

Clan/regional division and corruption
in the state-building process of CAC societies.
The example of Kyrgyzstan.

Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of independence the Central Asian and Caucasian societies entered the difficult path to transition. Some of them have succeeded in the state-building process, others less so while, third became embroiled in a violent conflict.

The soviet legacy has both a positive and a negative impact on this complex process. Traditional and shadow institutions, which have survived the oppression of Soviet rule, also play a specific role, sometimes a harmful one.¹ On the other hand, many new institutions, such as democracy, liberalism, privatization, and market economy entered the social system.

Interactions between these three types of institutions are important, but extremely complicated. An analysis of this social reality can help us understand the problems of state-building process in CAC societies.

This research will focus on institutional framework of Kirghizstan, which despite its regional division between North and South, has succeed in maintaining its social unity and stability, though some of republics with similar social structure collapsed in state building and turned to a violent conflict (ex. Tadjikistan, Chechnya).

Thus, the main questions are: How Kirghiz society managed to avoid the potential conflict between two different regional groups? What was the mechanism and factors of conflict prevention? How this latent conflict was shifted and what form does it have today?

Theoretical assumption

The traditional structures of CAC societies are not *per se* a factor that is conducive to internal conflict or disturb state-building process. Many stable societies have different social divisions. Thus, the social divisions, traditional or not, are not the danger for the stability.

¹ See : Akiner and Barnes (2001), Koehler and Zürcher (2003), Rubin (1998).

The problem is the fact that the shadow mechanisms, which regularize the relations and interactions between traditional structures and state institutions, are based on the logic of patronage networks and on the sense of affinity to region or clan.

In theory there could be four different situations:

A) **Oppression** of networks (based on clan or regional affinity) by formal institutions. Example: Soviet Union. The formal soviet institutions oppressed all other types of institutions and tried to dominate and to control all social life. Hence, informal and “traditional” institutions were forced into underground existence. The risk for conflict was minimal.

B) **Capture** of the state by one clan. After the collapse of the Soviet state there were important structural changes. The formal institutions became weaker, while informal and “traditional” institutions became more active and dynamic.² Fostered by a wave of traditionalism, networks based on clan/regional affinity became the dominant principle in the access to state resources. When members of only one group gain power, other groups become excluded (Table 1). If that were the case there would be an animosity and contests between distinct corporate groups. This constellation would compare to the situation prior to the civil war in Tajikistan.³ Such a situation can be very dangerous and may disturb the state-building process.

C) **Compromise**. Different networks based on clans/regional affinity can also find some balance and achieve a compromise in access to resources. Then the power and access to resources would be shared between different clan/regional groups. (Table 2). This situation is less dangerous than prior situation. The danger may appear at the moment of change of status quo.

D) **Stratification**. There can be a fusion of corrupted elites on one hand, and of different clan/regional groups on another. The clear stratification of the society may take place since “[...] members of the high-status group prefer to limit their social interaction with lower-status individuals”.⁴ (Table 3) This situation can provoke a social revolution, which can become interregional conflict by the manipulation of authority.

² Koehler, Jan and Zürcher, Christoph, *Potential of Dis/Order. Explaining violence in the Caucasus and in the Former Yugoslavia*, Manchester, (Manchester UP), 2003.

³ Rubin, Barnett R, and Snyder, Jack (1993).

⁴ Hechter, Michael, “A rational choice approach to race and ethnic relations” in Mason, D. and Rex, J., *Theories of Race and Ethnic relations*, Cambridge, (Cambridge UP), 1986, p. 269.

E) **Fusion**. In this theoretical situation one can imagine the fusion of elites and different clan/regional groups, without strong stratification of the society. Civic society and representative democracy may consolidate the stability. This situation can be the base for successful state building.

Different networks within corrupted elite seem to play an important role in each of these situations. Thus, the role of networks plays a crucial role in the clan/regional divided society in general, and in evolution of institutional framework particularly.

These situations are not necessarily consecutives, or mutually excluding. Some of them can be present at the same time in the society.

Indicators for these situations can be :

1. the behavior of population in every day life,
2. relations between political elites of different regions amongst them,
3. the role of the networks (based on appurtenance to clan or regional group) in access to resources,
4. the attitude of the state vis-a vis these networks.

Today, Kyrghyzstan presents features of two situations : (C) “**Compromise**” and (D) “**Stratification**”.

Since 1993 there is a sharing of power between different network based collective groups. There was a compromise between the Northern and Southern elite. The clan/regional elite manipulate people through the networks based on clan/regional affinity. New formal institutions, such as the “Council of elders”, were created on different levels: from local to republican. These new institutions helped central authority to manipulate people.

Today, the dominant rule within the networks of corrupted elite became a bribe, clan or regional solidarity is not playing so much role. *Tooganchilik* is losing its force, nevertheless rests operative at the local level, and partly at the regional level.

