Midterm Report
# To Volkswagen Foundation

October 2004

Responsible for the Report:
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Introduction

This midterm report summarises the preliminary research results of the comparative, cross-societal research project *Accounting for State-building, Stability and Violent Conflict* and aims to present certain key findings from the work in progress. It also provides an overview of the practical organisation of the project and an account of how the project will be administered as of October 2004.

The project is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and hosted by the Institute of East European Studies in cooperation with the Institute of Social Anthropology at Freie Universität Berlin. The ongoing empirical research focuses on (1) the conditions for successful / failed defusion of potentially violent conflict in Caucasian and Central Asian societies. The analysis is placed (2) within the context of state building processes. [1]

Methodologically, we rely on a multidisciplinary approach, combining political science, social anthropology and contemporary social history.

The interface between these disciplines and the key unit of analysis is the institutional framework of the successor states of the Soviet Union. Focusing on the institutional framework allows us to depict and understand the incentive structures of local actors engaged in organising or defusing violence. This approach also allows us to understand the micropolitics of local conflicts and to place it in the wider context of successful or failed state building. Regionally, the project focuses on the nineteen successor polities that emerged in the Caucasus and in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From this sample, extensive fieldwork is being conducted in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkessia by six research fellows[2] in cooperation with local experts and research institutions.

How to read this report:

The first part of the report identifies the point of departure of this research project. The second part provides an overview of the implementation of the project. Thirdly, we discuss the preliminary results of the fieldwork, including those that contradict or confirm our initial hypothesis. In the fourth part we explain the impact that the results of the research have on the organisation of the remaining eighteen months of the project. Lastly we provide information on administrative issues, such as financial status, unexpected changes and organisational problems we are facing. Additional information, graphs and documents of relevancy are collected in the annex to this report.

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[1] For further information on the research project see Hhttp://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/csccaH
[2] Cf. the field-reports of Alexey Gunya, Scott Radnitz, Bahodir Sidikov, Azamat Temirkoulov, Jonathan Wheatley and Gunda Wiegmann in the annex to this report.

Part I: Objectives, research issues and anticipated results from the outset and as stated in the original research design

The collapse of the Soviet empire posed a formidable challenge for the successor polities in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The centrally administered Soviet society has fragmented into multiple societies, which have to (re-) build state administrations, (re-) draw boundaries, and (re-) invent loyalties. Since the fall of the empire, these societies have had to establish new institutional arrangements for self-regulation in order to ensure security, political participation, economic development and inter-group stability. These institutions have to be inscribed into a political space, the boundaries of which are often weakly defined and contested. Furthermore, ready-made historical templates are not available, since all the Caucasian and Central Asian societies are latecomers and have not experienced significant periods of independent statehood.

All the Caucasian and Central Asian societies of the collapsed empire have faced this challenge. Not all societies, however, have managed to find a non-violent solution. Those administrative units of the collapsing empire which have a multi-ethnic population have faced particular problems: here, the ambitions and fears of two or more ethnic groups have to be addressed, separatist tendencies have to be avoided, growing antagonism along ethnic (or else religious-ideological) lines need to be defused and attempts by ethnic entrepreneurs to conquer the state by using ethnicity as a resource of mobilisation have to be blocked.

Some of these post-socialist societies have successfully managed these tasks and have avoided violence. Others have succeeded in polity building, but only at the price of conflict and violence. And some of the new countries came close to complete failure – they lost the semblance of statehood and internal violence became endemic.

The point of departure for the project is consequently to identify what conditions facilitate certain new orders. What actors, procedures and institutions are necessary to foster non-violent intra- and inter-group relations, particularly in dealing with conflicts? How does conflict interact with institutional change in terms of the innovation, adaptation or breakdown of institutional arrangements? What combination of factors does it take to build or lose the state as the principle rule-setting agency? Are there alternative institutional arrangements for the provision of local governance as the facilitator of non-violent and stable relations between and within groups?

Interdependency between conflict-prone social, political, economic conditions and violent/non violent conflict processing

Conflict is a normal state of affairs in most societies. Usually, conflicts are processed according to the formal and informal institutions that society has in place to deal with conflict. Our interest is focused on those institutions that either manage or aggravate conflict, and on the flow of resources relevant for the functionality and sustainability of these institutions.

Thus, it is not conflict per se that should be the primary focus of analysis in understanding the dynamics of emerging statehood but instead, whether conflict is prone to violent escalation, and whether conflict leads to (non-violent) disruption in inter-group co-ordination because the groups involved choose to withdraw.

| Independent Variable
Sources of Conflict | Intervening Variable
Institutional Setting | Dependent Variable
Outcome / Dynamics |

values

status

resources

Formal Institutions

Informal Institutions

Static Stability, avoiding conflict

Dynamic stability

Instability Violent escalation of conflict

Feedback

Hybrid institutional arrangements (official, informal, customary, Soviet heritage) matter

Institutions are accepted, trained and sometimes enforced patterns of interaction, which can frame conflicts. Conflict potentials can thus be defused by institutions. The breakdown of an institutional framework may enable already present risk factors to translate into violent conflict. The breakdown of an accepted institutional framework that has hitherto kept risk factors in check by providing reliable conflict regulation may be called the social dis-embedding of conflict.

The institutional framework provides the incentive structure for local actors and thus informs their strategic action. Institutions can therefore not only defuse violence, but they can also produce violence if the incentive structure encourages certain forms of violent action.

Furthermore, institutions are linked to conflict in that they have distributional effects. They determine the access to resources that are crucial for organizing violence and determine the relative position of actors.

The institutional arrangement of a society produces incentive structures for actors, defines the windows of opportunity for political entrepreneurs and establishes the constraints in which actors are locked.

We argue that the institutional framework of societies in the Caucasus and Central Asia today consists of the still relevant legacy of official and informal Soviet institutions as well as new institutions or significantly adapted institutions that developed in response to conflict and challenges after the meltdown of the Soviet state.

The breakdown of the Soviet Union put tremendous pressure on existing institutional arrangements. It was accompanied by both external and internal pressure for reforms aimed at establishing the rule of law, democratic procedures, a market economy and a legal framework enabling the organisation of a civil society. Where conflict escalated into civil war, the adaptive capacities of those arrangements were tested to the utmost, at times beyond breaking point. In Tajikistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan and to some extent in Armenia the experimental democratization ushered in by perestroika and the more radical attempts at institutional reforms by the national movements in these countries were followed by periods of sustained violent conflict. The experience of civil war put into question the effectiveness and legitimacy of both established Soviet institutions and Western role-models for governance and conflict control. The institutional arrangements that emerged against the backdrop of those periods of collective violence organised by non-state or would-be-state actors provided the basis for the relative regime stability achieved over the past five to ten years. This stability is characterised by institutional arrangements that merge the functions of official (Western-modelled) state institutions with informal techniques of governance that were either inherited from the Soviet Union or were established during the time of violent entrepreneurship.

