Russia’s Integration into the World Economy:  
A European Perspective*

Wolfram Schrettl, Berlin

Some Remarks from a Historical Perspective

As the previous speaker, Professor David Lane, pointed out, the Soviet block had been characterized by some degree of autarky. Clearly, the “natural” preconditions for autarky are not always and everywhere given in equal measure. The ability to go alone, i.e. to successfully practice bloc-autarky, varies with physical and other endowments. The former Soviet bloc happens to have been well equipped in that respect. Of course, the flip-side of autarky was isolation, a consequence of which was that the economic potential of the respective economies could by far not be fully utilized. Key elements of the Soviet system were designed, if not to prevent economic contacts with the world economy then at least to exercise full central control over them, the most obvious case in point being the state monopoly on foreign trade which extended not only to contacts with economies outside the Soviet block, but also to contacts within the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA).

When the life-span of the Soviet block came to its end, no-one seriously doubted that some degree of opening of Russia was needed. One of the obstacles to the opening may have been that it simply had never really been tried before in Russia – at least not on a scale comparable with prominent historical cases. These days we are being reminded that Japan began to open up following the “visit” of Commander Perry of the U.S. in 1853. More than 100 years later, China opened up beginning in 1978. In a number of respects, this may be seen as a repeat performance of the experience of Japan. For example, one may argue that it takes a shock for a country to open up. In the case of Japan, that may have been the less-than-friendly nature of Commander Perry’s entry. In the Chinese case, it may have been the sudden perception of a shocking degree of backwardness. A possibly more important similarity may be seen in what a contemporary observer wrote about Japan’s opening in the middle of the 19th century: “When Perry kicked open the door, he didn’t go in, they came out.” (quoted freely after this week’s edition of The Economist). In other words, both Japan and China, upon opening, produced export surpluses, did not accumulate foreign debt, and sometimes followed quite protectionist policies. In the case of Russia, it took the shock of the 1998 crisis to make the country follow a similar path. For the time being, that is fine.

However, we should not forget that, before the most recent developments, the final stage of the Soviet block was one of disintegration rather than integration. It was disintegration in at least three respects. Not only the “system” – comprising, at the minimum, the single party, inclusive state ownership of the means of production, and the central planning and coordination of economic activities – disintegrated, but so did the CMEA, and also the USSR, the latter resulting, most visibly, in new borders, new countries and separate currencies. Without implying regrets, one lesson was clearly that disintegration can destroy wealth, which may serve to demonstrate the value of integration. In the case of the Soviet block, many old ties, including trade ties, were interrupted.

Foreign Trade

The western-most members of the CMEA immediately headed “back to Europe,” which is almost tantamount to “away from Russia,” not only politically, but also economically. As a result, their foreign trade with the West sky-rocketed, while trade with Russia declined deeply. Much of this, although not all, can be ascribed to the forces of gravity (in the sense of gravity models of foreign trade). The ambition of many new countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union was directed in much the same direction, although their possibilities were clearly fewer. Most importantly, they did not qualify as clear candidates for the European Union in the same way as the central European economies did. Nevertheless, a “hub and spoke” pattern of trade of the FSU developed with the “hub” mostly being the European Union, and trade between the FSU economies being relatively neglected. The tasks ahead were then clearly defined. One was the development of “natural” trade ties, both with the West and also within the ex-USSR or CIS. This entailed to some extent a resurrection of old trade ties. Efforts into the latter direction were hampered by the overwhelming economic and political weight of the Russian Federation as compared to the other countries in the CIS. This birth defect of an inevitable asymmetry is quite unlikely to disappear. Furthermore, there is the question of what exactly are “natural” trade ties. Gravity models of foreign trade tend to give ambiguous results. But it is at least reassuring that some of that research suggests that the potential for trade between the Russian Federation and the European Union is not by far exhausted. In the case of the central European countries, the reorientation of trade towards the West may rather easily qualify as a natural trend, all the more so because this conforms with the ambitions of the CEECs, with historical precedents, and with the fact that the European Union was very receptive vis-à-vis the CEECs, notwithstanding some complaints of the latter.