There are a few competitions between corrupted elites of different clan/regional groups. On the contrary they try to consolidate their positions by creating alliances (ex. marriage).

There is more solidarity between people from different clan/regional groups. People are organized in many NGO’s, professional associations, etc.

One can also observe a clear stratification of the society, where according to some estimation more than 80% of population is poor.

There is also a danger for social apprising, which can be turned to interregional conflict by manipulations, the Aksy events prove this assumption.

Exploration of the report

This report is based on the fieldwork in two different targeted areas: Batken and Bishkek. Batken was interesting for this research, because it is the most conservative and traditionalist region of KR. Bishkek was interesting because it is the capital, the most progressive place in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, these targeted areas present two extremities of the social reality in KR.

The research in Batken region has been done within the development project “Batken Capacity building: Food security, Regional cooperation and Stability”. Following qualitative methods were used during the fieldwork in Batken and Bishkek: participant observation, expert interviews, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. The collected data was proceeded using the instrumen - matrix. This report is the results of this process.

The first part of the report is the analysis of Cross Cutting Issues in Batken and Bishkek. At first stage, the method of descriptive analysis is used; at the second stage, the method of comparative analysis is used for comparison of the social structure in Batken and Bishkek.

The second part is the preliminary results. The results were separated according to historical evolution of the social structure, with the aim to explore its dynamics. Three periods were identified : 1) soviet period, 2) the end of the USSR and the beginning of 90’s, and 3) the period of 90’s – today. The method used in this part of the report is the application of the data to the theoretical assumption of my proposal.

The third part of the report is the methodology. This part is the critique and remarks on the method used during the fieldwork , especially the matrix.

1. Cross Cutting Issues

During the fieldwork it was found that social institutions and mechanisms function similarly in Batken region and in other regions of KR and even other republics of Central Asia. Nevertheless, the form and impact of these institutions are different from one region to another.

Thus, different results were achieved in Batken and in Bishkek. The development, modernization and transition to the market economy are much faster in the capital of KR than in regions, especially than in Batken.

1.1 Descriptive analysis

1.2.1 Batken

The situation of social system in Batken is different than in the capital, but also than in other region of KR. Batken is the most conservative and traditionalist region of Kyrgyzstan. There are several reasons for this:

- 1) Geographical location. Batken is the most far and isolated oblast of KR. Only one road connects the capital of Kyrgyzstan with Batken oblast, other roads goes through the territory of neighboring Uzbekistan. Moreover, this road goes through Uzbek enclave Sokh, making Batken itself an enclave. Due to the geographical location, few infrastructure and social systems were developed in Batken during the Soviet period.
- 2) Historical particularities. Batken oblast was the last region, which fell under the external conquerors. At the moment of arriving of Soviet power to the Central Asia, Batken was the bastion of anti-Soviet resistance on the territory of present KR. This attitude played an important role in the fact that local people kept its traditions and culture more than in other parts of KR.
- 3) Political factors. Batken is a new oblast that was established in 1999. Administrative institutions do not have a strong background and experience yet, due to its past subordination to the Osh oblast administration. Few local soviet nomenklatura was developed, thus, the impact of Soviet system is not as strong as in other part of KR.

4) Economical factors. The essential part of Batken economy is based on agrarian and cattle-breeding sectors. Though several minings and factories are present in Batken oblast, the main part of population is occupied by these traditional sectors of economy. The traditional way of economical activities permitted to preserve cultural particularities.

5) Social factors. Traditional social structure of KG society is based on 28 (according to some information 23) different clans or tribes. These clans are united into three big confederations: *Sol kanat* (Left wing), *On kanat* (Right wing) and *Ichkilik* (Center). *Ichkilik* was the confederation that consisted of new-coming tribes. At the moment of war each confederation had its specific place on the battlefield according to its name. *Ichkilik* was in the center because of the mistrust and test new-coming tribes. Today each confederation has its specific geographical location. Batkenians are Ichkiliks and consider themselves as particular Kyrghyz and some of them even say that they are not Kyrghyz at all. This conviction provoke locals to preserve their identity, culture and traditions.

During the fieldwork, several official and nonofficial institutions as well as social mechanisms, which play an important conflict processing role, were founded in Batken oblast. Most of them preserved much of its traditional features due to the factors quoted above.

Resources

Land

Land is the most important resource in this region, due to the extended agricultural sector. Control and distribution of land belong to the state institutions such as Gosregistr, Fond of Land Redistribution. This resource is depended on irrigating water, which is necessary for land using. Changes on land possession, control or distribution may provoke tensions and even violent conflicts. Actually land is a disputed resource, which can become the cause of the violent conflict.

Water

Water is the second important resource in this AO, because the usage of land depends on this resource. The control and distribution of this resource depends on the AO and its inhabitants. There is sufficient water in this region, nevertheless, this resource depends on effective

management. Today, water is a source of disputes because of the ineffective management and land disputes.

