force, hired during the 1950’s in Southern Europe and in Turkey, as well as their descendents and relatives were considered to be ‘foreigners’, even at a time, when it had become obvious that most of these ‘foreigners’ or ‘migrants’ were going

to stay in Germany and were not going to return to their countries of origin, in particular Turkey. Nevertheless, German Minister of the Interior Schäuble confirmed this point of view at the opening of a conference on integration issues in early December 2006: „We never were a country of immigration and until this day we are not a country of immigration.“¹¹ The minister did not deny that migration to Germany is taking place. But for him the term immigration is linked with immigration policies and the selection of immigrant cohorts. With regards to such criteria, the minister sees a clear distinction between Germany and, for example, a country of immigration such as Canada.

The consequences of the refusal to accept migration as a massive *de facto* immigration were and are far-reaching: As a result of this false assumption, no efforts were made to incorporate immigrants into the German society. However, the leading assumption that Turkish labour migrants would eventually return to Turkey was not only popular among German politicians and migration decision-makers. Most migrants of the first generation themselves assumed that they would return and therefore expended as little effort as possible on their way of living, their command of German, etc.

The events monitored in Berlin during the last three months of 2006 show, on a municipal level, corrective attempts to cope with the consequences of the increasing cultural/societal diversity in Berlin's society. Some initiatives failed or have been interrupted for internal reasons, such as lack of money or interpersonal conflicts. The approach described in Nos. ii and vii of the monitoring aims to increase the number of migrants of Turkish origin in the civil service and in the Berlin police force, the latter being the result of an increasing number of clashes between the police force and the migrant population in certain residential areas (No. viii). As the media reports of such developments, this approach bears new conflicts: a) one problem is caused by the poor command of German among migrant applicants for positions in civil service and the police forces. If the Berlin administration would decide to lower the proficiency level for lesser qualified migrants, this decision would violate the principle of legal equality. b) If the administration decides to lower the qualification level in general, this would lead to a general decrease in the professional qualification of civil servants, including the police force. Closely linked

with a possible violation of legal equality and the European antidiscrimination legislation is a proposal by the conservative politician Volker Kauder (Christian Democratic Union), who suggested an increase in the percentage of Turkish speaking school teachers. Such proposals are brought about by the observation, that „German schools (...) are confronted with a threefold problem: On the average, teachers are too old and among them are too few men and not enough migrants. In other words: In the classrooms, difficult male pupils and a high percentage of mostly un-integrated children of Turkish, Lebanese or Yugoslavian origin are taught by older German women, who are not taken seriously as role models. Furthermore, these teachers sometimes simply do not know, to which type of authority these children react in a positive way.“¹²

The attempt by the Berlin Senate administration to introduce a quota in favour of migrant teachers was successfully challenged by an ethnic German female applicant, on the ground that such quotas violate the new EU antidiscrimination legislation. Supported by the *Trade Union for Education and Science* (GEW), the administration plans now to amend Berlin's law on the training of teachers: Teachers with a command of certain (migrant) languages such as Turkish will be preferred in decisions about job applications; the administration intends to mark certificates of such students higher than others, whereas the trade union suggests to reduce the waiting period from three years to one year. However, an approach that is directed first of all to the increase of school discipline seems too narrow with regards to the general question of language command, integration and the understanding of school teaching. Yelda Özcan (born 1961, Istanbul), an exiled Turkish writer and journalist residing in Berlin since 2001 explains the different educational ideals and traditions in Germany and Turkey: “When my son was seven years old, I attended a meeting of parents at his school, in an area of central Istanbul. I had heard that the female teacher was beating the children. Because I wanted to avoid directly addressing this and because I did not want to be taken for impolite, I asked: If the children are very unruly or naughty and do not keep order in their class-room, what are you going to do? Before she could answer, several parents, among them several women wearing headscarves, spoke up and said: Mrs. Teacher, please beat our children! If they are unruly, they deserve to be beaten! Because of my question,

these parents understood that I am against violence, and immediately they rallied against me. I was the minority. I was completely alone in my opinion, and the teacher did not have to make any comment. A parents' meeting, at which it is said, 'Please, do beat our children!' – that is unimaginable in Berlin."¹³ Without questioning the 'type of authority' to which Turkish migrant children might traditionally react, the increase of young male teachers of migrant background may result in the growth of 'educational violence' as accepted in Turkish schools.

Another general problem linked with the preference of Turkish in school is the fact that Turkish is neither the state language nor an acknowledged national or ethnic (minority) language in Germany. In the public discourse on integration, most participants meanwhile agree that migrant minorities have to adapt linguistically to the state language – German. In a larger context, the preference of migrant languages is linked with the acceptance of the concept of multiculturalism¹⁴. This concept allows the co-existence of distinct immigrant cultures different from the monoculturalism of a nation state and its normative ethno-cultural homogeneity. The policy of multiculturalism was first introduced in Canada (1971) and was quickly adopted by nearly all countries of the 'old' European Union before being abandoned by several of them, notably Denmark and the Netherlands, in a 'revival' switch. The reasons for this revival have not been profoundly explored, although political changes from social-democrat to conservative governments, negative experiences with multi-cultural policies and violence in the name of Islam¹⁵ come first to mind. Some recent European critics even blame the naïve romanticism of multiculturalists for the neo-conservatism in Europe.¹⁶

Similar developments can be observed in Great Britain, Austria and Germany, where the once wide-spread social consensus among the political, cultural and media elites was replaced by a critical questioning of the main thesis of the ideology of multiculturalism – the alleged equality of cultures: Are all cultures truly equal in all their elements, and more important: Are all these elements compatible, acceptable and worthy of respect? However, ardent followers of the multicultural rule do not worry about the compatibility of cultural elements or integration issues, as integration and adaptation seem unnecessary in a society of equally respected cultures.

The monitored media coverage includes two reports about aggressive and violent behaviour of immigrants in residential areas with immigrant majorities (Nos. iii and viii). In an interview from November 2006, two Berlin juvenile court judges warned against "a new wave of adolescent violence" and described fear and violence as part of the daily life experience in parts of Berlin's residential areas of Neukölln, Schöneberg, Wedding and Tiergarten, where German girls are victims of adolescent immigrant (Turkish or Arab) perpetrators¹⁷: „For some time, we have observed among the perpetrators an open hostility towards Germans. That leads to the humiliation of girls, who are fondled and kicked. In the protocols you will always read, 'You German slut!' In the past, I never came across such incidents, with the exception of German perpetrators and the hatred of foreigners.

'Fucking Christian, pork eater' (Schweinefleischfresser) – those are the most common insults. Recently we learnt about a school, whose entrance is unofficially reserved for Turks and Arabs. German pupils are not allowed to enter through this entrance. After one child violated this rule, the girl was pressed against a wall and harassed with copulation movements. Then she was threatened: 'You are not allowed to lift your eyes. A German slut is not allowed to look at me.'¹⁸

Critics of multiculturalist ideology point to the offences described above as part of a Macho ethno-religious 'culture', which is clearly incompatible with the secular value system of liberal, post-modern Western societies. In an interview given a year after he unknowingly provoked the so-called 'cartoon controversy', Flemming Rose of the Danish 'Jyllands Posten' mentioned a poll among the approximately 200,000 Muslims in Denmark in the spring of 2006. Only ten percent of the respondents placed freedom of opinion above the protection of religious feelings. More than fifty percent believed that the protection of religious feelings must be the highest priority, whereas percentages among Denmark's Non-Muslim population are exactly the opposite. Less than ten percent of Non-Muslim respondents think that religious feelings must be respected to a greater extent than the right to freely express one's opinion. Rose concluded that such a result is contrary "(...) to the development of European history of the last 200 years and contradicts everything which has been fought for in order to

establish liberal, secular democracies. (...) The multiculturalists and the leftists (...) have betrayed all values, for which they had once fought: equal rights for men and women, the right to freely choose a partner, the right of education. All these were once aims of the leftists. But once the Muslims were concerned, they (the leftists; TS) did not want to hear about this any longer. Everything is now explained by cultural differences, which have to be respected.”¹⁹

All critics of immigrant/Muslim violence, however, hurry to emphasise that the borderline between liberals and religionists is not exactly identical with ethnic/religious communalities. For example, F. Rose stated: “The borderline (...) runs between those, who keep to democratic rules, on the one hand, and those, who despise these rules and take refuge in violence, on the other. Democratic Muslims are my allies. Danes, who side with radicals and fundamentalists and push their own agenda in this way, are not my allies.”²⁰

In Germany, this statement is confirmed by increasing criticism from the side of representatives of the Turkish speaking community, such as the Turkish-Circassian sociologist Dr. Necla Kelek (born 1957 in Istanbul) or the Turkish-Kurdish Berlin-based lawyer Seyran Ateş (born 1963 in Istanbul), as well as the members of parliament Ekin Deligöz (“The Greens”) and Lale Akgün (born 1953 in Istanbul; Social-Democrat). It is no coincidence that most of the critical voices from the Turkish community are female and frequently from an urban, bi-national background with one parent belonging to an ethnic minority.

Based on personal experience as well as in-depths interviews with 50 women of Turkish and Muslim background, N. Kelek describes in her bestselling book *The Foreign Bride*²¹ the Turkish community in Germany as self-isolated, self-centred and largely unwilling to communicate with the majority population: “I have my doubts, whether the majority of Turks, residing in Germany really want to be integrated – their prevailing attitude speaks to the opposite. Most of them do not read German newspapers, not to mention German books. Most of them watch exclusively Turkish TV, shop in Turkish shops and have no private contact with Germans. The country in which they live is foreign for them, and it remains foreign. (...) This attitude is encouraged by influential Turkish institutions in Germany.

None of them, none of the Turkish papers issued in Germany and none of the religious associations leads a truly active policy of integration, be it for the sake of convictions or out of the fear of losing their influence on the Turks residing here. They swear to the [Turkish; TS] constitutional principle of ‘one flag, one nation’, they celebrate their Turkish nationalism and it is their interest to improve the position ‘of the Turks’. An interest in the German society is not visible.”²²

In this shadowy world of a largely uncontrolled ‘parallel society’, the import of ‘unspoilt’ young women, frequently in the context of arranged and/or forced marriages, domestic violence and control of women and even the murder of women as the result of a patriarchal ‘honour codex’ is a wide-spread habit. The far reaching influence of this ethno-religious island is demonstrated by the fate of S. Ateş, who was seriously wounded during an attempted assassination in 1996 and had to see the perpetrator from the extremist rightist ‘Grey wolves’, or MHP party, set free because a Berlin court ruled that the proof was insufficient. As a feminist lawyer, S. Ateş defended the interests of Turkish and Kurdish women. However, after massive threats in summer 2006 in the aftermath of the murder of Hatun Sürüncü, she felt compelled to resign.