Russia’s ambition was different, although equally clear. President Putin, at the latest, leaves no doubt that full participation in the world economy, in all respects, is one
of his central goals. Russia is to participate in the process of globalization meaning the economic core aspects of (1) trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights, (2) free movement of people, in particular visa-free travel into the EU, (3) full participation in world capital markets, and (4) institutional integration into the world economy, most importantly into the key governing and regulatory bodies. As a result, Russia should in the end be accepted as a respected and trusted partner with an excellent reputation. Clearly, in order to achieve this goal it is necessary to overcome quite a number of obstacles. A problem of importance, specifically for Russia, may be that integration into the world economy tends to reduce the need to be part of a larger economic and political unit. With reduced trade barriers, smaller economies have better chances to survive on their own. This may lead to the break-up of nations. Alberto Alesina and his collaborators have shown in theoretical work how the integration of the world economy may contribute to the disintegration of nation states.\footnote{Given that one of the central concerns of Russian policy makers is to make sure that the disintegration of the CMEA and the USSR will not be followed by the disintegration of the Russian Federation, integration into the world economy may well be a double-edged sword for that nation.} Further, with reduced trade barriers, smaller economies have better chances to survive on their own. This may lead to the break-up of nations. Alberto Alesina and his collaborators have shown in theoretical work how the integration of the world economy may contribute to the disintegration of nation states.\footnote{Given that one of the central concerns of Russian policy makers is to make sure that the disintegration of the CMEA and the USSR will not be followed by the disintegration of the Russian Federation, integration into the world economy may well be a double-edged sword for that nation.} Given that one of the central concerns of Russian policy makers is to make sure that the disintegration of the CMEA and the USSR will not be followed by the disintegration of the Russian Federation, integration into the world economy may well be a double-edged sword for that nation. 

Foreign trade, as a potentially fast-moving variable, did indeed perform a wild roller-coaster ride during the years of reform. Imports especially rose rapidly, then collapsed in the wake of the 1998 crisis and are now rising rapidly again. While there is at present a lot of discussion about tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in the WTO context, it needs to be remembered that one of the lessons that had to be learned the hard way in the course of the 1990s concerns the key role of the exchange rate. In particular, Russian politicians came to accept, reluctantly, that an overvalued currency could be suicidal for an economy. Of course, one may question what exactly “overvalued” means. The simple answer, i.e. to take PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) as the standard of comparison, clearly does not hold. A better and pragmatic indicator may be the relative growth of exports and imports. Thus, it should be considered a warning sign if imports consistently grow faster than exports, even if that only takes the form of a foreign trade or current account surplus dwindling rapidly, rather than that of an outright trade deficit. Other facts of key importance for the Russian Federation are the critical role of world market prices for oil and other natural resources. While this may appear as a one-sided form of integration, it is not a form of disintegration either. Some degree of one-sidedness also prevails in the regional orientation of Russian foreign trade. The European Union clearly dominates, and it will do so even more after EU enlargement. This, however, is mainly due to the forces of gravity, with geographical factors figuring prominently. Relatively little change is to be expected in that regional orientation, at least in the short run. One factor that may mitigate the influence of geographic proximity in the medium to long run has to do with the world market price for natural gas. At present prices, most natural gas is likely to be transported by pipelines. However, with the gas price now in shouting distance of a level where Liquid Natural Gas...
(LNG) is beginning to make economic sense, and combined with forecasts of skyrocketing U.S. natural gas imports, large scale Russian exports of LNG to the U.S. and to other customers not linked to the present network of Russian export pipelines become a serious possibility. This would give Russian exporters of natural gas a wider range of potential customers than those in Western Europe to which the existing infrastructure is predominantly linked.

