Laura Wolfs

Democrazy?! Ballots, Bullets and the Challenge of Forging Peace.
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Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin
Garystr. 55
14195 Berlin
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Tel.: +49 30 838 54058
Fax: +49 30 838 53616
Laura Wolfs

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>APC</td>
<td>All Peoples’ Congress</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDD-FDD</td>
<td>Conseil National pour la Décence de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>Control Variable</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DV</td>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West-African States</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Outcomes</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRDEBU</td>
<td>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRUD</td>
<td>Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy</td>
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<td>FRUD-AD</td>
<td>FRUD-Ahmed Dini (armed subsection of FRUD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>IV</td>
<td>Independent Variable</td>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy and Elections in Liberia</td>
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<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar System Design</td>
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<td>NELDA</td>
<td>National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy</td>
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<td>NMG</td>
<td>Neutral Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palipehutu-FNL</td>
<td>Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu Forces Nationales de Libération</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAM</td>
<td>Peace Accords Matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
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<td>SLPP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone People’s Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to Liberia</td>
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<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union pour le Progrès National</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Setting the Scene

At the end of the Cold War, there was a proliferation of *intra*state conflicts, as opposed to the previously predominant *inter*state conflicts.\(^1\) Elections were viewed as a panacea for the ills developed during a country’s internal conflict\(^2\) because elections in “themselves can build capacity to deal with conflicts peacefully.”\(^3\) The core premise of this logic is that “peace will be secured by an election because the winner will be recognized as legitimate by the population, making violent opposition more difficult.”\(^4\) Some examples seemed to confirm this notion. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was during the nineties often described as the ‘oasis of peace’ in the otherwise turbulent Balkans. Then, a conflict erupted, which after thirteen months of violence ended in the Ohrid peace accord of August 2001. "There will be more hard work ahead and many more challenges, but these elections are a decisive step in the right direction and a clear rejection of the violence which tarnished the last months," said NATO secretary general George Robertson following the country’s first post-conflict elections in 2002.\(^5\) The elections marked a decisive step towards war termination in Macedonia and the country’s rejection of violence. Peace was consolidated to such a great extent that at the end of 2005 Macedonia was granted candidate status to the European Union.\(^6\)

A similar course of events was expected in December 2004, when in Côte d’Ivoire the rebel group *New Forces* signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the declared goal of “peace born from free, fair and open elections.”\(^7\) These elections, held six years later, turned out to be brutal and violent, leading the renowned conflict resolution, non-governmental organisation *International Crisis Group* (ICG) to release a publication in March the following year entitled “Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?”.\(^8\)

Côte d’Ivoire was not an exception to the rule. In, amongst others, Nigeria (2011), the Philippines (2007), the DRC (2006), Uganda (2006), Congo-Brazzaville (2002), Angola

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1 Themnér and Wallensteen (2012).
2 For a general overview of the discourse see Diamond and Plattner (1996).
4 Collier (2009): p.80
(1992), and Kyrgyzstan (1990), elections that had been expected to confirm war termination triggered new conflicts in themselves. Despite this, there is of course no iron law which dictates that elections in post-conflict societies are doomed to fail, as evidence from the first example of Macedonia (2002), as well as Nepal (2008), Sierra Leone (2002) El Salvador (1994), Mozambique (1994) and South Africa (1994), show. Nevertheless we cannot deny that it appears that “elections held in the shadow of war sometimes generate more violence in already war-torn societies.” In light of a growing number of examples where elections, the cornerstone of democracy, did not fulfil their alleged promise of resolving conflicts using ballots rather than bullets, concerns mounted as to whether the so-called developing world was in fact ‘ready’ for democracy. Robert Kaplan, the controversial journalist and academic, thus asserts that a myriad of cultural and economic factors make the societies of Eastern Europe, the Arab World and Africa essentially unfit for democracy. “In a society that has not reached the level of development Toqueville described, a multi-party system merely hardens and institutionalizes established ethnic and regional divisions” and democracy thus becomes a fraud: it becomes democrazy.

1.2 Research Question

In light of this potential gap between normative appeal and the empirical evidence, the question I would like to address is

Why are post-conflict elections, following the termination of a conflict through a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), successful in preventing the recurrence of conflict in some cases, but not in others?

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9 Adapted from Kühne (2010).
14 Pointed out by Flores and Nooruddin (2012): 558.
1.3 Peace through Democracy?

Elections have increasingly been attributed a dual role in post-conflict settings, namely war termination and democratisation.\textsuperscript{15} Elections are thereby regarded as means to demilitarize politics, leading to democratisation. I am first and foremost interested in the role of elections in war termination, since I focus on the ‘success’ of an election in preventing the recurrence of conflict in post-conflict countries where the conflict was terminated by the signing of a CPA.

To differentiate between the role of elections in war termination and democratisation is important. The success of elections in marking the beginning of politics dominated by ballots rather than bullets does not guarantee success with regards to democratisation.\textsuperscript{16} I will therefore not investigate the long-term benefits of elections for democratisation as part of this paper. Since my focus is on cases where a CPA was signed, I am also not concerned with the circumstances which enabled the conflict parties to strike a deal, since these differ from those related to implementation of provisions of the CPA and, ultimately, war termination.\textsuperscript{17}

Civil wars are often ‘seemingly intractable’, which explains the plethora of theories concerned with their origin as well as their resolution.\textsuperscript{18} This paper will build on what can be considered the two most dominant strands of theory: the ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ mobilisation debate. The ‘greed’ perspective, predominantly associated with the work of Paul Collier and his associates, essentially holds that economic agendas are the primary driving force behind internal conflict.\textsuperscript{19} The grievances approach, most prominently defended by Robert Gurr, conversely claims that repression and perceived or real disadvantage of one group leads to violent conflict.\textsuperscript{20} More recent findings, however, suggest that the distinction between the two lines of thought is not so clear cut. Frances Stewart found that the aspect of ‘greed’ plays less of a role in the decision to wage war when the disadvantaged group is included in the political process.\textsuperscript{21} This interlinked function of greed and grievance when violence is perceived as rational is what my model, subsequently introduced in Chapter 3, is built on.\textsuperscript{22} The task is, to manage the legacies of

\textsuperscript{18} The Balkan Wars were particularly in their early stages characterised by reference to the ‘intractable’ nature of the conflict, making intervention undesirable.
\textsuperscript{19} E.g. Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Collier (2000).
\textsuperscript{20} Gurr (1970).
\textsuperscript{21} For a review of the debate refer to Keen (2012).
\textsuperscript{22} Regarding a review of the literature which also adheres to this opinion refer to Keen (2012): p.771.
the conflict prior to the holding of the first post-conflict election in such a way that leaders will lay down their arms and the uncertainty of the electoral process can be overcome.\textsuperscript{23}

My paper combines elements of both rational choice theory and institutionalism. While actors (rebel groups and government) are rational and war recurrence should thus not be in their interest, their choices are constrained through incomplete information, making commitment to the peace process a complex task.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, the model introduced in this paper builds on the assumption that strategies of individuals are mutually dependent on expectations of how other individuals will behave. Since information is incomplete, this can lead to “self-fulfilling prophecies”, or security dilemmas, if there are no security inducing factors which help the actors to overcome their commitment problem.\textsuperscript{25}

In order to avoid the distortion of my results through interference of competing explanatory factors, two control variables are employed prior to case selection. Since the majority of literature on civil war recurrence focuses on factors affecting the conflict environment, I controlled for the degree of economic development (CV1), as indicated by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and prior levels of democratic experience (CV2) as indicated by the Polity IV Index (Chapter 5.2). In addition, I have chosen the most similar cases which had the most extreme values on my independent variables, as this gives the strongest results when using congruence procedure as part of a positivist research design.

In order to explain the phenomenon of recurring conflict following a national election (DV), I deduced from existing theory two explanatory variables which I posit to be the most decisive with regards to preparing the ground for peaceful elections, following the signing of a CPA. The period under examination is thus the ‘transitional phase’, the period after a CPA is signed and before a new, democratically elected government is inaugurated. I propose that we should pay particular attention to the role of external security guarantees (IV1) and to the inclusiveness of political institutions (IV2) in order to explain the phenomenon of the recurrence of conflict following a national election in post-conflict countries.

I argue that these two features, IV1 and IV2, reduce the stakes of the electoral process so that deciding who governs, essential for war termination, can be achieved without backsliding into conflict. IV1 provides a safe structural environment, whereby the

\textsuperscript{23} Lyons (2002) equally points out the connection between conflict resolution and political transition concepts with an emphasis on the role of interim, or transitional, structures.

\textsuperscript{24} Fearon (1995) gives a comprehensive account of this dynamic, specifically referring to ethnic groups.

\textsuperscript{25} Also pointed out by Lindberg (2009): p.10.
international peace operation credibly guarantees the agents (the government and the rebels) that they will not tolerate any violation of the agreed upon rules, serving as a containment mechanism for potential spoilers.\textsuperscript{26} IV2 ensures that the institutional environment is inclusive which mitigates credible commitment problems and hence leaves no room for grievances. Both explanatory variables are designed to manage expectations which prevent actors committing to the peace process due to lack of trust. If expectations are not managed, the electoral process serves as a critical turning point towards a recurrence of conflict. This highlights that the effectiveness of elections for war termination depends on the context in which they are situated.\textsuperscript{27}

The findings from the comparative case studies (presented in Chapter 7) of Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burundi show that there is indeed a positive relationship with regards to my explanatory variables and the ‘success’ of elections in preventing a recurrence of conflict. That said, the two cases where neither of my explanatory factors was present, point to a slightly more complex picture. While one (Sierra Leone) slid back to war not even a year after the signing of the CPA, the other (Djibouti) was able to conduct peaceful elections despite the missing presence of factors I expected to be crucial in this. The paper nevertheless demonstrates that the experience of a political order where trust was rewarded and mechanisms for monitoring and punishment existed prior to the holding of elections is a contributing factor in breaking the cycle of violence.

\subsection*{1.4 Relevance and Methodological Remarks}

While much has been written on the causes of intrastate conflict, there is far less on “the circumstances under which the self-renewing aspects of internal conflict become, or may become, muted.”\textsuperscript{28} This masters thesis hence aims to contribute to the still evolving peace-building literature, which focuses on war termination and the risk of war recurrence.\textsuperscript{29} Considering the threat posed by internal conflict to the international system, deducing factors which can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence is of great practical relevance. As early as the nineties the research gap was pointed out by Licklider, who attributes it to the lack of collaborative work between the separate disciplines of international politics (dealing with inter-state war), comparative politics (intra-state war

\textsuperscript{26} For a detailed account on the dynamics of spoilers in peace processes, see Stedman (1997).
\textsuperscript{29} Refer to Sambanis (2002) for a full review of trends in the study of civil war.
but without considering the existing literature on inter-state war) and history (working with non-transferable single case studies). This paper will employ a positivist design and conduct a small-N comparative case-study on basis of Most Similar System Design (MSSD). It thus departs from the predominantly employed large-N or single case study approach in order to investigate whether the apparent danger of elections in post-conflict settings can be mitigated. The focus is on internal conflicts ended through comprehensive peace agreements (CPA), as this has become the predominant end to internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War. My paper differs from other works on the subject of civil war recurrence following the holding of post-conflict elections in two important respects. Thanks to a newly released dataset, I was able to measure violence directly in relation to elections which allowed me to make a more differentiated assessment (Chapter 4.1) than previous studies which used a generalised threshold. Another important difference is that my IV2, inclusiveness of political institutions, assesses power-sharing pacts according to whether they were implemented and not only the provision made in the original peace accord, as was done in previous studies.

### 1.5 Structure of the Thesis

In order to elucidate my question regarding the phenomenon of recurrence of conflict following the first post-conflict election, the next chapter will review the most pertinent theories on conflict recurrence. Following the evaluation, I will deduce which aspects of existing theories are of relevance to answer the question of this thesis. In order to understand the phenomenon of elections seemingly serving as a trigger for violence under certain circumstances, the subsequent chapter will consider the democracy-conflict nexus. The third chapter will in light of the previously outlined considerations introduce the model this paper is based on, in which the influence of my study variables on my dependent variable is presented. Subsequently I outline how my concepts can be operationalised to be fit for empirical comparison and I summarise my model and its predicted effects once more. The challenge of case selection according to the principles of MSSD and the inherent necessity of controlling for third variable influence are the subject

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32 For the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset, refer to Hyde and Marinov (2012).  
33 This was made possible through the new database Peace Accord Matrix (PAM), peaceaccords.nd.edu, last accessed 05.02.2013.  
34 E.g. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and (2005a); Cammett and Malesky (2012).
of the fifth chapter. From that follows the empirical test of the model on the basis of my case studies Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia in chapter six. The final chapter assesses the validity of my model with regards to my results. Lastly, some potential shortcomings of my work, as well as points for further research, are discussed.

2. The Democracy-Conflict Nexus: A Commitment Problem?

2.1 Forging Peace? Conflict Recurrence Revisited.

In the following I will present a brief review of the origins of violent conflict. This overview can by no means be regarded as exhaustive.\(^{35}\) Explanations for the emergence of conflict are manifold. Large-N, quantitative studies solve the problem by merging all possible factors into a regression analysis while single case studies enlighten every single aspect but, "we need to bring knowledge together in reasonably compact form in order for that knowledge to serve a useful purpose."\(^{36}\) Accordingly, I will only review the most pertinent factors focussing on conflict recurrence specifically. Explanations can roughly be divided into three camps which focus respectively on the question why did the original conflict start, how it was fought and how did it end.\(^{37}\) These explanations will be addressed in reverse order. Lastly, the chapter will argue that national attributes are the most important factors to consider, i.e. the reasons why the original conflict started, when examining the breakdown of peace in light of an election\(^ {38}\), because they shape the political context in which post-conflict elections are set.\(^{39}\) Creating a context in which commitment becomes possible thereby plays a pivotal role in preventing the recurrence of conflict, as I will show in the model introduced in Chapter 3.

Conflicts that ended in military victory are thought to be less likely to erupt again, compared to those which ended in stalemate. The first explanation is that it reveals information on the relative strength of the victor. This knowledge is thought to act as a

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deterrent for potential rebels.\textsuperscript{40} Secondly, the winner is likely to have gained control over the organisational infrastructure, making it increasingly difficult for rebels to find an opportunity for rebellion.\textsuperscript{41} In situations during which the conflict parties are in a military deadlock because neither of them have the capacities for military victory, i.e. stalemate, an end to the conflict by the means of a peace accord is likely since it increases the parties interest for cooperation.\textsuperscript{42} Since this paper only examines cases which ended in a CPA, the theory on military victory is not of particular relevance for this paper and was only included due to its paramount role in theories on conflict recurrence.\textsuperscript{43}

Those authors concerned with how the previous conflict was fought, consider the length of the conflict and its deadliness to play a substantial role on the chances of war recurrence. In short, the severity of a war can be a predictor for the likelihood of renewed conflict. In that sense, the more costly a war was in terms of resources and duration, the less likely it is to erupt again because of the resulting war fatigue. War fatigue is often proxied by the percentage of the population killed during the conflict\textsuperscript{44}, which bears some caveats due to data unreliability.\textsuperscript{45} More than once a researcher will come across population size or death toll estimates which vary among several thousand.\textsuperscript{46} Hence, studies most commonly try to take into account the length of a previous conflict as a proxy.\textsuperscript{47}

In contrast with the two more minimalistic explanations, the third category regards characteristics within a state, often in relation to the previous conflict, as most important for the explanation of conflict recurrence. The discourse can roughly be divided into the categories of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. ‘Greed’ advocates in part explain civil war in terms of the economic feasibility of rebellion, i.e. the lack of alternative sources of income makes the recruitment of rebels an easily accomplished task.\textsuperscript{48} Conflicts are thought to be simply motivated by greed for material resources. Under these conditions, maintaining peace is thought to be difficult, since it is always in the interest of rebels to “acquire more goods by using force.”\textsuperscript{49} This school of thought also emphasizes the negative effect of natural