MP Deligöz received threats, insults and massive criticism from the Muslim community, after she made a public appeal to immigrant Muslimas to integrate into the German society and “arrive” mentally and socially in the country of their residence. She criticized the headscarf as a symbol of self-exclusion. As a result, she is now under the protection of body guards. The media under scrutiny also reported about supportive reactions in the Turkish community of Germany. For example, a Frankfurt/Main based Turkish-German club honoured Deligöz publicly. As N. Kelek emphasised in the preface of her book’s third edition (2006), the percentage of Turkish women who wear a headscarf drastically increased over the last decade since 1996.²³ She also cites a 2003 study of the *Centre for Turkish Studies* (Frankfurt/Main), according to which 71 percent of the interviewed migrants define themselves as religious Muslims, among those 19 percent as ‘very religious’; compared with the year 2000, this was an increase of 14 percent.²⁴

The case of the Turkish actress Sibel Kekilli (born 1980 in Heilbronn/Germany), who had

criticized Islam for being violent during a public debate in Berlin, demonstrates the problematic link between the Turkish community of the city and the diplomatic representation of their country of origin. S. Kekilli's criticism aroused not only the protest of the predominantly Turkish audience, but also that of the Turkish Consul General of Berlin, who left in protest. The focus of this protest was the accusation that Mrs Kekilli allegedly "denigrated our nation", a legal offence according to the Turkish Penal Code (§ 301 and similar). The accusation of "insulting" or "denigrating" the Turkish nation/Turkishness is regularly (mis)used to silence liberal or democratically minded critics in Turkey and has led to the legal prosecution and condemnation of human rights defenders, journalists and writers. It also resulted in the assassination of the Armenian-Turkish journalist Hrant Dink on January 19, 2007, and the subsequent flight and exile of the first and only Turkish literary Nobel prize winner Orhan Pamuk after a court case under § 301 in 2006 and death threats by nationalist extremists in 2007. It is significant that such severe violations of the freedom of opinion are extended from the Turkish state territory to Turkish communities abroad.

It is not only members of the Muslim community or Turkish nationalists who attempt to silence critics, but also ethnic German or other European experts who sharply reject the criticism of Muslim/Turkish/Kurdish traditions or try to downplay the importance of the criticised cases as irrelevant 'single cases'²⁵, while stating an increase of 'Islamophobia' in the public opinion. Two recent studies seem to confirm such allegations: a 2006 study by the *Centre for Turkish studies* (ZfT; Essen)²⁶ and a EUMC study²⁷, which contains the following key findings:

- Muslims are often victims of negative stereotyping, at times reinforced through negative or selective reporting in the media. In addition, they are vulnerable to manifestations of prejudice and hatred in the form of anything from verbal threats through to physical attacks on people and property.
- Many Muslims, particularly young people, face limited opportunities for social advancement, social exclusion and discrimination which could give rise to hopelessness and alienation.
- Research and statistical data – mostly 'proxy' data, referring to nationality and ethnicity – show that Muslims are often disproportionately

represented in areas with poor housing conditions, while their educational achievement falls below average and their unemployment rates are higher than average.

- Muslims are often employed in jobs that require lower qualifications, and as a group they are over-represented in low-paying sectors of the economy. Their poor situation in the labour market is a particular cause for concern, given that unemployment is a key factor affecting integration. This was recognised in November 2004 by the EU leaders during the Justice and Home Affairs Council 2, which included employment as one of the eleven common basic principles for community and national integration policies.²⁸

The EUMC researchers paid special attention to phenomena of 'Islamophobia', although they had to admit that "Islamophobia is a much used but little understood term. Although there is currently no legally established definition of Islamophobia, and the social sciences have not yet developed a common definition either, policy and action to combat it is undertaken under the broad concepts of racism and racial discrimination, which are universally accepted by Governments and international organisations. The EUMC therefore bases its approach to identifying the phenomenon and its manifestations on internationally accepted standards on racism and the ongoing work of the Council of Europe and United Nations".²⁹ The problematic consequences of an equation of 'Islamophobia' and racism and of the use of a legally undefined term in the social sciences can be seen clearly in the examples given in the EUMC study for Germany. Most of the xenophobic incidents of 2004 and 2005 identified by the EUMC as 'Islamophobic' have been attacks on Turkish/Kurdish fast food stands, on a Muslim butcher shop and on mosques. The violence consisted of the painting of swastikas, of arson and a gun shot. However, the report also includes as an 'Islamophobic' incident a speech by the vice-president of the Cologne police department in Emden on 4 May 2005, where he made allegedly "Islamophobic statements", alluded to Huntington's expression of a '*clash of civilisations*' and outlined a menacing scenario of Islam taking over political power in Germany. He later publicly expressed his regret that his statements had been interpreted as xenophobic."³⁰

The quote of Huntington's term 'clash of civilisation' as 'Islamophobic' behaviour is an example in itself for the transgression of an anti-discriminatory discourse. Even more controversial is the use of 'Islamophobia' as one of seven criteria for 'group-related hostility towards humans' as defined by the director of the *Institute for Interdisciplinary Conflict and Violence Research* of the Bielefeld University, Prof. Wilhelm Heitmeyer. For him, 'Islamophobia' is equal to racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, homophobia, privileges of the establishment, and 'classical sexism'³¹. He defines 'Islamophobia' rigidly as a 'generally rejecting attitude against Muslim persons and against all teachings, symbols and religious practices of Islam'.³² It is obvious that the inclusion of any 'rejecting attitude towards religious practices of Islam' is incompatible with a liberal, feminist or human rights orientated criticism of Islam. The authors of the EUMC study seem more aware of the general incompatibility of a too rigid interpretation of 'Islamophobia' with basic human rights standards: "A distinction must also be made between attitudes and actions against Muslims based on unjust stereotypes and criticism of Muslim beliefs that can be seen as undermining fundamental rights. The common fundamental principles of the European Union and its Member States under Community law, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, must be respected. These values include respect for the uniqueness and freedom of the individual, freedom of expression, equal opportunities for men and women (including the equal right of women to make individual choices in all areas of life) and equal treatment and non-discrimination on a number of grounds, including, for example, sexual orientation. Efforts to protect those principles may at times clash with the perceptions of religious duties of certain individuals or faith groups. However, this perspective is of fundamental importance and Member States have a positive duty under international human rights law to protect and promote these values, while ensuring that a potential critical stance towards certain attitudes of other groups in society respects the principle of equal treatment."³³

Contrary to what seems to be common belief, the above mentioned ZfT study concludes that 11 September 2001 was not a turning point in the co-habitation of Muslims and the Non-Muslim

majority in Germany. According to this and previous studies, German media depict Muslim issues predominantly in the context of news on terrorism. The negative reaction caused by this negative context, is increasing. Interestingly, this fact does not affect the everyday life experience of Muslims, living in Germany. D. Halm states that, despite the increase in the amount of news on Muslim terrorism, there has not been an increase in the general rejection or exclusion of Muslims, even if appeals to religious tolerance were very seldom after 11 September 2001. More significant than the qualitative changes of the discourse are, however, the increasing negative connotations in the media coverage and subsequently in the unofficial discourse. However, as his only example, D. Halm mentions the decrease of media coverage of Muslim artists, whose numbers have not changed since 11 September 2001, although they are far less present in German media today than previously.³⁴

The current discourse on Turkish/Muslim communities, integration and similar issues in German mass media and beyond is not only characterized by a polarity of opinions, but also by the phenomenon of self-censorship. The debate on a Neuenfels' staging of Mozart's opera 'Idomeneo' in Berlin might serve as a telling example. The performance was cancelled in October 2006 due to a fear of Muslim attacks and was then reintroduced in December 2006.³⁵ In the media and in the German public, this incident was largely understood as a conflict between the Muslim conservatism and the freedoms of opinion and of the arts, although the local daily newspaper *Tagesspiegel* did cover the *Turkish Council's* public statement in support of the liberty of arts³⁶. In reality, the 'Idomeneo' controversy was rather an inner-German or inner-European conflict, based on false analysis of the threat, on popular perceptions of Islam as being generally violent and a lack of courage. Necla Kelek noted, that Germans "(...) fear to discriminate against Islamists for their religion or origin. Rather they (the Germans, TS) tolerate the violation of basic rights. This, however, originates in a specific German identity problem. (...) In this country, a feeling of guilt seems to be more relevant than the defence of the constitution. (...) The good Germans and quite a few Christians forgive Muslims of everything, only to reduce their own alleged guilt. The argumentation is simple: Foreigners are poor (because they are exploited by

us) and they are good (because they are different than us). Therefore the German society has to pay its debts and to support them. They do so with political considerations and financial subsidies.”³⁷ The Turkish author appeals to her German readers “to defend their achievements and values with much more self-confidence.” In particular, she expects the Germans not to be tolerant “of those, who despise our laws and only use them in order to extend their religious influence and continue their reactionary practice in the name of liberty.”³⁸

NOTES

- ¹ The period covered by the Monitoring was limited from 1 October until 31 December 2006.
- ² Dr. Tessa Savvidis is researcher at the Department of Sociology of the Institute of Eastern European Studies of the Free University of Berlin.
- ³ Das Philosophische Quartett: Demographie als Schicksal: Das Drama der Geburtenraten. - <http://www.ftsmmedia.de/philosophie.php?d=2006&artid=110&b=1>
- ⁴ The difference between ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ minorities is determined by the existence of a state, in which the given minority is a majority. In this sense, the Danes in the German Land Schleswig-Holstein are a national minority - the only national minority of the four officially recognized ethnic minorities of Germany.
- ⁵ Figures based on estimations by the minorities
- ⁶ Website of the German Embassy at Washington, D.C.: http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/facts/facts/question_s_en/landandpeople/population7.html
- ⁷ The ‘Länder’ in question are Schleswig-Holstein, Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
- ⁸ Online edition: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/148.htm>
- ⁹ Work on the Convention discontinued in 1996. For criticism and details, compare the contribution of Prof. Budislav Vukas (Zagreb) to the discussion on the state of minority protection in the enlarged EU at the Meeting of the CEI Working Group on Minorities, Lendava, 27 October 2004: http://www.ceinet.org/download/Vukas_WG_Lendava.pdf
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ Dernbach, Andrea: „Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland“ [We are not a country of immigration]. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 7.12.2006 - <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/archiv/07.12.2006/2948770.asp>
- ¹² Vieth-Entus, Susanne: Das fremdelnde Klassenzimmer [The Class Room is Getting Foreign]. *Der Tagesspiegel*, 18

December 2006. - <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/fragen-des-tages/archiv/18.12.2006/2971636.asp>