In consequence, state-society relations in Central Asia and the Caucasus today are neither a complete innovation established from scratch, nor are they sufficiently explained by the Soviet (formal and informal) institutional legacy, even if they still resemble these in form and bear the same name-tags. The fragile stability achieved is a function of hybrid institutions that adapted in different ways to the opportunities and challenges encountered during the past fifteen years.

State-building and conflict processing from the local point of view

While most conflict monitoring and early warning systems target the international and national level and rely on macro-indicators for analysis and prognosis of conflict potentials, this research focuses on conflicts taking place at the community level or – if larger in scale – impacting on the local level. There are two reasons for this choice of perspective.

First, the presence of macro-risk factors does not inform us about how communities actually cope with those risks. Escalation of violence or non-violent conflict processing depends to a significant extent on the institutional capacities of society to deal with stress and risks on the ground.

Second, the capacities of local society to come to terms with conflict either as daily routine or as an extraordinary event is a *terra incognita* for national and international decision makers and service providers based in the centres of the Newly Independent States. This is why any systematic peace and conflict assessment that is of practical value to agencies interested in fostering state formation and non-violent, stable social relations has to take into account the local perspective, working bottom-up rather than top-down.

The methods applied for analysing conflict processing within the context of state-building focus on qualitative data and require prolonged fieldwork. There are a number of reasons for choosing this methodological approach.

One reason relates to the fact that the way communities deal with and talk about conflict is usually a sensitive issue. It is often concealed behind normative facades that reflect how the interlocutor imagines things should be rather than

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how they really are. Trust-building with key informants, cross-checking information and participant observation of social practice help to differentiate norm from deed.

Not only is normative (mis-) representation a problem when trying to analyse the social practice of conflict, but the perception people have of conflict cannot be taken at face value for analytical purposes. This is not to say that the local perceptions are wrong and the outside perception is right or that perceptions of conflict are not important for conflict analysis. All the same, perception of a social process (like conflict) should not be confused with the process itself. Perceptions can be assessed in questionnaires; the politics of conflict – i.e. the unwritten rules, constraints and tricks according to which actors "do" conflict – can only be grasped by qualitative in-depth research.

While qualitative and participatory methods are useful for accessing local knowledge, the research team has had to be aware that the local population may be ignorant to the significance of the daily routine that they consider self-evident. Teaming up informed outsiders with methodologically trained local researchers significantly reduces this risk of *missing the obvious*.

Quantitative surveys can also be used to test hypotheses or gather additional information after measurable indicators for relevant social processes have been identified in the fieldwork.

Part II: Teaching, research methods and proceedings

In this section we provide an overview of the practical implementation of the research project (see the chart provided as annex to the hardcopy of this report for an overview).

Phase I - April-August 2003: Theoretical background; research proposal development; preparation and training of empirical research methods

During the initial six months of the project the organisers focused on developing crosscutting research issues with the team, on teaching and training heuristic and empirical research methods and on advancing the individual research agendas of the team members. Regular teaching included a weekly seminar on the heuristics of conflict research in the former Soviet Union, a weekly workshop on empirical research methodology, biweekly meetings between the team leaders CZ and JK with the researchers individually in order to discuss and advance their project proposals, and a University lecture on the impact and prospects of intervention in conflicts.

Despite the fact that this preoperational period was intense and team cooperation good, the time-frame could have been extended. Owing to the interdisciplinary character of the research project, as well as differences in the level of academic and empirical research experience, the research agenda of some team members had to be adapted or changed significantly and methodological training stressed.

Contracts with cooperation partners in Georgia and in Azerbaijan

During the first phase, project cooperation contracts were concluded with two research institutions – ICCN in Georgia and the Institute for Peace and Democracy in Azerbaijan. These institutions provided effective logistical assistance and intellectual backing to the project during the course of the fieldwork conducted in those countries (Sidikov and Wheatley). Thus far the project has included no further permanent cooperation agreements. We found individual case by case research assignments to local researchers or research institutions better fitted in places where either no adequate partner organisation could be identified (Tajikistan) or cooperation would have been too expensive.

The bulk of the funds for cooperation and local research assistance we decided to use for back-up and follow-up surveys informed by the extensive qualitative research conducted by the core group of the project.

Berlin/LPG Klasdorf Workshop on empirical methods and shared research agenda; crosscutting issues (21.07.-31.07.03)

From 21 July to 1 August the team held its concluding workshop for the preparation phase of the project. The first five days the team spent in Berlin, focussing on research methods to be applied in the fieldwork ahead and on the finalisation of a common research framework (crosscutting issues, see annex p. 7). The second week the team went to the former LPG Klasdorf in Brandenburg in order to apply the methods that had been learned in a context that related to the forthcoming fieldwork. The task was to gain an understanding of informal institutions, conflict processes

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and the role of the state in a former State Collective Farm of the GDR after ten years of transition to a market-based system.

During this training the consensual decision was that Bahodir Sidikov would split his fieldwork between the planned research in Uzbekistan and a similar research agenda for Azerbaijan; the risk of doing fieldwork only in a surrounding that appears familiar was thus minimised.

Phase II – August/September 2003 to August/September 2004: main fieldwork

All researchers were obliged to conduct fieldwork for an uninterrupted period of between 10 and 14 months. By September 2003 all members of the research group had departed to their locations of fieldwork.[3]

Autumn 2003: Working visits to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan by team leaders; field-visits AT, GW, SR, BS

From August to November 2003 the team leaders CZ and JK spent a total of 12 weeks in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for implementation visits and initial fieldwork support, particularly for the junior researchers in the team. The travel included a two week trip to Afghan Badakhshan by JK to establish contacts and check on the possibility of extending the project's scope to this border region of Afghanistan.

During this initial period of fieldwork the team leaders established contact with local and international development organisations and reached cooperation and support agreements with them. For the initial fieldwork this institutional embedding proved to be of benefit for three of the field researchers (Temirkoulov, Wiegmann, Wheatley).
Outcome: three reports to GTZ on conflict and peace potentials at community level in the region.