### Institutional Integration

As to the institutional integration of the Russian Federation into the world economy, the present Russian administration continues to give this objective a very high priority. The institutional integration is progressing, at varying speeds, in a number of dimensions. Thus, the Russian Federation has gradually been formally recognized as a market economy, both by the U.S. and the EU – although this recognition is not quite unqualified. Furthermore, Russia, for quite some time already, is a member of the Paris Club of Creditors, notwithstanding the fact that the country itself is, for all practical purposes, more of a debtor than a creditor. Russia has also attained almost-full membership of the G-8.

### WTO

At present, much noise is generated by Russia’s ambition to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) – as the last important country not yet a member of that organization, following the recent accession of both Chinas. Membership in the WTO is critical also for Russia’s relations with the EU which, as a follow-up to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PACO) of 1994, is now dangling the prospect of negotiations on a Free Trade Area (FTA) with Russia, making it contingent upon successful completion of the country’s entry into the WTO. The additional offer of the EU to discuss with Russia the possibility of a Common European Economic Space (CEES), seems much more remote. WTO membership appeared imminent for a while, but now it is questionable again whether membership will be granted before the conclusion of the Doha Round of trade liberalization. Fortunately for Russia, the Doha Round itself seems to be stalled so that hopes for accession in time still appear justified. Is membership really necessary? From a number of perspectives, the answer is clearly yes. Thus, it is important for Russian self-perception to become a member of the club where the future of world trade arrangements is negotiated. Being locked out from those negotiations, as the last big country of this globe, seems hard to stomach. Membership is also desirable for Russia in order to facilitate countering antidumping and other measures against its exports and thus gaining better access to the markets of Western industrialized economies. Not least of all, membership in the WTO may be instrumental for domestic reforms. If the respective measures are required as a result of WTO membership, it may be easier to channel them through the Russian legislative process. Thus, WTO membership is expected also to give a boost to domestic reforms. At the same time, WTO membership is not all that it has been beefed up to be. Economic success without membership is clearly possible. China’s economic success is only the most obvious recent example that countries can go a long way without membership. Conversely, there is no denying that quite unsuccessful countries have long been members in the WTO. At the same time, membership may give even successful economies an extra boost. Although China had cumulative FDI of about US$350 billion before membership, we have already seen that in the year following accession, annual FDI reached a record US$53 billion – despite a drastically shrinking volume of world-wide FDI. In concrete terms, WTO membership requires the Russian Federation to reduce, over time, both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, to open up closed sectors, such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, etc., to foreign investors, to respect intellectual property rights, i.e., to end the pervasive piracy of music, software and movies, and also to eliminate local content requirements. From the perspective of the EU (which has the mandate to represent all EU member countries in the negotiations), a major stumbling block for Russia’s accession is that country’s practice of dual pricing, especially for energy, but also in the area of railway tariffs, which are two-tier for domestic and foreign freights. Export prices of natural gas are about six times the level of domestic prices, for crude oil the export price is about four times the domestic price. The EU argues that these pricing practices amount to hidden subsidies for Russian producers, e.g. for those of mineral fertilizers where over 70 percent of production costs are fuel costs, thus driving Western producers out of business. The official Russian position argues that low energy prices are simply a comparative advantage deriving from the country’s endowment with natural resources. While that comparative advantage clearly exists, it does not justify dual pricing; it can only be used to explain a strong position of Russia on world markets for energy products. Another Russian argument is that domestic producers are so inefficient that they simply need three times the energy of Western producers on a per capita and even more so on a per unit of GDP basis. Again, this cannot serve as a justification for dual pricing. The argument of high transportation costs, for energy, to the West does however carry weight. As a result, there will in the end remain some price differential for energy between domestic and foreign markets; the only open question is the appropriate magnitude. The most recent negotiating position of the EU calls only for decontrol of domestic Russian energy prices (for producers) and for well-head taxes instead of export taxes. It seems that Russia should be able to meet those requirements without undue sacrifices. The extent to which Russian lobbies (civil aircraft industries, automobile producers, aluminium producers, the banking, insurance, and telecom sectors, and agriculture) and foreign lobbies (reportedly there is some Chinese pressure to open
up Russia’s labor market) will be able to delay the Russian legislative process and the negotiations in Geneva, respectively, is unlikely to be overwhelming. It is becoming clear even to the most skeptical Russian observers that concerns about cheap imports killing off domestic manufacturers and thus causing high unemployment, are quite unjustified, and that the factor much more important than WTO membership for the amount of imports is the foreign exchange rate of the ruble. Fortunately for this insight, memories of collapsing imports in the wake of the 1998 devaluation are still vivid in Russia. Thus, it is widely known that the importance of tariffs pales in comparison. It may also be helpful that similar concerns as in Russia had prevailed in China in the run-up to WTO membership, but did not materialize there at all. Ex ante, the prediction in China was that imports would sky-rocket as a result of membership and that pressure on domestic producers would rise. It was further expected that, after a difficult first year, the economy would adjust to the heightened competitive pressure and would quickly recover. In actual fact however, nothing negative at all seems to have happened during the first year of membership. As a result, Chinese experts to this day are unable to give an example of a single negative effect of WTO membership. It very much appears that, for China at least, WTO accession will go down in history as some sort of Y2K event. It would be surprising if the outcome for Russia would turn out very much different.