- ¹³ ‚Eine Türkin in Berlin‘ [A Turkish Woman in Berlin]. *Inländer: Zeitung für Verständigung und Integration*, No. 4, Dezember 2006, p. 14
- ¹⁴ Different typologies of integration philosophies and policies may be built empirically from the ground up or deduced from *a priori* theoretical assumptions. The position of German immigrant integration has been defined and classified in different manners. Gary P. Freeman mentions Castles (1995) and Castles and Miller (2003), drawing an example from earlier approaches. They conclude that there are three main types of approaches to ethnic diversity among the liberal democracies: differential exclusion (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland), assimilation (France, Britain, and the Netherlands), and multiculturalism (the United States, Canada, Australia, and Sweden). A closely related approach focuses on national models, idioms, or traditions of citizenship and nationhood. The most influential effort of this sort is Brubaker’s description of two models—the ‘ethno-cultural’ (Germany) and the ‘civic territorial’ (France) (1992; cf. Favell: 1998a). – Freeman, Gary P.: Perspectives on Immigrant Integration in Europe: Emerging Commonalities and Stable Particularities. University of Texas at Austin, http://www.ces.boun.edu.tr/2/2/mart/gary_freeman.pdf; see also: Castles, Stephen: How Nation-states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity. *New Community* 21/3 (1995): 293-308; Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller. *The Age of Migration*, 3rd ed. (New York: Guilford, 2003); Favell, Adrian: Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain (London: MacMillan, 1998a)
- ¹⁵ Most cited examples are 11 September 2001, the assassination of the Dutch producer Theo van Gogh and the violent aftermath of the ‘cartoon controversy’
- ¹⁶ For example, Flemming Rose in his interview with the German journal “Der Spiegel”: „We were completely innocent“ – „spiegel online“, 15 December 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,454194,0.html>
- ¹⁷ „Zivilisatorische Standards gelten nicht mehr“ (‘Civilized standards are no longer existent’). „Tagesspiegel“, 23 November 2006, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/archiv/23.11.2006/2915719.asp>
- ¹⁸ Idem.
- ¹⁹ „We were completely innocent“ – „spiegel online“, 15 December 2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,454194,0.html>
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Kelek, Necla: Die fremde Braut: Ein Bericht aus dem Inneren des türkischen Lebens in Deutschland (The Foreign Bride: A report from the interior of Turkish life in Germany). (München 2005; 3rd edition August 2006). In 2002, N. Kelek defended a doctoral thesis on ‘Islam in everyday-life’ (Islam im Alltag).
- ²² Kelek. *ibid.*, p. 277

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- ²³ Kelek, *ibid.*, p. 14
- ²⁴ Kelek, *ibid.*, p. 257
- ²⁵ Kelek, *ibid.*, pp. 13-17 and 264-268. – See also p. 265:
“Some German scholars of Oriental studies tend to be more Muslim than the Muslims. This has a very concrete reason: If a scholar of Islam criticises the Islam, he risks a prohibition to enter Muslim countries, because every criticism is considered as blasphemy. He would be considered as an enemy by those whom he wants to explore.”
- ²⁶ Halm, Dierk (2006) Zur Wahrnehmung des Islams und zur sozio-kulturellen Teilhabe der Muslime in Deutschland [On the Perception of Islam and the Socio-cultural Participation of Muslims in Germany]. Essen, 2006 - http://www.zft-online.de/UserFiles/File/Endbericht%20_2_.pdf
- ²⁷ European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia: Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, (December) 2006. - http://www.migration-online.de/data/muslime_in_europa.pdf LAMOPHOBIA
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 70
- ³¹ <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/Feindseligkeit/Menschenfeindlichkeit.html>
- ³² <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/Feindseligkeit/Islamphobie.html>
- ³³ EUMC (2006), p. 16
- ³⁴ Halm, *ibid.*, p. 40
- ³⁵ Lemke-Matwey, Christine: „Idomeneo“ soll bald wieder auf dem Spielplan stehen. „Tagesspiegel“, 4 October 2006. <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/archiv/04.10.2006/2815575.asp>; „Idomeneo“: Polizei ermittelt intern. „Tagesspiegel“, 29 December 2006, <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/archiv/29.12.2006/2990740.asp>; Schaper, Rüdiger: „Idomeneo“ – Die Welt im Opernglas. „Tagesspiegel“, 17 December 2006; Führende Köpfe bei „Idomeneo“. „Tagesspiegel“, 16 December 2006- <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/archiv/16.12.2006/2968616.asp>
- ³⁶ Leber, Sebastian: Türkischer Bund: Kunst muss frei sein; heute Abend wird Mozarts „Idomeneo“ aufgeführt – zu Gast wird auch viel Prominenz sein. „Tagesspiegel“, 18 December 2006;
- ³⁷ Kelek, *ibid.*, p. 272
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 280

GERMAN EXPERIENCES IN CARRYING OUT INTERETHNO FIELD STUDIES

Marina Schwedler¹

1. Introduction

The societal integration of the Turkish migrants in Berlin is the central topic of the following analysis. In order to specify the perception and integration of this group, the results of a content analysis of the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* are presented and discussed. The content analysis was carried out in the period from October 2005 until March 2006. Its results will be used to verify the assumption of the key role of mass-media in the integration process. More precisely, the assumption is that the press can very much foster the openness of the German society, thus encouraging the integration of the population of Turkish ethnic origin. Given the freedom of press, print media can effectively influence this process.

The main question is whether the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* dedicates a sufficient number of publications to the cultural, social, political and other interests and problems of the Turkish migrants in order to reach both German and Turkish readers. If applied, this approach could stimulate mutual interests and accelerate integration from both sides. In this context, it is essential to find out whether *Berliner Zeitung* also pursues the goal of encouraging the integration of the Turkish migrants. This concerns the positioning of this group within the German society, its identification with the achievements, problems and prospects of German society, but also the interactions between the German society and the group of Turkish migrants.² One should take into account the fact, however, that neither German society nor the group of Turkish speaking migrants is ethnically, politically or socially homogeneous. In addition, due to the fact that German society is rapidly aging, the integration of the Turkish speaking migrants is becoming more important than ever.

2. The Turkish Migrants in Berlin

The presence of Turkish migrants³ in Berlin is not a recent phenomenon. Already at the beginning of the 20th century, Turkish speaking people lived in Berlin as immigrant workers. In the year 1917, 2.046 Turks were registered in the German capital.⁴ However, a large-scale immigration of Turkish citizens as so called “guest-workers” started in 1961, after a German–Turkish agreement allowed the employment of a Turkish work force in Germany. By the end of 2005, the number of Turkish migrants in Berlin rose to 117,624 people⁵.

This number does not include naturalised migrants, but refers only to those residents of Berlin, who still hold a Turkish passport. Residents of Berlin who gave up their Turkish citizenship to become citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany are not included in any specific annual statistics in Berlin. With or without German citizenship, the Turkish speaking migrants form the largest ethnic minority in Berlin. This is a very visible community, especially in the districts of *Mitte*, *Kreuzberg* and *Neukölln*. Turkish language, fashion, restaurants and shops actually dominate the urban landscape in these parts of the city. But Turkish people live in other districts of Berlin as well. Most of them consider Germany to be their home country, since their families have already lived in the country for two or three generations.

3. Reporting about the Turkish minority in the Newspaper *Berliner Zeitung*

The newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* has the largest circulation in Berlin, with an average circulation of about 0.5 million copies per day. Therefore, *Berliner Zeitung* can be regarded as the most influential among the reliable newspapers in Berlin. The formal analysis of the newspaper shows an increase in the reporting about the Turkish minority over the period of the content analysis from October 2005 until March 2006.

Table 1

Monthly amount of publications about the Turkish migrants

Month	October 2005	November 2005	December 2005	January 2006	February 2006	March 2006	Total
Number of publications	16	19	12	19	34	55	155

Concerning the statements of fact about the Turkish minority on the pages of the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* we have come to the following hypothesis: The increasing amount of articles referring to the Turkish minority cannot be regarded as a sign for increasing interest in the Turkish minority on the part of the newspaper under scrutiny. The reporting about the Turkish minority by *Berliner Zeitung* is linked to the illustration of events and key issues involving the Turkish minority but having a high *news value* in and of themselves⁶.

During the period of content analysis the following events and issues were in the centre of the public debate:

1) Reactions to the murder of Hatun Aynur Sürücü on February 7th, 2005

This was the most significant political event related to the Turkish minority during the period of content analysis. The Berlin police believe that the young Kurdish woman was shot by her own brothers because "(...) she had allegedly disgraced her family with her European lifestyle (...)".⁷ This pre-mediated murder for the preservation of the honour of the family led to a widespread controversy within Berlin society because boys from the Turkish community justified the crime with the words: "She had behaved like a German woman." The murder of Hatun Aynur Sürücü remained a key media topic after a court case against the victim's brothers started in September 2005.

The main *news factors*⁸ that make this event a key issue are *negativity*, *personalisation* ("human interest" / "human touch" on the basis of the profound illustration of the fate of Hatun Aynur Sürücü), *emotionality*, *meaningfulness* (Hatun Aynur Sürücü tried to integrate into German society, she had acquired German citizenship), *consonance* (shock /surprise about appearance of

such an unexpected "crime" and the emergence of the question about the real situation of Turkish migrants in German society - whether they are actually integrated).

2) Reactions to the riots of young migrants in Paris (in November, 2005)

In the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung*, the attitudes of young Turkish residents to these events were covered and the question was raised whether such riots could take place in Berlin as well. The main news factors in this case are *threshold* (such riots in Berlin could have a huge effect on the whole German society), *negativity*, *continuity* (as these events went on for a long time in Paris), *consonance* (anxiety regarding the appearance of such a conflict with the biggest minority group in Berlin).

3) The increase of reporting about education (in January, February and March, 2006)

One essential political event concerned the discussion about a possible obligation for migrant students in Berlin to use German as the only official language during classes. This discussion continued in an even more intensified way in February and March 2006. Much of the reporting focused on policies in the field of science and education. At the same time, educational issues were regarded more generally and not only in the context of the Turkish minority. The essential news factors that give this event news value are *meaningfulness* (in some respects German language is regarded as a precondition for integration of migrants.), *negativity* (protest of some representatives of the Turkish minority against an obligation to speak only German) and *consonance* (debates between representatives of the German ethnic majority and Turkish minority).

4) Reaction of the Turkish minority to the controversy over the Danish Mohammed Cartoons (in January and February, 2006)

In this context, the main news factors are *threshold* (the publication of Mohammed cartoons had an extreme effect on a large number of people) and *consonance* (anxiety of appearance of conflicts between Muslims and Christians).

5) Reactions to intended citizenship tests for migrants in Germany/Berlin (in February and March 2006)

This event was determined by the news factors *meaningfulness* (some representatives of German society maintain that there have to be some essential preconditions to get the German citizenship), *consonance* (appearance of debates about potential discrimination of migrants by implementing the citizenship test).

6) Severe violence at a secondary school with a high rate of migrant pupils led to the proposal by teachers to dissolve the school (in March 2006)


The news factors that determine the news value are *frequency* (after a general discussion about the obligation to use only German in schools, conflicts appeared again), *negativity* (illustration of negative

actions of pupils in school), *consonance* (shock/surprise that pupils could behave in such a negative way, indicating that there exist deep-rooted social problems in some groups and spheres of society).

Hence, the reporting about the Turkish minority was affected by the illustration of facts, problems and topics having high news values and which were expected to attract the attention of the readership. Since the content analysis was focused only on a part of the topics covered by the newspaper, this fact can only describe a tendency. On the other hand, half (cases **1; 2; 6**) of the key topics illustrated were directly or indirectly linked to acts of violence or acts of civil disobedience on the part of the Turkish minority. This fact leads to the second central hypothesis concerning perception of the Turkish minority by the *Berliner Zeitung*: Being based on a relatively critical and negative presentation of the Turkish minority, the news values primarily aim at reporting about the Turkish minority that results in a relatively critical, negative and narrow perception of this minority group. The higher number of negatively oriented articles than positively oriented ones reveals a critical and negative tendency in the perception of the Turkish minority group by the newspaper. The predominance of neutral articles can be assessed as a result of the balancing of different facts, which is a sign of reporting that tries to avoid bias:

Figure 1


Emotional orientation of the material



As Figure 2 demonstrates, the purpose of most articles was to inform the reader about facts and issues and to form a critical attitude towards a problem – without suggesting a solution:

Figure 2

Intent of publication




This problem-oriented reporting can lead to the formation of stereotypes in connection with the Turkish minority group. As a result, this group could primarily be perceived in connection with unresolved problems in German society.