\textsuperscript{40} Refer to Walter (2004): p.374.
\textsuperscript{43} Refer to studies by Snyder, Brancati (2011a) and (2011b); Walter (2004).
\textsuperscript{44} Also done by other authors, such as Snyder and Brancati (2011): p.14; Lacina and Gleditsch (2005).
\textsuperscript{46} For example, the death toll estimate of the war in Bosnia ranges between 150,000 and 250,000; see Bassiouni (2011): p.228.
\textsuperscript{47} Hoddie, Hartzell, Rothchild (2001): p.190; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2001); Walter (2002) employs both deaths and duration as her indicators.
resource endowment on sustainable peace.\textsuperscript{50} The `resource curse` was later on refined to have particular validity in countries with large quantities of petroleum product exports.\textsuperscript{51} The greed perspective, dominated by logit-regression analysis and hardly backed up by evidence from comparative case study, has been criticised for its lack of recognition that its `feasibility` hypothesis can also be explained by shifting the emphasis to grievances.\textsuperscript{52} In that sense, the literature concerned with grievances argues that low income encourages rebellion because continuous poverty and a low living standard function as triggers in themselves, encouraging popular discontent.\textsuperscript{53} From that follows the belief that so-called `horizontal inequalities` (an unequal distribution of resources in a society) are the reason for conflict.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, rebellion becomes `feasible` due to grievances created by inequality rather than material self-interest. Yet another drift in the grievances perspective uses the notion of `identity` as an additional explanatory factor. Grievances of one distinct group which exist due to horizontal inequalities are thereby instrumentalised by political entrepreneurs for mobilization.\textsuperscript{55} The theory has been criticised for being prone to endogeneity, since both identity and inequality are likely to be affected by conflict, making it impossible to detect the causal direction.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, inequality is a question of perception and can hardly be objectified. Finding the right indicator thus becomes a hardly insurmountable challenge.\textsuperscript{57} Additional reservations have to be made with regards to the measurement of identity, since it is difficult to define a measure which is “applicable across many different types of societies”, especially because states tend to have multiple cleavages (i.e. societies).\textsuperscript{58} As a consequence, some have found a statistically relevant relationship, while others have not.\textsuperscript{59} Within the `grievance`, `horizontal inequalities` literature evidence has emerged which links economic incentives, favoured by the `greed` strand of literature, to political processes. They found that the role of economic incentives in conflict mobilisation is found to

\textsuperscript{54} The most prominent account on “Horizontal Income Inequalities” is Stewart (2004), pointed out in Keen (2012). Also refer to Roeder and Rothchild (2005a): pp.45-6.
\textsuperscript{55} Snyder (2000).
\textsuperscript{56} Holmqvist (2012): p. 15.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.: p. 15.
\textsuperscript{58} Norris (2005): p.17
diminish, the greater the inclusiveness of the political system.\textsuperscript{60} The origins of greed are thereby grievances which can be addressed by providing an environment which enables actors to make credible commitments to abstain from violence.\textsuperscript{61} The emphasis on creating an environment where commitment becomes possible since “neither greed nor grievance alone is sufficient to explain the incidence of violence” has been the subject of the World Development Report in 2011.\textsuperscript{62} The report argues that in order to reduce violent conflict, institutions and mechanisms have to be present, which enable reform and a break with the past. This has also been emphasized in some recent publications, concerned specifically with war recurrence.\textsuperscript{63}

The interlinked function of greed and grievance, during which the electoral process exacerbates already existing commitment problems in the absence of security inducing factors is the focus of this paper. The next chapter elaborates on why democracy, and elections, are thought to provide a framework for peaceful conflict resolution while overlooking the differences between societies at peace and those just having undergone violent conflict.

\subsection*{2.2 Replacing Bullets with Ballots}

In the following chapter I will explore the idea that elections can function as a means for war termination. Understanding where this idea comes from will elucidate certain theoretical considerations of the democracy-conflict nexus.

The idea of democracy as a remedy to violent conflict first gained new attention from practitioners and academics alike due to the foreign policy of former American president Woodrow Wilson after World War I.\textsuperscript{64} According to the then propagated view, democracy, “a system of community and cooperation”, would make governments just per definition, since “social conflicts that might become violent are resolved through voting”\textsuperscript{65} and demilitarisation of politics occurs.\textsuperscript{66} Bullets are replaced with ballots.

The ‘peace through democracy’ thesis was significantly backed up by early empirical evidence from the political scientist Michael Doyle, who found that democracies are less

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Discussed in Keen (2012): p.771 with regards to the comparative merits of the greed versus grievance debate.
\item The reverse argument can be found in Holmqvist (2012): p.17.
\item World Bank (2011): p.75.
\item Mason et al (2011) who emphasize the importance of the conflict environment, Call (2012) with a focus on the danger of political exclusion in the post-war environment as well as Lemarchand (2006): p.2.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
likely to engage in violent conflict.\textsuperscript{67} Doyle’s formative publication which laid much of the foundation for contemporary conflict studies and policy was, however, based on \textit{inter-} rather than \textit{intra-} state conflict.

Adapting the ‘peace through democracy’ thesis to states just having undergone \textit{intra-} state conflict bares some caveats. The peace-inducing effect of democracy can be attributed to two factors, namely civil rights and political liberties. Both are often not present following \textit{intra-} state conflict.\textsuperscript{68} No country becomes a democracy overnight. Instead, it has to undergo the often painful period of liberalisation.\textsuperscript{69} However, the relationship between liberalisation and peace is not the same as between democracy and peace. During the liberalisation phase, “countries become more war-prone, not less.”\textsuperscript{70}

The lack of firm regulations and a centralized state increases the insecurity of actors since they cannot rely on the state to defend them against violent behaviour.\textsuperscript{71} This clears the way for a political environment in which there are incentives for people to undertake collective action, so-called political opportunity structures.\textsuperscript{72} In that sense, periods of leadership change indicate moments of heightened political opportunities, where potential insurgents may become mobilised and resort to violence.\textsuperscript{73} This is contingent on the fact that elections are a period of increased uncertainty, because they determine who governs.\textsuperscript{74} At the same time, deciding who governs and "how power will be concentrated are fundamental conditions for war termination."\textsuperscript{75} Nevertheless we have to recognise that the conduct of elections in a context of high insecurity, as is the case in post-conflict countries, can result in a security dilemma. This is especially true in post-conflict countries if the question ‘who will govern’ had previously incited a violent conflict.

A security dilemma occurs, when "competing ethnic, religious, and political actors [...] mobilize against the possibility of future threats, triggering a cascading tit-for-tat escalation and polarization from other segments of society."\textsuperscript{76} As a result, the more actors try to increase their own security, the less secure others will feel or vice versa.\textsuperscript{77} Micro-level explanations equate security dilemmas with the presence of spoilers, i.e. those

\textsuperscript{67} Doyle (1986).
\textsuperscript{68} Rummel (1997): p.163.
\textsuperscript{69} Mansfield and Snyder (1995): p.79
\textsuperscript{69} Snyder (2000).
\textsuperscript{70} Mansfield and Snyder (1995): p.79
\textsuperscript{71} Snyder (2000): p.27.
\textsuperscript{72} This argument draws from social movement theory. For a review of the literature refer to Vermeersch (2011).
\textsuperscript{77} Binningsbø (2005): p.4.
elements in a post-conflict state who feel threatened by the potential new order and hence use violence to try to undermine it.\textsuperscript{78} Both approaches share the notion that violence may be used in a context of insecurity as deterrence against a future threat.

The insights from this perspective depart from the early transitiology literature by suggesting that elections are more than just an indicator of success in the transition from one regime type to the next, especially in post-conflict contexts.\textsuperscript{79} They should be considered a process with institutional incentives and opportunity structures\textsuperscript{80} which can incite and accelerate violence prior to the establishment of civil liberties, and eventually democratisation.\textsuperscript{81} If then one views elections as a process, and not just an indicator, the effects of the electoral process start prior to the actual conduct of an election. The eve of the election can be considered a focal point because it represents the temporary culmination of that process, but elections cast their shadow long before.\textsuperscript{82}

Taking the predominant attention off the election itself and instead focussing on the process set in motion by an election, we can better understand why election related violence may occur over a long time-span and at many different points in the process: it occurs on the eve of an election, during its actual conduct, or as a result of how it is conducted (see Model 1). Without careful management of the elections themselves as well as the period prior to their conduct, the social forces underlying a country’s most important conflicts are likely to be mobilised. In this way “an election can bring to head the very conflict it is supposed to sort out and itself lead to violence.”\textsuperscript{83} The nature of the ‘transitional period’ “will form the context in which former combatants and future voters assess their prospects and make decisions to either organize in a manner that supports the peace process or prepare for a return to war.”\textsuperscript{84} Accordingly, the period under examination for this paper is the ‘transitional period’, which begins from the signing of the CPA until the conduct of the first post-conflict election.\textsuperscript{85}

The model to be introduced in the next chapter describes the phenomenon of elections serving as a focal point for violence rather than a demilitarisation of politics and connects it to the explanatory factors that I regard as most influential with regards to the recurrence of conflict following a national election.

\textsuperscript{80} Lindberg (2009): xxii.
\textsuperscript{85} Guttieri and Piombo (2007): pp.3-34.
3. The Model – Elections as a Critical Turning Point

My question, why are post-conflict elections only in some cases successful in preventing the recurrence of conflict, implies that the holding of elections is implicitly regarded as an end goal that any country moves towards once it has signed a CPA. In this sense, the conduct of elections can no longer exclusively be attributed to the involvement of Western powers. The demand for elections, and democracy, is also no longer restricted to certain cultures. Some view the Arab spring as a pro-democracy movement, "confirming that demands for democracy transcend such cultural differences." Popular demands for elections were also raised in Nepal, where Maoist rebels demanded elections to end the conflict in 2006. In Africa, the African Union adopted in 2007 the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), illustrating the continent’s commitment to democracy. How post-conflict elections will play out, however, will be determined by the institutional and structural conditions in place during the ‘transitional phase’.

Putting oneself into the shoes of those you try to understand can provide a useful basis for analysis because it enables the researcher to isolate those security concerns which make committing to peace difficult, even after a country has achieved the first step of signing a CPA. The true test of a transitional government comes with holding a peaceful election, even if the government appears to be making headway. After signing a peace agreement, rebels or government have essentially two options; either:

1) They decide to cooperate and move towards war termination by committing to the holding of peaceful post-conflict national, legislative elections (as was the case in South Africa in 1994); or

2) They realise scheduled elections could leave them without a place in government and thus vulnerable to the abuse by the election winner, thus they decide to defect, to not

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86 Shain and Linz (1995) employ the same premise in their seminal book on examining the role interim administrations play with regards to the subsequent regime type. The notion is also shared by Lyons (2002).
90 This is pointed out by Leonard (2011): p.42.
93 Refer to Hartzell, Hoddie, Rothchild (2001): p.185, who point out the overwhelming influence of institutional factors and the structural environment.
implement the terms of the agreement, and to resort to violence, whether they become a perpetrator themselves or encourage it.\textsuperscript{95}

\textbf{Model 1 - Elections as a Critical Turning Point}

Option two can take different forms. In its most simple form (\textit{Variant a}, see Model 1) the more marginalised group feels threatened by an election and resorts to war.\textsuperscript{96} The outbreak of the Rwandan conflict following the signing of the Arusha Accord has been attributed to such fear of an election.\textsuperscript{97} The start of the electoral process triggered the traditionally politically marginalised Hutus to defect from the peace process. This was in part due to the late deployment of a smaller than promised United Nation’s (UN) peace operation, calling into question the credibility of the UN’s commitment to monitor, verify and sanction defection from the peace process. Furthermore, the promised power-sharing

\textsuperscript{95} For variations on violence related to the breakdown of electoral processes refer to Fischer (2002).
\textsuperscript{96} Refer to Leonard (2011): p.45 for a discussion on the causes of pre- and post-election violence.
deal was not implemented. The transitional context was thus characterised by uncertainty and insecurity. Defection from the peace process can furthermore be expressed through electoral fraud (Variant b), which in turn is likely to lead to mobilisation by citizens or the opposition (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic in 2011). A further possibility (Variant c) is that one of the actors (rebels or ancien régime) assumes they will come out as the winner of the election, and are then proven wrong. This caused a recurrence of conflict in Angola, when UNITA, the party of the warlord Jonas Savimbi, lost the election despite proclaiming already weeks before that their victory was certain.

Whatever modification of option two we look at, defection can be viewed as rational insofar as there have been no signs of power concessions (IV2), there are no mechanisms for generating trust and punishing defectors (IV1) and violence and oppression from the election winner seems a very real possibility. Rational is used here to mean that decisions are dependent on perceived costs and benefits of one’s actions. The electoral process thus exaggerates the ‘shadow of the future’ from which the security dilemma arises because it increases uncertainty in an already insecure environment with no prior history of political cooperation.

From this, it follows that in order to solve the dilemma, a context of security has to be present from the signing of the CPA until the holding of the election, i.e. for the entire electoral process, so that “electoral conflict and violence [do not] become tactics in political competition.” Viewed in this way, “the central theme of civil war termination is ‘not evil, but tragedy’.”

I propose that the stakes of the electoral process can be reduced through the presence of two security inducing factors. In her seminal work, Walter (2002) showed that the robustness of external security guarantees (IV1) and the degree of inclusiveness of political institutions (IV2) are the most significant explanatory factors for the implementation of a peace agreement. I argue that the independent variables furthermore ensure the conditions for elections functioning as a means for war

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98 This is most likely done by the former incumbent. Refer to Collier (2009): p. 35; and p. 70 for the importance of access to infrastructure in electoral fraud.
102 The phrase ‘shadow of the future’ was first employed by Axelrod (1984).
termination\textsuperscript{106}, because they provide the necessary security for actors to commit to the electoral process. Managing the processes which give rise to security dilemmas and commitment problems will determine what path a country takes following the post-conflict election: war termination or recurrence of conflict.\textsuperscript{107}

The process, where insecurities are managed by my independent variables can be expressed in a model (\textit{Model 2: Reducing the stakes of the electoral process through guarantees}).

\textbf{Model 2 – Reducing the Stakes of the Electoral Process through Guarantees}

\subsection*{3.1 Safe Structural Environment – Deterring Violence (IV1)}

Following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement, the local security context remains volatile and can easily be interrupted by a security dilemma or spoilers (see Chapter 2.2). Whether these spoilers manage to interrupt the peace process or not depends on “the role played by international actors as custodians of peace.”\textsuperscript{108}

Peace operations have in several studies proven to have a positive effect on peace\textsuperscript{109}, whereby the risk of more fighting drops by 70\%\textsuperscript{110}, and the insecurity associated with

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid.: p.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{107} Lyons (2002): p.9.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Stedman (1997): p.6.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} E.g. Snyder and Brancati (2011a).
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Fortna (2004): p.285.
\end{itemize}
political competition, such as, elections, is reduced.\(^{111}\) While, as it has been pointed out elsewhere, “the terminology of peace operations is notoriously slippery”, the term ‘peace operation’ is used in this paper to refer to a multinational force aimed at restoring or preserving peace.\(^{112}\) Often, the national army has lost local legitimacy during the war or it has been disbanded following the conflict, for example as part of a security sector reform.\(^{113}\) The presence of an outside force, i.e. a peace operation, can consequently provide conflict parties with security guarantees, in part because they are considered as more legitimate and/or impartial as a single state.\(^ {114}\) The term security guarantee refers to the promise of a third party to verify, monitor and enforce post-treaty behaviour, if necessary also by force, increasing the incentives of the parties to the conflict to stick to the peace process.\(^ {115}\)

The legitimacy of an outside force cannot be regarded as a given, however. There may be situations where the peace operation does lack legitimacy and is not regarded as impartial by all actors on the ground. The continued occurrence of atrocities while an international peace operation is present can also lead to a lack of legitimacy and a loss of credibility, as it was the case under the ECOMOG forces in Liberia in 1990.\(^ {116}\) The legitimacy gap is, however, more likely to occur in different subcategories of peace operations, namely in what one might call a ‘humanitarian intervention’ (Bosnia) or a ‘democratic intervention’ (Iraq), where the intervening force has no authorisation from the parties to the conflict.\(^ {117}\)

When there is a lack of legitimacy of the third party guarantee and trust respectively, the deterring function of a peace operation is seriously jeopardised, as indicated in the examples above.