17-23 January 2004: Workshop Bishkek

The progress reports of the team members revealed a marked difference between the senior researchers and the PhD students in the team. As was to be expected during the first phase of the fieldwork it was not always possible to stay true to the initially anticipated research focus. Particularly the ill-defined and fuzzy but widely used terms like "clan", "mahalla" or "aksakal" proved to be useless as analytical terms and required more empirical scrutiny.
The main results of the Bishkek working week was that a clearer understanding was achieved of **modes of local governance** and the **core functions of statehood**. With regard to reliable conflict processing, the role of **procedure, monitoring** and **sanction** was highlighted. As an issue of special interest **social embedding and dis-embedding** of conflict processing was discussed. Viewed in the context of modes of local governance a draft questionnaire, produced by the Georgia team, was refined. The aim of the questionnaire was to account for the embeddedness of local modes of governance in different regions of Georgia.

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[3] For more detailed accounts of the organisation of fieldwork by the individual team members see annex pp. 8-34

14-23 May 2004: Workshop Baku

The working week in Baku first and foremost advanced our comparative perspective on constellations involving formal and informal institutions that "stabilise" local modes of governance and central steering capacities via the state. We also dropped the term "stability" and substituted it with (institutional) continuity and the capacity to reproduce certain orders. Hence, our main focus was on empirical evidence of hybrid institutional arrangements that are relevant for the continuity of some core functions of statehood and reproduction of (local) modes of governance. Analytically, the question of functional redundancy or competition between institutional arrangements was further developed.

During the workshop it became evident that the decision to encourage team members not only to work in settings that they thought they knew already had paid off. On the other hand, the difficulties of one team member who insisted on focussing on his own country of origin mounted and it proved increasingly difficult to integrate the research results of this team member into the common framework. The team leaders therefore decided to prescribe a specific research agenda, time plan and focussed research questions to Temirkoulov's fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan.

June-September 2004: Publication of 1st work-in-progress report on preliminary results and return of team from fieldwork

- The first results of the project were prepared for publication during the summer (for further project related outputs see below):
- Koehler, Jan and Zürcher, Christoph (2004), 'Conflict and the state of the state in the Caucasus and Central Asia: an empirical research challenge', Berliner Osteuropa Info, 57-67.
- With contributions of each team member on her/his fieldwork
- Gunya, Alexej (2004), 'Severnyi Kavkaz: raspredelenie resursov i vlasti na lokal'nom i regionalnom urovnyakh', Berliner Osteuropa Info: 21, 83-88.
- Radnitz, Scott (2004), 'Understanding and Withstanding the 'Stans'', Berliner Osteuropa Info: 21, 101-103.
- Sidikov, Bahodir (2004), 'New or Traditional? 'Clans', Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan', Berliner Osteuropa Info, 68-73.
- Temirkoulov, Azamat (2004), 'Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic', Berliner Osteuropa Info: 21, 94-100.
- Wheatley, Jonathan (2004), 'Elections and Democratic Governance in the Former Soviet Union: the Case of Georgia', Berliner Osteuropa Info: 21, 75-82.
- Wiegmann, Gunda (2004), 'Local Political Structures and a Reflection on Field Research in Tajikistan', Berliner Osteuropa Info: 21, 89-93.

Third Phase – October 2004 to October 2005: Refining and writing up the results

The third phase of the project is in the final planning stage. From 14 to 17 October we will conduct a workshop aimed at integrating the research

agenda for the remaining 16 to 18 months of the project. The main issues on the agenda are (a) required framework data; (b) functions and functional equivalents of hybrid statehood; (c) modes of local governance; (d) institutional arrangements that matter most; and (e) relevant modes of conflict processing that matter for continuity, change and potential violent breakdown.

Until spring 2005 the project will be structured around biweekly working meetings on shared points of interest that are to be agreed upon during the "integrating workshop". These meetings will be organised among team members in turn.

By March 2005 requirements for follow-up studies and additional research needs by partners in the target regions will be defined and adequate methodological approaches designed to gather the required information effectively. The follow-ups will be implemented in late spring and early summer 2005.

Also, by March 2005 the preparation of the fieldwork in Afghan Badakhshan will be concluded. Focussed empirical research in Afghan Badakhshan will be carried out in the spring and summer 2005.

The final six months of 2005 and first two months of 2006 will be used exclusively for writing up the empirical results (book to be finished by October 2005) and extracting theoretical conclusions (book to be finished by February 2006).

Part III: Findings from the field and impact on theoretical focus of the project

State in process: statehood and governance

In general terms, statehood may be identified by four crucial organisational capacities: the capacity to exercise central authority of some kind; the capacity to provide immaterial public goods (of which security is the most important one); the capacity to provide material goods (such as public infrastructure or health care) and the capacity to regulate conflict by providing access to conflict processing institutions. But who provides these output functions of statehood? The Weberian inspired scholar would surely not hesitate to expect these to be the core function of state, brought to citizens by acting or enabling government via a bureaucratic state apparatus. However, the scholar that is located somewhere on the ground in the Caucasus or in Central Asia waiting for the state to drive by – a state spotter, so to speak – may find that statehood happens, but by no means only as an output of the state bureaucracy. What really happens is that these outputs are provided by a locally specific cocktail of state and non–state actors via formal and informal institutions. When these output functions are not provided or facilitated exclusively or predominantly by a state apparatus but by alternative institutions, competing, bypassing or cooperating with official state institutions, we speak of modes of governance rather than of government.

Detecting **selective provision of statehood** by state agencies to relevant corporate groups on the one hand, and **functional equivalents to statehood** provided by various agencies on the other, moves to the fore of analysis.

Although it is beyond the scope of this research to provide a comprehensive model of state building in the Caucasus and Central Asia, four issues of relevance have emerged from the research to date.