**European Union: FTA and CEES**

The relations of the Russian Federation with the European Union have a mixed history. A period of mutual neglect was followed by heightened interest and then again neglect, especially in the immediate post-September 11 period. This may have to do with the not yet fully-resolved conflict between the European and the Asian identity of Russia. More important, however, seems to be the Russian self-perception in terms of size and weight. At the one extreme, Russia is seeing itself as a world power on a par with the U.S. At the other extreme, Russia is regarding itself as small enough to contemplate membership in the EU. In actual fact, neither is the country a serious contender for world power status of U.S. dimensions, nor is membership in the EU a realistic possibility. EU membership seems to be out of question for three reasons. In the first place, it is inconceivable that any EU member will ever get voting rights that would exceed those of the present large members (France, Britain, Germany, Italy). Although shared decision-making is a frequent Russian desideratum when it comes to the country’s integration into international regulating bodies, shared decision-making within the EU context implies the possibility of being outvoted in matters of key domestic importance. It is hard to imagine that the associated loss of sovereignty would be acceptable to Russia. Secondly, the amount of financial transfers (structural funds etc.) to Russia that would be required according to present EU rules, would by far exceed the EU’s willingness to pay. Of course, there is the option of “second class membership” with smaller financial transfers. But it appears equally inconceivable that Russia would accept second class membership in any club, least of all when it comes to financial transfers. Of course, such an attitude is not unique to Russia—witness the noises made by Poland when reduced EU payments were contemplated. Thirdly, the bundle of rules and regulations of the EU (the *acquis communautaire*) would be by far too heavy a burden as it would stress to the limit Russia’s ability and willingness to implement. It is no secret that Russia has trouble implementing its own laws. The difficulties would be multiplied in the case of laws and regulations that come by mail from Brussels.