Peace operations have evolved since the first ever UN Mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that was deployed to the Middle East in 1948. In the 1990s a major paradigm shift in peacekeeping occurred, in part triggered by a changing geo-political environment. During the Cold War, article 2.7 of the UN charter which specifies that “issues which are ‘essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of a state should not be of concern to the UN, and thus not be internationalized”, prevented the UN

\(^{113}\) This was for example the case 2001 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The legitimate use of force by the national army is often challenged by armed rebels. Creating a monopoly of force for a national army is hence one of the first, and most daunting, challenges.
\(^ {117}\) For further information on the different types of intervention and the role of legitimacy, refer to Grimm (2010).
from interfering in internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{118} The former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali published in 1992 “An Agenda for Peace”, capturing the new-found confidence of external actors with regards to the role they can play following an intrastate conflict: “peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.”\textsuperscript{119} Operations, which were previously “defined as outside the parameters of international action, with reference to Article 2.7”, started to be regarded as legitimate, leading to an expansion of peace operations.\textsuperscript{120}

The growth in demand was endorsed by the UN. In 2001, the UN published “No Exit without Strategy”, which amongst other things stresses the role external actors can play in “in facilitating the restoration of mutual confidence.”\textsuperscript{121} Fortna (2008) argues that “peacekeepers can have a causal, rather than spurious, effect on the stability of peace if, \textit{inter alia}, they reduce the likelihood of aggression by raising the costs of war or the benefits of peace for the peace kept and they can deter or prevent one side from reneging on a political deal and excluding the other from power.”\textsuperscript{122} This effect hinges on the credibility of a peace operation, however. Credibility depends on “rapid deployment, proper resourcing, ability to deter spoilers and the ability to manage expectations.”\textsuperscript{123}

Regional organisations have also started to adapt to the increasing demand for peace operations. While the first regional peace operation took place in the same year as the first UN mission, carried out by the Organisation of American States in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, there has been a real diversification of actors undertaking peace operations since the 1990s. By now, missions undertaken by the Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (and until 2002 its predecessor the Organisation of African Unity), and the European Union are increasingly common\textsuperscript{124}; there have also been the so far three Russian-led Missions in Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{118} Wallensteen (2012): p.132
\item\textsuperscript{119} United Nations (1992): Paragraph 20.
\item\textsuperscript{120} Wallensteen (2012): p.133.
\item\textsuperscript{121} United Nations (2001): Paragraph 9.
\item\textsuperscript{122} Fortna (2008): p.86.
\item\textsuperscript{123} Bellamy; Williams and Griffin (2010): p.142.
\item\textsuperscript{124} The EU authorised this year alone three new missions, the EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan), the Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) and the EU-Mission in Niger (EUCAP SAHEL Niger).\end{enumerate}
Despite the increase in peace operations deployed in intrastate conflict over the period 1948-2004 (see Figure 1), by far not all internal conflicts are subject to an international peace mission. It seems that the saying, "Peux ce que veux. Allons-y." memorably employed by the head of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Rome Dallaire, in a telegram to the secretariat of the United Nations in January 1994 when requesting more military personnel in the prelude to the Rwandan Genocide, does not hold true in all circumstances. Some researchers have tried to elucidate the factors that determine where peace operations are sent. In principle, the question of a conflict being "a threat to or an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security" guides the deployment of a UN peace operation (no matter whether this is a Chapter VI or VII mission). While there are still no paramount investigations on the determinants of the deployment of regional peace operations, it appears that the rationale is the same as for UN missions. Early research tends to emphasize national security interests as being the primary explanatory factor for UN intervention, essentially claiming that "any UN decision

Figure 1: Peace Operations and Internal Conflict

Despite the increase in peace operations deployed in intrastate conflict over the period 1948-2004 (see Figure 1), by far not all internal conflicts are subject to an international peace mission. It seems that the saying, "Peux ce que veux. Allons-y." memorably employed by the head of the United Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Rome Dallaire, in a telegram to the secretariat of the United Nations in January 1994 when requesting more military personnel in the prelude to the Rwandan Genocide, does not hold true in all circumstances. Some researchers have tried to elucidate the factors that determine where peace operations are sent. In principle, the question of a conflict being "a threat to or an endangerment of the maintenance of international peace and security" guides the deployment of a UN peace operation (no matter whether this is a Chapter VI or VII mission). While there are still no paramount investigations on the determinants of the deployment of regional peace operations, it appears that the rationale is the same as for UN missions. Early research tends to emphasize national security interests as being the primary explanatory factor for UN intervention, essentially claiming that "any UN decision

126 Author's own translation: "If there is a will, there is a way"; Quotation taken from United Nations (1999): http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/1967799.365502948.html, last accessed 05.02.2013. p.10.
127 E.g.: Gilligan and Stedman (2003); Fortna (2004).
129 Refer to Bellamy and Williams (2005).
to intervene [...] will reflect the dominant power of the intervening side and the relative importance of the subject nation.”\textsuperscript{130} The national interest of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) and the extent to which the conflict is perceived by them as a threat can hereby be regarded as the most important determinant for intervention.\textsuperscript{131} Other authors, such as Jakobsen, dispute the thesis that national interest is the \textit{sine qua non}.\textsuperscript{132} The CNN effect, the theory that television news coverage has an agenda setting function thereby forcing national governments to respond to humanitarian crises, also plays according to him an important role in the decision to deploy a peace operation. A peace operation is most likely to be deployed “when there is both a high probability of success and low probability of casualties.”\textsuperscript{133} Gilligan and Stedman (2003) find in their quantitative study that deadly conflicts in countries with a relatively small government army are the most likely receivers of UN intervention. Whether the country is a former colony of a permanent member of the Security Council, has high levels of primary commodity exports are, amongst other factors, not correlated to the likelihood of intervention.\textsuperscript{134}

Following on from the above described empirical evidence, the chances for success of an election in functioning as a means for war termination can be increased through the presence of robust external security guarantees. The robustness of an external security guarantee depends on its legitimacy and its credibility (further refined in Chapter 4.2). This leads me to the following hypothesis for my first independent variable, IV1:

\textbf{H 1: The more robust external security guarantees, the less likely the recurrence of conflict following a national election.}

\section*{3.2 Credible Institutional Guarantees –Addressing Grievances (IV2)}

"Democratic survival and breakdown are a question of political crafting."\textsuperscript{135} The truth of that statement also holds true when thinking about the initial ‘crafting’ of democracy, following violent internal conflict. The type of crafting employed for the transitional period, i.e. the period after a country signed a CPA but prior to its first post-conflict election, is regarded as "crucial in determining the subsequent regime, and may affect

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Bennis (1996): p.84
\item Jakobsen (1996).
\item Ibid.
\item Di Palma (1990): vii.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
whether ethnic and regional conflicts will interfere with the prospects for long-term stability.\textsuperscript{136} The crafting of political institutions is here particularly important. Institutions are defined, following North, as "the constraints that human beings impose on themselves."\textsuperscript{137} Obeying to these constraints, when present in the 'transitional phase', can serve as costly signals to the parties of the conflict, thus decreasing their security concern and the stakes associated with the election. 'Costly signals' in this context mean that the actors signal what their intentions for future behaviour are. This information can thereby increase the chances of commitment to peace because it decreases the chances for miscalculations and a resulting security dilemma.\textsuperscript{138} Political pacts\textsuperscript{139} aim to maximise the stakeholders of the political game and thereby increase the incentives to play by the rules.\textsuperscript{140} They are thus a form of an institutional guarantee, whereby the stakes posed by electoral competition are reduced through advancing reconciliation and addressing grievances by the means of power-sharing.

The concept of institutional guarantees is greatly associated with the work by Arend Lijphart, who was interested in the question of why societies such as the Netherlands or Belgium, which are divided along religious, ideological or linguistic lines, were able to live together peacefully. His main observation was the prevalence of what he termed the 'consociational nature' of political institutions. For Lijphart, "elite cooperation was the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy."\textsuperscript{141}

The power-sharing concept found adherents within conflict studies, and within peace-building circles more specifically, since societies which have undergone conflict can also be regarded as divided, thus struggling to find a common basis for cooperation.\textsuperscript{142} Since I take the grievances perspective with regards to sustained conflict, the fundamental idea of Lijphart's work to incorporate groups rather than exclude them in order to overcome those grievances makes consociationalism a natural starting point of inquiry.

The institutional features which Lijphart considered to lead to the greatest degree of cooperation were \textit{executive power-sharing} among a 'grand coalition' of political leaders; a \textit{mutual veto}, requiring all parties to agree on political processes and protecting minorities;

\textsuperscript{136} Shain and Linz (1995).
\textsuperscript{137} North (1990): p.5.
\textsuperscript{138} Refer to Fearon (1995) for costly signalling. The concept is equally employed in Walter (2002).
\textsuperscript{139} In the following, consociationalism, power-sharing and political pact will be used interchangeably.
\textsuperscript{140} Norris (2005): p.4.
\textsuperscript{142} Binningsbø (2005): p.4.
the *proportional representation* of major groups; and a high degree of *segmental autonomy*, i.e. a degree of territorial autonomy.\textsuperscript{143}

Lijphart’s work was subsequently the foundation for many further investigations on power-sharing. O’Leary and McGarry used Ireland as a case study and found that cross-community executive power-sharing, in which each significant segment “is represented in the government with at least plurality levels of support within its segment”, creates conducive conditions for elite cooperation.\textsuperscript{144} The authors hence greatly favour grand coalition governments. This institutional set-up seeks to induce stability into the political system through guaranteed group representation, amongst other things reducing the winner-take-all effect of an election. Under different circumstances, even the voters may fear too much what the losers will do. Charles Taylor, the brutal warlord who controlled Liberia for much of the 1990s, was excluded from the peace process. When it came to elections in 1997 which he won overwhelmingly, voters said they voted for him out of fear what a continued exclusion may result in.\textsuperscript{145}

While Lijphart and O’Leary and McGarry were mainly interested in the distribution of political power more generally, another strand of literature focuses on the capacities of institutional structures to increase the likelihood of post-conflict stability. Most noteworthy in that field of research is the work of Mathew Hoddie and Caroline Hartzell, who apply the concept of power-sharing to the post-conflict context.\textsuperscript{146} The core questions they address are 1) whether power-sharing has a positive effect on peace during the transition phase and 2) whether power-sharing creates the conditions for elections.\textsuperscript{147} They argue that when power-sharing provisions are present during the transition phase, “they tend to send reassuring signals to parties to the conflict that their vital concerns will not be ignored or attacked following the establishment of peace and a new government.”\textsuperscript{148} This observation extends not only to political institutions but all institutional arrangements, including territorial, military and economic pacts.\textsuperscript{149} The authors examine *de jure* power-sharing provisions, as stipulated in a peace agreement. They argue that no matter

\textsuperscript{143} Refer to Norris (2005): p.3 for a comprehensive overview of Lijphart’s concepts.
\textsuperscript{144} Refer to Wolff (2011): p. 4 for an overview of the adaptations and diversification of consociationalism in contemporary peace-building strategies.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.: p.83.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.: p. 84.
\textsuperscript{149} For definitions of these types of pacts please refer to Ibid.: pp.86-90.
whether the agreed terms are implemented or not, they serve as a “costly signal of the parties’ commitment to accept a common rule” and refrain from using violence.\textsuperscript{150}

The literature on institutional incentive structures designed to reduce the stakes associated with democracy, i.e. elections, has started to examine the integration of former rebel movements into the political party system.\textsuperscript{151} The Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) and its leader Hashim Thaçi, the former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Front (KLF) the integration of former rebels into Tajikistan’s post-conflict government (1997); or the continuing participation in politics of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are only some examples of rebel movements transforming into formal political players. These parties tend to lack a clear political strategy and experience, often leading to a propagation of those divisions which caused the conflict in the first place.\textsuperscript{152} According to the power-sharing rationale, the potential danger of integrating former rebel groups into the political party system during the ‘transitional phase’ can be reduced through the presence of coalition governments. In their “quest for the median voter”, politicians are expected to “crowd the centre”, thus moderating their interests and contributing to reconciliation among the former warring factions.\textsuperscript{153}

Whilst the integration of former rebel groups has the clear advantage of creating an incentive structure which makes their recourse to bullets less likely, some authors have also pointed out the inherent problems associated with this development.\textsuperscript{154} Examples of the critique include that rebel movements are not homogenous actors. In the case of Sierra Leone (1999), political power-sharing empowered the political leader Sankoh, who had “no control over the more militarily geared wing of RUF.”\textsuperscript{155} The subsequent breakdown of the Lomé agreement has been attributed to misconceiving RUF as a unitary actor and consequently empowering a political actor without the ability to encourage moderation within the rebel movement, which was the reason for empowerment in the first place.\textsuperscript{156} Furthermore, the rebels might lack legitimacy in the eyes of the population.\textsuperscript{157} Another danger is that a rebel only wants to capture the presidency and has no interest in cooperation. Thus, power-sharing should not give disproportionately

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Hartzell and Hoddie (2005a): p.84.
\item \textsuperscript{151} For a review of the literature, including the advantages and disadvantages, refer to de Zeeuw and Curtis (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{152} Refer to Snyder (2000) who argues that elections in the democratisation phase the lack of clear political strategies leads to political appeals along former conflict lines.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Reilly (2008): p.178.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Refer to the discussion in Sririam (2008).
\item \textsuperscript{155} Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p.22.
\item \textsuperscript{156} Ibid.: p.22.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Morgan (2007): p.31.
\end{itemize}
large powers to one actor enabling him to act in such a way, as in Liberia 1997.\textsuperscript{158} This final argument in particular, potentially making the power-sharing regime prone to “reproducing insurgent violence”\textsuperscript{159}, calls to mind democratisation scholars’ words of caution about continued participation of the former elite during the transition of democracy.\textsuperscript{160} These examples show that those in charge of installing a transitional government are faced with the challenge of differentiating between ‘authentic peacemakers’ and those who will continue the warlord tradition.\textsuperscript{161}

Some authors have criticised the power-sharing approach for taking the politicisation in societies divided by conflict as a given. This creates an institutional environment where there are no incentives to transcend traditional group affinity and thereby does not contribute to reconciliation among the former warring factions.\textsuperscript{162} Power-sharing is thus regarded as failing at what it aims to achieve, namely reconciliation and cooperation, because it is based on an institutionalisation of the same cleavages that developed during the conflict. The political system which was installed in Bosnia after Dayton is an example typically employed to illustrate the fallacy of power-sharing.\textsuperscript{163}

One has to differentiate between short term and long term institutions, however.\textsuperscript{164} As Roeder and Rothchild, some of the most adamant critics of power-sharing, note, power-sharing can be “a progressive compromise”\textsuperscript{165} and “can work as shortcuts to habituation” for democratic governance.\textsuperscript{166} This is to say, while power-sharing may not be the best basis for democratic governance in the long run, it presents one of the best options to end a conflict and set the conditions for democratisation, as has been confirmed by recent empirical studies.\textsuperscript{167}

In order to prevent elections serving as a turning point for renewed conflict, transitional institutions have to be designed in a way to overcome some legacies of the civil war, i.e. heightened distrust between the parties, by providing a context encouraging reconciliation, thereby promoting the demilitarisation of politics.\textsuperscript{168} Power-sharing institutions which empower a political minority at the cost of the majority “constitute a more credible commitment to respect the rights and interests of minorities in a postwar

\textsuperscript{158} Dupuy and Detzel (2007): p.25.
\textsuperscript{159} Refer to Tull and Mehler (2005).
\textsuperscript{160} For a discussion on the topic refer to Pridham (2000).
\textsuperscript{162} Snyder (2000): p. 329, mainly referring to the works by Donald Horowitz.
\textsuperscript{163} Refer to Norris (2005): p.9.
\textsuperscript{164} See for critique related to freezing of ethnic identities Horowitz (2000); Spears (2002).
\textsuperscript{165} Roeder and Rothchild (2005a): p. 50.
\textsuperscript{167} Binningsbø (2005); Brancati and Snyder (2011a) and (2011b).
\textsuperscript{168} Refer to Lyons (2002).
political arrangement." Some authors have also found that experience with power-sharing decreases the likelihood of elections later on being contested.

Addressing grievances and ensuring an inclusive process prior to the first post conflict election can reduce its stakes, thus preventing a recurrence of conflict. Since this is dependent on the inclusiveness of the political process, my second independent variable (IV 2) is the “Degree of Inclusiveness of Political Institutions” established in the transitional government. I derived from the above outlined theory the following hypothesis:

**H 2: The more inclusive the political institutions following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the less likely recurrence of conflict following a national election.**

### 4. Operationalisation

In the following, my previously defined concepts will be operationalised in order to test my hypotheses.

#### 4.1 Recurrence of Conflict Following a National Election (DV)

The specific focus on the recurrence of conflict following a national election was chosen because elections can be viewed as a critical turning point, where a country can potentially move towards war termination as long as structural and institutional factors serve as safeguards, as outlined in Chapter 2.2.

One of the main challenges faced when engaging in a study aimed at contributing to the ‘peace-building’ debate, is to find appropriate implicit or explicit indicators for categorisation of the cases, in order to have a cross-unit reference point. Given that peace is characterised by the absence of violence, similar research endeavours tend to employ the level of violence as the indicator when measuring a country’s progress. Typically, a threshold of ‘25 battle related deaths’ or an even higher ‘1,000 battle related deaths’ threshold is used to determine a recurrence of conflict. Employing thresholds

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170 Snyder and Brancati (2011a): p.472
173 Examples include Jarstad (2008) and Snyder and Brancati (2011b).
for measurement poses some problems for post-conflict countries. Data collection in conflict regions is a hazardous task, making data availability a problem. Since the cases under examination typically lack civil rights or a free media, the latter is also not a reliable source. As a consequence, some cases may not be understood as being in conflict, simply because they narrowly miss an arbitrary threshold. Even authors who employ a threshold, such as Jarstad, note that “not all election-related violence is captured in the data” and hence one cannot draw conclusions on whether the elections were in fact peaceful. While I would not go as far as Zartman who argues that “such studies do not explain civil conflict, they explain conflict with more than 1,000 deaths, which is a bit like explaining human growth by starting at the age of 12 years,” it is clear that relying on the presence of conflict merely by one absolute, numerical indicator does indeed not reveal all that much.

