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
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THE INTELLECTUALS' ARTICULATION OF THE MUSLIM IDENTITY

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## **The Intellectuals' Articulation of the Muslim Identity**

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### **Abstract**

In this paper I analyze the production of national narratives by intellectuals during 1960s and 1970s in socialist Yugoslavia and the Diaspora. Special attention is given on the historiography, which provided the most fruitful space for endowing the Bosnian Muslim national category with a national past. The sources for this paper consist of unpublished archival material as well as published monographs, journal articles as well as short articles in daily newspapers. By looking at individual intellectuals and their works the purpose is to show the role of intellectuals in the creation, circulation, and contestation of national culture and to capture the variety of intellectual work involved in nation-building. It appears that there were centrifugal competing practices of narrating the past, which resulted in a pluralism of thought. The integration of the Diaspora shows the construction of different national concepts, which were to mark Muslim distinctiveness. Depending on the construction of the (national) past differing national spaces were imagined and propagated.

*"The only absolutely certain thing is the future, since the past is constantly changing." (Yugoslav aphorism)*

### **1. Introduction**

In the WP 2 I have shown that the discussions on national policy within the communist party were mainly shaped by discursive practices with keywords such as republican affirmation, national equivalence, and affirmation of the underdeveloped regions. While the party members were creating the political frame of the nation, it was the task of

intellectuals to fill it with stories of the past in order to verify the newly institutionalized national category (Filandra 1998: 266).

The role of intellectuals in nation-building has been a topic of wide interest in present scholarship on nation-building (Boyer 2005). By looking at their production of knowledge the aim is to show the role of human agency in the creation, circulation, and contestation of national culture, and to capture the intellectual work involved in nation-building in its full diversity (Boyer 2005: 105). However, defining intellectuals as a community has been quite difficult. Karl Mannheim's view of intellectuals as a socially unattached and relatively classless community has been seriously challenged. The range of definitions include people who are supposed to speak the truth to power holders (Boyer 2005: 106), over "men of ideas" and guardians of national traditions and cultural knowledge (Shils 1972: 34), a historically emergent technocratic class (Đilas 1985), to those cultural elites inhabiting fields of knowledge production and authorization (Verdery 1991: 29). The current paradigm in the analysis of the intellectuals' role in constructing the nation's past has been informed by the awareness of a strong presentism in history writing (Chatterjee 2006: 5).

Intellectuals played a crucial role in the formation of national identity in Miroslav Hroch's historiographical research, and in his model of three phases of nationalism (Hroch 1993). The emergence of a nation is divided into phase A, during which scholars search for a national past and popularize the nationalist idea in their writings, whereas phase B is characterized by the growth of national movements in which intellectuals often play an important role. In phase C the idea of the nation is assimilated by the population at large. While phase A, and to some extent phase B can be traced back to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, respectively to the inter-war period; the preconditions for entering phase C were not present until the 1960s and 1970s.

In this working paper, the main focus will be on the production of historiography during the 1960s and 1970s. Several arguments can be put forward to motivate such an approach. First of all, more than literature, philosophy, or any other social science, history was used to underpin the very foundations of the nation. Second, Marxists argued that a correct understanding of the past was essential in order to understand historical

development and to determine policies for the future (Verdery 1991: 216). In other words, the production of a national narrative was a highly politicized act, in which patriotism was sometimes very hard to distinguish from scholarship (Chatterjee 2006: 3). To stress the historical context in which history is being written in our case means to look at the mechanisms of history production in a communist regime with a still strong party presence and control. Therefore, one has to consider how intellectuals articulated national identities, as well as how their analyses were in fact identified as such and distinguished from other works.

The involvement of intellectuals and historians in the creation of nationalist policy has been explained in different ways. Gellner has stressed opportunism as an explanation for the intellectuals' involvement, with the desire for social and political power as the main motive (quoted in Dragović-Soso 2002: 7). Although pragmatism cannot be ruled out on the individual level, this approach fails to provide a satisfactory explanation of the plethora of historical consciousnesses. As will be shown, a wide range of conflicting tendencies within the discipline resulted in a pluralism of national narratives. There were varying degrees of commitment to the party, which can be shown if one follows the work of individual scholars over a period of time. Salim Ćerić was for instance extremely dedicated to the Central Committee. In his *Muslimani sprskohrvatskog jezika* from 1968, however, he advocated an institutionally based nation-building process among Bosnian Muslims that exceeded the limits of the party's national project. Thus, the long espoused statement that historians are to national movements what "poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin addicts" (Hobsbawm 1992: 3) seems too simplistic.

The structural and contextual approach focuses on the political, ideological, social, and economic circumstances, in which the intellectuals/historians acted (Dragović-Soso 2002: 7). Andrew Wachtel has, for instance, shown that the intellectuals' abandonment of Yugoslavism occurred only after the adoption of the 1963 constitution, when the political context of decentralization favoured more particular national narratives (Wachtel 1998: 197-198). Such an approach takes into account multiple factors when explaining the complex interaction between historical practices. However, what Wachtel fails to notice is the necessity to methodologically disaggregate the notion of national historiography and

to trace the contesting logics of national narratives that emerge.

It appears that no central authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina guided the production of national narratives. Instead, there were several competing practices, which resulted in a pluralism of thought, although all of them served the ideological purpose of producing a Muslim national identity. Consequently, one cannot explain the discourse by reference to the dictatorial powers of the party (Bokovoy 1997: 16). Not only that Yugoslavia was much less repressive towards intellectuals than other communist states, but the party was dependent on the intellectuals and therefore tolerated “dependent monopolies” of history production.<sup>1</sup> Despite the obvious alliance between political and intellectual elites, the relationship was never the result of a simple top-down dictate by the politicians, but a far more a function of an ambivalent and complex network of accrediting, neglecting, and tolerating different interpretations of the history of the nation (Giesen 1998: 41). In addition, the varying positions of the historians within the field of narrative contestation were often determined by long-standing private links with members of the political leadership, which protected them from the supervising apparatus.

Moreover, the bitter struggle over the distribution of power within the LCY) was reflected in the politicized production of history (Bokovoy 1997: 16). However, despite images of a pluralized environment, the historiography was not totally autonomous. The party knew how to use perks in order to make the scholars reproduce the desired discourse.

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<sup>1</sup> The intermingled, ambiguous, and complex power relations between the members of the LCY and intellectuals has been most obvious to me during the students’ protest in Sarajevo in 1968, which were interpreted at that time as the most serious political challenge to the LCY. On a secret meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was held on September 16, 1968 in Sarajevo most of the party members identify university professors that were explicitly and outspokenly criticizing the regime during the demonstrations. One of them was the historian Milorad Ekmečić. Besides his refusal to retract his critics after the party’s menaces, the party members realize their dependence on his competence for the approaching university reforms, which made them tolerate Ekmečić’s anti-regime activities. (The document has not been registered yet) ABH – “Strogo povjerljivo 1968”.