A possibly realistic alternative to EU membership would be to develop various degrees of institutional affiliation of Russia to the EU, including adoption of suitable parts of the *acquis*. Among the advantages of such an arrangement would be a partly reduced entrepreneurial risk with the possible result of increased FDI. In other words, gains from trade could be complemented by “gains from trust.” This would be in line with the central tenets of newer theories of economic growth which put institutional quality, social capital, etc., at the center. Of course, it needs to be mentioned that some authors question the wisdom of adopting the *acquis*. Aslund and Warner (2003) argue that the *acquis* is infested with social democratic inflexibility that could be damaging for Russia. The *acquis* is said to go with too much bureaucracy, too high costs and over-regulation, thus constituting a barrier to economic growth. As evidence for the inflexibility, these authors point out that the rate of unemployment is about twice as high in Poland as in Russia. While they fail to discuss alternative reasons for this difference, such as Poland being relatively less protected by an undervalued currency or the possibility of still very high hidden unemployment in Russia, their argument, if true, points to a potential trade-off between two results of the *acquis*, namely on the one hand increased FDI and, on the other hand, an increased inflexibility. A pragmatic conclusion from that difficulty could be to argue for a careful and selective adoption of parts of the *acquis*. That possibility is already under discussion in Russia. In any case, in the short and medium run the power of geography, i.e. the location of the big agglomerations in the Western part in the Russian Federation speaks strongly in favor of a substantial EU-orientation of Russia.

The next concrete step following Russian accession to the WTO would be negotiations on a Free Trade Area. The concerns raised in Russia in that respect are much the same as those that can be heard in the context of WTO accession. Incidentally, they also very much resemble the fears that were voiced in the U.S. in the run-up to NAFTA. Normally, a trade-off can be expected between short-run pain and long-run gain. The short-run losses that come
with increased competitive pressure would affect some sectors, whereas others would gain. The long-run gains are expected to result, as usual, from a more efficient division of labor. To the extent that the present round of EU enlargement will create trade diversion, which is, however, hardly to be expected, an FTA could help as it would mitigate some of the trade diversion. However, this is likely to be a pseudo-problem as present EU tariffs are lower than those of the EU candidate countries. Thus, rather than new trade barriers being erected, accession economies will have to reduce tariffs vis-à-vis Russia as a result of enlargement. On the most important, for Russia as well as for the EU, imports of natural gas, the EU at present has zero tariffs. Of course, a problem may emerge for Russia because accession countries will also have to reduce tariffs vis-à-vis the third world so that Russian exporters will face increased competitive pressure from there. On an even more general level, Russian critics of an FTA argue that it would cement the raw material bias of the Russian economy. While this is indeed a theoretical possibility, countries like Norway and Britain have shown that with suitable policies, such as the stabilization fund in Norway, this danger can be minimized. A more fundamental concern with FTAs keeps being raised by international economists. While some of them argue that an FTA is a harmless transitory stage towards full multilateralism, others, most prominently Jagdish Bhagwati, suggest that bilateralism in actual fact is a dead-end rather than a transitory stage towards multilateralism. The argument is that if countries begin to charge differentiated tariffs, with rates depending on the origin of the traded goods, the final result will be a mess. Moreover, bilateralism is prone to undermine the most-favoured-nation principle, i.e., the rule that the lowest tariff applicable to one member must be extended to all members. The position of political practitioners, such as Robert Zoellick, the present U.S. trade representative, is that the road to multilateralism is simply too cumbersome and slow. The veto power of the unwilling partners in multilateral negotiations would unduly hamper progress. Rather than wait for the slowest partners, consent- ing countries should go ahead and not allow themselves to be held back by the laggards. For the sake of completeness, it needs to be added that the main partner in many of the bilateral negotiations, the U.S., is frequently accused of behaving like a selfish hegemon, exploiting its present power at the expense of poorer countries. In some quarters, this accusation is even extended to the WTO which is said to be in danger of degenerating into an instrument of U.S. lobbying interests. That latter accusation is, however, unlikely to apply to the proposed FTA between the EU and Russia.