Some studies try to overcome the problem by employing a proxy indicators. In line with the paradigm ‘security first’, the degree of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) following conflict is a popular measure, since these studies assume that peace prospects and a party’s commitment to peace can be measured by their willingness to demobilise. These studies are in many cases prone to tautology since the degree of external involvement, i.e. peace operations, is used as an independent variable. The tautological problem this causes is that the degree of DDR is in many cases financed through peace operations, since national governments lack the financial capabilities. Empirically speaking this measure is not without problems either, since there are cases where demobilisation did not take place, or was not even included as part of a peace agreement, and former conflict parties nevertheless stuck to the peace process, thus making it a poor proxy to measure peace.

Addressing the insufficient threshold indicator, I opted for a more differentiated assessment by adopting the coding of my DV from the Varieties of Democracy Codebook and its variable “1:26 Election other related violence.”

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175 Ibid. (2012): p. 14 refer to a study on Guatemala where media coverage of killings decreased as repression by the state increased.
180 Tajikistan has had considerable difficulties with disarmament, but peaceful elections took place prior to completing disarmament, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "formal demobilisation was not even included in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords"; see GTZ (2001): p.30.
Operationalisation: DV – Recurrence of violence following a national election

00 – Conflict breaks out anew during the electoral process in the transitional phase (i.e. following the signing of the CPA prior to the conduct of the first national legislative post-conflict election).

0 - Widespread violence between civilians is occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths (at least 25) or displaced refugees.

1 - There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result (less than 25), and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2 - There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3 - There were only few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4 – No recurrence of violence following a national election.

Yes = high levels of post-electoral conflict based on the categories 00, 0, 1, 2
No = low levels of post-electoral conflict based on the categories 3, 4

The focus is on legislative/parliamentary national elections, as applied by Jarstad (2009). She found, that the degree of fairness of an election did not have an effect on an elections ‘war-termination’ or ‘war-inducing’ potential.\footnote{Jarstad (2009): p.44.} Since this is what I seek to examine in this paper, the degree of fairness will not be taken as an additional indicator.

Elections and Violence – The need for a Dynamic Timeframe?

In Chapter 5.3 I will elaborate how the phenomenon of post-conflict elections requires me to determine my timeframe in relation to the conduct of a country’s first post-conflict election. It shall hence suffice to say here that if a conflict breaks out anew during the electoral process, i.e. following the signing of the CPA prior to the conduct of the first national legislative post-conflict election (as defined in Chapter 3 as \textit{Variant a} of the
model), my case study analysis will examine whether this breakdown is related to my explanatory variables.

For information on the dates and type of the election, the website Election Guide will be consulted. Recently, a number of projects tried to evaluate the effect elections have across a scale of autocracy and democracy. One example is the Codebook for the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) Dataset. It provides information on elections since 1960 and includes a variable on electoral violence, which codes whether there is “significant violence involving civilian deaths immediately before, during, or after the election.” The NELDA variable also explicitly examines whether violence amongst civilians occurs, since they consider that as an indicator for elections where competitiveness, and thus its contribution to democratisation, is likely to be hampered. Another dataset for crosschecking results in NELDA is the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED), which includes data on armed conflict for most African and Asian countries and specifies the origin and perpetrators of violence. For additional information, the archive LexisNexis will be consulted.

The scale will allow me to make a more differentiated assessment and to not become a subject of the above described threshold fallacy. Since the outbreak of war is also perceived as a process, a nuanced approach can observe a trend for each case and allows for better analysis of variation amongst the cases studied. When the cases examined score a level 3 or 4 as defined by my scale on the previous page, we can consider a country to be largely at peace.

4.2 Robust External Security Guarantees (IV1)

As outlined in my theoretical discussion, I regard the presence of robust external security guarantees, materialised as an international peace operation, as an explanatory factor in relation to the recurrence of violence following a national election. A peace operation can during the ‘transitional period’ prior to the election monitor, verify and sanction defection

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184 Refer to Nelda33 in "National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy: Contact and Data Access" http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/#contact; the most recent codebook (Codebook for Version 3 of the dataset, last updated August 15 2012) is only available via this contact form. Date accessed: 26.11.2012.
185 Refer to Hyde and Marinov (2012).
188 Refer to Regan and Norton (2005).
from the peace process, thereby contributing to the establishment of mutual confidence.\textsuperscript{189} A robust security guarantee can only be regarded as such when an outside force came in with the mandate it promised, at the time it promised. Peace operations that came in with a significantly reduced mandate will thus be coded as a ‘weak’ security guarantee.\textsuperscript{190} The underlying logic is that in these cases the third party commitment is not credible and hence will not act as a deterrent for the use of force of one of the warring parties.\textsuperscript{191}

**Operationalisation:** weak / strong (binary variable)\textsuperscript{192}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong/robust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No security guarantee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promise to protect but mandate and force not defined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to deploy verification mission of under 500 observers</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to deploy verification mission of at least 500 observers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of less than 5000</td>
<td>Strong/robust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of at least 5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weak security guarantee = verification mission, international observer mission 0, 1, 2
Robust security guarantee = presence of an international peacekeeping mission 3, 4, 5

The threshold of the categories is based on examination of peace operations. The ‘under/at least 500’ threshold for categories (2) and (3) was determined by the fact that half of all missions with no mandate to use force have a peak personnel of under 500.\textsuperscript{193} One core principle guiding the definition of peace operations used by the UN is the consent of the parties.\textsuperscript{194} This classification was also employed for the selection of

\textsuperscript{190} Significant here means that the personnel deployed should at least equal 95 per cent of the promised contingent.
\textsuperscript{191} Following Walter (2002): p. 66.
\textsuperscript{192} As coded by Walter (2002): pp.67-68;
\textsuperscript{193} See Appendix for list of peace operations with no mandate to use force.
missions under review, equally for UN and non-UN cases.\textsuperscript{195} Peace operations were identified from a recently published compilation which includes all peace operations from 1946 till 2009.\textsuperscript{196} Considering only those cases where the conflict parties consented to the peace mission should preclude problems of legitimacy of the operation. Legitimacy, as outlined in Chapter 3.1, is important to ensure that a peace operation can provide credible commitment to the parties and function as a security guarantee.

I am not exclusively focusing on UN peacekeeping operations, as it is done in many other works, since I am not assessing the purely normative effect of the missions.\textsuperscript{197} Some scholars have emphasized the common goal of UN missions to introduce liberal market democracies wherever they intervened.\textsuperscript{198} This ideological notion is, however, irrelevant for my categorisation which is based on the idea of how well these missions can enforce peace, i.e. how well can they provide security guarantees to ensure credible commitment of all parties and punish those who are not playing by the rules. The advantage of my approach lies in the fact that experts expect regional organisations to play an increasing role in peace operations in the years to come\textsuperscript{199}, lately indicated by the passing of a Security Council resolution aimed at further institutionalising the cooperation with the African Union.\textsuperscript{200} The Democratic Republic of the Congo is only one example where the United Nations “were unwilling to get involved to any significant degree, leaving the peace processes to be pushed forward by regional actors and organisations.”\textsuperscript{201} Assessing the robustness of external security guarantees of regional organisations and their capability of serving as a credible guarantor of security necessary to reduce the stakes of a post-conflict election hence offers a relevant outlook for possible future developments.

### 4.3 Inclusive Political Institutions (IV2)

Following the theoretical considerations outlined, I consider the degree of inclusiveness of political institutions following the signing of a peace agreement, i.e. in the ‘transitional

\textsuperscript{195} Bellamy and Williams (2005): p.158 find that there is no fundamental difference between UN and non-UN peace operations.


\textsuperscript{197} My initial sample of 36 countries which experienced termination of a conflict through a CPA includes four cases which qualify for a non-UN peace operation: Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{198} Paris (2004).


\textsuperscript{200} United Nations (2012).

phase’ prior to the first post-conflict election, an important explanatory factor to elucidate the phenomenon of the recurrence of conflict following an election.

The inclusiveness of political institutions has been highlighted as a main concern for durable peace.\textsuperscript{202} Territorial and military pacts will not be included in this analysis. The feasibility of territorial pacts in conflicts that were not fought over territory is rather low.\textsuperscript{203} Some scholars advise the implementation of territorial pacts only for homogenous territories.\textsuperscript{204} I will not focus on military pacts because elite cooperation, the core of Lijphart’s consociationalism, only focuses on political institutions. In line with Lijphart’s theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence derived from other authors, I assume that all rebel movements will have high preferences to participate in the governing institutions, whereas a pre-arranged division of the military power is likely to be lower on a rebel movement’s list of priorities when it comes to the implementation of the peace plan and successfully concluding the transition phase.\textsuperscript{205}

This paper will focus on \textit{de facto} and not \textit{de jure} political institutions since I follow Lijphart’s belief that the experience of joint governance, and hence having the concrete possibility of having a say in political processes, is what prevents the reoccurrence of conflict in light of an election.\textsuperscript{206} It thus departs from the more common approach of Hoddie and Hartzell as well as other authors. The fact that nearly half of all peace agreements (43\%) do not manage the transition from finding a compromise on paper, i.e. the peace agreement, to actually implementing the terms of the agreement, exemplifies the importance of investigating \textit{de facto} institutional set-ups.\textsuperscript{207} Implementation is the linchpin because it demonstrates that the commitment to peace is credible, otherwise a return to the battlefield might be preferable. I argue that the potential exercise of power (as examined by those authors only looking at \textit{de jure} institutions) is not enough in a setting where there has not been a prior period of shared power. Not considering the differences in implementation of CPAs might also explain why analyses which only look at \textit{de jure} institutions at times conclude that political power-sharing is not associated with

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{202} Discussion on this, including literature review in OECD (2011).
  \item \textsuperscript{203} Hartzell and Hoddie (2007): p.169.
  \item \textsuperscript{204} Vandeginste (2009): p.74 also argues this point.
  \item \textsuperscript{205} Walter (2002) Table 4.1, p.73. Walter argues that the resolution of a civil war is a three step process. For the last phase, the implementation of the terms of the treaty (and its endurance) she does not consider military pacts.
  \item \textsuperscript{206} Scholars who examine \textit{de jure} institutions include Cammett and Malesky (2012): p.1010 and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) and (2005a); Walter (2002). Jarstad (2009) and (2008) constitutes an exception. She codes cases as political power-sharing, where government and rebels experienced joint rule but does not differentiate between the degree of power-sharing.
  \item \textsuperscript{207} Walter (2002): p.6, Figure 1.2.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
longer peace. While the problem of examining the true effects of political power-sharing is likely to be diminished by examining what has actually been implemented, we are still confronted with the problem of “operationalising some of the core concepts” and “establishing consistent institutional categorizations and reliable comparative evidence covering a wide range of countries”, resulting in only some of the concepts being examined. Although I have overcome the question of implementation, the latter criticism, not investigating all parts of consociationalism, is also a potential shortcoming of my work. I am trying to overcome this problem, by focusing on those aspects which gained the highest scores in an empirical investigation which centred on the question of reducing political violence in countries after conflict by the means of institutional guarantees, i.e. power-sharing, closely following Lijphart’s consociationalism.

I measure the inclusiveness of political institutions by examining the strength of two sub-categories of Lijphart’s consociationalism, namely (A) Grand Coalition and (B) Proportional Representation.

(A) Grand Coalition “should gather the leaders of all significant segments to govern together.” Viewed this way, it does not have to be the cabinet in a parliamentary system, but can also be the three-member rotating presidency in Bosnia, established after Dayton. This would, according to my Matrix 1 on p. 44 classify as A4.

(B) Proportional representation on the other hand decides, broadly speaking, on the influence allocation in society. Proportional representation, typically associated with electoral systems, can take on different forms when employed in the transitional phase. Just looking at the sample from which my case studies are drawn, one can point to the CPAs in Angola in 1994 and 2002, which stated that “the first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates” [author’s note: as elected in 1992] “shall constitute the UNITA parliamentary group.” Yet another way of achieving proportional representation in transitional government structures was experimented with in Iraq, where a transitional government was elected by proportional representation in January which governed until the transfer of power to a new government elected in December the same year. In South Africa on the other hand, all major political parties were to be represented in the

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208 Cammet and Malesky (2012) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2005a).
210 Binningsbø and PRIO (2005).
211 Lijphart (1977): p.25
213 Ibid.: p.15.
transitional government according to a proportional system. These examples indicate that there are manifold ways to apply proportional representation even during the transitional phase. The sharing of power is furthermore not restricted to one particular mode of governance, but can be achieved in a multitude of ways. In that sense, even a presidential system can exercise joint power, which empirically speaking is done as often as in parliamentary systems.

The scaling of (A) Grand Coalition and (B) Proportional representation is ordinal. Whilst the (B) Proportional Representation variable was already ordinal in Binningsbø’s work, I assigned the values for (A) Grand Coalition following empirical evidence derived from quantitative analysis according to which subdivision achieved the highest level of statistical significance in their regression analysis.

I presume that “the more political pacts, the better.” This accordingly means that the presence of no features is coded as 0, while all other categories are added together. This denotes, that a country in which (A 3) a ‘Coalition Cabinet’ (3 points) and (B 3) ‘Seats in the legislature allocated in a fixed quota’ (3 points) are observed, scores 6 points in total. A country which has on the other hand (A1) ‘No grand coalition’ (0 points) and (B 3) ‘100% of the seats in legislature allocated by proportional representation’ (2 points) will score 2 points in total.

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217 Binningsbø and PRIO (2005): p.25
218 Hartzell and Hoddie (2003); Binningsbø and PRIO (2005); Wolff (2008).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Studies</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>A Grand Coalition</th>
<th>B Proportional Representation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A 1: no grand coalition</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 2: a majority coalition cabinet</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inclusiveness of political institutions: 6–4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 3: a transitional coalition cabinet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 4: an agreement for 2 or more parties in the executive</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1: no proportional representation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 2: between 50% and 99% of the seats in legislature allocated by proportional representation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>inclusiveness of political institutions: 3–0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 3: 100% of the seats in legislature allocated by proportional representation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B 4: seats in legislature allocated on a fixed quota</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Matrix 1: Political Pacts 4**
4.4 Summary and Prediction

As I want to explore why post-conflict elections sometimes seem to trigger renewed conflict as oppose to precipitate demilitarisation of politics, I use the recurrence of violence following a national election as my dependent variable. I argue that the structure of the ‘transitional phase’ in which the electoral process is set exerts influence on the outcome of the latter. The insecurity of the process can be mitigated through robust external security guarantees (IV1) which help the parties to the conflict to overcome their mutual fears by monitoring their behaviour and punishing violations to the agreed upon terms. Inclusive political institutions (IV2) can address remaining grievances while at the same time demonstrating both parties that cooperation is possible and not detrimental. I would therefore expect that in cases where neither of my explanatory factors are present, a recurrence of violence is likely and might even occur prior to the culmination of the electoral process, i.e. the election itself. Furthermore, if the peace process breaks down it is further evidence that the mere prospect of an election in war termination is insufficient because those circumstances preventing elections taking place are also likely to be those which contribute to violence.\(^{219}\)

Accordingly, the following two hypotheses shall be tested in the subsequent empirical discussion:

**H 1:** The more robust the external security guarantees, the less likely a recurrence of conflict following a national election.

**H 2:** The more inclusive the political institutions following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the less likely a recurrence of conflict following a national election.

5. Methodology and Case Selection

In order to test hypotheses derived from theory, one can either conduct an experiment or obtain conclusions through observation.\(^{220}\) Considering the obvious obstacles for experimental research in conflict studies, the hypotheses will be tested using case study analysis which complies with the logic of congruence. For congruence testing, “the

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\(^{219}\) Jarstad (2009): p.54 comes to a similar conclusion.

researcher tests whether the predicted value of the dependent variable, in view of the 
values of the case's independent variables, is congruent with the actual outcome in the 
case.\textsuperscript{221}

Small-N case studies have many advantages over large-N, purely quantitative studies, 
which currently dominate the conflict studies literature.\textsuperscript{222} As we know, correlation is not 
causation, and having a thick description of events can contribute to discovering the 
potential shortcomings of current models by testing data against good case studies.\textsuperscript{223} If 
case studies are employed to investigate findings from large-N or small-N data sets, they 
often do not go beyond a single case study or two.\textsuperscript{224} This paper on the other hand will 
ensure that more cases than variables are examined in order to not have more variables 
than cases and thus become a victim of the “small-N many variables” problem.\textsuperscript{225}

**The Universe of Cases: Comprehensive Peace Agreements**

"A fundamental task in any research project is defining the universe of cases."\textsuperscript{226} I 
restricted my initial universe of cases, i.e. all countries that experienced intra-state 
conflict, to those which signed a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA). Countries 
included in the sample previously experienced “large-scale violence among geographically 
contiguous people concerned about possibly having to live with one another in the same 
political unit after the conflict."\textsuperscript{227} This study defines a CPA as an agreement where the 
major parties in the conflict are involved in a negotiation process and those issues at 
heart of the underlying dispute are included in the negotiation process. This does not 
mandate “that the exclusion of a few more outlying parties makes the agreement less 
‘comprehensive’ in nature."\textsuperscript{228}

In order to establish which peace agreement qualifies as ‘comprehensive’ in nature, I 
relied on the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM).\textsuperscript{229} PAM is a project established in 2012 by the 
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame and works 
closely with the renowned Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UPCD). The project was 
developed with support from the United States Institute of Peace and the National

\textsuperscript{222} Paul Collier being the most notorious example of this.  
\textsuperscript{224} Jarstad (2009); Jung (2012); Walter (2002).  
\textsuperscript{228} Vanderzee et al (2010).  
\textsuperscript{229} For the full definition employed by the Peace Accords Matrix, please refer to the Appendix to this paper.
Science Foundation. PAM codes peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2006 qualitatively and monitors their implementation until the present date. This allows me to cross-check my own assessment with that of an established research team, which should in turn lead to more robust results since PAM employs a multi-step process for coding the material. Another advantage of using the PAM database is that it codes the CPAs according to which provisions were present and which ones were not, in addition to whether the provisions were in fact implemented. Singlehandedly reading and evaluating hundreds of peace agreements plus their subsequent execution would have been a nearly impossible challenge, which is why despite the complex forces underway during conflicts, conflict literature remains dominated by large-N country regressions.