## **2. Providing a National Perspective on the Past**

In connection with the censuses, the question of the Muslim identity was discussed by the intellectuals. However, in 1953 Špiro Kulišić did not receive political approval due to the fact that his article challenged the centralist policies (Kulišić 1953). There were no claims for a separate Muslim national category, so there was no need to write a history of the Bosnian Muslims until 1961. In 1961 an article by Enver Redžić on the specific character of the Bosnian Muslims appeared in the Belgrade journal *Socijalizam*. Like Kulišić, Redžić provided the public with an article on the *longue durée* of the ethnic distinctiveness of Bosnian Muslims (Redžić 1963: 102-124). Redžić's narrative focused on the history of their "national declaration", while paying more attention to the discussion on census categories than Kulišić had done. On the question of who the Bosnian Muslims are, Redžić answered in the negative, meaning that they were neither Serbs nor Croats. The article was also dedicated to the negation of the authenticity of Bosnian Muslims in the previous, bourgeois regimes. Redžić argued that the only "objective" approach to the subject would be to recognize the national status of Bosnian Muslims, which was possible only after the introduction of the communist regime. As a result of this approach, the periodization of political regimes became inseparable distinctions between "good" and "bad" scholarship. The true history of Bosnian Muslims was therefore still to be written, and did not take place until seven years later.

## **3. 1968: The Past of the Republic and the Muslims. Conference on the History of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The year 1968 marked the beginning of the engagement of historians in the construction a Muslim national history. Most party members at the seventeenth session realized the still existing academic gap in regard to the Muslims. The political affirmation of a Bosnian Muslim nation, therefore, called for an explicit master narrative produced by intellectuals. Avdo Humo even went so far as to suggest withholding information from the public until a better preparation had been achieved:

*My suggestion would be that today we discuss some of the directives but that we still do not make them public until we have not worked on them more. Before we*

*go with this to the public, certain directives and approaches from contemporary social and political situation have to be done. Otherwise going public with this would just cause misunderstandings and would probably not contribute to any clarifications.*<sup>2</sup>

Exactly these ideas were to influence major scholars in 1968, which made history-writing a central political and ideological arena (Verdery 1991: 217).

A two-day conference with the title “*Istorijske pretpostavke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*” (Historical Premises of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina) was held on November 18, 1968, marking the official recognition of the republican status of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 29 November 1943.<sup>3</sup> The Institute of History in Sarajevo, founded by the Central Committee in 1965, organized the conference. As its first director Redžić remembers, the main purpose of the conference was to produce research on the history of the republic Bosnia and Herzegovina (Redžić 2008). The ceremonial opening speech was held by the Central Committee member Stojan Bjelajac, who in the name of the CK SK BiH greeted the participants and recounted in short keywords the two meetings of 1943, the AVNOJ meeting in Jajce and the first ZAVNOBiH meeting in Mrkonjić Grad, turning them into the cornerstones of the Bosnian peoples’ cohesion and freedom.<sup>4</sup> The AVNOJ therefore marked the beginning of a new period in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The speech was concluded with a call to scholars to provide a basis for the republic’s equal status with other Yugoslav republics, and to make impossible any

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<sup>2</sup> AJ – 507, CKSKJ, II BiH, K. 6, fasc. 1, p. 78.

<sup>3</sup> This meeting is in the historiographical accounts erected as the formative moment of the independent status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Delegations from all parts of Yugoslavia (except Macedonia) attended it and declared federalism as the new administrative form of Yugoslavia, which would consist of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Sandžak and Macedonia as its federal units. The status of Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina upon which Serbian and Croatian interests were mostly colliding was at that time in the original documents not settled. The proclamation of independent republican status of Bosnia and Herzegovina followed actually first in 1944 at the second meeting of ZAVNOBiH, which defined Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic of neither Serbs, nor Croats nor Muslims but of Serbs, and Croats and Muslims. (Džaja 2004:103). Thus, by individualizing Muslims at that period a balance was to be established between the two pools, the Croatian and Serbian. However, the document never stated Muslims as a nation at that time, although Bosniak historiography often interprets it as that.

<sup>4</sup> *Istorijske Pretpostavke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* 1968, p. 10.

tendencies to negate the equality of the three national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>5</sup> Branislav Đurđev from the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Vasa Čubrilović, member of the academies of sciences and arts in Belgrade and Zagreb put the finishing touch on the ceremonial opening. The constellation and order of the orators and their background alluded to the complexity of the interdependence between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Croatia.

The thematic focus of the conference was on the socialist period and World War II, which in the Yugoslav context also represented the socialist revolution. The Yugoslav and Austro-Hungarian periods were also covered, although the presentations were mainly restricted to political history. Most of the thematic sessions were worked through and presented by scholars with different national backgrounds. In contrast to most scholars, the Muslim historian Avdo Sućeska traced the history of the republic as a political entity to the Ottoman period. In his view, foreign rule was understood as having passed smoothly, which means that he represented an understanding of the historical process that emphasized continuity (Sućeska 1968: 48). Since the Ottoman period was associated with the formation of the Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group, this guaranteed an even stronger connection between the history of Bosnia and the Muslims.

Vasa Čubrilović presented a strong antithesis to this view. In his presentation, Bosnia and Herzegovina was created to the disadvantage of Croatia and Serbia. In Čubrilović's view, historical developments in Bosnia were the result of pressures by external forces that made it possible for Bosnia to become established at the expense of Serbia and Croatia (Čubrilović 1968: 15). By locating the origin of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the national states of Croatia and Serbia, Čubrilović implied that the territorial cohesion of Bosnia had nothing to do with the desires and abilities of the Bosnian Muslims.

Atif Purivatra was the second explicit articulator of a history of (Bosnian) Muslims rather than of Bosnia. In his presentation concerning the attitudes of the CPY towards Muslims during World War II (Purivatra: 1968: 498), Purivatra presented leaflets from the period, which addressed Muslims as a separate group fighting for the liberation

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<sup>5</sup> Istorijske Pretpostavke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, p. 10.

of Yugoslavia together with Serbs and Croats. For Purivatra, this proved that the CPY had recognized the Muslims twenty-five years earlier. The formation of separate Muslim military units within the partisan movement was the second strand of thought that he used in support of his argument. Moreover, he just factored out that this “recognition” of the Muslims was revoked after the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia, with the expectation that they soon would assimilate into Serbs or Croats.