Although there was a predominance of analytical articles with the general aim to give

relatively objective and profound background information about an event, the detailed illustration of this event, i.e. criminal activity. This can result in an intensification of stereotypes about the Turkish minority as defined by its high involvement in specific types of events:

Figure 3

Journalistic forms of presentation




It is important to note that there is a high frequency of the topics *court verdict* and *actions of civil disobedience*, especially during the months of October, November and December 2005. This might be explained by the fact that the reporting was dominated by the portrayal of the criminal activities of the Turkish minority and of facts concerning the background of the trial against the brothers of Hatun Aynur Sürücü during this period. The focus on topics changes, depending on the events. During the months January, February and March 2006, the topics *actions of civil initiatives*, *public movements*, and *demonstrations* became more relevant. There was also a noticeable decrease in the values *court verdict* for January and

a decrease of the value *actions of civil disobedience* for January and February. These are temporary fluctuations of the focus in the reporting. The situation changed in March 2006, when reporting about *court verdicts* and *actions of civil disobedience* once again began to increase. The background was the murder of a Berlin policeman by a member of the Turkish minority group and the above mentioned discussion about dissolving a secondary school in Berlin Neukölln.

By any means, the predominance of reporting on negative events is very remarkable. This supports the critical attitude that the newspaper forms about the Turkish minority:


Figure 4



The presentation of involvement of the Turkish minority in *actions of political parties*, *political movements*, *demonstrations and meetings* gives the impression of a full representation of the Turkish minority group as political actor. However, it turns out upon closer examination that many of the political issues in which the Turkish minority is involved were ignored by the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung*. For instance, it is striking that the reporting about the Turkish minority focused only on the spheres of policy connected to the above-mentioned key topics. Topics that deviate from the

key issues, like high unemployment rate among the Turkish minority or the participation of the Turkish minority group in the German political parties, are hardly mentioned. The explanation might be that the latter topics are less prone to create sensations or to be connected to very negative or very positive actions and events. The focus on cultural policy refers to the fact that it is possible to report on the way of life of some representatives of the Turkish minority group in terms of the perception of conflicts:


Figure 5



The stress on cultural policy might be a matter of preference because the topic refers to themes that have a human touch. This preference could be interpreted in the sense of a “depoliticization” of society and media. In this context, Figure 6 points out at the predominance of *other conflicts*. They were often related to the relationships between the regional executive power and members of the Turkish minority groups, who were involved in

criminal actions. But the same category also includes incidents directly or indirectly linked to the murder of Hatun Aynur Sürücü, which also implied moral and ideological conflicts. The emphasis on *other conflicts* paints a specific picture of the Turkish minority that in some respects seems to be exotic and specific in contrast to the German majority.

Figure 6




The exotic perception of the Turkish minority is intensified by focusing on its specifics. Indeed, the reporting on ethnic groups in general is very much

related to the Turkish minority in the first place (see Figure 7). Only 13 percent of all articles referred to *all citizens of the region*:

Figure 7

Groups of population as mentioned in the material




In the reporting, the Turkish minority group gives the impression of being very homogeneous and characterized by typical problems and activities, as well as by its involvement in specific events. The reporting of the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* gives the German readers the impression that the topics reported apply to all Turks in Berlin and that there are no representatives of the same ethnic groups who feel comfortable in the German society and do not produce any conflicts at all. The reason for the relatively negative picture that the newspaper

produces concerning the Turkish minority is linked to the reporting about the Turkish minority in a negative context. Another reason is connected to the fact that there is only a small number of journalists of a Turkish minority background who could improve the negative image of their ethnic group. Figure 8 shows that journalists stemming from the Turkish minority were underrepresented as authors of articles about the Turkish minority in the analyzed newspaper:

Figure 8

Political status of the publications




Turning to the political status of the publications under scrutiny, we notice that 85.8 percent of all articles express the *Opinion of the "man from the street"* or bear the character of rather *depersonalized statements of journalists*. Some 7.2 percent referred to *statements of representatives of the artistic intelligentsia of the Turkish minority* and 5.2 percent referred to *Statements of prominent journalists and commentators from the Turkish minority on current events*. This latter figure contains, among others, a new column in the newspaper written by a Turkish journalist advertising a new TV-series. It has the title "Türkisch für Anfänger" (Turkish for Beginners) and tries to explain the peculiarities and difficulties of the Turkish-German co-existence in everyday-life by using the example of a German-Turkish patchwork-family. The column is combined with an introduction into basic knowledge of Turkish. About 2 percent of the articles analysed consist of statements or comments by prominent representatives of the regional elite and of the national parties, of scientists and researchers and of representatives of Turkish parties and movements. The results correlate with the *type of articles*. The bulk of them contain objective interpretations of journalists. The interpretations rarely make an use

of purely linguistic effects of manipulation like metaphors or euphemisms.

In summarizing the perception of the Turkish minority group by the newspaper *Berliner Zeitung*, it can be seen that this perception is determined by key issues concerning the Turkish minority. They generally function on the basis of the journalistic principle: "Bad news is good news". The newspaper *Berliner Zeitung* does not actively try to moderate this negative tendency and considers the Turkish minority as rather isolated from the German majority. The newspaper tries to use objective linguistic forms in order to present the Turkish minority without emphasising the differences, but these efforts are not particularly successful. The quantity of illustrations of the Turkish minority in a negative context conveys a specific picture of this group to the German readership. The group is presented as relatively homogeneous and characterised by a high involvement in different conflicts. In addition, the perception of the Turkish minority is also determined by the very limited involvement of its representatives in the production of the newspaper, as mentioned above. As shown in Figure 9, in the majority of cases, the "man from the street" was quoted in the analysed material.

Figure 9



With a total number of 73 quotations, statements by the *man from the street* or depersonalised statements appeared most frequently on the pages of the newspaper under scrutiny. This category implies statements by a German or Turkish “man from the street”. With a total number of 22 statements, *representatives of the creative intelligentsia of the Turkish minority* make up another frequently used category. This phenomenon has to be judged very positively because, in this way, the newspaper conveys opinions of the Turkish-speaking minority and allows it to express itself. The relatively high number of 20 *statements by academic scholars or references to scientific-popular publications* can be understood as an effort to actually practice intentional objectivity. The number of *statements of representatives of the regional ruling elite* can be traced back to the high rate of issues of regional policy. Generally speaking, the reference to all sources and the predominance of representative sources – 88 altogether, in contrast to the *statements of the man from the street* (with a total of 73) – underline the persuasiveness of the analysed material. This positive tendency has to be properly evaluated but it can hardly compensate for the image of the Turkish minority drawn by the emotional orientation of articles and the negative choice of topics.

4. Conclusion

The results of the content-analysis can be summarized in the following way:

The selection of news stories about the Turkish minority is primarily determined by their news values. The objective forms of presentation of the information predominate. This underlines the efforts of the newspaper to be as impartial as possible.

The formal analysis registers a high number of depersonalized articles. Many articles contain the objective interpretations of journalists. The function of some articles as outlet for representatives of the Turkish minority emphasises the use of the newspaper as a channel for the Turkish community to communicate its opinions to the German majority.

This objective style of reporting should not be misinterpreted as objective reporting about the Turkish minority in Berlin. The difference becomes obvious when we analyse the purpose of the publications. The issues selected try to attract readership with spectacular themes that have high news values. Many articles connect the purposes *to inform and to form a critical attitude*. Although the majority of articles have a neutral emotional orientation, many spheres of policy are mentioned

in the articles due only to their connection to political events in Berlin or in Germany. There were many cases of events covered that automatically referred to negative contexts like “the honour–killing” court case or the killing of a German policeman.

The stress on *other conflicts*, on *statements of moral corruption of the Turkish minority* and the fact that there are more negatively oriented articles than positive ones leads to the assumption that some kinds of internal dilemmas accompany the reporting about the Turkish minority. The main dilemma can be described as a conflict between the critical perception of the Turkish minority group and the political correctness of reporting. The compliance to political correctness is obvious because the newspaper does not use rhetorical means like *explicit calls to discriminate against an ethnic group*, *concealed calls to discriminate against an ethnic group*, *quotations without proper comment*, *xenophobic statements and texts* or *statements about the moral supremacy of one ethnic group*. Nevertheless, it also becomes obvious that there are hardly any positive reports on the Turkish minority in this newspaper.

In addition to the articles by the above mentioned journalists representing the ethnic minority in the newspaper, such as the journalist who regularly writes the commentary “Unter uns” (“In private”) to the Turkish-speaking readership of the newspaper, other journalists also make efforts to awaken interest among the German readers for the Turkish language with the column “Türkisch für Anfänger” (“Turkish for Beginners”). Nevertheless, only 6 percent of the analysed material referred to positive aspects of the Turkish minority in Berlin. These articles illustrated, for example, the economic efforts of Turkish businesses in Berlin. In a sharp contrast, 21 percent of the reporting was focused directly on criminal activities and on the events related to the murder of Hatun Aynur Sürücü. The remainder of the reporting was mostly dedicated to the illustration and examination of political events like the reactions to the riots of young migrants in Paris, the controversy over Mohammed cartoons, the obligation for migrant pupils to use only German at Berlin schools and the reactions to citizenship tests for migrants. These are relevant political topics, but it becomes apparent that the newspaper concentrates on problems with the integration of the Turkish community into the German society. As seen from the opposite point

of view, this tendency does not go so far that achievements in the integration of the Turkish minority are completely ignored. But the presentation of the Turkish minority in the newspaper is based on a very narrow perception of the Turkish minority, regarding them primarily as losers in German society because some of them are involved in criminal acts. On the other hand, the newspaper presents topics that imply problems and/or complicate the integration process of the Turkish minority.

This kind of presentation of the Turkish minority will hardly stimulate the integration process by the majority society. The negative presentation and perception of the Turkish minority fails to show the whole spectrum of the Turkish ethnic group in Berlin, which actually has many similarities with the German ethnic majority. This impedes the identification of the German readers with the issues facing the Turkish ethnic group as issues of the German society itself. In addition, the newspaper is only partly addressed to Turkish readers. It is hard to believe that successful representatives of the Turkish minority would prefer to read a newspaper in which they and other representatives of their ethnic group are presented primarily in connection with bad news and scandals. Furthermore, the newspaper perceives the Turkish minority predominantly as an object which produces problems and not as one consisting of responsible people.

The increase in reporting about the Turkish minority group in the period analysed provides evidence for its increased perception by the ethnic majority in Berlin. But the perception seems to be concentrated more on bad news than on triggering sympathy and understanding for the manifold problems of the Turkish minority by the ethnic majority. The precondition for an adequate representation of the Turkish minority is the perception of this group as an integral part of German society. Moreover, this is actually an aspect which could be valuable to the German society given its demographic development. But taking into consideration the fact that a profit-orientated newspaper has to serve the interests of its readers, who are generally of German ethnic origin, the real or imagined interests of these readers indirectly set the guidelines for the publications in the newspaper.