The first is the amazing variety and selectivity in which state-building manifests itself: A key aspect of statehood, namely centralised control via an apparatus of coercion, is in place in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan but is provided according to an institutional logic that is not reflected in the formal constitution of the state. A system of effective parallel governance has been established within the state apparatus that provides a comparatively high degree of top-down control while pumping resources bottom-up into the grey coffers from which the parallel system is financed. The state in Tajikistan has consolidated an internal monopoly of military force, but has outsourced external military protection and control of the borders to Russia. Central control in Tajikistan is established in resource rich regions via vertical networks of presidential patronage, utilising the official state apparatus to govern according to the needs of the network (distribution of administrative posts for the provision of goods and services within the network). In resource poor regions that are of no interest to the patrons of the network state, local governance is provided not by a state administration but by substitute institutions such as internationally financed and organised NGOs. The Georgian state, at least until of late, has completely surrendered to networks of patronage, but it is still the state apparatus that is used for manipulating the clients. External military protection is virtually non-existent, whereas the internal apparatus of coercion, the police, is extremely large – but mainly but is mainly financed from informal sources rather than by the state. Compared to the

problems facing Georgia or Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan can be described as a functioning state with significant organisational deficits. Until recently it was widely considered a show case democracy among more or less authoritarian regimes in the rest of Central Asia. While endemic corruption and a worsening human rights record, particularly with regard to the treatment meted out to sections of the political opposition, have tarnished this image of late, the state is stable and unchallenged. In contrast to Uzbekistan or Azerbaijan, the parliament is the principle institution of political conflict, though not between political parties but between politicised regional strategic groups ("clans" in local popular discourse) dressed up as parties. Recent reforms in the law on elections and the first empirical evidence on modes of governance in rural provinces suggest that "clan democracy" is further on the rise.

Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that state capacities are weak in all these polities, the state still matters more than we had assumed initially. Even where core functions are outsourced, it is the state that enables or blocks alternative modes of governance.[4] The state, far from being a unitary actor or a consolidated institution, has re-emerged as the dominant theatre for competition over power, access to resources and prestige. This observation appears to hold even for places diagnosed by some analysts as suffering from near complete state-failure, like Tajikistan and until recently Georgia.

Thirdly, we find that in the process of state building the borders between the state and society, between the formal and the informal and between the public and the private are constantly contested, blurred and generally in flux.[5] A Weberian style ideal type conception of the modern state (i.e. centralised coercive authority on a defined state territory monitoring and enforcing a monopoly of violence, a monopoly of setting the law, and a monopoly of collecting taxes in return for the provision of public goods) appears to be not flexible enough to capture the various extents to which statehood may be institutionalised.

The official representation of the state, as envisaged in constitutions, books of law, images, myths, uniforms, procedures, name tags and other artefacts of state self-representation, generally follows the ideal type model of the modern (European) state. It may be even safe to say that the pressure for homogenisation of the state's self-representation has never in history been stronger than in today's globalizing world. However, seeing the "state" (that is, its self-representation) does not mean that we see statehood at work. In order to gain insight into the institutional strength or weakness of the 'state in practice' one has to turn analytical scrutiny to the blurred state-society divide. In other words one has to empirically assess the social fields in which governance – by state or alternative institutions – actually takes place. Within such a perspective, it is no longer "state building" that is really the issue, but rather "making statehood work, somehow".

Fourthly, we found that the modes of local governance have a decisive impact on the conflict processing capacities of society.

With regard to conflict processing, "ideal" governance would provide or facilitate provision of:

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[4] In particular the fieldwork in Tajikistan backs this assumption.

[5] This observation is central to all field studies and rich empirical evidence for dynamic processes of institution building and institutional decline on the state-society divide has been produced.

- negotiated agreements between conflicting parties or binding solutions to conflicts arrived at by specialised institutions, according to accepted procedures;
- formalisation of the agreements and decisions into binding contracts;
- implementation of the agreements and decisions;
- monitoring so that parties stick to the contract and 'play by the rules';
- a credible sanction mechanism against foul play and parties breaking the rules;

Local governance refers to the way political and economic power is organised at the local level and how this organisation of power affects society. Hybrid arrangements between official local government, official state and non-state bodies of self-government and informal power holders are found to have a strong impact on the occurrence and processing of conflicts in most regions covered by the project. Particularly in the regions marked by weak central state control, these modes of local governance are paramount in determining the prospects for conflict transformation.

Local governance – good or bad – is always exercised by a multitude of actors such as local government, local self-government, informal power holders, civil society and international organisations. Therefore, not all of the above mentioned tasks have to or, indeed, should be provided by local government (official state bodies).

Provision of negotiations, procedures and monitoring of agreements can often be effectively done by civil society itself. On the other hand, formalisation of agreements and sanctioning of rule breaking is often done more efficiently by the state. Of crucial importance is that, whatever the case, this division of labour between state agencies, civil society or international organisations is carried out according to the rules. From the perspective of functional Weberian statehood it must remain the prerogative of the state to set these rules.

Framework conditions for local modes of governance: the political economy of hybrid statehood (modes of control; modes of financing; flow of resources)

Zooming in on the way governance is taking place locally places the research within the wider framework of state-building. Even in states with weak central government, local arrangements do not take place in a vacuum, their autonomy is often borrowed from the central state and depends on the actual political economy in place (rather than the market economy existing on paper and in national or World Bank statistics).

Three types of economic activity should be differentiated in terms of their relation to the conflict and peace capacities of local communities in the target region of the research project. Firstly, there is the **official economy**, state sanctioned, law abiding, and tax paying. In the target regions of the project this economy is marginal (e.g. Georgia, Tajikistan) to non-existent (Afghanistan)

Second, there is the **informal** (also "shadow" or "black") **economy** which is not state sanctioned, nor protected by the law and is non-taxpaying. It avoids the state rather than challenging the state's monopoly of violence. The activities of the informal economy range from local coping strategies to the "second economy" of official enterprises or the venality of posts and services within the state administration. The informal economy in the target regions is dominant in structuring the economic incentives and strategies of actors in conflict.

Last, there is the **criminal** (were there is a state) or **(civil-) war economy** that is distinct from the official and informal economies in that it facilitates non-state violence as a central asset of economic activity. This violent economy challenges core state functions, is non-productive, preys on the official economy and taxes the informal, unprotected economy, and sells both violence and protection against violence as a service.

What we call the **parallel economy** is made up of the hybrid and often surprisingly stable arrangements between these three categories of economic organisation. They are neither only informal, criminal nor legal. This parallel economy in the post-Soviet context directly depends on the organisational potential and the resources provided via the state. The institutions governing economic rationale, as well as access and flow of resources in the parallel economy are, however, not the formal institutions of (Weberian, rule of law) statehood but rather substitute institutions providing some functional equivalents of governance as service to investors and other actors in this economy. Often, these substitute institutions reside within state structures and are manipulated by state functionaries. It is therefore difficult to spot the relevant informal institution concealed behind official state facades. This explains our interest in understanding the parallel economy and the institutions of governance that provide services such as rule-setting, settlement of conflict, monitoring and sanctioning from the perspective of involved actors. Particularly intriguing is the question of how effectively governance works for the parallel economy; preliminary evidence from Azerbaijan suggests that for those involved governance does provide contract security, predictability of investment and sanction capacity for foul play. There may be significantly less embezzlement and less corruption in the parallel economy than in the official economy.