By restricting his analysis to a very short period of time, Purivatra was able to draw a uniform picture of the party’s attitude towards the identity of Bosnian Muslims. This was one of the points in the discussion and polemic between him and the director of the Institute of History, the Muslim historian. Redžić strongly criticized Purivatra’s not sufficiently defined category “Muslim” (did he mean Yugoslav Muslims or Bosnian Muslims?)<sup>6</sup> and a simplified view, which overshadowed the political inconsistency of the party, which oscillated between recognition and negation of Bosnian Muslims. In Redžić’s view, the recognition of Bosnian Muslims as a nation was of a much more recent date. The leaflets from the 1940s aimed at mobilizing a cultural or religious group, and did not represent recognition of Muslim nationhood. Recalling his personal experience as a participant in the revolution, Redžić also criticised the view that the creation of Muslim military units meant recognition of the Muslim nation.<sup>7</sup> Subsequently, the conference opened the floodgates to a continuous and heated polemic between Redžić and Purivatra that was going to last for years to come.

Another central topic of the discussion focused not so much on the socialist period but on the role of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization in the first Yugoslavia. The main question concerned the first political Muslim organization, JMO, and the extent to which its political presence was crucial to maintain Bosnia’s autonomous status during the first Yugoslavia. It was argued that JMO was the guarantor of territorial integrity during the negotiations preceding the adoption of the centralist Vidovdan constitution in 1921, which defined the new territorial division of Yugoslavia.<sup>8</sup> This meant viewing the Bosnian Muslims as the cohesive force of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without them, it was

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<sup>6</sup> As it has been shown in working paper 2 the radius of representativeness of this category was a topic of heated discussion also in the political circles.

<sup>7</sup> *Istorijske Pretpostavke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* 1968, p. 583.

<sup>8</sup> *Istorijske Pretpostavke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* 1968, pp. 571-577.

argued; Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been split between Serbia and Croatia. The opponents of the argument viewed the JMO as an equivalent to the Serbian and Croatian bourgeois parties.

It is interesting to note that none of the participants in the discussion, which were mainly coming from the Bosnian academic milieu, dared to challenge Čubrilović's view, which marginalized Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Bosnian Muslims, since he viewed both as being historically predisposed to a unification with Croatia and Serbia. The reason was probably that Čubrilović, being a member of the prestigious academies in Zagreb and Belgrade, was not so much impeccable (he was criticized at least implicitly, by a critique of less extreme historians than himself) as incontestable.

What did those battles over the interpretation of the past mean, and what did they say about the Bosnian Muslim identity? In order to understand these issues, one has to appreciate that history was a catalyst for political claims. First of all, delineating the territory of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and looking beyond Yugoslavia to provide historical legitimacy, preceded the republic's emancipation within the Yugoslav federation, as well as its relationship to the neighbouring republics of Croatia and Serbia. Bringing this long past of territorial integrity into an organic connection with Muslim political claims, made an implicit statement about the inevitability of the recognition of Bosnian Muslims.

What emerged from this struggle was a debate about the identity of Bosnia and the Bosnian Muslims. In the eyes of some participants, like Purivatra or Hamdija Čemerlić, it was not just scholarship that had to be defended, but the notion of a Bosnian Muslim nation tied to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic. Others, like Redžić, emphasized a more critical approach to the delicate issue, thus distancing himself from the party and implying a more internationally valid methodological approach. All scholars were members of the Central Committee, and all were employed in state-run institution. Nonetheless, they held different views on the past that entailed different political implications for the present, which were obviously tolerated by the Communist party or even reflected the party's still inchoate vision.

#### **4. Writing a “True History”**

While the conference was mainly dealing with the history of the republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the same year there appeared a politically appropriate study on the history of the Muslims. Since so far no Muslim nationalist voice could be found in the historiographical practice by Croatian and Serbian historians, it had to be created. According to the new interpretations of history, the main dividing line of history was to move from class differences to the “nation”, which had to be liberated from foreign oppression (i.e. mostly Serb and Croat nationalist aspirations).

Salim Ćerić’s book “The Serbo-Croatian speaking Muslims” was the first monograph dedicated to the history of the Muslims as a separate nation. The media attention given to the book not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but all over Yugoslavia had an astonishing effect. More than 15 book reviews were written within the shortest period of time. The horizon of expert opinion ranged from admiration to dismissing it as a piece of adolescent literature (Macan 1970:37). The time for a “true history” had come, in which the Muslims finally “would become a subject of Bosnia’s history”, exclaimed Mustafa Imamović in his evaluation (Imamović 1969: 49). This argument was repeated in most Bosnian journals and newspapers. In other republics, a more distanced and reserved approach made the lines.

Nonetheless, Ćerić’s book was a pioneering work on the national past of the Muslims. It had the style of an essay or popular text, written in narrative prose, simple in its language and thus accessible to a wider audience. But again, already in the title the author expressed an ambiguity about who the Muslims were. According to Ćerić, the Muslims were to be identified through language and religion. The territory of their dispersion was implicitly announced by the reference to Serbo-Croatian speaking Muslims only. According to the title it would include Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, and Montenegro. Muslims from Macedonia and Kosovo were excluded. In the content however, it very soon became obvious that the bonds of “nation-ness” were imagined along Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial lines.

The chapters of the book were conceptualized chronologically. In the chapter on feudalism and capitalism, the modes of production received primary attention, followed

by socio-political circumstances and cultural forms. Thus, in the prevailing historical materialist mode of thinking, the history of the Bosnian Muslim as a national subject was presented as constantly progressing towards the presence. Ćerić traced the nation's genealogy back to medieval times. Although the formative moment of the confessional tripartite constellation was situated in the Ottoman period, the roots of the Bosnian Muslims needed to be found even further back in the past. This made the notion of the Muslims as an indigenous ethnic group even more palatable, but it also required two narrative constructs: the first was to prove that the Muslims had to antecede the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, and the other was to facilitate a smooth passage from one era to the other. While the Ottoman period previously had been associated with an era of invasion, oppression, and cruel foreign rule, in the Muslim narrative discourse the Ottomans turned into liberators of the *Bogumils* from Christian oppression. According to Ćerić, the Slavic *Bogumuils* converted to Islam *en masse* soon after Muhamed II. el Fatih's "act of liberation", because they had a religious belief that was almost interchangeable with other religions (Ćerić 1968: 52). It was thus argued that a dogmatic and religious affinity between Islam and Bogumil faith provided a smooth passage from pre-Ottoman Slavic to Ottoman Muslim society. Similarly, the ethnic character of Bosnian Muslims was perceived as a synthesis of Slavic origins mixed with the "foreign" Islam. It was therefore argued that the beginning of the history of the Bosnian Muslim "nation" was not to be found in the Ottoman period, as was otherwise assumed, but in the times of the *Bogumils*.