Thus, as a politically independent newspaper, the *Berliner Zeitung* has to manage the balance

between providing objective information and the function of “self-assurance” for the recipient. The distortion of the balance has its effects, since the existing negative prejudices and attitudes can be intensified by negative reporting on the Turkish minority group. The solution is difficult but not impossible. It consists in reporting on negative phenomena together with reporting on the positive tendencies connected with changes in the Turkish minority group in Berlin.

NOTES

- ¹ Marina Schwedler is researcher at the Department of Sociology in the Institute for Eastern European Studies of the Free University Berlin.
- ² The readiness of the Turkish-speaking group to integrate into German society can only partially be taken into accounts since the serious treatment of this issue would require an analysis of the Turkish language press in Berlin.
- ³ The present-day Turkish-speaking community in Berlin consists of a variety of ethnic groups - ethnic Turks but also Kurds and other ethnic groups from Turkey, which use Turkish as their first or native language. There is a high percentage of linguistically acculturated Kurds among those who speak Turkish, both in Turkey and in the Turkish speaking community of Berlin.
- ⁴ See Greve, Martin; Cinar, Tülay. “Das türkische Berlin“ / 2., korrigierte und ergänzte Auflage/ Berlin: Die Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats / November 1998, p. 15.
- ⁵ Statistisches Landesamt Berlin/ Pressemitteilung 213/05 vom 2.11.2005/ in: <http://www.statistik-berlin.de/pms2000/sg03/2005/05-11-02.html> (13.03.2006)
- ⁶ News values determine how much prominence a news story is given by a media outlet. In practice, such decisions are made informally by editors on the basis of their experience and intuition..
- ⁷ Ramelsberger, Annette (2005) ,Vogelfreie Frauen’. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/,polm3/deutschland/artikel/160/48112/> (21.02.2005)
- ⁸ See Schulz, Winfried (1991) *Die Konstruktion von Realität in den Nachrichtenmedien*. Freiburg and München, 2.Aufl.

MOLDOVAN EXPERIENCE IN CARRYING OUT INTERETHNO FIELD STUDIES

Valentin Tsurcan, Valentina Teosa, Diana Molodilo¹

At the time of the 2004 census, Moldova's total population was 3,383,332. The largest ethnic group in the republic were the Romanians accounting for 76.1 % of the population. Other major ethnic groups were the Ukrainians (8.4 %), Russians (5.8 %), Gagauz (4.4 %), Bulgarians (1.9 %), and Jews (2 %).²

The Gagauz are Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians. They are concentrated around the cities of Comrat, Ciadir-Lunga, and Vulcanesti. It is agreed that they migrated to Bessarabia from Bulgaria in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Shortly after Moldova declared its sovereignty in June 1990, the Gagauz declared their independent "Gagauz Republic" in the southern part of the country. The 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Moldova awarded them substantial autonomy. Now Gagauzia is officially autonomous territory unit of the Republic of Moldova, called also Gagauz Yeri.

In order to study the current situation and the prospects of social integration of the Gagauz population under the conditions of the independent state of the Republic of Moldova, three methods of field study were applied:

1. **Interview.** 30 successful representatives of the Gagauz ethnic group were approached with questions about the modality and intensity of the ethnic minority's participation in the political, economic, and cultural spheres of the Moldavian society, as well as about factors influencing the degree of societal integration of the Gagauz people;
2. **Content analysis.** "Vesti Gagauzii" (Gagauzia News) was selected as the publication, upon which the content analysis was conducted.
3. **Monitoring of events.** The 9 publications with the highest readership and the broadest coverage of a wide spectrum of official authority structures and opposition movements were used as information sources.

The in-depth, structured interviews were conducted according to a pattern developed

specially for this INTAS project on three groups of successful representatives of the Gagauz ethnic group. The first group included politicians in the official public service, as well as in political, public and civil forms of activity. The second group consisted of business people who promote the socio-economic development of the Gagauz autonomy. The third group was represented by persons involved in the advancement of the national cultural revival.

The results of the interviews reveal the specifics of the participation of Gagauz ethnic elite in elected bodies and think tanks, in NGOs, in trade unions and in business organizations. One may notice disappointment in the political system and lack of willingness to be involved in political struggles. 26 of the 32 interviewed representatives of the elite do not belong to any political party. Only 4 of the interviewed persons are on the electoral roll of a political party – three in the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova and one in the National-Republican Party. One should keep in mind that there are more than 20 political parties and blocks in Moldova.³

In the interview, representatives of Gagauz people connected to politics, business and culture in the Republic of Moldova associate *promotion and success in career* predominantly with the synthesis «education – skills – experience – authority». However, they also note obstacles in the legislation, discrimination and language barriers. In addition, they stress the limitations of the access to information, the indifference of the young people and financial deficits.

The *social and cultural portrait* of the interviewed persons reveals a high level of education of the Gagauz elites. As a rule, they have a university education and a good command of 3 to 6 languages. They are also closely connected with the Gagauz national culture. Their parental families have different educational attributes. Half of the interviewees were brought up in families with university and secondary education, but the other half had only primary education. Two thirds of the respondents were brought up in families with an average or satisfactory level of wealth, the

rest in poorer families. As a rule, these families were not politically active. More than one third of the respondents live in mixed marriages.

The section devoted to the *connection with the culture of origin* confirms the complexity and the contradictory nature of the cultural processes in the traditional Russian-speaking environment of Gagauzia. The process of overcoming Soviet heritage and of reviving the national culture is gaining momentum. This is shown in the mastery of the native language, in the tendency to transfer language and culture of origin to the children, in the regular participation in ethnic cultural events and in regular contacts with representatives of Gagauz ethnic groups abroad. However, watching TV programmes or in reading newspapers in the Gagauz language presents difficulties. Very few people do this. Gagauz elites are characterized by moderate religiousness. None of the interviewees attend church services regularly.

The *choice of language system* varies very sharply among the groups of respondents. Politicians choose a bilingual (Gagauz as one of two languages) or trilingual system (Moldavian, Gagauz, Russian). The business persons prefer a bilingual system. The representatives of culture have a strong preference in favour of one official language. This result identifies some amount of divergence among representatives of the Gagauz ethnic group and the dependence of language preferences on other social factors and interests.

Among the *reasons of anxiety of Gagauz people*, the following are put forward: the ethnic group is poorly represented in the political decision-making process; it is difficult for Gagauz people to get a public service position and to find a well paid job; public opinion is against the ethnic group. The interviewees identify discriminatory practices in relation to the Gagauz in the economic, as well as in cultural and linguistic spheres. Religious beliefs are not a subject of anxiety.

The newspaper “Vesti Gagauzii”⁴ was selected for the **content-analysis**. The newspaper reflects the official position of the authorities towards the Gagauz minority living on the territory of the Autonomous Territorial Unit Gagauzia (ATU). The articles analyzed dealt with the relations between the ethnic majority and the Gagauz ethnic minority. The period of the content analysis covered publications from October 2005 to March 2006. The overall number of articles selected for the content analysis amounted to 177.

The official press in the ATU Gagauzia highlights the national relations in the region. In most cases, the information on the topic is included in anonymous articles. The cultural and economic policy in the region comes to the foreground in the presentation and interpretation of events. Other subjects reflected on the pages of the publication concern social policy, housing policy, educational policy and issues of the public health care.

The distribution of the analyzed materials according to their form reveals that impersonal statements of fact make out the highest percentage of the articles (42%). Many of them are written merely to inform the readers about the events. Commented messages, reportages, subjectively presented statements of fact with small commentaries are also frequently noticed (29% of the publications). Interviews with and speeches by public figures of the region also make up a considerable part of the analyzed materials (12%). Analytical articles and documentary materials make up 9% and 7% respectively. Special attention was given to the Peasant Revolt in Comrat which occurred in 1906. A number of documents, texts of trials and testimonies of witnesses were published to inform people about the events that took place at that time.⁵

The newspaper “Vesti Gagauzii” publishes mostly informational material concerning national relations (78%). This information includes reports about the work done by the Executive Committee of Gagauzia. Other materials inform about projects in the region or about awards given by the Head of the region to outstanding representatives of the region. As we could expect, the official edition mainly covers the speeches of the Head of the region and his deputies, together with information about representatives of the regional ruling elite (49%). Representatives of the artistic intelligentsia of the Gagauz minority are also given appropriate attention (16%). They are people who make efforts to preserve the Gagauz language and culture. They publish the findings of their scientific research and of studies about the history and culture of the Gagauz people or create new works of art. Speeches from representatives of the central state politics are noticed on the pages of the newspaper comparatively rarely (12%). Space is also given to the opinion of the “average man”. There are depersonalized statements referring to history and tradition (9%). There are also popular scientific publications and articles from scientists together with analytical articles (9%). Speeches from

prominent journalists and publicists of the Gagauz-language region are not abundant (4%). The same applies to the speeches of prominent journalists and publicists at the national level (1%). The periodical under scrutiny represents official interests and, for this reason, the events related to life in the Autonomous Republic are given the highest coverage - 58%. There is also information about civil initiatives and public movements (11%).

Throughout the content analysis, no materials were found that highlighted the activities of the parties, actions of the police or terrorist activities. Information about demonstrations, meetings, pickets, strikes or military activities were identified in only 1% of the publications and actions of civil disobedience in only 2%.

The results obtained are best explained by the fact that the given newspaper reflects the interests of the government in the region and covers events intended to facilitate the formation of a positive image of both leaders and population. This being the case, the periodical lacks material that could ignite instability in the region. Information about the vulnerability of social groups that fight for their rights by means of picketing, meetings and strikes is also avoided.

For the **Monitoring of Events** we used as a source comprised of the 9 publications⁶ with the highest readership and the broadest coverage of a wide spectrum of official authority structures and opposition movements. The monitoring was also carried out within six months between 01.10.2005 and 31.03.2006. During the period of the field study, 269 cases were registered in which the representatives of Gagauz minority of the Republic of Moldova were involved. The data collection was carried out in close cooperation with a representative from a research group in Komrat⁷ (Gagauz Yeri). There were no significant problems regarding access to the necessary information. However, in some cases, especially concerning opposition press, there were delays in the reception of some issues.

According to the monitoring data, the ethnic problems currently facing Gagauz people are reflected in all types of events and reactions to them: economic, cultural historical, social, political legal and particularly national.

Within the period of the field work, the sources included in the monitoring referred to events as "interethnic relations themselves" in a small share

of the reported cases - 3.0%. The reason for the insignificant presence of this type of events is the decrease of their topicality for Gagauz Eri public opinion during the period under scrutiny. The topicality of this type of events declined in the Gagauz Eri substantially after the settlement of issues related to the national identity of Gagauz people in the 1990s. The most frequently reflected events concern "domestic and/or international political decisions and actions" - 30.1%, and "domestic and/or international cultural and historical events" - 26.0%.

The events stated as monitoring results are mainly of a nonrecurring nature - 79.6 %. Recurring events make up one fifth of the total - 20.4 %. Taking into account the fact that there are a great number of long-term, strategic problems in this society, the ratio of nonrecurring to recurring events is inadequate for the existing situation.