See "Pyramid" and "Lottery" in annex p. 3-4 for visualisation of aspects of the parallel economy interlinking with strategies of central steering; cf. also the textbox "postism" as a state controlled market of opportunities.

Identification of relevant actors within institutional arrangements of hybrid statehood; collective action & mobilisation

The role of actors in conflict processing and state-building processes rose to greater prominence than anticipated in the design of the project. Of particular interest is the interdependence between institutional settings informing the chances and limits of how actors organise in groups that are capable of acting collectively and producing certain functional outputs (cf. annex p. 4).

The evidence collected thus far underlines the significance of strategic groups, formed around resources that are provided predominantly by the post-soviet state (most importantly posts, privileged access to information, the entitlement to steal and extort, access to state assets, access to security as in exemption

from arbitrary treatment or legal persecution). Such corporate groups are capable of formulating strategies and translating those strategies into action. They often derive from elites of a variety of loosely knit identity or trust-groups (such as locality/neighbourhood, ethnicity, religion, education-history, and socio-professional groups). The connection between these emerging strategic groups and their social base are of paramount importance for their capacity to engage in conflict. Socially embedded elites may resort to mass-mobilisation if they are unable to pursue their strategies otherwise; disembedded elites are confined to the rules of competing for power and resources set in the political centre. We do have some indication that a decisive technique, applied with varying success, of regaining some central authority over society after the collapse of the Soviet Union was precisely the domestication of relevant local elites, a domestication that strategically alienated and disconnected these elites from their local/ethnic/socio-professional basis.

Among the more important actors in conflict and processes of local governance the research identifies former members of the Party nomenklatura, networks of former Komsomol functionaries, new businessmen, criminal authorities, community defenders (including former fighters in areas affected by civil war) and some spiritual or traditional local authorities.

Functional competition and redundancy: hybrid institutional arrangements

Hybrid institutional arrangements, i.e. arrangements which combine various sets of rules – formal and informal, traditional and new, public and private, state and societal – are characteristic of post-Soviet institutional arrangements. In order to assess the functional stability and effectiveness of such arrangements, empirical work must establish whether such merged institutions reinforce each other in functional terms or whether their institutional logic in fact contradicts each other In other words is the performance of these institutions marked by redundancy or is it marked by competition?

Institutions of dual use[6]
A different pattern of hybrid institutional arrangements is characterised by dual or multifunctional use. A somewhat complex example is the (Soviet and traditional) institution of *subotnik* in parts of Central Asia. While the *subotnik* had been institutionalised as socialist obligatory collective community work all over the Soviet Union, in Central Asia it drew on the traditional institution of mutual assistance and collective action called *hashar*. In some communities studied in the context of the research project, the current organisational structure combines socialist and traditional legacies. In parts of Tajikistan, for example, soviet-era *brigadirs* of only formally privatised *kolkhozes* mobilise for collective community work (*hashar*) drawing on traditional obligations in order to build a community centre on the initiative of a local big man who can then claim credit for organising the collective action.

An example of the dual use of hybrid institutions relates to a concrete case studied in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan, when in 2002 the organisational potential of the *subotnik/hashar* institution was functional in organising civil disobedience and mass-mobilisation following the arrest of a popular local opposition politician. The

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[6] Cf. the research of Scott Radnitz

ordinary function – mobilisation for collective work or, more generally, provision of non-specific reciprocity at community level – was successfully "borrowed" by the organisers of the political protest and civil uprising.

Safeguard institutions[7]

There appears to be a pattern of hybrid institutional arrangements that may be called safeguards. Typically, the function of an official institution is reinforced by an informal institution that may be considered more reliable than the official set of rules. For instance, a tax police officer in Batken oblast, Kyrgyzstan, has official command over his subordinates. Since he is, by virtue of his position, involved in various illegal and corrupt activities he is aware that his position and personal safety depends on his ability to monitor and control his subordinates. The official mechanisms available are not sufficient for him, however. He therefore prefers to employ relatives and close associates from his home community into the more delicate subordinate positions since he can rely on a parallel, informal mechanism of monitoring and influencing their behaviour via their families, the respected elders of the community (*aksakals*) and a common code of honour (*urp-adat*).

GoNGOs and NonGOs: co-opting society and occupying the state

GoNGOs are Non-Governmental Organisations set up by Governmental Organisations in order to access resources made available to the non-governmental sector. Officially, they are directed by a person without office, usually a relative or client of a representative of the state bureaucracy. GoNGOs are used for fund-raising purposes and for keeping the independent NGO scene in check by legal means.

If one includes, however, informal non-governmental organisations, for example corporate groups based on notions of collective identity, socio-professional background or shared interest into a broader understanding of civil society, the institutional relationship between government and society develops additional shades. In most parts of Uzbekistan, for example, the sophisticated traditional neighbourhood organisation of the *mahalla* has in practice been incorporated into the state, and via vertical command is charged with the tasks of local governance (ranging from mediation in disputes and distributive functions to surveillance and control). Local businesses are, to give another example, exploited by the state to provide public goods as in unpaid communal work, such as garbage collection (*goshash* or state-imposed hashar).

In Kyrgyzstan[8] traditional institutions at various levels have been formalised and officially incorporated into state governance. Councils of elders at local level and gatherings of family heads at the regional and national level (*kurultai*) have been formally endowed by law with decision-making power and consultative functions.

In Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan strategic groups emerged around state resources that were made available to them as a presidential strategy of consolidating power.[9] From loose reference groups with a common notion of regional origin (*zemlyachestvo / regional fellowship*), sometimes tinged by ethnic markers (e.g. Kurds from Nakhichevan), corporate groups emerged in a highly controlled and regulated form of competition over state resources that were distributed by the top patron of the central state, the President. These groups – deriving their emic

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[7] Cf. the research of Azamat Temirkoulov
[8] Cf. research of Azamat Temirkoulov
[9] Cf. research of Bahodir Sidikov

and etic labels from toponyms like Nakhichevan, Armenia, Samarkand, or Bukhara - were misrepresented by internal and external observers as (traditional) clans. Instead, they are corporate groups organised around strategic interests. These interests lie in the exploitation of resources that are made available by an external institution, namely the state under presidential control. It is this mode of governing that is creating locally dis-embedded strategic groups the president deems appropriate to balance power. In other words, the distributive strategies of state leaders, applied to consolidate personal power in an environment where the state was weakly institutionalised and still contested, brought into being the "clans" of today. In contrast to corporate groups based on real or imagined kinship with clearly defined boundaries – proper clans – these strategic regional groups do not exist autonomously of the state; their ability to act collectively depends on the resources made available to them by the state.