Although an FTA is still far from being a realistic prospect, there is already talk about a Common European Economic Space (CEES), also encompassing the EU and the Russian Federation. Perhaps not surprisingly, the ideas discussed by the prospective partners in such a CEES differ considerably. Thus, in the Russian understanding of the CEES the “four freedoms” (free movement of goods, services, capital and people) figure prominently. President Putin called for a European continent without dividing lines which, in his view, will require the freedom of movement, within all of Europe, for Russian citizens. In the understanding of the EU, the concept of a common space includes not only the economic dimension, but also issues of security, justice, education, and culture. The specific economic dimension includes the harmonization of legislation in the areas of standards, technical regulation, tariff regulation, government procurement, and competition. Harmonization is meant to include the adoption by Russia of key provisions of the acquis communautaire of the EU. It also includes the recurrent theme of energy corporation, especially in the area of natural gas.

Critics see serious drawbacks of the economic dimension alone. The idea of making Russian laws and regulations compatible with those of the EU implies considerable difficulties, not only because not all rules can be regarded as beneficial to the Russian side. Thus, it is suggested that, beyond the four freedoms, only parts of the EU company law and some regulations on state aid might be suitable for Russia. The rest is regarded as either superfluous or harmful. A potentially more prohibitive obstacle to the harmonization of EU and Russian laws and regulations has to do with the fact that harmonization can by no means be interpreted as convergence. In practice, it rather means the unilateral adoption by Russia of EU laws and regulations. This is difficult per se. It is made even more difficult due to the dynamic nature of the acquis. Russia would not only have no say in the acquis, it would also have to rubberstamp its continuous changes over time. This is already causing serious constitutional problems in countries like Ireland and Norway, which are associated in a comparable way to the EU. Notice however, that the unilateral adoption of the acquis and its development over time, while it causes problems of democratic legitimacy, has so far not caused any practical or functional problems. Yet, the political concerns appear to be serious and there may be no easy solution. One possible way forward could be to include the Russian Federation, in the form of consultations, already at the stage of discussing and legislating new elements of the acquis. That, however, may well be both impractical and unacceptable to the EU. Nevertheless, negotiations over those issues may already serve to signal a willingness of both parties to make progress. That in itself may have positive effects on productivity, in that it could be interpreted as a positive sign by investors. Although the respective discussions per se cost next to no resources, it needs of course to be made sure from the outset that no possibility for disappointment, comparable in particular to that of Turkey, would be implied for Russia. In other words, no ex ante perspective for membership should be contemplated, irrespective of what may be considered conceivable, or what could possibly develop, over the longer term. In addition to those
most obvious fundamental difficulties, it should also be mentioned that Russia’s involvement in the customs union with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and also the occasionally revived efforts towards a common currency (or even state) of Russia and Belarus can only exacerbate the problems.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, the path towards Russia’s integration into the world economy seems to be charted out in a reasonably clear way. Accession to the WTO can be regarded, for all practical purposes, as a foregone conclusion. This in itself may give Russian reforms a palpable boost. In the area of foreign trade, the EU will remain the principle partner. Oil, natural gas and other raw materials will continue to be the key Russian export products. Foreign direct investment in the Russian Federation will continue to rise, less so because of any immediate Russian financial needs, but rather due to a Russian interest in facilitating technological and managerial spill-overs. Multinational companies in ever larger numbers will also make their presence felt, not least visually. Integration within the CIS will continue, at the minimum in the area of trade, but possibly also extending to a common Russian-Belorussian currency, for example. Infrastructure links between Russia and Western Europe will continue to grow, with the respective possibilities being almost unlimited. The orientation of Russian exports to the EU, while strong, may become less pronounced once LNG exports take off in a serious way. In other words, the U.S. as a customer may overcome the economic forces of gravity. At the same time, once EU enlargement is completed, the Brussels bureaucracy may have more resources, in terms of time and energy, ready to be devoted to the Russian Federation. (Of course, even after enlargement, digestion problems resulting from the present round of EU enlargement may continue to require the attention of Brussels and thus tie up resources.) The integration at the level of the population will also continue, e.g. with ever larger numbers of students moving in both directions. Partly as a result of that, the integration of what could be considered common global knowledge will make further progress. The latter point is of particular importance in the light of the factors said, by modern economic theories, to generate economic growth.