Both the official and the oppositional press cover primarily regional and local events - 45.4% and 37.5% correspondingly. Events on the national level are reflected to a much smaller extent in the sources - 12.3%. On the one hand, this situation is explained by the insufficient participation of Gagauz Yeri in the national life of the Republic of Moldova. It is indicative that regional events prevail only insignificantly over the events of the local level. Thus, the tendency of predominance of short-term and local events is observed. This fact apparently bears witness to some self-isolation of Gagauz Yeri on a national scale. On the other hand, the increased attention paid to local problems is indicative of their growing relevance in the wake of recently obtained socio-political independence.

After the intense conflicts of the 1990s, the events during the period of study are relatively peaceable - 92.9% "non-conflict" events in comparison with 7.1% of events related to conflict. Among the latter, the "low intensity conflict" events make up 5.2% and the "high-intensity conflict" events - 1.9%. It may be noted that the relatively small percentage of conflict events results from the fact that in both Gagauz Yeri and Chisinau⁸ one and the same party is in power - the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova. Undoubtedly, this fact reduces the intensity of conflicts in the region but does not exclude the possibility of them completely.

In a number of cases, the events provoke response and reaction. Depending on the characteristics of the event and the degree of its

importance for society and for social groups, the reactions to the event differ in their degree and intensity. On the other hand, some features of society and social groups also determine the different degrees of reaction to events.

The nature of the reaction to events reflects the specific form of the publication. First, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that only 23.4% of the events provoke reactions and responses. This small proportion of reactions to events is indicative either of the limited intensity of events or of the manner in which they are presented. Taking into account that events concern very important aspects of life in Gagauz Yeri, one can draw conclusions about the insufficient activity of both the civil society and official power structures. Given the limited circulation of printed mass media, we can assume that the majority of the population is not informed about many events.

The results of the monitoring show that the emotional reactions to events are dominated by positive attitudes - 52.4 %. Obviously, the majority of reactions are characterized by the fact that people do not feel threatened by the events. The neutral and negative emotional attitudes, in 17.5% and 30.2% of the reactions respectively, are marked by a low intensity of negative emotions. The majority of the reactions to the events are characterized by a low risk level or its total absence – 6.3% and 84.1% correspondingly. At the same time, it is necessary to note that the risk in reactions to events is not completely absent – 4.8% evaluate the degree of risk as very high, and 6.3% as moderate.

The conclusions concerning the social integration of the Gagauz minority in the Republic of Moldova that stem from the analysis, are the following:

Serious problems exist concerning the integration of the Gagauz minority in the society of the Republic of Moldova. The respondents identified discriminatory practices in the political and economic spheres. The most positive results relating to integration concern the cultural/linguistic legislation and practice as well as the absolutely positive situation with respect to religious freedom and choice.

The reasons for the existing problem situations can be found in the legislation, in the bureaucracy and in the traditions on one hand. On the other hand, they are related to the low level of civic

engagement of the Gagauz minority in Moldova and in the development of democracy itself.

On the whole, it is possible to draw the preliminary conclusion that the social integration of the Gagauz minority in the Republic of Moldova can be defined as successful. At the same time, the study also revealed a number of problems, which require political measures for optimization of the social integration of the Gagauz minority in the Republic of Moldova in the course of the democratic political transformation.

NOTES

¹ Dr. Turcan Valentin, INTAS Project National Coordinator, Dr. Teosa Valentina, INTAS Project Scientific Adviser, Molodilo Diana, INTAS Project Assistant Researcher, PhD student, Moldova State University.

² Nota informativa "Cui privire la totalurile recensamintului populatiei din 2004 [Information Note "Regarding the results of the population census from 2004"] In : <http://www.statistica.md/recensamint.php?lang=ro> (03.08.2006)

³ Partide politice si alte organizatii social-politice din Republica Moldova [Political Parties and other social-political organizations from Republic of Moldova]. See <http://www.parties.e-democracy.md> (23.07.2006)

⁴ «*Vesti Gagauzii*» [Gagauzia News] is a regional newspaper. In its appendix it publishes a "Bulletin" including official documents of Gagauzia (local laws, governmental decisions). The newspaper is published weekly in Komrat with a circulation of 5170 copies.

⁵ See Cakir, Mihail./Basarabyali Gagavuzlarm Istoryasi. [History of the Gagauz people of Bessarabia.]. Chisinau, 1934.

⁶ 1) *Vesti Gagauzii* [Gagauzia News] – the regional newspaper – the organ of National Assembly of Gagauzia

2) *Znamia* [Banner] (Chadyr-Lunga), founded by the executive committee of Gagauzia and editor's labour collective, published weekly, circulation of 5000 copies, official, regional

3) *Nastoyashee znamia* [Veritable Banner] (Chadyr-Lunga), founded by the administration of Chadyr-Lunga, published weekly, circulation of 5000 copies, oppositional, regional

4) *Stolitza Komrat* [Capital Komrat] (Komrat) founded by the mayor's office and municipal council of Komrat, published weekly, circulation of 5000 copies, official, regional

5) *Panorama* (sheet newspaper), founded by the administration of Vulkaneshty, published in Russian, circulation of 500 copies, oppositional, regional

6) *Anna sioziu*, issued on means of general sponsor, the Turkish agency on cooperation and development, attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic.

7) *Achik Gioz*, subheading: a newspaper for non-party people, issued irregularly in Russian and Gagauz languages, circulation of 500 copies.

8) *Edinaya Gagauzia* [United Gagauzia] founded by the political movement "United Gagauzia" Komrat, is published weekly.

9) Magazine *Saba ildyzy* [Morning star], subheading: "Ethnos. Culture. History", appendices: children's magazine "Giunezchik" (the Sun), founded by the executive committee of Gagauzia.

⁷ Komrat is the capital city of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia.

⁸ Chisinau is the capital city of the Republic of Moldova.

RUSSIAN TATARS: IDENTITY AND SOCIETAL INTEGRATION

Irina Kouznetsova-Morenko¹

Tatars make up the largest ethnic minority in Russia, numbering 5.5 million or 3.8 % of the Russian Federation. The Republic of Tatarstan plays a significant role in the federation because of its untypical model of federalism. It came about due to specific circumstances and active policies, both on the side of the Republic and of the federal centre.

Tatarstan is situated in the middle Volga region. It is a large industrial centre and one of the most economically developed regions in Russia. The population of the Republic is 3.8 million. The major ethnic group consists of Tatars (51.3 percent of the population of the Republic). The Russians make up 41 percent of the population. The Republic claims responsibility for the development of the Tatar national culture and language and for the preservation of the ethnic identity of the Tatars living on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The research carried out within the framework of the project "Comparing societal integration of Turkish and related minorities: Institutional strategies in INTAS and NIS countries"² aids in understanding key dimensions of the current situation of the Tatar ethnic group. They include the role of ethnicity in the social capital of Tatars, the reproduction of ethnic values and language by the Tatars' elites, the ethnic preferences and stereotypes of the Tatar elite and the preferences towards living in the sovereign Tatar State. Other issues studied in the framework of the project concern the content and intensity of events connected with the status of the Tatar ethnic group, the connections of Tatars in Russia with Tatars abroad, etc. In this paper we will examine the results of thirty semi-structured interviews with successful representatives of Tatar elite as well as the monitoring of events and documentary analysis.

The unique nature of Tatarstan as compared to other constituent republics of the Russian Federation is determined by the ethnic composition of the Republic. Its territory is one traditionally characterized by a dense population of Tatars. The history of their statehood extends from the Volga

Bulgaria, through the Golden Horde and Kazan khanate until 1552. The unique legal situation of Tatarstan is based on the consequent realization of the right of self-determination of nations. The period of strengthening of the Republic's autonomy was marked by the actions of Tatar nationalistic movements during the decline of the Soviet Union. The radical wing of the movement insisted on the complete separation of Tatarstan from the structure of the RSFSR and on the gradual replacement of the non-Tatar population by Tatars from outside of the Republic. This wing of the Tatar movement was able to mobilize several thousand people through its interpretation of the history of interrelations between modern Tatarstan and the Russian Federation and by exploiting of the political resource of ethnicity.

The collapse of the Soviet Union opened possibilities for a practical realization of the desire of Tatarstan's nationalist elite for the sovereignty of the country. The Declaration on state sovereignty was adopted on December 30, 1990. This act had its historical roots in discussions about the status of Tatarstan carried out first in 1917 and then again in the 1930s in the context of the preparation of the Constitution of the USSR of 1936. In 1991-1992 Tatarstan became the leader in the efforts of political subjects of the Russian Federation to gain sovereignty. The process resulted in the adoption of the new Constitution of the republic in March 1992. Sovereignty was proclaimed on the basis of a referendum conducted at this time, although the Federal Constitutional Court and the government of the Russian Federation had strong objections against it. The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan fix its status as a sovereign state. In 1994, it was clarified that the Republic is associated with the Russian Federation on the basis of a Treaty "On Delimitation of Jurisdictional Subjects and Mutual Delegation of Powers between the State Bodies of the Russian Federation and the State Bodies of the Republic of Tatarstan".

After the election of Vladimir Putin as the second President of the Russian Federation, the federal centre started a policy of strengthening

state structures, first of all of their executive branches. This was made possible by the creation of new federal districts in 2002 and later by the abolition of the direct election of governors in 2005. In 2002, the Constitution of Tatarstan was adjusted, after decisions by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, to conform to the Russian Constitution. The current period is marked by the preparation for a new transformation of the interrelations of the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. According to a 1994 treaty between Russia and Tatarstan, which expired in July 2005, the Republic received special powers and rights not granted other republics of the Russian Federation. Thereafter, a new power-sharing treaty between the Republic of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation was prepared. It includes the adoption of a special clause stipulating the responsibility of the Republic for the development of the national culture and language and the identity of the Tatars living outside the boundaries of the Republic, together with the strengthening of the position of the ethnic majority in Tatarstan. The Tatar ethnic group is understood as the basis of the local statehood. In the context of the preparation of the new treaty, the monitoring of events revealed the influence of cultural particularism among the Tatars.

The post-perestroika transformations in politics and culture have influenced the development of a new ethnic identity among the Tatars. The collapse of Soviet identity and the development of ideas and practices of ethnic sovereignty resulted in the use of ethnic resources in shaping cultural policies regarding the dissemination of Tatar art and mass culture, language and education. According to the findings of the study, the strengthening of the Tatar ethnicity is not perceived as a barrier hindering social mobility in Tatarstan. The factor identified by the interviewees as most significant for the achievement of a higher status was the factor of education. It was also underlined that belonging to the Tatar ethnicity helped the respondents to reach higher social positions in Tatarstan. However, it was simultaneously underlined that Tatars in the Russian Federation generally have less chances for upward mobility than other ethnic groups. In the opinion of some representatives of the Tatar elite, the situation was described as a continuing cultural and linguistic oppression of the Tatars. It was characterized as a negative public opinion towards Tatars together with economic and political discrimination. The respondents insisted on the

fact that these problems should be resolved. A special case of discrimination was evident in the prohibition to shift the orthography of the Tatar language from Cyrillic to Latin letters in 2004. Another issue raised was the suspension of special tax benefits for the Republic. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, Tatarstan paid no more than 25% of the taxes that were collected in the Republic to the federal centre, whereas the "Russian" territories paid up to 45%. The negative public opinion towards Tatars in Russia was mentioned by the respondents on various occasions: *"On a daily basis, one can feel it. ... they associate us with the Tatar-Mongols and therefore the attitude is somewhat negative from the very beginning. This is transferred from generation to generation"*. (interviewed politician)

The political rhetoric in this respect is very intense. The State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan addressed the President of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation with an open letter "On the necessity of urgent measures aimed at prevention of the threat to interethnic and inter-religious peace and consent in the Russian Federation" (26.01.2006). At the same time, the Committee of the State Council of Tatarstan on culture, science and ethnic questions rejected a draft of the federal law "On the basics of the state national policy" on the grounds of its non-conformity to the Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan. The stumbling-block became the clause 16, which states—that the Russian people are the "state-forming" nation, "self-determined on the entire territory of the Russian Federation".