NonGOs, on the other hand, are Governmental Organisations controlled by Non-Governmental organisations. Such arrangements can be found at all levels of state organisation. If the engineering and balancing of strategic groups indicated above gets out of control, the state-invented strategic regional groups might detach from their local base and engage fully in competing for state capture in the capital. This situation appears to be taking place in Azerbaijan at the present moment. There is a strong indication that at least with regard to some crucial ministries the state has lost the initiative and the ministries are run according to the interests of regional strategic groups rather than defining the rules of engagement for the "clans'" competition over state resources.

At lower levels state organisations such as regional branches of the law enforcement agencies, other extensions of the central administration or local bodies of self-government have been taken over by powerful local strategic groups. This appears to be particularly the case in countries like Georgia or Tajikistan where central authority (official state or parallel network) has not been effectively re-established after the state collapse of the early 90s. In places like Rasht in Tajikistan or until recently Javakheti in Georgia the influence of central state institutions was confined to strategies of co-opting important private power-holders into state positions in an attempt to exercise some control over these regions.[10]

The "old guard" institutions[11]
Some of the show-case institutions of Soviet self-representation as a state with total socialist system penetration of society were Soviet only on the outside and hybrid on the inside. Among the usual suspects were the *sovkhoz* and *kolkhoz*, the kolkhoz-markets or *bazaars*, the state-run industrial *kombinats* and, last but not least, the local bodies of state administration at republic and sub-republican level. In local practice all these official organisational forms of the Soviet state-controlled system tended to merge official and informal institutions in order to make the organisation work on the ground (cf. "tandem" institutions in annex p. 6). *Kolkhozes*, for example, incorporated and formalised arrangements of transhumance[12] that had been established between mountain and plain dwellers of different ethnic and socio-professional background.[13] The *kombinat* became a key resource and service provider for the sophisticated shadow economy and the

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[10] Cf. the research of Jonathan Wheatley and Gunda Wiegmann
[11] Cf. research of Alexey Gunya.
[12] Transhumance is an institutionalised form of vertical seasonal migration of livestock between summer and winter pastures. It entails complex legal agreements on rights of passage and on various forms of exploitation of shared natural resources between affected communities in the mountains and in the plains.
[13] Examples are found in the North Caucasus, in Kyrgyzstan and in Tajikistan in the area covered by the project.

economy of deficits that evolved after the 60s and significantly changed the incentive structure of local elites. Ethnic affiliation and the social weight of certain influential corporate local groups (kin-based or other) became important principles informing the rules of co-optation and balancing in the game of distributing positions within the local state administration. Even local law enforcement bodies sometimes integrated traditional (e.g. mediation in feuds) or informal (professional mediation and enforcement services of the criminal world) mechanisms into their daily practice.

In some parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia organisations like *kolkhozes* and *kombinats* are still officially in place. More often than not they exist on paper and have lost their complex economic and social functions. However, in some cases, as in Kabardino-Balkaria, they are still important resource and service providers to local communities.

In some post-Soviet countries the formal system of local administration still resembles Soviet practice (in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, for instance). However, in general the informal rules of staffing and network service provision, while not completely new, have adapted significantly to the disintegration of remote central control and resource provision via Moscow. The textbox "postism" in the annex p. 5 presents an overview of institutionalised forms of governance via informal distribution of posts in the state apparatus that our research has singled out thus far.

The significance of having the right people in the right positions becomes obvious if one takes into consideration not only that a semblance of official statehood needs to be maintained, but also that a parallel system of vertical control and bottom-up resource flows needs to be administered in places such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan, where resource flows inevitably exceed the state budget by a considerable margin. A minister of economic development or a minister of reconstruction and infrastructure development in Azerbaijan, for instance, may perform poorly from the perspective of official statehood. He may be highly sufficient and trustworthy, though, as fund-raiser or treasurer for the grey coffers of the parallel state.

Conflict as heuristic tool to capture adaptive capacities of institutional arrangements

In our research context conflict processes are seen as **heuristic tool**, as indications of the institutional stability or fragility of local society. In other words, analysing the way local society deals with conflict and crisis informs us about the strengths and weaknesses of society in producing **adaptive change**. Conflict analysis therefore does not only inform us about the conflict itself; it also informs us about the capacity of the units of analysis (be it local state institutions at district or regional level, rural village communities or other defined target groups) to apply and, if necessary, adapt their norms and rules under the stress of changing and competitive environments. Empirically assessed conflict processing sheds light on the local organisation of the blurred state-society frontier. In functional terms conflict in society is important to produce change: changes in the allocation of power, changes in the distribution of resources, and, maybe most importantly, changes in the rules according to which power and (material/spiritual) resources are organised in society. **Conflict, more than other social processes, puts the institutions of society to the test and makes the effectiveness of written and unwritten rules visible.**

Institutionalised conflict is not only necessary for a continuous readjustment of the balance of power within a group but is also essential for the innovation and adaptation of structures and norms within society. Institutionalised conflict is often the driving force behind the order that keeps communities together. The acceptance and legitimacy of the local social order - from official forms of local governance or arrangements of water distribution to informal rules of marriage and religious practice - are based to a large extent on the reliable, non-violent, and non-disruptive processing of day-to-day conflicts. In other words, the accepted way in which a society deals with conflict is a defining characteristic of that society.

Conflict and institutions are strongly interdependent aspects of social organisation. Institutions inform the options and choices of actors in conflict. Conflict, on the other hand, can have a strong impact on institutional change, innovation or breakdown of reliable rules. In an environment in which crucial official institutions regulating distribution and access to resources and power are consciously re-shaped by internal and external actors, the issue of the embedding and legitimacy of engineered institutions moves to the fore. Our research thus far suggests that a purely functional approach to legitimacy and sustainability of order based on officially designed and implemented conflict processing institutions might not be sufficient. While in some cases society accepts new institutions because they work rather than because it recognises them as something of its own, in other cases new rules are disregarded and undermined as something alien.