5.1 Criteria for Case Selection

Since this study adheres to the methodological principles of “Most Similar System Design” (MSSD) and applies the congruence procedure, cases will be chosen by the independent variable and “appear to be similar in as many ways as possible in order to control for ‘concomitant variation’“, so that “the factors that are held constant through the selection of cases cannot be said to be alternative sources of that relationship.” This will allow me to discount third-variable influence by creating “a semi-controlled environment that limits the effects of third variables by holding them constant.”

Cases are chosen by the independent variable, as oppose to the dependent variable, since the results from this method are more robust. The crux of cases chosen by the dependent variable is that you can only study what these cases have in common. From this follows, that the common denominators of the cases are mistakenly presumed to be "crucial antecedents of the outcome under investigation", despite other countries with a different outcome also fulfilling these characteristics, which in turn would make the hypothesis implausible. In order to test hypotheses, MSSD offers two different methods. Choosing as many different combinations of the variables as possible helps to test their relative strength. We can hence determine which proposed explanatory factor has the greater explanatory power. Since samples often do not allow for this type of

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232 Blattman and Miguel (2010): p. 22 also criticise this fact.
235 Ibid.: p.46.
237 Ibid.: p.132.
testing without forfeiting the similarity amongst cases, it is also possible to “select cases with extreme values on the independent variable. Such cases offer strong tests, because the theory's predictions are certain and unique (...).”\textsuperscript{238} Additionally, this approach “lowers the numbers of third factors with the strength to produce the result that the test theory predicts which lowers the possibility that omitted variables account for passed tests.”\textsuperscript{239}

While MSSD applied in case study research certainly overcomes some of the caveats inherent in social science research, it is criticised for the oversimplification of reality, resulting in only limited explanatory value. It nevertheless is valuable for theory testing and to determine general tendencies.\textsuperscript{240}

5.2 Control Variables

In the following section the two factors which are held constant throughout the study will be presented. While there are plenty of variables which tend to be held constant, authors are often not consistent in their estimation with the direction of the proposed effect.\textsuperscript{241} In line with the proposed importance of the role of the environmental context for conflict recurrence as outlined in Chapter 2.1, the paper will control for the two least disputed factors: the degree of economic prosperity (CV1) and previous regime type (CV2).

One of the least disputed accounts within conflict studies is that “poor people fight more.”\textsuperscript{242} The ‘bottom billion’ continue to be stuck in a ‘conflict trap’, especially if they previously experienced a conflict, because the chances of development and increasing income become lower which in turn increases the chances for further conflict.\textsuperscript{243} As I have already discussed in Chapter 2.1, the greed and grievance perspectives have each advanced reasons why low-income countries have a certain pre-dispositions for experiencing violent intra-state conflicts compared to richer countries. Across the board, a rise in income is agreed to lower the chances for rebellion, whether this is due to greed or grievance. A case in point is that following a rise in income, translating in a decrease of infant mortality rate by 30 per cent, the Aceh Rebel Organisation in Indonesia

\textsuperscript{238} Van Evera (1997): p.79.
\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.: pp.52-3.
\textsuperscript{240} Van Evera (1997): p.54.
\textsuperscript{241} For example, Lijphart is inconsistent in his predictions for favourable implementation environments. Pointed out in Binningsbe (2005): p.10.
\textsuperscript{242} Collier (2009); Gleditsch (2007).
\textsuperscript{243} The term ‘bottom billion’ is most notably employed by Collier (2003). Refer to Collier (2007) for a discussion on the ‘conflict trap’, i.e. likelihood for conflict increases if a country previously experienced a conflict.
experienced recruitment problems for the period between 1976 and 1989. The expected effect is hence, that the lower the degree of economic prosperity, the more likely recurrence of conflict. I will use Gross National Income (PPP, in current US dollar) as my indicator for the degree of economic prosperity. Data was retrieved from the World Bank database. For each country, the year in which the CPA was signed was chosen as the basis for the figure quoted in Table 1 in the Appendix.

Another variable that should be controlled for is previous democratic experience (CV2). The hypothesis, “the less democratic experience a country had previous to the conflict, the more likely is that elections cause a recurrence to violence” is generally agreed upon in the conflict studies literature and ‘one of the usual suspects’ when assessing why elections sometimes cause a renewed outbreak of violence in post-conflict countries. The positive effect of democratic experience for the lasting chances of peace is related to the expectation that previous democratic experience is thought to lead to an internalisation of the democratic principles. This is primarily based on the ideas of Larry Diamond who poignantly wrote “over time, citizens of a democracy become habituated to its norms and values, gradually internalising them. The trick is for democracies to survive long enough – and function well enough – for this process to occur.” Once this has been achieved, democracy can be regarded as the dominant political culture. The benefits of an emerged democratic political culture include, amongst others, the “tolerance of opposition and dissent, trust in fellow political actors and a willingness to cooperate, accommodate and compromise.” We would therefore expect that any country which previously had democratic experience would have a lower chance for renewed conflict. In order to control for this phenomenon, we rely on the assessment of ‘democraticness’ by the Polity IV Index, as employed in previous studies measuring the degree of previous democratic experience.

After holding income (CV1) and previous democratic experience (CV2) constant, the initial sample of 36 cases classified as CPA’s by PAM from Africa, Europe, Asia and America respectively, has been reduced to 16. The 16 cases which qualified are listed in Table 1 in the Appendix.

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245 Adapted from Roeder and Rothchild (2005a):p.45.
246 World Bank, Data, Countries according to income classifications, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications, last accessed 10.01.2013. Refer to Table 1 in the Appendix.
250 The variable can be divided into not democratic (-10 to -6), semi-democratic (-5 to 5) and democratic (6 to 10). This classification has previously been employed by Binningsbø (2005) and Ellingsen (2000). Refer to Polity IV Index, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, last accessed 05.02.2013.
the Appendix. In order to test the case selection of PAM for possible selection bias, I consulted compilations of CPA’s in order to ensure that a similar set of cases was included in other studies. The majority (8) of cases represented in Table 1 did neither have an implemented political pact during the transitional phase, nor a robust peace operation on the ground. Only 3 cases classified for having both inclusive political institutions and a robust peace operation. There are more cases where there is a strong security guarantee present but a political pact was not implemented (3) than vice versa (2).

The sample does not allow me to test all combinations of values on my independent variables. There are only 2 cases which exhibit a low value on IV1, i.e. no robust external security guarantees, but a strong value on IV2, i.e. high inclusiveness of political institutions, both of which are with regards to other characteristics substantially dissimilar to the other cases within the sample. The danger of distorting my results outweighs the benefits of having a sample with all possible combinations of my independent variables. I will therefore use case studies which have the most extreme values on the study variables and are also with regards to other possible explanatory factors the most similar. As I am focusing with my IV2 on the distribution of political power, I will not examine cases fought over territory since other studies found that the means for peace-building differ between conflicts fought over government power and territory.

The cases to be examined are Djibouti (2001), Liberia (2003), Burundi (2003) and Sierra Leone (1996). They appear to be having similar characteristics with regards to other possible explanations for the recurrence of conflict following a national election (DV). All countries experienced more than one episode of violent conflict and signed numerous peace agreements, prior to the CPA under examination in this paper. The conflicts prior to the signing of the CPA had a strong transnational component and classify as ‘new wars’, in that they were not driven by ideology. None of the countries have large export revenues resulting from refined petroleum products. All countries are located in ‘conflict

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251 The danger of selection bias was pointed out by Khosla (2004): p. 67. PAM data set (used in this paper) was compared with the cases mentioned in Wallensteen (2012) p.135 and Jarstad (2009) pp.52-3.

252 Rwanda experienced genocide within the period under examination. Angola’s election took place after six years, compared to two in the other cases. Refer to Chapter 5.3 for the resulting problems of this. Furthermore it is one of the world’s largest oil producers.

253 Authors have pointed out, that while conflicts fought over territory are able to, and indeed often do, introduce federalism, stakes are thus divisible. Refer for instance to Stedman (1997).

254 One party to the conflict received support across its borders. Djibouti – Eritrea, Sierra Leone – Liberia, Burundi – Rwanda, Liberia – Guinea.


 ridden neighbourhoods’ so-to-speak, increasing the risk for conflict spill-over.\textsuperscript{257} The conflicts prior to the signing of the CPA were relatively short, ranging from two to five years.\textsuperscript{258} Even though these factors are not employed as explicit control variables, the choice of my cases for comparison appears to be convincing because the cases are decisively similar with regards to other factors which one may expect to have an effect on the likelihood of conflict recurrence.\textsuperscript{259}

5.3 Discussion: Dynamic Timeframes for the Analysis of Violence and Elections

Since the focus of my study is the recurrence of violence following a national election, the timeframe chosen will be the year in which the CPA was signed until the conduct of the first post-conflict parliamentary election. The timeframe is thus chosen in relation to my dependent variable, as already pointed out in Chapter 4.1.

Comparable studies opt for a five-year timeframe, but the reasoning has some shortcomings.\textsuperscript{260} Jarstad thus writes that Angola did not experience a return to conflict within the five year period, since elections were only held six years after the CPA was signed. In fact, there was significant violence against civilians once the election took place, six years after the CPA was signed.\textsuperscript{261} The analysis thus fails to shed light on what it seeks to explain: violence in relation to elections.

Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001), who other authors refer to with regards to the timeframe, write that some of the effects of the conflict environment are likely to attenuate over time, hence a longer time frame could blur these developments. This criticism is particularly valid with regards to their investigation on the durability of settlements, using the two proxies previous regime type and the structure of the international system.\textsuperscript{262} Since my study holds these two factors constant, it should be less susceptible to potential distortions of this type.

\textsuperscript{257} Related to diffusion theory. See Gleditsch (2002).
\textsuperscript{258} PAM Country Comparison: Djibouti: 01 Feb 1998- 07 Feb 2000; Sierra Leone: 01.03.1991- 30.11.1996; Liberia: 01.01.2000- 17.06.2003; Burundi: 28.06.1998-02.12.2002. While ‘short’ is of course a relative assessment, the conflict episodes were decisively shorter compared to the civil war in Mozambique which started in 1977 and where the CPA was only signed in 1992 or the Philippines, where equally over two decades passed from the start of recorded violence until the signing of the CPA. See PAM: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/country/, last accessed 25.01.2013.
\textsuperscript{259} Walter (2002): p.109 equally writes, regarding the cases she chose to compare, that she chose them because they were as similar as possible out of all the cases of her sample.
\textsuperscript{260} Refer to Jarstad (2009) and (2008).
\textsuperscript{262} This refers to my CV 2. All countries in the sample reached a settlement following the end of the Cold War.
The authors also caution that the effect of institutional arrangements is likely to change over time. As an example they give the effect of new grievances created through the non-implementation of a settlement.\textsuperscript{263} Having this likely development in mind, I chose an approach which is able to account for that problem. I do not merely look at the ‘words’ of a CPA but also whether they are turned into ‘deeds’, namely whether the provisions were implemented. Furthermore, I examine the period from the signing of the CPA until the first elections, i.e. the transitional period. This approach recognises that the presence of the power-sharing provisions (IV2) set in place after the signing of a CPA is not finite, i.e. they \textit{may} become a part of the constitutional set-up but they do not \textit{have} to. By addressing the issue of implementation directly as part of my design, I will evaluate whether the resulting grievances were addressed and if not, whether that had an adverse effect with regards to the conduct of elections.

Nevertheless we have to acknowledge that substantial in-sample variation of the duration until the first legislative election should be avoided, since the fading memories of conflict may make a recurrence of conflict less likely after ten years than after two.\textsuperscript{264} And indeed this seems to be the case. As many as 40 per cent of conflicts return within ten years back to war.\textsuperscript{265}

Since I explore whether the presence of my independent variables helps to answer the question why there is sometimes a recurrence of violence following an election, determining my cut-off point independent from the actual holding of the election will tell me little about the presumed peace inducing effect of my independent variables with regards to the insecurity caused by an election. In addition, the logic of my rationale is supported by the finding in Jarstad’s study that of the 22 countries where parliamentary elections were held, 17 slid back into conflict following the election.\textsuperscript{266} Considering the above refuted reasoning of sticking to a five year timeframe, I will determine the timeframe for each country according to the holding of its first post-CPA national legislative (parliamentary) election. If the electoral process broke down prior to the holding of an election, (see Chapter 2.2), the analysis stops at the breakdown of the peace process. This is compatible with the operationalisation employed by Jarstad, who for those cases where no elections took place in the by her defined five-year time frame

\textsuperscript{264} Ibid., also pointed out in Collier (2009): p.74.
\textsuperscript{265} Collier (2009): p.75.
she coded the recurrence of violence dependent on whether the country experienced one year of peace following the signing of the CPA.\(^{267}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of the independent variables</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Signing of the CPA</th>
<th>Holding of the First Post-Conflict Elections</th>
<th>Timeframe (in years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV 1 and IV2 not present for the time under examination (-)*</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord, Mai 12 2001</td>
<td>2003 parliamentary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Abidjan Peace Agreement, Nov 30 1996</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>Conflict breaks out anew during the electoral process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1 and IV2 strongly present for the time under examination (+)*</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Liberia Accra Peace Agreement, Aug 18 2003</td>
<td>2005 parliamentary (and presidential)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Pretoria Protocol November 2003</td>
<td>2005 parliamentary (and presidential)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own compilation.

*plus and minus indicate that the cases had the highest and the lowest values on the study variables respectively out of my initial sample.

Table 2: Case Selection 5

6. Empirical Test of the Model

The model introduced so-far will be tested on four case studies, Djibouti (2001), Sierra Leone (1996), Liberia (2003), and Burundi (2003).

6.1 Recurrence of Conflict Following a National Election

As outlined in Chapter 4.1, my dependent variable is measured along an ordinal scale consisting of five indicators, each signifying a different degree of violence in relation to electoral conduct in my four post-conflict case studies. Prior to introducing the classification of the dependent variable for each case, a brief history of each conflict with respect to the history of political competition, the parties to the conflict and the signing of the CPA is presented.

6.1.1 Djibouti (2001)

The conflict in Djibouti can be divided into several stages, the two main episodes being characterised distinctively by grievances due to exclusion from the political arena.

Djibouti is a former French colony, located on the Horn of Africa, surrounded by Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea. It is home to two main population groups, the Afar (ca.35 per cent, of Ethiopian descent) and the Issa (ca.60 per cent, of Somali descent). The relationship between the two groups was aggravated during colonial times when the French took turns in supporting one or the other of the ethnic groups. In 1977, Djibouti gained independence when 98 per cent of the population voted in favour in a referendum.

The 'first' conflict episode lasted from 1991 till 1994. Tensions between the two majority ethnic groups started when a precursor of a multi-party system was introduced in 1991 through constitutional reform with re-election of the parliament scheduled for the same year. "The new charter limited, however, the number of legally registered parties to a maximum of four and was not accepted by the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy" (FRUD, Afar dominated) which boycotted the first multi-party elections.

FRUD was an amalgamation of opposition groups. At the end of 1991, the rebels commenced with attacks on the government army, feeling marginalised by the Issa dominated government and its political party Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès (RPP).\textsuperscript{270} In 1994, the government signed a peace agreement with the moderate faction of FRUD, which ended the first civil war in Djibouti. FRUD was registered as a political party the same year, as part of a power-sharing deal arranged in the peace accord, “Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale” from December 26 1994. Partially implementing the CPA, some of FRUD’s members were assigned cabinet posts in mid-1995.\textsuperscript{271}

6.1.2 Sierra Leone (1996)

As in the case with Djibouti, the conflict in Sierra Leone can be separated into different stages, namely a military regime followed by a civilian regime which was overthrown in favour of another military government.\textsuperscript{272}

Sierra Leone is situated in West Africa, bordering Guinea and Liberia. Great Britain established Sierra Leone 1787, when it became a haven for freed slaves. When Sierra Leone gained independence in 1961, there were some short-lived expectations that it would become “a model state”\textsuperscript{273}, an assertion that was quickly to prove, unfortunately, wrong. Whilst approximately sixteen ethnic groups reside in Sierra Leone, two are numerically dominant (the Temne, dominating the north of the country and the Mende, dominating the south. Each equal approximately 30 per cent).\textsuperscript{274} The British introduced a distinction between Creoles (British subjects) who were allowed “token representation in colonial institutions of rule” whilst natives (protectorate Africans) had no such representation until 1924.\textsuperscript{275} This exacerbated tensions between the politically dominant Creoles and the protectorate Africans, mainly Temne and Mende.