While conducting research on the preferences towards living in a sovereign Tatar State, we were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, the respondents recognized the impossibility of both territorial and cultural separation from Russia. On the other hand, many of them expressed the desire to live in a separate Tatar state. Such a position was supported mainly by leaders of the influential nationalistic movements: *"I have been in many countries of the world and I have seen that people cannot be happy without their own state. People should have their own state structure that supports their education, language and culture. One cannot live without it. I see that the Russian Federation does not need Tatars at all"* (Chairman of the Tatar Public Center).

We discovered a high level of reproduction of ethnic values and language by the Tatar elite. Its representatives claimed a good or excellent command of the Tatar language, the transfer of Tatar language skills to their children, participation in the organization of events associated with the Tatar culture and a preference for other Tatars in joint activities. Informants expressed concern about the Russification of the information environment: *“Why are we losing the language – because the information environment is more than 90 % Russified”* (a representative of political elite). At the same time, the level of development of the Tatar mass media was evaluated as low, resulting in a lack of attention on the part of people towards the space of Tatar language information exchange. There is a high level of criticism directed at the federal and local authorities who do not keep Tatar culture alive in the stream of globalization. The monitoring of events and the interviews showed the popularity of a discourse on the “decline of the Tatar culture”. The interviews and the documentary analysis revealed different positions in the evaluation of this problem. We could identify both criticism of the federal bodies in Moscow for limiting the cultural development of Tatars and criticisms of local policies, which do not pay enough attention to the development of the Tatar national culture. Experts pointed out the insufficient use of the available potential for cultural growth and development of bilingualism in the republic. They also mentioned that some normative projects in the language sphere need further development and drew attention to the absence of scientific analysis of the current socio-cultural situation.

Since 1992, the Republic of Tatarstan has two state languages – Russian and Tatar. This is definitely one of the most significant victories for the Tatar national movement. Today, the language policy of Tatarstan does not leave any room for alternatives to bilingualism. This can be seen both in the results of the monitoring of the political situation and in the analysis of the interviews. Bilingualism was chosen by the majority of the respondents as the best language policy. We identified different positions of respondents that legitimated the status of the Russian language as the second state language in the Republic as well as instrumental justifications of bilingualism as a factor of tolerance. The instrumental approach justifies the parallel use of the Russian and Tatar languages in Tatarstan on the basis of the

importance of the Russian language as a means of interethnic dialogue within the territory of the Russian Federation: *“Russian, obviously, is the language of interethnic dialogue; one cannot do without it. The same with English – God wants it, both in Europe and in America”* (representative of business elite). Other respondents who adhere to the *tolerance approach*, insist that monolingualism, both in case of the Russian and Tatar languages, would violate the rights of a major ethnic groups in the multiethnic society of the Republic of Tatarstan.

Islam plays an important role in the ethnic identity of Tatars. To be a Tatar means to be a Muslim. Most representatives of the Tatar elite observe the major ceremonies of Islam, but do not adhere to the daily religious practices. As seen from one point of view, this is due to the lack of trust in the Muslim clerics. Another explanation refers to the discontinuity of religious practices in the Soviet era. Thus, the very situation concerning religion in Tatarstan and concerning the institutional conditions of its development bears some uncertainties. There are internal contradictions within the Muslim community in the Republic, which result in severe struggles for institutional power. However, there are also tensions between the state authorities and the religious leadership of the Muslims in the Republic. Both disagreements and institutional tensions might turn out to be temporary, since both the Government and the religious leadership of the Muslims understand the necessity of preserving the status of Kazan as the spiritual centre of Tatars throughout the Russian Federation. The accuracy of this assumption is confirmed by vigorous activities of the World Tatar Congress in the sphere of Islam. Provided Kazan can keep its good connections with the Muslim activists throughout the Russian Federation, this would be an important asset for Tatarstan in its relations with the federal centre.

Tatarstan conducts intensive international politics. The attractiveness of the Republic for foreign investments is conducive to the strengthening of its political and economic independence. As seen from another point of view, the position of Tatarstan as a spiritual and cultural centre of the Tatars facilitates various directions and types of cooperation between the Republic and Turkish-language countries and with states in the Middle East. As an advisor of the President of

Tatarstan stated, “*Tatars should work in the Turkish world, as it used to be centuries ago. This is our economic and cultural niche, our advantage*”. In fact, Tatarstan is one of the main Russian foreign trade partners with Turkey. It occupies the third place among the countries that trade with Tatarstan.

The concluding comments should raise the point that any tensions between Russia and Tatarstan would result in the destabilization of the complicated political, economic and social situation in the Republic. The official discourse on the “decline of the Tatar culture”, which is paralleled by the emphasis of this problem in the Republican mass-media, may evolve into wide spread discontent and a further expansion of the interethnic distance. The ethnic identity of the Tatar elite is strong and is characterized by the perception of discriminatory practices on the part of the federal centre. The government of Tatarstan

and the Tatar elite openly express their discontent concerning the cultural and ethnic policies of the Russian Federation. This might become the unifying basis for the consolidation of Tatar society and a clear argument in favour of separatist propaganda and political actions. The evolving image of Tatarstan as the religious and cultural centre of Tatars together with the intensive cooperation of the Republic with Turkey and the states of the Middle East might strengthen the economic, political and cultural support of this type of propaganda and political action.

NOTES

¹ Dr. Irina Kouznetsova-Morenko is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Kazan State Medical University.

² INTAS Ref. N. 04-79-7018.

SOCIETAL INTEGRATION OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS: PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES AND STRATEGIES¹

Svitlana Babenko²

1. Mapping the Subject

Beginning in 1475, Crimea belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The Crimean peninsula enjoyed several years of formal independence before Catherine II included it into the Russian empire in 1783. After the October Revolution, the Crimean Republic was established as a part of the Russian Federation and later as a part of the USSR. This status of the Crimean Republic existed up to 1945. In 1954, the Crimean Oblast was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic.

On May 18th and 19th, 1944, by decree of Stalin, 238,500 Crimean Tatars were deported from the Crimea. During the deportation, about half of the Crimean Tatars perished. The official reason for the deportation was their collective responsibility for collaboration with the fascist invaders during the Second World War. The active migration policy of the Soviet state in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the absolute dominance of Russians and Ukrainians among the population of Crimea in the second part of the twentieth century. Due to the centralized cultural policy, there was a gradual Russian assimilation of the ethnic minorities in the Crimea.

Emerging in 1960 in the places of deportation of the Crimea Tatars in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Siberia, the national movement of the Tatars took momentum. In 1967, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decree rehabilitating the Crimea Tatars. However, the right to return to the historical native land (Crimea) was not yet given to them. Nevertheless, the Decree made it possible for children of the deported Crimean Tatars to move from the rural settlements to towns, to get education and good quality jobs. In the 1980s, the majority of the Crimean Tatars living in the Central Asian republics were already city-dwellers.

On November 14, 1989, the Supreme Council of the USSR passed a declaration "About the admission that the repressive acts against peoples who had been undergone forcible migration were illegal and criminal; and about the guaranteeing of the rights of these peoples". The declaration became the legal basis for the suspension of restrictions on the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. The Ukrainian Republic in the USSR developed the first settlement and allocated funds for the Crimean Tatars' return to their historical native land in 1990-1991. Thus, a process was put in motion which is not yet completed:

Table 1

Dynamics of the Crimean Tatars Return in the 1990s

(thousands of people)³

Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Amount of returnees	28 200	33 800	41 400	27 600	19 300	10 800	9 200	3 600

According to the data from the Ukrainian population census conducted in 2001, 248.2 thousand persons who identified themselves as Crimean Tatars were living in Ukraine at that time. This number includes 243.4 thousand persons

residing on the Crimea. The census established the following ethnic composition of the population of the Crimean Peninsula: Russians – 58.5%; Ukrainians – 24.4%; Crimean Tatars – 12.1%; others – 5%.⁴

2. Specificity of the Field

In comparison to the Turks in Germany and Bulgaria, the Tatars in Tatarstan (Russia), and the Gagauz in Moldova, the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine have a rather specific history of deportation and repatriation. This history explains the complex set of problems currently facing the Crimean Tatars, with respect to migration and societal integration:

- a) the territory to which the Crimean Tatars have returned after their deportation is populated by people who have been living there already for about 60 years;
- b) the mass repatriation of Crimean Tatars has been taking place under the conditions of deep economic crisis in Ukraine;
- c) there is no other national state to support the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars apart from Ukraine, which itself has been working on establishing its own nation-state since 1991. For this reason, there are no well-developed institutional mechanisms for dealing with ethnic minorities in the country;
- d) currently, the population of the Crimea consists to a large proportion of former officers of the Soviet Army, Navy and secret services as well as of officers of the present day Ukrainian and Russian armies, naval forces and members of their families. All these segments of the Crimean population are strongly prejudiced against the Crimean Tatars as a result of Soviet propaganda;
- e) the Crimean peninsula has a future as a large holiday resort. Hence, land on the coast is already very expensive. There are clear indications that the Crimean Tatars expect to be allocated land as returnees from deportation.

These social and economic conditions constitute the complicated background of the obstacles to the societal integration of the Crimean Tatars and of current and potential interethnic conflicts.

In order to study the complexity and the contradictions of the inter-group dynamics accompanying the societal integration of the Crimean Tatars, a set of research methods was applied including monitoring of events, content analysis of the local press and in-depth interviews with successful representatives of the Crimean

Tatars. In addition, background information was collected and observations were carried out. The data collected by these methods made it possible to identify the structures and practices that determine and accompany the societal integration of the Crimean Tatars. The impact of various institutional structures and coping practices on the integration process were identified.

In order to analyze core problems of the Crimean Tatars' societal integration, we will continue by using results of interviews carried out with successful representatives of this ethnic group. Results gathered by other methods will be used only in order to enrich the analysis and its results. The Ukrainian team conducted 31 semi-formal interviews with representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, who hold high positions in business, politics, culture, and in the state administration of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea (ARC). The social portrait of the interviewees may be presented as following:

- all interviewees have a higher education;
- almost all of them had been activists in the national movement in the 1980s;
- after returning to the Crimea they participated at all levels in the Crimean Tatars' Madjlis⁵;
- most of them are married and the majority of marriages are not mixed;
- their level of religious involvement is rather high (almost all of them participate in religious services and have a strong Muslim identity).