Ćerić argued that Muslim society in the Ottoman period was subdivided into a class structure consisting of ayans, beys, merchants, the ulama (clergy), free peasants, and the reaya, but "despite its heterogeneous class structure Muslim society perceived itself as a cohesive entity" (Ćerić 1968:117). In the course of Ottoman decline, class differences diminished as the Muslim allegiance to the Ottoman state was overshadowed by more patriotic feelings towards Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ćerić 1968:104-113).

Ćerić also argued that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 marked the end of the feudal period and the entry into a capitalist mode of production, which he chronologically subdivided into the periods of Austro-Hungary and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He classified the two periods by distinguishing between the domination of an external (Austria-Hungarian) elite, and the latter period of "domestic" hegemony.

Industrialization and modernization entered Bosnia during the Austro-Hungarian administration, but did not succeed in homogenizing the population within the boundaries of a common Bosnian nation, defined in territorial terms, since “the internal market remained ethnically split with cohesive forces [existing] only among the individual ethnic communities” (Ćerić 1968: 147). Besides modernization,<sup>9</sup> the character of Habsburg rule was elaborated in a positive light, since it guaranteed the Bosnian Muslims their identity and Bosnia and Herzegovina its autonomy. Serb and Croat nationalist aspirations, on the other hand, were depicted as assimilatory and as striving to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into parts of the Serbian and Croatian nation-states (Ćerić 1968: 158). Moreover, Ćerić also characterized the period as an era during which there appeared the first forms of political representation of Bosnian Muslims through the JMO, which he tended to idealize, rather than to point out that representation was restricted to the upper strata of the Muslim community.

The most interesting and important question in the history of Bosnian Muslims concerned the interwar period, when the Muslim elite officially declared itself in Croatian or Serbian national terms. According to Ćerić, the belief that the Muslim population depending on its cultural development would become Croats or Serbs, represented an assimilatory tendency towards the Muslims. According to Ćerić, “The assimilation policy did not bring about any decisive results. The Muslims conceived it as pressure on their cultural heritage and resisted it with all available means”(Ćerić 1968: 201). For the author, those intellectuals who proclaimed themselves as Serbs or Croats did so out of political opportunism rather than enthusiasm. The variability of their national affiliations served Ćerić as the best evidence for this state of affairs (Ćerić 1968: 202). For Ćerić, the fact that organized assimilation policies, led by Muslim cultural associations, failed to influence the “Muslim masses” was the best proof of Bosnian Muslim nationhood. In the view of Ćerić and other “primordialists”, the nation-ness became essentialized, ancient and deterministic in character. Since cultural and confessional differentiations among the Bosnian Muslims later served to create splits, religion became the focus of Bosnian Muslim nation-ness. However, given the fact that religious and cultural differentiation

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<sup>9</sup> Contemporary historiography distances itself from interpreting Austro-Hungarian rule with modernization. Bringing modernity was far more a strategy to legitimate the rule of the semi-colonial policy making of the Habsburg monarchy.

was being assumed as a form of what Clifford Geertz calls “givens”, religion became the main denominator of the national identity (quoted in Brubaker 2004: 49). Thus, being Muslim in religious terms and declaring oneself as Serb or Croat became incompatible, since Croats and Serbs could, according to the logic of argumentation, only be Catholics, respectively Orthodox. Religious differentiation turned into the main form of bounding.

While Ćerić viewed the Croatian and Serbian national affiliations as mere political identities, which were fluid among Bosnian Muslims, he energetically argued that Muslim national identity was immutable. Thus, Muslim believers were predetermined only for a Muslim national category. The official national declarations as Serbs and Croats were seen as a superficial identity layer while the Muslim national identity would lurk beneath it and was not interchangeable.

Only with the communist takeover and the socialist revolution were Bosnian Muslims finally awarded their previously neglected national rights (Ćerić 1968: 215). In the same way as Purivatra, Ćerić thereby argued that communist national policy was consistent from the beginning, decided upon at the fifth regional congress in 1938. Thus, in Ćerić’s account the admiring view of the role of communism was determined by an author’s party affiliation and ideological premises rather than based on testimonies of archival materials.

And indeed, the book was of potential value not only for ordinary Muslims and intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the political apparatus. In the archival material of the Bosnian commission for inter-ethnic relations from 1969, there is a typewritten manuscript on the “Problem of the Yugoslav Muslim Nation.”<sup>10</sup> Although no author signed the document, its content is identical with Ćerić’s officially published work, but contains parts that are interwoven with Marxist considerations of the nation-building processes. The fact that it was written in the *ekavica* and the different ink colour of the typewriter leads to the conclusion that it was written by another author, more proficient in Marxist ideology on nations. It was archived with a compilation of book reviews and a short letter from Ćerić addressed to Džemal Bijedić, which contained the

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<sup>10</sup> ABH - Komsija za međunacionalne odnose 1969 (material not registered officially, no signature available).

following remark: “I send you all the review on my book, which I have received until now. Hope to hear your opinion about it soon.”<sup>11</sup> Although it does not appear clearly that the book was ordered by the political authorities, it was used as the party’s new master narrative on the Bosnian Muslims. And indeed, it went relatively unchallenged until prior to the census in 1971, when alternative narrative models appeared within the Muslim intellectual strata.

### **5. In the Name of the Republic or the Nation? Pre-census Mobilisation(s)**

The adoption of the Muslim national category made it necessary to organize a good and convincing propaganda in the media. In the period between September 1970 and April 1971, the Yugoslav and especially Bosnian media were overflowed with articles on the importance of the forthcoming census. In fact, it was the first time that the Bosnian Muslim identity became a subject of discussions in the public sphere.

Most of the discussions centred on the two census categories. The Yugoslav and the Muslim was embraced in a rhetoric of new democratic ideas, new solutions within the course of reforms, and more democratic self-management, in which a new relationship between republic and Federation would guarantee national and republican affirmation, and equality between developed and under-developed regions.<sup>12</sup> All these issues were made dependent on the results of the census. In order to achieve a balanced policy, two aspects were brought forward in the public discussions. One emphasized the need for affirmation of republican national categories and political power, and the second sought to devalue the “Yugoslav” category and associate it with unitarism, which represented federal power.

The media in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflected republican national policy. The documents of the commission for inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina had already shown that the party’s main concern was not only to supervise the pre-census discussion in the media but also to engage intellectuals and make them propagate the

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<sup>11</sup> ABH - Komisija za međunacionalne odnose 1969.