Local informal or formal institutions are capable of keeping peace within the community when they are protected by social control and self-policing.[14] This is the case with the majority of village communities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The problem with this kind of conflict processing is that its effective scope is confined to the village, the neighbourhood or the extended family. The capacity for the implementation of decisions, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defiance is limited to the scope of the "eye of the village" and sanctions of reputation; i.e. it is limited to the community. Such institutions are not equally suitable for stable inter-communal conflict transformation. The results of research conducted by the authors in Afghan Badakhshan and rural areas of Tajikistan show that decisions reached on inter-communal conflicts often reflect the power relations between conflicting parties rather than legal principles. Conflict is left in limbo or (temporally) decided by power. Without a supra-communal institution, the formalisation of binding decisions does not take place. Ideally, this supra-communal institution regulating conflict is the state (rather than commanders or local strong men). In this respect, the lack of the state at the local level is a critical deficit in all countries under scrutiny.

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[14] Cf. the research of Gunda Wiegmann

Part IV: Consequences for further organisation of the project

Methodology

From the outset this project has had as its principal focus institutions that inform conflict processes and state-building (the intermediate variable in scheme 1 on page 5). During the course of the fieldwork it became evident, however, that we also need to concentrate on identifying and collecting data on the structural, political, social and economic framework in which local level state-building and conflict processing takes place. We therefore decided to invest some energy in dealing with the macro indicators that account for social, political and economic "stability" or "vulnerability". This data is partly available and each team member is responsible for collecting such macro or framework data for her/his country. Some data has to be collected by local specialists, however. This is particularly relevant for data that put official macro indicators like GDP growth or annual budgets and expenditure into the context of an unaccounted economy that easily exceeds the official or legal economy in quantity and in the quality of providing incentive structures for governing elites. With this goal in mind we are working on Terms of Reference for local research institutes that could provide relevant macro data and case studies on the political economy of hybrid statehood: what core functions are provided and how are they financed. We are planning to conduct a first survey in Azerbaijan to check the feasibility of such an undertaking.

The preliminary results of the fieldwork encourages our focus on the institutional constraints informing human action. These include **both** the legal framework **and** unwritten rules shaping the way social actors pursue their goals and deal with the conflicts that arise. Such arrangements are usually "hidden" behind official statistics and normative self-representation. They can only be accounted for by in-depth fieldwork; according to the initial plan fieldwork is therefore essential to account for the micropolitics of conflict. Fieldwork is, however, also needed in order to fill with content some of the big but empirically empty buzzwords of the statecraft discourse: our empirical work will add to the knowledge of how neopatrimonial rule actually works (and what is or is not neopatrimonial about it), and whether it makes sense to lump together all sorts of informal and officially unaccounted for resource flows as corruption. It will also further our understanding of the puzzle of the sustainability of weak or even failing statehood.

Finally, in order to account for state-building as a conflictive and dynamic process, the results of the micro- and community-based research need to be reconciled with developments that are larger in space and time scales, such as breakdown of empire, state-building efforts and outside interference. By integrating both perspective and methodological approaches we intent to arrive at grounded theoretical conclusions on institutional breakdown, continuity and conditions for adaptive institutional change in reaction to dynamic framework conditions.

Afghan Badakhshan: contested statehood, highly dynamic institution-building in action

For the parts of Central Asia and the Caucasus on which we have been concentrating our empirical research effort thus far, the initial focus on potentially violent conflict has shifted to issues relating to provision of statehood and governance. While reliable and predictable conflict processing and the provision of a governed public space devoid of arbitrary violence are cornerstones of (Weberian) statehood, outright violent conflicts have been on the decline in the research area despite overt deficits in official state-building exercises. Our approach provides insights into the mechanics of non-violent continuity that often occurs against the odds.

After some pioneer work in Afghan Badakhshan in the fall of 2003 and after consultations with Dr. Levermann of VW Foundation, we decided that it would make sense to include an example of state-building under the permanent threat of alternative organisation of violence into the project. This is why we announced a tender for a research position focussing on the local dynamics of statehood and conflict processes in Afghan Badakhshan. Two candidates (one female, one male) successfully applied and will share the research position for the remaining 18 months of the project (see administrative issues, finance plan and CVs in the annex).

Follow ups next year: team and local partners

The process of applying analytical scrutiny to extensive fieldwork material gathered over a period of one year usually reveals certain voids and open questions that might be crucial to the academic success of the project. The upcoming four months will be organised in such a way that blank spots can be identified, and focussed follow-up research efforts may be designed. In early summer 2005 some of the team members might return to the field in order to concentrate on outstanding and decisive questions that are of relevance to the overall project. This will also be a time of focussed cooperation with identified cooperation partners in the target regions.

One such focus for follow-up research may well be to identify and research conflicts arising at the intermediate level where local modes of (self-) governance interact with strategies of central steering characteristic for hybrid statehood. Another focus might be to identify procedures within hybrid statehood or within functional alternatives to statehood as non-violent conflict processing institutions. Of general importance is empirical evidence that enhances our understanding of monitoring and sanctioning capacities provided within the informal organisation of statehood. Finally, in order to tackle the question of institutional continuity, adaptive change and breakdown, we need to deepen our understanding of the social embedding of designed or engineered rules.

Using and enhancing connections with institution-building practitioners

During the initial phase of fieldwork the teams in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan cooperated with local and international development agencies under the guidance of Christoph Zürcher and Jan Koehler. GTZ and MSDSP (an NGO under the roof of the Aga Khan Foundation) expressed their interest in the research methodology developed within the framework of the VW project.

A cooperation agreement on a comprehensive assessment of peace and conflict potentials at community level in the target regions of the development programmes was reached. From a conflict perspective, those regions coincided fully with the research interest of the project. This cooperation proved to be highly successful: logistics, organisational cover and access to entry points were provided by the established organisations in the regions. The results of the peace and conflict analysis were fully compatible with the practical intentions of the organisations and provided baseline information for further fieldwork.

In Georgia team members cooperated with GTZ and other international organisations in identifying best practice approaches to conflict transformation and in analysing formal and informal local power structures in the research regions of the project. Here again collaboration between practitioners and field researchers proved to be mutually beneficial.

Administrative issues

Finances to date and future

Finance Plan: see annex p. 2

Team

Leading an international and multidisciplinary research team whose members have very different backgrounds and levels of experience is challenging.