The country’s first pseudo-competitive elections took place one year after independence in 1962, won by the Mende dominated Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). In 1964, with the death of its founder and leader, the SLPP started to lose its grip on power, which

\textsuperscript{271} Five ministers were assigned cabinet posts; see PAM, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/48/powersharing_transitional_government>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Last accessed 28.01.2013.
\textsuperscript{274} Kandeh (2004): p.128.
incited some tensions and increased politics being played out along regional lines. What since independence been a relatively peaceful transition had changed dramatically by 1967, when the country was shaken by its first coup d’état. The coup brought the northern-dominated All Peoples’ Congress (APC) to power in 1968 under the leadership of Sir Siaka Stevens, who declared the country a one-party state in 1978. The systematic oppression of any opposition resulted in the rule of the APC for 24 years.

The conflict under examination in this paper first erupted in 1991, when pressure to reform the government structures mounted, leading to the adoption of a new constitution allowing for multiparty government rule. In April 1992 a coup disposed of the authoritarian APC leader Joseph Momoh, installing a military government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Meanwhile a rebel group called Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started to gain strength and control over the territory. RUF’s particular strength was that it attracted the marginalised rural community across ethnic divisions. Following massive demonstrations by the general population, the government conceded to allow the holding of a National Consultative Conference which demanded elections. This led to the registration of political parties. One month prior to the election, a coup led by the NPRC’s defense minister ousted Strasser, the previous incumbent.

What can be regarded as the second phase of the conflict is when the Bio-led junta handed over power to the election winner Ahmad Kabbah, of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), who won the legislative vote in March 1996 “overwhelmingly in the south and east of the country”, while losing in RUF’s stronghold in the north. At the same time, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), a Mende dominated southern militia movement close to the government SLPP, started to become more active in its fight against RUF. RUF meanwhile had done everything in its power to prevent people from casting votes, including carrying out horrific mutilations of civilians, while it itself boycotted the

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277 See Abraham (2000).
279 Akam (2012).
285 Ibid.: p.89.
elections. At least 27 people died in the run-up to the election, during which the conflict parties did not manage to agree on a ceasefire.

The election gave impetus to peace talks, starting with a ceasefire agreement the month after the election and finally cumulated in the Abidjan Peace Accord, signed on 30 November 1996. The CPA was brokered under the auspice of several regional players (e.g. ECOWAS, the OAU, the Commonwealth and the London based conflict resolution NGO International Alert), while the UN's involvement was limited.288

Sierra Leone is thus slightly unusual with elections taking place prior to the existence of a CPA and a ceasefire agreement. As in the case of Djibouti, Sierra Leone also stuck to its previous electoral timetable and the next round of elections was supposed to take place in five years. As one scholar has written, “it is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that this experiment with democracy ended on 25 May 1997, when Kabbah was violently overthrown”, only six months after the signing of the Abidjan CPA.289

The conflict started anew in May 1997290 through the installation of the military government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a splinter group of the national army with the support of RUF.291

FRUD started to support the incumbent RPP, hoping the party would fulfil the promise to finally implement measures for a greater distribution of power.292 This accommodating sentiment was not shared by the whole rebel group since real concessions of power were awaited to no avail. This led to the creation of a radical faction of FRUD led by Ahmed Dini, subsequently referred to as FRUD-AD. The group continued to carry out violent attacks against the government with increasing frequency in 1998, which is regarded as the start of the second phase of the Djiboutian conflict.

In 2001, a ‘final’ peace accord was signed, the Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord, incorporating FRUD-AD. The peace agreement did not alter the occurrence of elections in five year intervals. Although elections were scheduled for 2002 (having taken place prior to that in 1997), they had to be delayed for a few months until 2003. The first post CPA

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287 Harispe (1996): Polls close in Sierra Leone after at least 27 killed in related violence.
288 It was only represented through a special envoy appointed by the Secretary-General, Berhanu Dinka from Ethiopia.
290 Refer to Peace Accords Matrix, Sierra Leone for the coding of violence start and end date. peaceaccords.nd.edu, last accessed 13.01.2013.
parliamentary/legislative election following the signing of the in Djibouti took place in 2003.\textsuperscript{293}

As scholars have previously noted, empirical data for Djibouti is rare, despite Djibouti being one of the countries typically included in research endeavours in this field.\textsuperscript{294} It is thus difficult to judge whether the subsequent assessment with regards to the recurrence of conflict following a national election (DV) and my two independent variables is correct or marred by data shortcomings. In the following, I will assess the recurrence of violence in relation to the scale introduced in Chapter 4.1 for the national elections in 2003. NELDA has no violence recorded.\textsuperscript{295} In sum, violence following the parliamentary election did not take place despite allegations of fraud by the opposition.\textsuperscript{296} Research via LexisNexis did not reveal any further information.\textsuperscript{297}

\textbf{6.1.3 Burundi (2003)}

As in the previously examined cases, the conflict in Burundi also occurred in several stages, characterised by intervals of alternating civilian and military rule, often as a precursor to or succeeded by violent conflict.

Burundi is located in the East-African Great Lakes Region, bordering Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. Rwanda and Burundi were from 1916 until 1962 a European Colony, first under German and subsequently under Belgian rule. Burundi is home to three ethnic groups, the Hutu (ca. 85 per cent), the Tutsi (ca. 14 per cent) and the Twa (ca. 1 per cent).\textsuperscript{298} Colonial policies enforced the ethnic labels which favoured the minority Tutsis.\textsuperscript{299} Following independence in 1965, the instrumentalisation of ethnicity has, as in the other cases examined in this paper, led to a continuous struggle over either maintaining or capturing power, often along ethnic but also along regional lines.\textsuperscript{300}

Following independence in 1962, Burundi’s first election three years later brought a Hutu to power. Shortly after, the government was overthrown and a Tutsi-led junta established

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{293} The government in Djibouti held onto to the electoral calendar which existed prior to the CPA. It thus held previous, faux-competitive parliamentary elections in 1992 and 1997.
\item\textsuperscript{294} Pointed out in Brass (2008): p.523.
\item\textsuperscript{295} Refer to Appendix for Nelda Data.
\item\textsuperscript{296} IRI/IFES (2005): p.3.
\item\textsuperscript{297} Access via the library of Freie Universität Berlin. www.lexisnexis.com, last access 10.12.2012
\item\textsuperscript{298} Daley (2006): p.662.
\item\textsuperscript{299} Hintjens (1999): p.250-3.
\item\textsuperscript{300} Falch and Becker (2007): p.1 and p.4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
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a one-party state dominated by the Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA). Two more episodes of violence occurred, in 1972 and in 1988, due to mutual fears of an attack from the other side, i.e. a classical security dilemma.\textsuperscript{301} Following the violence in 1988, a reform process aimed at ensuring Hutu inclusion in government was started by UPRONA’s leader Boyoa.\textsuperscript{302} Burundi’s first multiparty election in June 1993 was won by Melchior Ndadaye, representing the Hutu-dominated Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU), who defeated Buyoya in a landslide victory.\textsuperscript{303} Subsequently, a peaceful transfer of power from the previously unchallenged UPRONA took place. Three months after Ndadaye took office, in October 1993, he was assassinated in a coup staged by the Tutsi-dominated military due to fear about increasing Hutu/FRODEBU power and “the real or imaginary prospect of an imminent reform of the armed forces.”\textsuperscript{304} This failed attempt to end the war meant that mistrust and tensions were high. As a consequence, the plane crash killing the Burundian president served as a spark that started a new chapter in the history of Burundian conflict in 1994. Three Hutu rebel groups, Conseil National pour la Décence de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu Forces Nationales de Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL), and the Front pour la Libération Nationale (FROLINA) thus started their rebellion against the government.

In the period between 1993 and 2003 many attempts were made to find a solution for lasting peace, which resulted in several episodes of peace in the country. In 2003, regional powers finally managed to pressure the CNDD-FDD to partake in negotiations for a new peace agreement, which was finalised in the Pretoria agreement.\textsuperscript{305} The agreement incorporated some of the same structures that had been agreed upon within the Arusha Accord from 2000, but included this time both rebel groups, thus classifying, following PAM, as a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.\textsuperscript{306}

After elections were initially scheduled for October 2004, they had to be postponed due to security concerns because the marginalised splinter-group FNL was still resisting co-option

\textsuperscript{301} Ibid.: p.2.
\textsuperscript{302} Nindorera (2012): p.11 attributes this to pressure from international donors.
\textsuperscript{303} Ibid.: p.12.
\textsuperscript{305} This was in part helped by a changing dynamics of the conflict in the DRC. The Burundian rebels had received support by Kabila’s government because Kabila wanted to punish Burundi for its support to Rwanda in its fight against the DRC. Refer to Falch and Becker (2007): p.20.
\textsuperscript{306} The CPA was in 2004 enhanced with a further provision but the provisions from the Pretoria Agreement remained in place.
into the transitional institutions and continued to carry out isolated violent acts. The legislative/parliamentary elections were held in July 2005 and brought the CNDD-FDD (Hutu) candidate Pierre Nkurunziza to power. This successful electoral process can be regarded as the culmination of the many previous years of violence.

This assessment of success is echoed when examining the NELDA database, which shows no violence recorded for the election, that was considered "free and fair" by international observers. Further research in the ACLED revealed, however, that fighting against the FNL continued and approximately 25 people died. The fighting did not last longer than one day and was mainly concentrated in the capital. Research via LexisNexis did not reveal any further information.


Liberia has experienced several stages of conflict. The first was a one-party governance, followed by violent incidents, the inauguration of a warlord as a president, and a second major episode to the conflict, his overthrow followed by a period which is under examination in this paper.

Liberia was established in 1820 and borders Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Like Sierra Leone, it was founded to resettle freed slaves, in this case by the US, the so-called Americo-Liberians. Liberia is home to as many as sixteen different ethnic groups. The Americo-Liberian elite which devolved from the resettlement behaved largely similar to their European colonial counterparts in their vast oppression of the indigenous population, denying them Liberian citizenship until 1904 and voting rights until 1940. Conflict over power was thus always fought against the privileged Americo-Liberians, which was effectively a one-party state until a coup d'État in 1980, bringing the first indigenous president Samuel Doe to power. Conflict had previously begun to mount due to grievances over economic deprivation, leading to violent protests.

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307 The election had been scheduled for this day still under provisions included in the 2000 Arusha Accord.
309 Refer to Appendix for Nelda Data.
315 Ibid.:2.
Doe’s style of governance in which he favoured his own ethnic group, did not however differ to the previous governments with regards to the use of violence and discrimination against the remaining populous. Violence was used to oppress dissident voices and the civilian population, leading to several coup attempts, in an effort to remove Doe. In December 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by the former government servant Charles Taylor, entered Liberia from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire and started to dominate the border area. Gradually, the NPFL was able to take more and more control of the country, bringing Taylor to power and setting Liberia off on a track of violent conflict. When a transitional government was established in the early 1990s under the auspice of ECOMOG, the warring parties were explicitly excluded.\textsuperscript{317} Since the resulting interim administration was not able to forge permanent peace, another peace process (the Abuja Agreement 1995) was started, this time including Taylor and his party the NPFL, leading to Taylor’s electoral victory in 1997.\textsuperscript{318} Tensions started to mount again, leading to renewed incitement of the conflict in 2000 when Taylor’s opponents, the rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy and Elections in Liberia (MODEL), wanted to remove him by force.

This second conflict (2000-3) was ended by the signing of a CPA in Accra (Ghana) in August 2003.\textsuperscript{319} The peace agreement, backed by a multitude of international actors such as the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN, has been said to differ largely with previous agreements in that it was mutually inclusive.\textsuperscript{320} The peace accord included a sunset-date for the transitional government and thereby stipulated elections to be held in late 2005 with power handed over to the elected government in early 2006.\textsuperscript{321}

As in the previous case studies, I consulted the ACCLED\textsuperscript{322}, NELDA\textsuperscript{323} and LexisNexis\textsuperscript{324}. There was no violence following the parliamentary election recorded, which took place on the same day as the first round of the presidential election.\textsuperscript{325} The same holds even when extending the time span to the inauguration of the new government in January 2006.\textsuperscript{326} David Harris, an expert on Liberia, asserts that the largely cordial atmosphere that existed

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{318} Ibid.: pp.205-6.
\textsuperscript{320} Dupuy and Detzel (2007): p.iii.
\textsuperscript{321} Refer to Accra Peace Accord.
\textsuperscript{323} Refer to Appendix for Nelda Data.
\textsuperscript{324} Access via the library of Freie Universität Berlin. www.lexisnexis.com, last access 10.12.2012
\textsuperscript{326} There were peaceful protests with regards to the results of the presidential election but the former football star and loser of the election, George Weah, called for his supporters to remain calm and non violent. See Jonathan (2005).
\end{flushright}
between parties can be attributed to the political culture which evolved during the transitional government. This aspect to the Liberian peace process will be discussed in the next chapter.

Summary

Timeline: Recurrence of Conflict and National Elections

In Sierra Leone the move from violent conflict to war termination by an election failed dramatically. With a promised peacekeeping mission not materialising and relevant stakeholders to the conflict being excluded from government, it did not take long for war to resume. Despite similar preconditions as in Sierra Leone, the election in Djibouti went smoothly without violence against civilians occurring at any point during the electoral process. In Burundi, having achieved the challenge of implementing a highly complex and extensive political pact while benefiting from a peace operation, the election did not cause violence in itself, but the violence did not completely subside between a splinter rebel group and the government. Liberia can be regarded as the most successful out of the cases examined, with all favourable conditions present, the election took place peacefully.

6.2 Robustness of External Security Guarantees (IV1)

External security guarantees provided by an international peace operation are, as outlined in Chapter 3.1, presumed to provide the safe structural environment necessary for conflict security guarantees.

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parties to move towards elections and thus war termination. This is, in part, due to their greater credibility and legitimacy compared to individual military actors. The cases under investigation experienced peace operations to a different degree. In Burundi and Liberia, there was a strong international presence both from the UN and regional actors, in line with the promise made when the respective peace accords were signed. In Djibouti, such promises never existed, whilst Sierra Leone is an example of the effects of a broken promise, i.e. promised security guarantees which failed to materialise. In the following discussion, the hypothesis that robust external security guarantees decrease the likelihood of conflict following a national parliamentary election will be examined by means of a comparative case study.

6.2.1 Djibouti (2001)

Whilst Djibouti is a relatively small country with national interest of one of the permanent members of the Security Council (France) - thus making it a likely case for intervention according to some of the theories outlined in Chapter 3.1 - it did not benefit from an international peace operation providing a safe structural environment conducive for the conduct of peaceful post-conflict elections. There as hence a 0 – No security guarantee for the period following the signing of the CPA in 2001 until the country's first legislative parliamentary elections in 2003.

Individual military actors played a decisive role in the Djiboutian conflict, however. The dynamic is quite different to a peace operation, however, because their involvement had not been agreed to by the conflict parties and they did not aim to create a context where credible commitment would become possible. Nevertheless it is necessary to consider their role at this point with regards to the impact on the lack of violence following the parliamentary election.

The first individual military actor examined is the former colonial power France. Since 1977, France has had the largest military base in the entire region, with approximately 2,600 stationed military personnel in 2005. Its role in the Djiboutian conflict, and its contribution to non-materialisation of violence following the signing of the CPA, became apparent with regards to the second military actor with stakes in the struggle.