<sup>12</sup> *Oslobodenje*, 1.3.1971, p. 5.

party's official identity policy.<sup>13</sup>

Different conceptions of the Muslims on the republican level also resulted in different interpretations of their ethno-genesis, ranging from neglecting their ethnic attributes to endowing the category with national rights. Moreover, articles dealing with Muslim identity, written two or more years earlier, became actualized. By (re)entering the public sphere, the central Committee in Bosnia utilized them as instruments for social mobilization. Thus, a three-year old article written by the Croat Vladimir Blašković, published in the Croatian journal *Kritika*, filled the headlines of the daily magazine *Oslobođenje* in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Blašković doubted any

*developed present awareness of an ethnic authenticity among the Muslims. Moreover, who could neglect apodictically the presence of traditional Croatian or Serbian national affiliations among the Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sandžak. (Blašković 1970: 12-17).*

This type of statement, which negated the existence of a Muslim ethnic identity, was present in Serbia and Croatia (Logor 1970: 3). On January 8, 1971, *Oslobođenje* published a special issue, in which the collected media material from Croatia (Blašković 1970: 12-17) and Macedonia (Palikruševa 1970: 5) was condemned as anti-democratic, nationalistic aspirations, which could only be left-over from the old bureaucracy.<sup>14</sup> The policy of assimilation which Salim Ćerić described in his book as a phenomenon in the Yugoslav Monarchy seemed not to be diminishing.

For the first time, intellectual debates began to reach the public sphere in dailies all over Yugoslavia. The academic discursive practice, therefore, was “democratized” and made available to a broader audience. This massive proliferation of academic debates did not primarily serve academic needs, but was symptomatic of an intensified ethnic mobilization. The Muslim claim to be different was at the same time, given the ambiguity of the category “Muslim” interpreted as a lack of political rights in other republics (like Macedonia, Serbia, or Montenegro.) While in the political debates the issue of the Muslim category was more explicitly articulated in terms of power relations, the

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<sup>13</sup> ABH - Komsija za međunacionalne odnose 1971, material not officially registered no signature available.

<sup>14</sup> *Oslobođenje*, 8.1.1971, p. 5.

population was introduced to it through the debates among intellectuals, which turned the past into a means for mobilization in the politicized public sphere. Academia thus served political goals by mediating between the elite and the population.

Most of the public space in Bosnia and Herzegovina was characterized by tensions among Bosnian (Muslim) intellectuals, such as Redžić and Čerić. For instance, in April 1970 *Oslobođenje* published a text by Čerić's, which criticized an article by Redžić in the academic journal *Pregled* (Redžić 1970: 19-32). In the article, Redžić did not write the word "Muslim" with a capital "M"<sup>15</sup>, which would have given the Muslims a national attribute. Instead, he proposed the adoption of a "Bosnian" national identity and argued that "Muslim" was inadequate, since it referred to religious attributes. Redžić's analysis used the same periodization as Čerić (see above). However, he argued that it was the strong affiliation with the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than religion that was the primary determinant of Bosnian Muslim identity. For Redžić, the distinction between the Muslims living in Bosnia and those from other parts of Yugoslavia represented an evocative bounding (Barth 1969: 4). Čerić also referred to the Muslims living in Bosnia. For him the national diversity of Bosnia and Herzegovina was of crucial importance because at stake was the national quota within Bosnia and Herzegovina. It follows that both intellectuals had the same understanding of how to define the Bosnian Muslims, but used different identification markers. In other words, Redžić did not challenge the idea of a Bosnian Muslim collective identity. Instead, he criticized the choice of name. In the period between 24 February and March 13, 1971,<sup>16</sup> when all 18 sequels of Čerić's elaborate were published, Redžić never had an opportunity to make his voice heard in the most popular daily in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In his recently published autobiography Redžić only mentions the critique by Mustafa Imamović of the same text (Redžić 2008: 95). It was also published under the title "It was no accident" in the daily newspaper *Oslobođenje* in 1970 and referred to the (mis)spelling of the name "Muslim".<sup>17</sup> Čerić's text, however, remained factored out of

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<sup>15</sup> After the official recognition of its Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina the Central Committee introduced the new writing of the name "Muslim" with a capital M, which was the only symbolic resource to announce the new political status as a nation.

<sup>16</sup> The texts appeared every day in the culture column, see *Oslobođenje* 24.2.1971-13.3.1971.

<sup>17</sup> Imamović 1970, p. 5.

Redžić's personal memory.

*Oslobođenje* was not meant to provide public media space for academic polemics, but served as a mobilizing force in order to assure popular acceptance of the “Muslim” category. Since the policy of Bosnia’s affirmation as a republic was conceptualized under the premise of a tripartite national structure, the “Bosnian” concept did not comply with the political visions. Moreover, the Muslim political elite were able to secure its independent space within the national quota system only through institutionalizing the category “Muslim”. Yet, the name “Bosnian” alluded to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggested a social cohesion along territorial rather than ethno-religious boundaries. Therefore it was unsuitable for the political project of the Muslim elite.

It was Ćerić’s mission to reformulate this issue in academic discourse, to empower the Muslims with a history and obliterate the Bosnian variant. In his argumentation “Bosnian” nationality had the same assimilatory connotation as Yugoslav identity (Ćerić 1971:8). In addition, the Bosnian national concept would have been a novelty, without any historical roots, while the roots of the Muslim collective identity had already been found in history (Ćerić 1971b: 8). In this respect, the implied logic was almost identical with the ideological frame of self-management: unity and cohesion was to be achieved through the affirmation of the particular as an equal part of the whole (Jović 2003:171). Analogically, Ćerić was arguing that Bosnian cohesion could be realized only through the political and cultural development of all three national groups (Ćerić 1971b:8). Any differing positions, however revealing they might have been, were therefore banned from the public sphere. By supporting Ćerić’s view, the party-controlled media clearly dismissed any alternative interpretations.

## **6. Break up with the Central Committee**

As already shown, the cultural forms of articulation of national identity were rarely discussed in the political sphere. The main topic was the issue of national quota and the assertion of political power on the republican level. It was the task of intellectuals to create a cultural heritage and symbols within the politically constructed frame. After the census in 1971, Ćerić intensified his efforts in articulating a Muslim national identity.

In the introduction, I argued for an actor-oriented approach in the analysis, which would concentrate on the agency of the individual person. Only then is it possible to trace the complexity of the intellectual's but also the politicians' roles and their relationship to "cultural politics" (Boyer 2005: 109). This helps to draw a more dynamic picture of the power relationships and varying degrees of commitment to politically constructed national images. Sometimes personal convictions override the externally or politically defined frame. This was the case with Salim Ćerić. On 26 April, 1971, Ćerić made a presentation under the title "Some Problems Regarding the Protection of the Nations' Future, which Live in their National State or the Forthcoming National Policy in SR Bosnia and Herzegovina".<sup>18</sup> On the basis of the socialist ideological paradigm of national equality, Ćerić first diagnosed a national suppression of Bosnian Muslims and campaigned for equal rights in realising "internal cultural communication,"<sup>19</sup> which would have ensured the existence of their national essence. What Ćerić meant was:

*usage of the language and script, which they perceive as their own [...];*

*the right to get publicly addressed in their language and script [...];*

*the right to cultural manifestations*

*the right to an education in their own language and script with their own schoolbooks in literature, history, ethnology. The nations need their own institutions [...] especially their own Matica (publishing house and cultural institution that existed for Croats and Serbs)<sup>20</sup>*

Although the political act of recognizing the Bosnian Muslims as a nation was a very important progressive step, Ćerić argued that the Muslims were still not equal with their co-nationals since they lacked the instruments for sustaining their national character.<sup>21</sup> Only through those instruments would it be possible to create a cultural community in national terms. The primary tasks would be to valorise the Muslim national heritage, to elaborate on Muslim history as part of the history of the nations of Bosnia and

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<sup>18</sup> ABH - Kabinet predjednika Branko Mikulic "Neki problemi zaštite" (material not registered yet).