We put a lot of effort into training and into streamlining the common research agenda. Given the relatively short time period at our disposal, we should be realistic with regard to what can be reached. The considerable differences between the more experienced post-doctoral fellows and the younger colleagues is not something that can easily be bridged. Likewise, the disciplinary differences will remain. The team leaders will ensure that teaching, training and coaching remains a key priority also during the second half of the project. We will also as much as possible foster exchange between the disciplines and between the individual research contexts. One of the objectives of this project is therefore to set up a framework that enables the projects team to benefit as much as possible from the diversity and variety within the project. One way of achieving this is to encourage the post-doctoral researchers to take over more responsibility and to act as tutors for the junior researchers.

We expect the following outputs by the team:

Sidikov and Wheatley will produce within the project a monograph (on Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, and on Georgia), and at least a chapter each for the edited volume.

Gunya will produce four to five analytical studies on the North-Caucasus.

Radnitz will contribute at least a chapter for the edited volume. His research conducted within the project will serve as the main block of his PhD dissertation at MIT. In August 2004 his PhD committee discussed and approved his preliminary results. Radnitz has received a one year Fulbright grant (10/2003 – 10/2004) which he accepted. This decisions was taken in agreement with the team leaders and has been approved by the VW foundation. Radnitz is currently working in Uzbekistan as translator for an US-American institution. This decision too was taken in agreement with the team leaders and has been approved by the VW foundation. He will join us in Berlin in Summer 2005 (see letter of intent annex p. 41).

Wiegmann is currently preparing her PhD (Promotion). We believe that she will successfully complete her Promotion, but not within the 30-months of the VW-grant. She will also contribute at least a chapter for the edited volume.

Temirkoulov will contribute a least a chapter for the edited volume. The team leaders do not think that he will be able to obtain a PhD degree during this project.

Koehler will finish his PhD during the course of the project. He will co-edit and co-author respectively the final publications and contribute one chapter to the final edited volume.

As discussed with and agreed by Dr. Levermann, we plan to allocate another grant to one or two researchers with a focus on Afghan-Badakhshan. It is hoped that these colleagues will join the project in November 2004 and stay with the project for 30 months or 12 months respectively (the needed funds are available, see budge plan in annex p. 2). One of the researches will be an experienced professional with country experience and institutional ties to an international NGO (AKDN)[15] working in the region in order to address issues of security and logistics.

Project related outputs

Publications

Of the project:

(1)   Gunya, Alexej (2004), 'Severnyi Kavkaz: raspredelenie resursov i vlasti na lokal'nom i regionalnom urovnyakh', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>: 21, 83-88.

(2)   Koehler, Jan and Zürcher, Christoph (2004), 'Conflict and the state of the state in the Caucasus and Central Asia: an empirical research challenge', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>: 21, 57-67.

(3)   Radnitz, Scott (2004), 'Understanding and Withstanding the 'Stans'', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>: 21, 101-103.

(4)   Sidikov, Bahodir (2004), 'New or Traditional? 'Clans', Regional Groupings, and State in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>, 68-73.

(5)   Temirkoulov, Azamat (2004), 'Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>: 21, 94-100.

(6)   Wheatley, Jonathan (2004), 'Elections and Democratic Governance in the Former Soviet Union: the Case of Georgia', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>: 21, 75-82.

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[15] Aga Khan Development Network

(7)   Wiegmann, Gunda (2004), 'Local Political Structures and a Reflection on Field Research in Tajikistan', <u>Berliner Osteuropa Info</u>: 21, 89-93.

(8)   Homepage: <u>http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/cscca</u>

Of individual members of the project

Alexej Gunya
(9)   Региональные тренды развития и возможности трансграничного сотрудничества на Кавказе. В кн. Трансграничные проблемы стран СНГ. 2003. Москва, Опус, с 111-122.
(10)   Dynamique et stabilite de la communaute montagnarde du Yaghnob (Tadjikistan du nord)//Les Montagnards d'Asie Centrale. Cahiers d'Asie centrale N 11/12. Pp. 161-178. Tachkent – Aix-en-Provence. 2003.
(11)   Трендовые изменения и развитие горного региона: методология, географический анализ и возможности управления. Нальчик, КБНЦ РАН. 2004.

Jan Koehler
(12)   (2004), 'Institutionalisierte Konfliktaustragung, Kohäsion und Wandel. Theoriegeleiteter Praxischeck auf Gemeindeebene', in J. Eckert (ed.), <u>Anthropologie der Konflikte; Georg Elwerts konflikttheoretische These in der Diskussion</u>, Bielefeld, Transcript, forthcoming.
(13)   and Zürcher, Christoph (2004), 'Der Staat und sein Schatten. Betrachtungen zur Institutionalisierung hybrider Staatlichkeit im Süd-Kaukasus', <u>WeltTrends</u>, forthcoming.

Gunda Wiegmann
(14)   2004/04/04: Country Report Tajikistan, an article on the economic developments in Tajikistan for the Near and Middle East Economy Handbook 2004-2006, published by the Near and Middle East Foundation (www.numov.de)

Jonathan Wheatley
(15)   2004, Obstacles Impeding the Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia. ECMI Working Paper No.22 (September 2004) at <u>www.ecmi.de/doc/public_papers.html</u>

Christoph Zürcher
(16)   (2004), 'Einbettung und Entbettung: Empirische institutionenzentrierte Konfliktanalyse', in J. Eckert (ed.), <u>Anthropologie der Konflikte; Georg Elwerts konflikttheoretische These in der Diskussion</u>, Bielefeld, Transcript.

Reports

(17)   Koehler, Jan (April 2004), <u>Assessing peace and conflict potentials in the target region of the GTZ Central Asia and Northern Afghanistan programme to foster food security, regional cooperation and stability</u>, GTZ, ARC, Berlin.

(18)   Zürcher, Christoph (April 2004), <u>Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Rasht Valley, Shurabad District and GBAO, Tajikistan</u>, GTZ, ARC, Berlin.

(19)   Koehler, Jan (2003), <u>Local conflict analysis: potentials and limits of regional cooperation in the triangle region of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia</u>. <u>First Draft</u>, FRCS, GTZ, Berlin.

(20)   Koehler, Jan and Zürcher, Christoph (2003), <u>Concept paper on tolerance enhancing measures in rural Tajikistan and beyond</u>, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn.

(21)   Wheatley, Jonathan (January 2004), <u>Best Practices and Lessons Learnt of Development Interventions in selected Conflict Fields</u>, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Tbilisi

(22)   Temirklulov, Azamat with Passon, Daniel (April 2004), <u>Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Batken Oblast, Kyrgyzstan</u>, GTZ, ARC, Batken, Berlin.