328 France's role will only be discussed with regards to the second Djiboutian conflict. For information on its role during the first conflict refer to Kadamy (1996).
When the Ethiopian-Eritrean war broke out in 1998, Eritrea cut Ethiopia off from access to the port and thus its weapon supply. The Djibouti port then became the point of entrance for Ethiopian goods and weapons. Tensions increased when Eritrea tried to stir up the active, radical, FRUD-AD faction, which had its stronghold in the north of Djibouti, right at the border to Eritrea. This prompted France to increase its military presence in Djibouti and monitor the border to Eritrea, helping to deescalate the violence within the country and demonstrating readiness to act in support of the government. Eritrea’s victory over Ethiopia in 2000 ended Eritrea’s support of FRUD.330

Further context for the implementation of the agreement was again heavily determined by Djibouti’s geographical position and resulting attention from the United States (US), the third noteworthy military power. When the CPA was signed in May 2001, no one could have expected that Djibouti would, within a few months, be the hot-spot for the fight against terrorism at the Horn of Africa. The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has since its beginning in 2002 “a semi-permanent troop presence at an enduring Forward Operating Site, Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti with more than 2,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence.”331 Both France and the US have thus significant military resources in Djibouti, including air craft carriers, ready to be deployed immediately. The US pays $30 million annually to the Djiboutian government for its access agreement to the camp, airport and port, which is topped up by an additional $30 million annual rent paid by the French military forces.332

France and the US both can be considered as actors, whose presence raised the cost of war (see Chapter 3.1) and are thus likely to have functioned as a deterrent for further violence, because it gave the Djiboutian government a comparative advantage.333 This was exemplified by France’s interception of Eritrea’s support to FRUD-AD. The Djiboutian government on the other hand had after 2001 increased financial means for repression. Djibouti has therefore an excessively large army, loyal to the government and comprised of approximately 100,000 men, compared to an overall population of 600,000 - 900,000.334 The government “knows it has leeway to make demands or govern imprudently, counting on the US for backup or to turn a blind eye.”335 Eritrea on the other

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hand played a role in re-inciting the conflict, exemplifying why individual military actors and their self-interest often lack legitimacy and credibility in peace processes.

6.2.2 Sierra Leone (1996)

The security context in Sierra Leone following the signing of the Abidjan accord can be described as anything but a safe structural environment. This can in part be attributed to the missing credible commitment by international actors.\textsuperscript{336} That lack of commitment is indicative for the failure to deploy a \textit{Neutral Monitoring Group} (NMG) from the international community, as had been stipulated by the CPA.\textsuperscript{337} Not only was the international community expected to provide a safety net via a peace operation, the UN, the OAU, the Commonwealth and Côte d’Ivoire were also expected to function as "moral guarantors" to the Accord, as prescribed in Article 28.\textsuperscript{338} The failure for the peace operation to materialise, however, makes this sound almost farcical. There were hence 0 – \textit{No security guarantee} for the period following the signing of the CPA in November 1996 until the renewed outbreak of conflict and the coup d’état in May 1997.

The former US ambassador to Sierra Leone during the conflict in the nineties, John Hirsch, asserts that the ‘lukewarm international response’ can be attributed to the perception “from outside the African continent as a small, strategically insignificant country”\textsuperscript{339}. Hirsch thus notes that the lack of national interest from a major power resulted in non-intervention, as expected according to the theory outlined in Chapter 3.1. The reasons for signing a peace accord differ to the reasons for its implementation, as noted in Chapter 1.3. Nevertheless one must make a connection between an important difference during the signing and during the failure to implement the Accord. The signing of the Abidjan Accord is said to have occurred thanks to the military strikes against RUF by the South African corporate mercenary force \textit{Executive Outcomes} (EO), consequently arriving at a military stalemate between the two parties.\textsuperscript{340} Military stalemate is thought to be positively associated with the decision to sign an accord\textsuperscript{341}, while conversely the re-emergence of an unequal balance of power is associated with the recurrence of conflict.\textsuperscript{342} The CPA, however, stipulated for EO to be withdrawn “five weeks after the deployment of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{336} Malan, Rakate and McIntyre (2002): p.6
\textsuperscript{337} Abidjan Peace Agreement 1996 Article 11.
\textsuperscript{341} Refer to Walter (2002): p.8 and subsequently to p.78.
\textsuperscript{342} Refer to Tilly for the concept of ‘multiple sovereignty’, as used in Mason et al (2011).
\end{flushleft}
the Neutral Monitoring Group. The EO was withdrawn without another actor providing a minimal security context since the NMG was not deployed, leaving the government at a decisively weaker position than prior to the signing of the Accord. The lack of any military presence, and even more so the broken promise of international commitment, arguably gave the rebels the space needed to plan another military strike, without fear of the immediate consequences of international action and without anyone there monitoring their actions, or those of the other conflict parties. One can thus conclude that the non-existence of a security guarantee is an important explanatory factor with regards to the breakdown of the peace process and renewed war, prior to even the conduct of elections.

6.2.3 Burundi (2003)

Like the two previous cases, Burundi has also been plagued by previous incidents of violent conflict without this resulting in the deployment of a peace operation. Nevertheless, Burundi presents quite a different scenario compared to Djibouti and Sierra Leone.

The peace operation in April 2003 was not just a novelty for Burundi, but also for the AU. The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), equipped for the first time in the history of the AU with a robust mandate and was deployed with authorisation of the Security Council, prior to the signing of the Pretoria Protocol in November. AMIB’s early presence thus provided the parties with a clear representation of the AU’s commitment to the peace process, while enjoying legitimacy and credibility from the conflict parties. As had been defined in the CPA, AMIB was primarily tasked to verify and monitor the ceasefire. Nevertheless its presence constituted a deterrent to violence, due to its robust mandate. In its initial stage, more than 900 troops had already been deployed and the mission soon rose to its full capacity of 3,250 military personnel. It had been agreed that AMIB was to be integrated into an UN mission, once its one-year mandate expired. This is, as in the case of Liberia as we shall see, an example of increasingly used sequential peace operations.

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343 Abidjan Peace Agreement 1996 Article 12.
347 Arusha, Protocol V, Article 3 and Ceasefire Agreement, Annex I, Article III.
348 Originally, 3,335 had been authorised. This is within the 3 per cent margin defined in Chapter 4.2.
AMIB’s impact on the ground has to be assessed twofold. Firstly with respect to my argument that external security guarantees provide a safe structural environment and secondly, that they give a credible commitment to the parties that they will not tolerate violence from, or against, the conflict parties. Violence did not subside completely since the breakaway faction FNL (not included in the CPA, see Chapter 6.1.3) continued its attacks, also against civilians, throughout 2004. At the same time, “the AU troops protected leaders returning to the country, so that they could take part in the peace process and eventually help form a government.” Without this protection and the politicians’ subsequent return to Burundi, the CPA implementation process and the success of the planned elections would have been jeopardised. Without their return and the joint exercise of power prior to the election, mutual mistrust between the former warring factions is likely to have persisted. Overall, AMIB can be regarded as having contributed significantly to the peace process in Burundi, particularly by showing their continuous commitment and support to the peace process. Furthermore, without AMIB implementing the groundwork, the UN is unlikely to have come in with such a great capacity and as many as 2,612 AMIB troops formed the first contingent of the UN force.

The United Nations Mission to Burundi (ONUB) arrived in June 2004, two months after the UN received the assessment mission report. At its peak, it had 5,650 military personnel as authorised in its mandate, which is in line with the request made by the assessment mission. Once the mission had been authorised, it was a “rollout very much in the spirit of the Brahimi Report’s call for ‘rapid and effective deployment’.” As agreed upon in the peace accord, the UN mission monitored the ceasefire, assisting in tasks related to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and ensuring protection of civilians and institutions.

Overall, AMIB and ONUB both played their part in providing a secure environment and reassuring both conflict parties. In particular, the decrease of violence exercised against civilians in the year of the election and its aftermath is an indicator that this contributed to transforming the context under which the elections took place. For the larger part of the period prior to the first parliamentary post-conflict election in Burundi, more than 5,000

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350 Particularly the massacre against civilians on 13 August 2004 is a tragic indicator of that. See Vandeginste (2009): pp.73-4.
armed peacekeepers were present, making it a very robust external security guarantee (Level 5).

**6.2.4 Liberia (2003)**

Whilst Liberia is the only case in this paper where peace operations were deployed during earlier conflict episodes, the attributes of the peace operation safeguarding the Accra Peace Agreement in 2003 were vastly different.\(^{357}\) As a consequence, many scholars point to UNMIL with regards to the success of peace following the elections in 2005.\(^{358}\) In the following I will assess how UNMIL affected the dynamics of the conflict so that the legislative election became a symbol for war termination rather than re-incitement of conflict.

The *United Nations Mission to Liberia* (UNMIL) was at the time of deployment the largest ever UN mission, with up to 15,000 personnel on the ground.\(^{359}\) This is no comparison to the meagre UN mission UNOMIL (1993-1999), which had at its peak 300 personnel and no mandate to use force.\(^{360}\) In addition, the approach to keeping the peace in Liberia was guided by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s statement, that “the United Nations and regional organizations should play complementary roles in facing the challenges to international peace and security.”\(^{361}\) This was realised through using the synergies from an upfront-deployed ECOWAS force (ECOMIL), making it another example of a sequenced peace operation.

ECOWAS already deployed its 1,500 peacekeepers while the peace process was still ongoing in July and had deployed 3,500 once the Accord was signed. The agreement stipulated that ECOMIL troops would be integrated into UNMIL, once the latter was ready to be deployed, as part of “an interlocking three-phase deployment.”\(^{362}\) Two weeks after the signing of the CPA, the Security Council issued a resolution for the deployment of UNMIL, which was readily implemented. The UN personnel were deployed according to the set timetable and had a Chapter VII mandate, i.e. a mandate to use force, as had been determined in the CPA.\(^{363}\)

\(^{357}\) 1990-9: ECOMOG; 1993-7: UNOMIL.


\(^{360}\) Refer to Appendix “List of Peace Operations With No Mandate To Use Force”.


UNMIL had, in October 2004, the chance to prove its potency as deterrent of violence and proving its commitment to the Liberian peace process when riots broke out. UMMIL reacted by increasing the presence of helicopters and clamping down on violence leading to a cessation of the riots. This can be compared with the example given for Djibouti, in which the French troops condoned the cross border attacks from Eritrea and proved their readiness to act as a deterrent to the violence (albeit clearly siding with one conflict actor).

With regards to the assessment of the nature of the external security guarantee, the UN and ECOWAS deployment should be counted as one guarantee, since the integration of the troops of the regional force took place under the umbrella of the UN and the approach had been designed by both parties. This made the peace operation an exceptionally strong deterrent: not only had the UN shown its continuous commitment to the peace process since the start of the negotiations in 2003 through assessment missions and the subsequent deployment, but this was also backed up by an experienced regional actor, namely ECOWAS.

In spite of the undeniable success of the external security guarantee under investigation, we should end on a cautionary note. Despite nearly ten years having passed since the signing of the Pretoria Protocol, UNMIL remains with a large presence in Liberia (currently 9,000). UNMIL is planned to be downsized “to about 3,750 personnel by July 2015.”

Doubts have been raised as to how the security situation will develop, once the peacekeepers leave.

### 6.3 Inclusiveness of Political Institutions (IV2)

Considering the fierce criticism that has been made by some scholars with regards to the long-term effects of installing power-sharing, it is interesting to note that nearly all countries of the sample rejected power-sharing following the end of the transitional phase. Burundi presents an exception here, with among other features, its constitutionally mandated 60-40 per cent split between Hutus and Tutsis still being

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367 Refer to Chapter 3.2.
practiced. Other authors have previously noted that in the case of Burundi and Liberia, at least the short-term impact of power-sharing appears to have been very positive in reconciling the conflict parties. The two cases thus highlight that making concessions of political power prior to the first post-conflict election is seen as a costly signal of commitment. Djibouti and Sierra Leone, on the other hand, are both extreme cases of lack of an institutional guarantee.

6.3.1 Djibouti (2001)

The peace agreement which ended the first phase of the conflict in Djibouti stipulated FRUD’s rebel-to-party transformation, including the fact that it should be involved in the management of the country. Whilst this did not lead to power being exercised jointly, the Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord from 2001 did not even continue the window-dressing of establishing inclusive political power-sharing institutions.

The CPA did not directly address the question of political institutions, although it allowed for an opening of the political system as such. The limitation of only four political parties, as stipulated by Article 6 of the Constitution of September 1992 was to expire on 3 September 2002, clearing, at least theoretically, the way for multiparty political competition. A limitation nevertheless remained with regards to the fact that all “parties would be recognised, subject to approval by the Interior Ministry.” The approval by the Interior Ministry has in some cases only happened after a delay. Registration to participate in an election is furthermore tied to an extortionate registration fee for a country classified as low income, which equals $28,500.

The peace agreement did not work as stimulus for reshuffling the government. Members of FRUD-AD waited in vain to be assigned some government posts. The transitional government thus consisted of the same politicians as prior to the conflict, where the exclusion of the Afar, represented by FRUD-AD, had incited the second phase of the

371 Refer to Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord Section VIII, Article 2.
372 Refer to 6.1.1, where some ministers were assigned token government posts in 1995.
373 Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord, Article 12.
conflict in Djibouti. It still held true that “in Djibouti, there is very little distinction between the ‘government’ and the majority coalition, which are de facto one and the same.”\textsuperscript{377} The question of ‘who governs’ was thus still answered in the same way as it was prior to conflict. The incumbent coalition (dominated by the Issa) had been ‘winning’ every seat in every ‘election’ since 1977.\textsuperscript{378} The president thus continued to concentrate all state power in the executive through continuing to limit the powers of the National Assembly, which is nominated by the president.\textsuperscript{379}

The elections in Djibouti have always been contested by the opposition who accused the government of fraud.\textsuperscript{380} As outlined in Chapter 3, fraud is a common tactic used by the challenged elites who still have control over the state apparatus. Whilst the continuity of political exclusion through non-democratic means often leads to violent opposition from rebel groups and the population, this was not the case in Djibouti. One analyst ascribed the lack of protests to growing apathy over “the way things are done.”\textsuperscript{381} The lack of protests is nevertheless surprising, considering that the demands of FRUD-AD always centred on participation in the political institutions.\textsuperscript{382}

Following the signing of the CPA in Djibouti, not much had changed with regards to the political landscape. Grievances of FRUD-AD and the Afar population had been addressed no more than at any other point in the history of Djibouti since independence. Djibouti had exceptionally low inclusion of the opposition on all levels of government for the period examined.

### 6.3.2 Sierra Leone (1996)

The state of political institutions in Sierra Leone following the signing of the CPA bare some similarities with those in Djibouti, albeit the outcomes with regards to the recurrence of violence were very different.

As in the case of Djibouti, the government elected in 1996 remained in power and the CPA did not include provisions for political power-sharing. The RUF leader Sankoh claimed that he had been promised “the position as vice president”, which was denied by the

\textsuperscript{378} Brass (2008): 530.
\textsuperscript{380} The presidential election from 1999 was considered free. Parliamentary elections in 1997 and 2003 are said to have been plagued by fraud. Refer to Marshall and Jaggers (2010a).
\textsuperscript{381} Bollee (2003): p.482.
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid.
government.\textsuperscript{383} Whilst the political opposition in Djibouti was not included in the post-conflict government due to the incumbent government still exercising control over the state apparatus and in silencing opposition, the RUF were not represented since they boycotted the election in 1996 and the CPA did not aim to create greater inclusiveness.

The Abidjan agreement mandated the inclusion of RUF into the political system and thus prescribed the registration of RUF as a political party within thirty days of the signing of the CPA.\textsuperscript{384} This did not occur prior to the renewed outbreak of fighting.\textsuperscript{385}

Proportional representation, creating inclusive decision-making bodies with members from all parts of society is as outlined in Chapter 3.2 regarded as one of the most important mechanisms for addressing potential grievances and inducing a feeling of security. The agreement contained no government office which mandated any specific share of power between the conflict parties.\textsuperscript{386} Some scholars argue, however, that one provision within the Abidjan accord, namely the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace could have, to some extent, resembled Lijphart’s grand coalition, since the joint commission should have held some coordinating power, albeit no decision making power.\textsuperscript{387} The CPA specified that the RUF and the former government of Sierra Leone ought to both be represented within the commission, without specifying the share of power between the two.\textsuperscript{388} The Commission was tasked with a number of coordinating measures, but none of them concerned political provisions. While four RUF members and four members close to Kabbah were appointed in late November, they never took up their work.\textsuperscript{389} The lack of real power held by groups opposing the government can be regarded as important factors with regards to the non-implementation of the only provision which could have aided in addressing grievances and supporting reconciliation.

“The people had fought for democracy but never got it”, said the spokesman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).\textsuperscript{390} The \textit{de facto} complete lack of institutional guarantees addressing any potential grievances marginalised groups and the RUF could have had is regarded as one of the explanatory factors for the breakdown of the Abidjan

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\textsuperscript{384} Abidjan Peace Agreement 1996, Article 13.
\textsuperscript{385} PAM <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/14/electoral_political_reform>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, last accessed 11.01.2013.
\textsuperscript{386} Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p.12.
\textsuperscript{387} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{388} Abidjan Peace Agreement 1996, Article 3.
\textsuperscript{389} PAM, peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/14/truth_reconciliation_mechanism. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Last accessed 13.01.2013.
\textsuperscript{390} Hirsch (2001): p.56.
agreement.\textsuperscript{391} On the eve of signing the Accord, a UN research analyst wrote, with regards to the lack of inclusive political institutions encouraging cross-ethnic cooperation: "having some of the major political parties that draw their support from certain parts of the country exclusively in the opposition is likely to make the next elections another life and death matter."\textsuperscript{392} The lack of concessions to RUF during the transitional phase is consequently a likely contributor to the outbreak of violence and subsequent coup d'état even before new elections took place.