<sup>19</sup> ABH - "Neki problemi zaštite", p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> ABH - "Neki problemi zaštite", p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> ABH - "Neki problemi zaštite", p. 16.

Herzegovina, to re-conceptualize schoolbooks literature and to create a flag.<sup>22</sup>

This amounts to what Löfgren has characterized as national-culture building. According to Ćerić, political recognition was just a frame that needed to be filled with cultural content. The main task would be to establish communication networks through which the concept of a national culture would be communicated and proliferated on a nation-wide level. In acknowledging the crucial importance of institutional communication, Ćerić appears to have shared Giesen's view that "it is only through the process of collective action, though the expansion of social networks to meet the requirement of modern institutions, that national identity is created in the first place" (Giesen 1998: 9).

The Commission for inter-ethnic relations on the republican level assembled on 12 July, 1971, to discuss the topic "The Relation between Republic-Nation-Culture".<sup>23</sup> Ahmet Čatić summarized Ćerić's position as follows:

*Some opinions have emerged lately, according to which Muslims are only politically recognized as a nation, but are deprived of any social components of this national character. Those opinions also state that Muslims are left only to the Islamic community and that they experience their national character but are not allowed to express it in an appropriate manner. It is thereby forgotten that political recognition is the precondition for any further emancipation.*<sup>24</sup>

Ahmet Čatić argued that all institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina were national, since they are made up of all three national groups. It would therefore be absurd to create separate Muslim national institutions.<sup>25</sup>

Central Committee member Hasan Grabčanović, accused Ćerić's campaign of being "a banal variant of Austro-Marxist ideology on the national question."<sup>26</sup> In addition, Branko Mikulić concluded that the policy proposed by Ćerić would result in a

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<sup>22</sup> ABH - "Neki problemi zaštite", p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> ABH - Komisija za međunacionalne odnose /Ćerić, the document is not registered yet.. This document has been presented also by Šaćir Filandra, see: Filandra 1998: 316-325, but I will continue to quote the original document.

<sup>24</sup> ABH - "Kosmija za međunacionalne odnose/Ćerić", tape 2, p. 2.

<sup>25</sup> ABH - "Kosmija za međunacionalne odnose/Ćerić", p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> ABH - "Kosmija za međunacionalne odnose/Ćerić", p. 8.

total partition of the nations. Even if it were true that the schoolbooks are not the best, this is the case not only for Bosnian Muslims but for all three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither history, nor culture, nor customs of the three nations have been properly explored, but this does not mean that the republic would break up.

Ćerić did not see any political separatism in his proposal and argued that without cultural institutions Muslims would remain mainly within the religious associations. Atif Purivatra and his colleague Kasim Suljević were present at the meeting. Although being proponents of the national identity of Bosnian Muslims, they did not exceed the politically set limits. None of them supported Ćerić. Instead, they continued to be effective not just as nation-builders but above all as activists of the communist party. Ćerić turned very soon against the party, which resulted in his change from progressive propagator of national identity to nationalist. For the Bosnian Muslims, this meant that they remained without what Löfgren refers to as a nationalized culture (Löfgren 1989: 17). In fact what the anonymous letter diagnosed in terms of marginalization of the Muslims was the lack of nation-building which in the case of the Croatian and Serbian national groups in Bosnia was supported by the neighbouring republics.

Thus, the Bosnian Muslims were only provided with little of that, which Löfgren has listed as the key determinants of a nation (Löfgren 1989: 9). In other words, the political and ideological project of the communist party was left without any cultural symbols serving as the embodiment of the “nation”. The Islamic Community remained the only “national” institution. Although it was of a religious and not secular character, it was the only institution that could assemble the nationally-oriented Muslims. The atheist nationally-oriented Muslims, on the other hand, were left without any institutions of their own. This ambiguity remained unsolved until the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Leaving the acknowledged national identity without an institutional basis in the cultural sphere confirms the assumption that the recognition of the Muslim national category mainly served the purpose of achieving a political integration of the Muslim political elite. In other words, the nationalist project was a top-down process, in which the elite were directing the dynamics of the nation-becoming discourse. The reason for the absence of separate Muslim cultural institutions that would have enabled the

constitution of a national culture merits further analysis. For some politicians it might have been an unnecessary task. A second explanation would be that in Bosnia and Herzegovina cultural institutions were supposed to be common for all three nations. However, Serbs and Croats could at least indirectly rely on the *matice* in Zagreb and Belgrade, while the Islamic Community was the only *Muslim* cultural institution. It was not until the 1990s, and then Bosnian Muslims adopted the national denomination *Bosniaks*, that a range of national institutions were established.

### **7. Long-Distance Nationalism: Concepts from the Diaspora**

In recent research on American nation-state building it has shown that in order to grasp a nation-building process, one has to exceed the limits of the nation's state, since it has been a result of an inter-national project (see Tyrell 2007). Within the historiography's paradigm of global dimensions a whole trans-national agency and agents' interrelatedness beyond the state borders has been possible to trace. By broadening the geographical horizon of the analysis, a very similar phenomenon also in our case study. Until now, the here proposed concept of a long-distance nationalism has been given not enough attention for the analysed period is the nationalist project. Although lacking analysis in depth, it is necessary to integrate it as a part of the narratives' pluralism and the embodiment of the nation-ness even within the set borders.

On the political periphery and detracted from Central Committee's control alternative national narratives emerged with alternative constituencies of the Muslim peoples from Bosnia. Interestingly, at approximately the same time as the Communist political rationality started to explore the nationalist concept, a "Bosniak" articulation of national culture appeared within the gatherings of the émigrés. The forms, in which this nationalist concept publicly emerged ranged from short declarative articles, texts published in academic journals to elaborate monographs.