At the same time, it needs to be recognized that integration into the world economy is by no means an automatic process. The political leaders will have to make choices and there exist forces, not least within Russia, that militate against integration, for example due to worries about Russian identity. However, the fact that countries like Italy, France, and Great Britain had no trouble retaining their identity, despite membership in the EU, or that Japan has extremely successfully integrated into the world economy while also keeping its identity, should demonstrate even to reluctant Russian observers that their worries are exaggerated. What may push Russia forward is that, in a competitive world, integration into that world is itself a competitive process. A case in point may be Russia’s effort to expedite its accession into the WTO following China’s success in that respect. Still, Russia’s integration into the world economy is unlikely to happen all too fast. Critical factors, such as people’s attitudes, are slow-moving variables. Similarly, reputation is something that takes a long time to acquire (and a long time to get rid of). Also, the Russian capacity to make unnecessary mistakes, destroying some of the progress, should not be underestimated. There are also dangers and risks associated with Russia’s integration into the world economy. The most important one, from Russia’s perspective, is that successful integration into the world economy may facilitate the disintegration of nations. Preventing that from happening could require a more centralized regime in Russia than one might wish to see. The ubiquitous Russian problem of inequality is in part also linked to integration into the world economy. Obviously, inequality of income and wealth distribution does affect foreign trade witness the huge numbers of luxury limousines imported by Russia. This observation can be generalized in that large chunks of Russian imports are characterized by goods of high unit value, thus signaling high-quality goods. If integration into the world economy tends to exacerbate the inequalities, then the latter’s productive (incentive) effects may be outweighed by its destabilizing effects on the social fabric. Moreover, the fight against too much inequality may itself deter investment, both domestic and foreign. That danger could be reduced, if the courts could be trusted to sort things out in a fair way. But this most obvious solution does not yet seem to work in a satisfactory way. The respective difficulties will remain with us for quite some time.

A less general, but more immediate, danger is the possibility of a domestic Russian economic slump, for example in the wake of collapsing oil prices on world markets, and a time-wise coincidence of that slump with WTO accession. That could lead to a post-hoc-propter-hoc error, i.e. a possible recession would be wrongly ascribed to WTO accession. Therefore, if a slump has to happen, then one would wish it to happen before WTO accession. In this way, the slump has to be attributed to other causes than WTO accession. Even better, a subsequent recovery from the slump, after accession, would then be ascribed – possibly again wrongly, but conveniently – to membership, with headlines then reading something like “WTO pulls Russia out of recession.” But that is just a pragmatic thought. In general, it is to be hoped that Russia can avoid a slump and that integration into the world economy will continue to progress smoothly. With that hope I want to finish. I wish you an interesting and successful conference.

Wolfram Schrettl is Professor at the Department of Economics and at the East European Institute of the Free University Berlin and Head of the Department of Law
and Economics at the East European Institute. He is also Research Professor at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin/German Institute for Economic Research) where he previously was Head of International Economics. He also taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Boston University, and Munich University and held positions at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., and at the East European Institute, Munich.

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1 See, for example, Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
2 The frequent claims that Russia is plagued by the Dutch disease are not shared by all observers.
3 Daniel Yergin of Cambridge Energy Associates reckons that within two decades, LNG could account for 20% of the U.S. gas needs, from perhaps 1% now; see The Economist, July 26, 2003, p. 60.
4 See, for example, Zak and Knack (2001).
6 A locus classicus is Bhagwati (1992).
7 See Zoellick (2002).
8 An excellent discussion of the issues is contained in Hamilton (2003).
9 See again Mau and Novikov (2002).

JÜRGEN BITZER
„Technologische Spillover-Effekte als Determinanten des Wirtschaftswachstums: Theoretische Erkenntnisse und empirische Evidenz“
Dissertation: Technische Universität Berlin in: Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften Nr. 532
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2003