\section*{6.3.3 Burundi (2003)}

The CPA under examination in this study was not the first time that power-sharing features were attempted in Burundi. Particularly early on in the peace process, these agreements were not inclusive and only occurred at an elite level without dialogue with the rebel groups.\textsuperscript{393} The process after 2003 has been described as closely institutionalising Lijphart’s model of consociationalism and offering ground for some optimism in the merits of the model.\textsuperscript{394} These potential merits with regards to the achieved inclusiveness of political institutions and the effect this had in addressing the security concerns of the groups during the heightened insecurity of the election in 2005 will be examined in the following discussion.

The Pretoria Protocol stipulated that the transitional institutions should be "a transitional legislature made up of a National Assembly and a Senate, a transitional Executive, a Judiciary and other transitional institutions as set forth in the present Protocol."\textsuperscript{395} This was assessed by PAM as having been implemented successfully.\textsuperscript{396} What had been agreed upon in 2003 was an extension of the Arusha Agreement of 2000, which failed to include all significant parties of the conflict. In order to rectify this and make the transitional government an attractive option for commitment for the rebel group CNDD-FDD, further power-sharing mechanisms were added into the executive branch, an option which, notably, was not applied in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{397}

With regards to the inclusiveness of the executive, the agreement stipulated that along with the president there should be two vice-presidents, belonging to different ethnic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{391} Dupuy and Binningsbø (2007): p. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{392} Bangura (1997): p.69.
\item \textsuperscript{393} Bah and Jones (2008): p.11.
\item \textsuperscript{394} Lemarchand (2006): p.1.
\item \textsuperscript{395} PAM, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/45/powersharing_transitional_government, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. Last accessed 15.01.2013.
\item \textsuperscript{396} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{397} Vandeginste (2009): pp.78-9.
\end{itemize}
groups and parties. Additionally (as agreed in 2003, making for an essential difference compared to 2000) there was to be a Minister of State on whom the decisions of the president would hinge. This became the leader of the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD, Pierre Nkurunziza.\textsuperscript{398}

The legislature was to consist of a transitional National Assembly and a Transitional Senate. The National Assembly was to be composed of members who were elected in 1993. Other parties, not represented in the grand coalition, would take up the vacant seats. Civil society actors should also be included. At the same time, the composition of the National Assembly was required to be 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi.\textsuperscript{399} The Senate was announced by the National Assembly and the president with consideration of the ethnic, regional and political balances. Furthermore, it prescribed the participation of former heads of states and, aside from the prescriptive Hutu and Tutsi participation, also guaranteed three seats for the Twa ethnic group. Within these elements, the question of proportionality was addressed. "The government shall include representatives of different parties in a proportion whereby more than half and less than three-fifths of the portfolios are allocated amongst the G-7 group of parties [authors note: predominantly Hutu Parties]."\textsuperscript{400}

The Pretoria Agreement additionally stipulated that the relevant ethnic group does not have to belong to a party associated with the dominant group, resulting in parties having to seek appeals across ethnic lines and creating cross cutting cleavages. This, in particular, stalled the implementation process initially. The Tutsi-dominated UPRONA felt threatened by the provision that Tutsis from a predominant Hutu party could take up seats in the transitional government.\textsuperscript{401} As a consequence, the CNDD-FDD boycotted its participation in the transitional government for one month between April and May 2004 because it accused the government of being too slow in its integration into government structures.\textsuperscript{402} The government distributed the agreed-upon posts to CNDD-FDD and officially registered it as a political party. Once this was done, CNDD-FDD returned to the transitional government.\textsuperscript{403}

\textsuperscript{398} Marshall and Jaggers (2010b): p. 3.
\textsuperscript{399} Falch and Becker (2007): pp.21-2.
\textsuperscript{401} see Vandeginste (2009): pp.74.
\textsuperscript{403} BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Burundi: Former rebel group changes name, transforms into political party. Retrieved via LexisNexis on 16.01.2013.
When the Arusha Peace Accord from 2000, during which no ceasefire was in place, was transformed into a CPA due to the participation of CNDD-FDD in 2003, and during its subsequent transformation into a political party in 2004, violence subsided majorly. As one scholar asserts, "by and large, when measured against the objective of war termination, the use of power-sharing can – so far – be considered to be a success story in the case of Burundi." The fact that the former Hutu rebel movement CNDD-FDD won the 2005 elections and this did not result in a renewed outbreak of violence certainly testifies that the trial period of sharing power significantly reassured the minority Tutsi. Secondly, the design of the political system created cross-cutting political cleavages prior to, and after the elections. The Pretoria Protocol and the resulting government thus fulfilled all the objectives of consociationalism: it instilled a culture of elite cooperation amongst all segments of society which addressed group grievances and served as a reassuring signal to all parties.

6.3.4 Liberia (2003)

As in the case of Burundi and Djibouti, the Accra Peace Agreement was not the first attempt at implementing some form of power-sharing. The previous attempts had failed, however, in encouraging cooperation but rather exacerbated tensions between different parties. The game started to change in 2003. In October, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was set up, in accordance with the CPA. The Peace Accords Matrix commends the inclusive nature of the transitional government and the absence of violence in the implementation process. Aside from some problems in late 2003, the process was relatively smooth and the allocation of positions for the NTGL was completed in early January 2004.

The inclusiveness of the political process in the NTGL was manifested within both the executive and legislative branch of government. The executive consisted of a president and an appointed cabinet approved by the Senate. The transitional coalition cabinet was set-up for which "the individuals (...) were nominated by the parties to the peace

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agreement and confirmed by the Assembly."\textsuperscript{408} The formerly armed factions were thus able to choose their own 'safety-nets', while the joint exercise of power was aimed to install moderation. According to Rothchild, the rebel movements LURD and MODEL feared that moderation resulting from cooperation would decrease power over their militia.\textsuperscript{409} They were therefore at first reluctant to cooperate. This was, however, overcome in due time. The only restriction which was placed on the executive structure of government was that "no representative of a warring faction could hold the position of chairman or vice-chairman in the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)."\textsuperscript{410} This provision could have, under different circumstances, been a source of tension since it excluded the possibility of a senior figure of one of the rebel movements taking up an 'appropriate' position. A factor which many regard as the ground stone for post-conflict peace is that Taylor, the leading figure of the rebel movement NPFL, had already left for exile in Nigeria several months prior to the inauguration of the NTGL and thus was not able to disrupt the peace by demanding a top-level position, which could have led to renewed conflict, as it did following his presidency in 1997.\textsuperscript{411}

The legislative branch of government was organized as a unicameral National Transitional Legislative Assembly, for which the posts were allocated according to a fixed quota.\textsuperscript{412} The three former conflict parties (GOL, LURD and MODEL) each received 12 seats, while other political parties obtained 18 seats and the 15 seats, whilst civil society counties were allocated 7 seats.\textsuperscript{413} Particularly the inclusion of civil society actors has been applauded, since it made the NTGL truly representative of all segments of society in the Lijphartian sense.

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.: p.18.
\textsuperscript{411} Harris (2006): p. 376.
\textsuperscript{412} Accra Peace Agreement Articles III and XXIV.
\textsuperscript{413} Dupuy and Detzel (2007): p.18.


### 6.4 Assessing the Validity of the Model – Interaction of the Variables

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<tr>
<td><strong>DV:</strong> Recurrence of Conflict following a national election (in countries where a conflict was ended through a CPA)</td>
<td>No recurrence of conflict following a national election</td>
<td>Breakdown of the peace process and installation of a military junta before elections could be held</td>
<td>No recurrence of conflict following a national election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV 1:</strong> Degree of Robustness of External Security Guarantees</td>
<td>No external security guarantees (0)</td>
<td>No external security guarantees (0)</td>
<td>Very robust external security guarantees (5)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>But...likely influential presence of French and American troops.</td>
<td>International presence had been promised but did not materialise, while private security company was withdrawn.</td>
<td>AMIB and ONUB both had mandates to use force and succeeded in decreasing violence against civilians.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>IV 2:</strong> Degree of Inclusiveness of Political Institutions (following the signing of the CPA)</td>
<td>Low inclusiveness of political institutions</td>
<td>Low inclusiveness of political institutions</td>
<td>High inclusiveness of political institutions</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Government structures remained unaltered after the signing of the CPA, only a ban on a limitation of four parties was lifted (A1 and B1 = 0)</td>
<td>RUF and other minor parties were not included in the interim government structures, CPA prescribed joint committee which never started its mandate (A1 and B1 = 0)</td>
<td>Power-Sharing was present in both the executive and legislative transitional institutions exemplified by</td>
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<td>• executive: president, two vice presidents and a Minister of State (A4)</td>
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<td>• transitional legislature: seats allocated according to a quota (B4)</td>
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<td>(A4 and B4 = 6)</td>
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Source: Author's own compilation.

Table 3 – Interaction of the Variables
7. Conclusion

7.1 Summarising the Evidence

My first hypothesis, that the more robust the external security guarantees, the less likely a recurrence of conflict following a national election, was partly confirmed. In Sierra Leone, violence broke out in the absence of a robust security guarantee, thus confirming the hypothesis by implication. In Liberia and Burundi on the other hand a positive relationship existed between robust external security guarantees and absence of violence following a national election. Djibouti on the contrary does not confirm the hypothesis. Potential reasons for this will be elaborated below.

My second hypothesis, the more inclusive the political institutions following the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), the less likely a recurrence of conflict following a national election can also be regarded as partly confirmed. Again, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia portray the expected relationship whilst Djibouti disconfirms the hypothesis.

Overall, one can conclude that my two explanatory variables were able to transform the context in which the electoral process was set into an environment conducive to the conduct of elections, as exemplified by Burundi and Liberia. The implementation of inclusive political institutions (IV2) and additional mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning through the presence of a peace operation (IV1) during the transitional period can consequently both be regarded to function as costly signals that the conflict parties are ready for a break with the past. The election was hence able to fulfill its war terminating function because the context in which it was held provided the necessary reassurance to the parties. The case study on Sierra Leone, where neither of my explanatory variables was present, on the other hand showed, that the lack of these security inducing factors increased the incentives to return to war. At the same time, Djibouti highlights the limitations of my model with regards to other possible factors for explanation since in this case both of my hypotheses were not confirmed but no recurrence of conflict following the election occurred.

For Djibouti, the analysis showed, that while no robust external security guarantees were present to ensure a safe environment for the implementation of the agreement, it is impossible to disregard the effect the strong French and US military presence must have had (and must still have) on the capacity of the incumbent government. This is likely to have led to a distortion of my results, leading to a disconfirmation of my hypotheses. For
one, the military presence on the ground had previously sided with the government and thus the rebel forces were in a significant disadvantage regarding their capacities for rebellion. Secondly, the Djiboutian government was close to bankruptcy and the IMF refused to pay any more credit, when the events of 9/11 turned Djibouti into the base for the fight against terrorism which gave rise to sudden, new government income.\(^{414}\) Whilst grievances were not addressed through the experience of joined governance prior to the election, it is likely that conflict did not recur because of the capacity of the government to silence opposition, partly enabled through the rents from both the American and the French military. Thus, no recurrence of conflict occurred despite in all likelihood electoral fraud having taken place, which I would have expected to serve as an incentive for mobilisation to occur (refer to Model 1). The implications this has on further research will be addressed in Chapter 7.2.

The case of Sierra Leone, where equally neither of my explanatory factors was present, paints a very different picture compared to Djibouti. Fortna, citing the Sierra Leone expert David Keen, writes that the persisting “spiral of mistrust between the RUF and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF)” was “largely responsible for the failure of the Abidjan agreement.”\(^{415}\) This mistrust proliferated through the failed deployment of a peacekeeping force and the lack of inclusive government institutions for RUF and other marginalised groups. The experience in Sierra Leone thus corresponds to the scenario described in Variant a in Model 1, where a marginalised group felt threatened and conflict erupted while the shadow of an election was still looming, i.e. conflict broke out anew during the electoral process. Thus, the lack of institutional and structural guarantees resulted in a continuously high insecurity context where grievances were not addressed.\(^{416}\) This process was accelerated by a sudden change in the comparative balance of power of RUF, when the private-security-company EO, fighting for the government, was withdrawn. From that follows that the military stalemate, which set the conditions for cooperation, was resolved (Chapter 2.1). Thus, in the absence of security inducing factors, RUF once again had the military means to strike back pre-emptively, while no external security guarantee monitored or sanctioned its behaviour.

7.2 Criticism and Outlook

In order to limit distortion of my results through third variable influence I did not test all possible variable combinations. Hence, I unfortunately cannot draw any conclusions at this point on which of my two explanatory variables proved to be more important with regards to preventing the recurrence of violence following an election. Further comparative research is hence needed.

Multicollinearity should in any case be avoided because it distorts the finding of the relationship of the independent variables with the DV. The combination of my two study variables could be suspected to be prone to this, since a peace operation may be more likely to be deployed if the presence of political pacts is assessed as a sign for the actors’ commitment to peace, and vice versa, conflict parties may be more likely to implement the pact when a peace operation has been deployed.\textsuperscript{417} In a study on the successful implementation of peace agreements and subsequent peace, Walter ran a regression analysis where security guarantees and political pacts failed to achieve standard levels of significance.\textsuperscript{418} While employing a different operationalisation for peace, her argument for employing the variables is also based on transforming the context of the transitional period.\textsuperscript{419} Other authors have also found that outside actors cannot exert influence on the implementation and conduct of inclusive political institutions.\textsuperscript{420}

For the sake of parsimony, the concept of the model introduced in this paper is very simplistic. Both the case of Djibouti (with the heavy presence of French and American troops) and the case of the private military company Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone show that my analysis with regards to the security context of my cases would have benefitted from an approach which recognises that there is a variety of actors which play a role in post-conflict situations, not only the national government, rebels and international peace operations. Particularly the lack of inclusion of non-state agents within much of the realist and constructivist analyses in conflict studies has previously been pointed out elsewhere, but has so far not been addressed.\textsuperscript{421} Nevertheless, my analysis helped to show the relevance of these actors as antecedent conditions. Furthermore, as Van Evera rightly states “a theory gains prescriptive richness by pointing to manipulable

\textsuperscript{419} Ibid.: pp.90-1. 
\textsuperscript{421} Refer to Schneckener (2009) for a discussion of armed actors in all different stages of conflict.
In that sense the empirical analysis of Sierra Leone benefitted from an additional insight, pointing to the malleable impact of the withdrawal of EO.

My question was guided by the increasing attention post-conflict elections have been receiving, from academics and policy makers alike. While I maintain that dependent on the context in which post-conflict elections are held, there is a significant danger of the process accelerating the breakdown of peace, there is an exaggerated focus on the election itself. One needs to wonder, whether the demands of national governments and development agencies has in part inspired this focus from the epistemic community, since security around an election is achieved more easily than for the whole ‘transitional phase’.

The case of Djibouti furthermore highlights that an additional measure would have proved useful, namely state capacity for repression. While all of the cases discussed are post-conflict countries which are somewhat autocratic in nature (by inference from the fact that they are not democratic, as indicated by my CV2), case evidence from Djibouti leads me to suggest that the capacities for repression still varied. Capacity for repression is in the literature on social movements regarded as one of the most important conditions for mobilisation, and as such important for the organisation of rebel movements and conflict recurrence. One measure to consider could have been the Political Terror Scale (PTS), which focuses on state behaviour with regards to the intensity, scope and range of violence used against non-state actors. This leads me to my next point, the important distinction between ‘war termination’ and ‘democratisation’.

At the start of this paper I pointed out that we have to make a distinction between the ‘success’ of an election in war termination and democratisation (Chapter 1.3). It appears that particularly Djibouti highlights this distinction: the election functioned as ‘a confirmation for war-termination’, but only because the regime is decisively undemocratic and repressive. Hence, further research should focus on the question of whether the same conditions that enable the holding of elections for war termination also set the conditions for long-term democratisation. This appears to be of particular relevance considering that both of my explanatory variables are not suitable for the long-term. In the majority of cases power-sharing is not practiced after an election (Chapter 6.3).

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423 For the relationship between knowledge bodies, i.e. epistemic communities and international policy refer to Haas (1992).
424 Fischer (2002) also makes a point on the interest of practitioners on a narrow concept of security.
425 For a review of the literature on social movements refer to McAdam et al. (1996).
426 For more information on the PTS (www.politicalterrorscale.org), refer to Wood and Gibney (2010).
Furthermore, peace operations cannot, and indeed do not, stay forever in a country. As mentioned for the case of Liberia, the pull-out of a peace operation that has been on the ground for the past decade is always a source of renewed concern. What we hence need is research into long-term measures which can help post-war societies to overcome the ‘conflict trap’ and forge peace that is more than the absence of violence.\textsuperscript{427}

\textsuperscript{427} This important distinction and the danger of confusing stability with peace are also discussed in OECD (2011) p.10.
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