Politically, the Bosniak national idea was organized around the so-called Liberal Democratic Alliance of Bosniaks Muslims, headed by Adil Zulfikarpašić. Tracing its roots to the political party JMO, the Liberal Democratic Alliance identified the political representation of the Bosnian Muslim population as their main task. Despite being an

ethnically inspired representative, its political orientation was however associated with the liberal and democratic trend. Regarding the national identity, its main task was to affirm the Bosniak national identity (Dervišević 1964: 1-2). The proliferation of its ideas and national was mediated but the journal “Bosanski pogledi” (Bosnian views), which were published in the period between 1960 and 1968 under the heading of Adil Zulfikarpašić. In its subtitle as “The independent journal of émigré Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina” it already revealed which audience was to be addressed. Behind the keywords “émigré” and “Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina” were the meanings of home and belonging. Bosanski pogledi were mainly a political magazine informing about the association’s activities. In regard to “Bosanski pogledi” content (Imamović 1996) its political nature was explicitly anti-communist whereby the thematic scope was clearly inspired by the communist policy in Yugoslavia. Being produced on a very low quality and amateur level, the magazine served several function: apologetic self-portraying of its founder Adil Zulfikarpašić, informing on the emigres’ activities, which often were reaction to the inner Yugoslav policy making, depicting topics related to Islam not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in the whole world, considering national identity of Muslim population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ironically enough, what the Bosnian Muslims were missing in Bosnia, a medium of communication and a synthesis on cultural content, was provided outside its borders. A nation-building process was taking place on the margins outside the space of the national recognition policy.

The simultaneous appearance of national perspectives on Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks, was certainly not an accidental case of paralleling. A closer look at it illuminates, however that the temporal dimension was probably the only commonness between the communist national policy and the externally elaborated national concept.

*For us Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniak identity is more than a feeling of regional belonging, more than just a geographical term, more than a historical-cultural subjectivity, although it entail all those elements. The Bosniak identity is our only and true national identification.*<sup>27</sup>

This statement was pronounced exactly the same year when the Yugoslav

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<sup>27</sup> Bosanski Pregledi, sept-okt 1963, broj 28-29, p. 1.

constitution accredited Muslims as an ethnic group in Yugoslavia. In all its ambiguity, the passage mirrors the characteristic interruptive interiority of the group-entity. Besides the identification pattern with “Muslims from Bosnia” as it was officially acknowledged in Yugoslavia, the text coming from outside Yugoslavia proposed another national identification pattern located within the Bosniak category. Nonetheless, it was first and foremost cultural identification with the Bosnian Muslims, which obviously exceeded the national borders that determined the identity also outside Yugoslavia living people. For, given the fact that the people living in the Diaspora first was perceiving themselves as the immanent subjects and objects of the proposed range of Bosnian Muslim narratives, only after employing this identity draft could reformulation in the name of a Bosniak alternative be proposed.

Thus, the borders of the imagined community spanned even to the point of special edges and margins, clearly across the border of the nationalist project (in Yugoslavia). Not only pluralism of national narratives but also of national places is attested (Bhabha 1994: 295). Obviously a disjunction between the politically inspired national narration and the representative forms appearing on the margins of the political dictum was at stake (Bhabha 1994: 291). Thus, at the same time the Communist policy was institutionalizing a Muslim ethnic (and later also national) category the émigrés proposed another concept of a Bosniak nation. However, the difference in the nomenclature was not at random. The alterity of the national narration revealed also the alterity of the political rationality in regard to the same national category. In the case of Yugoslavia the radius of the Muslim category was imagined on the Yugoslav-wide level. Although the Bosnian Communists were especially after 1968 proposing a republican-wide national status for the Muslims, under the premise of national equality with Croats and Serbs in Bosnia, the census in 1971 prevailed the Yugoslav variant. The nebulosity about the definition of the nation’s space (or territory) was always present also in the intellectual disputes, as already shown. In Ćerić’s book the historical content of Bosnian Muslims was given only under the title of a history of all Serb-Croatian speaking Muslims. The limitation to the Muslim population in Bosnia emerged only implicitly, as a subliminal discourse practice.

In contrast, under Bosniak nationalist thought not only new forms of cultural identity were presented but also an explicit Bosnian political solidarity. Consequently, the aspect

of territory, i. e. Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged as the main locus of the group's subjectivity. The narration was similar to Ćerić's one. Historically it drew the old age of the nation back to the medieval times. The group's identity was identified in the already mentioned Bogumils as the ancestors of the Bosniaks. However, according to the narrative logic the homogenizing criterion of the groups' experience under the name "Bosniak" was instead of the dogmatic relatedness with Islam (as was claimed in the narrative on Muslims) but the continuous struggle for Bosnia's political freedom and autonomy. As Adil Zulfikarpašić eagerly states:

*[...] This struggle for Bosnia's autonomy, the struggle for freedom of mind, freedom of religion was going on for centuries and formed the character and attitude of the Bogumil-Bosniaks to that extent that it became their main characteristic. (Zulfikarpašić 1963: 1-2).*

The only patriots were in this tale the Bogumils and Bosniaks, only them were endowed with the conscientiousness to defend their *patria*. Croats and Serbs, in contrast, were devoid of this feeling of connectedness to their country. Being equated with the Vatican and the Byzantine "powers" i. e. the assaulter of Bosnia this country could not be theirs. The past did not provide them with the legitimacy to assure any national claims. Moreover, in their image as a colony of Vatican and Byzantine they embodied a foreign and negative element. And lacking the account for any brave qualities like autonomy and fortitude, which had the Bosniaks their political status could only be that of a minority, their cultural heritage being external to Bosnia's history. Analogically, Bosnia was the state of the Bosniaks.

*[...] The Bogumils were the only constitutive element and the defenders of the state, while the religious minorities were just a kind of a colony of Vatican and the Byzantine, or Hungary. (Zulfikarpašić 1963:2).*

A more academically elaborated history of this model of nation was provided by Muhamed Hadžijahić, in an article, which was published in the *Südost-Forschungen* in 1962 (Hadžijahić 1962: 168-193). Resembling the reasoning of Zulfikarpašić, Hadžijahić's writing was marked by two national identity foci of the Bosniaks, language and the territory (state Bosnia and Herzegovina). By tracing the name Bosniak back to

the medieval times, which meant to be the classical age of the Bosniak nation the Bosniak national idea was not to be associated any more with the Austro-Hungarian regime and Kallay from the 19<sup>th</sup> century but with Bosnia as the its centrality. In addition, Hadzijahic applied the comparative method through which he set the nation-formation process in Bosnia next to those in Croatia and Serbia. One has to bear in mind, that Croatia and Serbia were politically identified with one constitutive nation. In his claim of an identical past with Serbia and Croatia he actually proposed a nation-state model also for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Not surprisingly, Hadzijahic's article immediately occupied space in "Bosanski pogledi", which praised the piece of work as an outstanding intellectual achievement.<sup>28</sup> This implies again an inter-national connectedness also within the diaspora nationalists. However, for Hadzijahic, this was not a hindrance to make friends also on the other side of the river. Ironically enough, the same author emerged twelve years later as one of the main national narration creator in Yugoslavia. His work "Od tradicije do identita", in this case acting on Bosnian Muslims rather than Bosniaks, emerged as the intellectual confirmation of the constitution 1974 (Hadžijahić 1974).