The current positions of the interviewees vary from vice-minister of the ARC to party chair and from vice-rector of an Institute to chief executive of a large corporation from leader of a NGO to celebrated author. This variety of social positions notwithstanding, common features can be identified their career paths can be found out from their life-stories. First of all, almost all of them pointed out that the labels "*deported*" and "*enemy*" were stigmatizing at the place of the deportation and affected both the public opinion and the institutional restrictions on their professional development. As a result, the labels created on the one hand a strong group identity and assisted the internal integration of the Tatar community, on the other hand, the labels spurred the aspiration to be "the best" in order to overcome obstacles and prejudices.:

We learned a hard lesson from the deportation. Where we lived, we had the label of “deported”, of traitors, and this mobilized us. At school, we did our best to study because our parents constantly told us that under equal conditions we would always be on a level lower, we would be restrained, therefore we must be the best to be able to achieve something. (businessman, male, 47)

The restricted rights of the deported people influenced the biographies of all interviewees. They experienced limited opportunities to study, to get good jobs, to become members of the Communist Party and particularly to return to the Crimea. Channels for upward mobility were thus substantially blocked. In addition, they have had to cope with prejudices towards their ethnic group after their return to the Crimea. These prejudices were actually spread by the history books used in the Soviet educational system:

Constant oppression, constant incorrect, perverted description of the history of the Crimean Tatars, focused on the concept “Tatars” ... “The Mongol Tatars” (this nation doesn’t exist historically, but it is negatively referenced in Russian history of the Medieval times)...Starting in 1922, our national elite have been repressed and destroyed... from 1944 until 1970 we were not admitted to higher humanitarian institutions, so we have no professional historians, etc. It was prohibited to teach our national language – in 1946 an order by Stalin stipulated that instruction was only to be given in Russian. (historian, politician, male, 81)

This situation stimulated a strong resistance on the part of group representatives and motivated group leaders to save the language, to preserve the national history and to participate in the national movement aiming at a return back to the Crimea. This meant fighting for collective rights by developing informal organizations among the Crimean Tatars in the places of their deportation. On the individual level, this meant resistance against mixed marriages and support for efforts to maintain the ethnic and religious identity and traditions in spite of external pressure.

Most interviewees emphasized the importance of their families during those periods in which they

lived under poor living conditions. Large Tatar families with many children were sent to the agrarian areas of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and forced to do hard labour. It was exactly this precarious situation that forced them to develop survival skills and learn from their experience:

...The big family played a great role. There were constant hardships. It was necessary to work day and night. On average, I worked at 3 places simultaneously in the Soviet times and repaired cars at home at nights ... Also, when I came here I worked 2 or 3 jobs to be able to earn enough to survive. It provided me with skills, and the desire to have a better life. (businessman, male, 67)

Thus, hardships stimulated the inner motivation for achievement, which became a valuable resource for coping with the difficulties of the repatriation period and for attaining the high positions currently held. However, for many Crimean Tatars, the repatriation implied economic loss due to the macro-social crisis all over the post-Soviet space during the 1990s. They were confronted with high inflation, with the collapse of the labour markets and with structural unemployment. In addition, the Tatars returning to Crimea had to integrate into the “fully booked” occupational structure of the ARC. This meant professional and educational inconsistencies in the positions of many returnees together with the necessity to change occupations and to take simple jobs. Settlement in rural areas of the ARC dictated a change in life-style:

Most of our people were considered to be well-to-do, because the forcible deportation was a great stimulus...it made people want to study, to achieve something more. Many of us achieved a lot. We lived in good houses and had good incomes, but when we returned here, we lost our status. (lawyer, female, 43)

Most difficult is the loss of specialization and professional skills because of the departure for the Crimea. Before leaving, people were specialists in various spheres, but here they have no jobs. This forced them to work all kinds of jobs: growing tomatoes, building their own houses, doing everything possible for survival other than practicing their profession. The unemployment led in turn to

the loss of qualifications and to a deepening of problems (vice-minister, male, 43)

The intensive involvement in political life became one of the main channels for upward social mobility after the repatriation. One of the interviewees described the situation as follows: *“life made us politicians”*. The readiness to take part in political life affects all areas of political activity from the general protection of human rights to local efforts to improve living conditions:

The conditions in which our people were put forced us to get involved in politics, to struggle for reinstatement of our rights, to fight for the return of our people back to the Crimea... (politician, male, 43).

In order to have a successful business, one needs to have a political “roof”. Without it, business couldn’t grow and develop in Ukraine... So in order to manage my enterprise, I had to become deputy in the regional council and a member of the Madjlis (businessman and politician, male, 47)

One of the major specifics of the societal integration of the Crimean Tatars in comparison to other cases in the INTAS research project concerns the fact that the Crimean Tatars were forced from the beginning by their circumstances to develop their own political structures in the form of NGOs (the Kurultay, the Madjlis, the Maarifchi, etc.). These organizations represent the self-government of the Crimean Tatars, which was developed as a counterpart to the official power structures, since they were closed to the Tatars. The development of this parallel political structure strengthened the internal cohesion of the Tatar ethnic group, but also strengthened the prejudices on the part of the local residents and distanced the Tatars from the Crimean society at large.

According to the interviews given by successful representatives of the Crimean Tatars, they remain in contact the Tatar Diaspora worldwide. Most of them have good contacts with Tatars in Turkey and maintain contacts with Tatars who remained in the places of deportation. However, the interviewees stress the point that the most important task at present is to strengthen ties with Tatars already in Crimea and to consolidate them in order to promote the cultural renaissance of the Tatars and the formation of a Tartar nation. This idea, which guides their thinking and behaviour, is indicative of a stress more on inner-group development and

less on the integration of the ethnic group into the broader society.

Many successful Crimean Tatars mentioned in the interviews that they are rather “secular” followers of Islam. Nevertheless, they also hinted that there are religious rituals that are part of their everyday life. They also stressed that there is no need to hide their religious preferences and that they are proud to be simultaneously Tatars and Muslims. They understand that at least part of their energies must be dedicated to the reconstruction and reopening of the sacred places of the Tatars in the Crimea. This leads to the conclusion that their activities are very much connected with efforts to revive their cultural heritage and the identity of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as they understand it.

In this broad cultural and political context, the efforts to develop the language of the ethnic group has a particular relevance, since language has the power to culturally and politically unite but also to divide people. The successful Crimean Tatars typically state that they do their best to transmit the Tatar language to their children in the family. However, this channel for the transmission of language and culture is seen as insufficient, since the educational system in the Crimea is actually monolingual. Having reached school age, Tatar children are already immersed in a Russian language environment. As a reaction, an NGO called *Maarifci* (enlightenment) was established. It unites educators of Tatar ethnic origin under the following goals: to educate the Crimean Tatars, to promote the development and use of the Tatar language via education and to foster the use of the Tatar language in the mass media and at cultural events. Actually, there is one weekly newspaper “Krym” (The Crimea) printed in the Crimean Tatar language, and there are three newspapers focusing on the problems of Crimean Tatars’ published in Russian. Until recently there were two hours of TV broadcasting in Tatar language. Now, there are three hour-long programmes broadcast three times per week.

As to the key issues of the integration of the Crimean Tatars into the Crimean and Ukrainian society, the interviews allow the following tentative conclusions to be drawn:

- *Firstly*, the economic, political and cultural structures of the present day Crimean society is characterised by substantive barriers and

hindrances for the Crimean Tatar people. The higher the positions under scrutiny, the more adamant the resistance on the part of the incumbents and their supporters.

- *Secondly*, the successful representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnic group demonstrate a very high level of concern about the Tatars' nation-building, at the same time demonstrating an understanding of the interests and rights of other ethnic groups living in the Crimea. They take a balanced position concerning the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language and strive to achieve the status of the Tatar and the Russian languages as second and third official languages in the Crimea.
- *Thirdly*, it turns out that the most burning issue concerns overcoming prejudices against the Tatar ethnic group. These are particularly relevant on the community level. The prejudices lead to various forms of discrimination in the fields of employment and administrative services, as well as to general issues of human rights such as settlement, language development, and cultural renaissance.
- *Fourthly*, the strategies of the Crimean Tatars' concerning societal integration are very much influenced by internal mechanisms of intra-group integration. The effect is the development of organizational structures (political organizations, administrative structures, NGOs and ethnic-based enterprises) which parallel the existing organizations of the ARC.
- *Fifthly*, the successful Crimean Tatars are convinced that the Tatars are ready to act as an ethnic minority and insist upon the protection their human rights in order to achieve more social justice and cooperation in the economic, political and cultural life of the Crimea, while preserving their dream to achieve the national autonomy of the Crimean Tatars in the framework of the Ukrainian state.

3. Concluding Remarks: Views and Voices of Others

The analysis of the achievements and problems regarding the societal integration of the Crimean Tatars would not be complete without a brief

reference to the attitudes of other groups in the Crimea towards the same issues. These attitudes were studied by participant observation of events in the Crimea:

- Due to domestic and international circumstances, the protection of the human rights of the Crimean Tatars is better now than the situation of other ethnic groups in the Crimea, including the group of the ethnic majority. Moreover, the situation of the Crimean Tatars is improving due to the work of domestic and international organizations;
- There is substantial international support for the Crimean Tatars' NGOs. The support includes funding, training and fellowships, which are not available to the representatives of other ethnic groups in the Crimea and their NGOs;
- The Crimean Tatars rely on a system of integrated, community-based support for each other in ethnically-based enterprises, NGOs, and educational activities;
- The Crimean Tatars have institutionalized the protection of their ethnic culture and can expect more and more Tatar language schools and Tatar language radio and TV broadcasting.
- The struggle for the protection of the rights of the Crimean Tatars often masks the ambitions and interests of the "new rich" of the Crimean Tatars who have aspirations of acquiring land and property and represent the interests of the average Crimean Tatars less and less.

The approach of distancing is used by both the Crimean Tatars and representatives of other ethnic groups. The official newspapers' discourse masks a lot of unresolved issues, already tending to evolve in a destructive way. The share of the publications about Crimean Tatars in the publications monitored (the newspapers 'Krymskiye Izvestiya' and 'Krimskiy Dialog') amounts to only 27 articles out of a total of 164, or 16.5 percent, during the monitoring period of 6 months between October 2005 and March 2006. In terms of content, there are a lot of articles about cultural events and meetings in which issues related to the deportation are discussed. A lot of publications describe memorial days, anniversaries and regional leaders' speeches, or include historical and cultural reports. Current conflicts or the historical background of interethnic conflicts are mentioned in only three publications. However, the

research clearly indicates that sources of interethnic conflicts are present in the different level of accessibility to resources by different ethnic groups in the Crimea. Other sources of tensions and conflicts are institutional decisions and policies, as well as prejudices which influence daily communication practices.

NOTES

- ¹ The research was conducted within the framework of the INTAS Project 04-79-7018: "Comparing Societal Integration of Turkish and Related Minorities: Institutional Strategies in INTAS and NIS Countries".
- ² Dr. Svitlana Babenko is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Kharkiv National University in the Ukraine.
- ³ *Source*: Svetlana M. Chervonnaya (1997) *Problemy vozvrashcheniya i integratsii krymskikh tatar v Krymu: 1990-ye gody* [Problems of the Return and Integration of Crimean Tatars in Crimea: the 1990s], Moscow, p. 6.
- ⁴ Website of the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics, Census of Population 2001 results
http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/regions/select_reg5/
- ⁵ The Madjlis [council] is a permanent executive body elected from the members of Kurultai [assembly] that is elected in general election by all adult Crimean Tatars. It is form of a self-government system that functions at three territorial-administrative levels.