The missing component of a cultural national phenomenology in the communist historiography appeared only one year before the constitution, in 1973, in Vienna, Austria (Balić 1973). Under the title "The Culture of Bosniaks. The Muslim component" the author Smail Balić, who lived and worked in Austria at that time, focused thereby on the linguistic aspect of the Bosniak national culture. He called the language of the Bosniak, the Bosniak language and underlined the argument with the traditional naming that got preserved among the Bosniak population. Although Balić adopted Hadijzahic's historical dating, which started with the Bogumils in medieval Bosnia, his analysis of the national culture begins with the Ottoman period. The cultural components were subdivided into two main sections: the spiritual and the material one. Within the first Balić analyzed the lyrics, prosa, oral traditions and the so-called alhamijado literature, which was in Bosnian language but written in Arabic script. The material component entailed mainly architecture and plastic arts.

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<sup>28</sup> Bosanski pogledi jan-feb 1964, pp. 5-6.

Not surprisingly, it was again Adil Zulfikarpašić, whose name gained central positions in the foreword as one of the main donor who enabled the publishing of this book.

## **8. Conclusion**

In WP 2 I have looked at the discussions on national policy within the communist party, which were mainly framed by discursive practices with keywords like republican affirmation, national equivalence, and affirmation of the underdeveloped regions, phrased in a Marxist-Leninist ideological vocabulary. The cultural image of nationhood, its history and narration, however was left to the intellectuals. Consequently, intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina were engaged in a process of a national identity construction. With a focus on individual agency, I have tried to show the role of intellectuals in the creation, circulation, and contestation of national culture and to capture the variety of intellectual work involved in nation-building. It seems that personal conviction and biographical background played a crucial role in the production of historiography.

The definition of Muslim distinctiveness was strongly related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to a history of non-Serbian and -non-Croatian identification. The fact that the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina did not assimilate into Serbs or Croats was a crucial argument behind the proposal for Muslim national recognition. Moreover, given the socialist environment, it was necessary to find a continuity in the position vis-à-vis the Muslims on the side of the ruling Communist Party. This was done by Atif Purivatra, who focused mainly on the CPY's attitudes towards the Muslims during World War II and tried to depict a uniform image of the Party's policy. I have tried to show that parallel to the writing of a Muslim national history, a history of Bosnia and Herzegovina had also to be conceptualized. By constructing a continuous territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by relating Bosnia's autonomy to the political efforts of Muslim political leaders, the republican affirmation was strongly associated with the Muslim nation

The case of Salim Ćerić has been very illuminating, since it shows that the institutionalization of the Muslim national category was, in fact, a political act without

any distinctive Muslim institutionally informed nation building in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For various reasons, the national proclamation was not followed by the creation of separate Muslim secular institutions which might have supported the process of nation-building. While Serbs and Croats had "their" academies of sciences and cultural foundations in Belgrade and Zagreb, the only Muslim analogy was, in fact, the Islamic Religious Community, which after 1968 changed its name into the Islamic Community. It is a task for further research to investigate to what extent the constitution of a Muslim nation had an impact on the social reality of every day life, and to what extent it affected the position of the Islamic Community changed after 1968.

By looking on the international dimension of the national narrative construction a picture of an interruptive interiority of the national narrative (which was present even within the Communist space) emerges. At the same time two differing forms of "national" history emerged on different places and under different ideological dictates. In their divergence of the nation's name, in the divergence of their trajectories and rhythms they contained also the possibility of a different imagining of the nation-hood. With the writing of two different histories of the "nation" two different state forms were actually at stake. Both histories were working under the premise of historical origin as a criterion for inclusion or exclusion. Nonetheless, although in the communist historiography the (Bosnian) Muslim entity was essentialized through the myth of medieval Bogumils, by locating their distinctiveness in the religious/confessional rather than territorial Bosnian aspect, they were meant to constitute one part of the multi-confessional Bosnia's history giving space of national perspective also to Serbs and Croats. The medieval Bogumils differed only in religion with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, while all three were possessing Bosnia as their commonness.

In contrast, the Bosniak concept considered the state as the centrality in the life of its national being. By identifying the Bogumils only with Bosnia the element of their distinctiveness was exclusory for Croats and Serbs, which according to this logic could only identify with Croatia and Serbia (in this case they were identified with Vatican and Byzantine). Being delineated as the majority and the only constitutive part in the country, all other groups, i. e. Serbs and Croats were to accept the policy of the Bosniak. What was at stake was simply the claim for a majoritarian nation-state as it was characteristic

in the Capitalist and Western part of Europe, which in fact gave the geographical frame of this thought and enabled it to be publicly proclaimed. Moreover, the application of terms like minority versus majority, or making language and territory the nation's main characteristic pressed analogically the pervasive Western model to the Bosnian case.

Interestingly, the communist prognosis of Bosniak national identity being the embodiment of the Muslim dominance over Serbs and Croats, actually was right. Thus, while the Muslim category and its proposed past as a source of national legitimacy was simultaneously internalizing the ideological thinking of a history of common ground with Serbs and Croats from Bosnia, thus balancing between particularity and commonality, the Bosniak historical discourse was producing the ideology of a nation-state model. In other words, at stake was a symbolically and culturally informed negotiation of political power through the turning of boundaries and limits.

The other point of difference was in regard to the cultural content. In the restricted nation-building policy of the Central Committee, the institutionalized Muslim category remained after all an empty costume lacking its cultural ingredients. This lack was then compensated in the Bosniak variant.

Although the diaspora provided a national concept including also the articulation of national cultural signs that were, as Ćerić diagnosed, missing in the communist proposed Bosnian Muslim variant, the Bosniak concept did not gain much attractiveness among the Muslim population living in Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time. Of course, the Bosniak concept, being condemned by the Communists, was also abandoned from any public representation. But if we take into consideration the already ongoing opening of Yugoslavia's borders for emigration of guest worker to Western countries during the late 60s and 70s, the idea definitely could not have remained incognito to the people. Still, in the party's documents no such underground organizations in the name of the Bosniak nation were registered, neither did the Central Committee ever consider any danger coming from the Diaspora. No intervention were made, which made it possible the double narrative movement exist next to each other, being meant to represent the same group of Bosnian population, however with two opposing concepts of nation-hood. This was until the 1990s, when the idea of the edge of Yugoslavia turned to become the

centre of then already independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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