State capacities

State capacities are limited. It is expressed in the absence of precise definite interstate borders, the slowdown of border delimitation and demarcation process, few effectiveness of state institutions. It encourages illegal developing of disputable territories and continuing of creeping migration form neighboring republics. The local authority reaction on these facts is restricted too and does not meet the requirements of the situation. That applies for the conflict processing role of the state, too. Several reasons for this situation were identified.

Batken is a new oblast that was established in 1999. Administrative institutions do not have a strong background and experience yet, due to its past subordination to the Osh oblast administration. State institutions were reorganized, created or deleted (i.e. the reorganization of Smarkandek AO and creation of Aksai AO). Thus, this region is in a process of structural reorganisation.

Moreover, the general transitional situation in the republic limits the state capacities further. The new juridical basis for landownership and the new water administrating system, are still in development and present an unfinished process. The state has difficulties to adopt its institutions to the new economic situation.

In addition, state capacities are weakened by the influence of the clan system in Kyrgyzstan, which has still implication into social and political life of Batken oblast. Some political decisions are taken not according to the political and socio-economical necessities but according to the logic of clan partition. This applies in particularly to the personnel policy. People in office often promote those from their own clan or region. Corrupt practices, like bribery or venality of positions have a serious impact on the decision making process of political and administrative staff of local state institutions, too. The distribution of land and water as well as the cross-border trade are issues, which are influenced by corruption.

Moreover, some state capacities are used for personal enrichment of small circle of people. Staff of border and customs check-points on the transit road are occupied with extortion and violate human rights. For example, in v. Hushyar (RU) the border guards and officers of State Automobile Inspection organize non-sanctioned check-points on market days with the purpose of own enrichment by means of extortion and bribes. These activities provoke discontent of population and increase the conflict potential. There is also indication for an underlying political motive behind the frequent setting up and changing the location of posts:

they increase the pressure on the neighbouring country, which is also engaged in setting up border-guards and custom posts with the same aim.

Formal non governmental organizations

A main objective of most NGO's working in the area is crisis prevention and conflict mitigation by promoting socio-economical development and regional cooperation between communities. Most NGOs cooperate with informal institutions in order to mobilize communities during project planning (i.e. aksakals, informal leaders) as well as during project implementation (i.e. Ashar).

Although, the intention of NGOs is explicitly connected to crisis prevention and conflict resolution, in certain cases their activity can increase conflict potential and even can be involved in conflict escalation. In some cases, the organisational potential and capacities for community mobilization, created by NGO projects, were used unconstructively in conflict escalation.

One of the reasons for less effective activities of NGO's is the lack of coordination and cooperation between different organizations in the region, what creates situations of doubling and counteraction.

Social control

Urp-adat is an informal set of rules based on a traditional value system. It still plays an important role in the way communities control themselves. In some communities, it is more institutionalised than in others and takes the form of strict discipline. This discipline is based on the respect toward ancestors, parents and elders. One of the elements of *urp-adat* is *darvishana*, an annual meeting of community members, where all important questions and problems are discussed, including tensions and conflicts. This is the moment when social control is obviously exercised, especially through its sanction mechanism that is called *uiat* (shame).

Several examples show that traditional social control is effective on things, which were produced by particular person or by the community on its own. Things produced by the state or organizations for the community are not protected by the traditional social control.

The memory of ancestors is highly protected by *urp-adat*., There is an example when violent conflict has been raised by the Aksay inhabitants, because of the protection of village cemetery.

The social sanctions of *urp-adat* can compel members of the community to support and even participate in collective violent action. Control is performed via sanctions such as *uiat* (shame), as well as awards – prestige, respect etc. Elder people – *aksakals* - have rights to sanction and award. Thereby *aksakals*, which have prestige and instruments of judgment, can mobilize communities for different activities, including violence, through *urp-adat*.

On the other hand, in case of a shared value system in two conflicting communities, *urp-adat* can play a conflict-preventing role. It provides a common framework of accepted rules of how to come to terms with the conflict (a code of conduct and procedures for conflict processing).

Today, the role of this institution is decreasing due to several reasons like the new socio-economical situation of the society. The communities are not longer secluded clusters, rather people are forced to leave to find labor elsewhere. That creates more openness in the society, which promotes new principles and values.

Informal Institutions

The institution of Aksakals

The institution of *Aksakals* has an important role in social life. The *aksakals*, who usually have a meeting point in the local mosque or chaikhana, consist of old men. They have a clear position to protect traditional norms and values. Sometimes, *aksakals* try to control not only religious and cultural part of the social life, but also formal decision making institutions and the local administration. For example, two years ago, in Chunkur kyshtak village, these intentions led to disputes between group of *aksakals* and deputies of the local council – *aksakals* disputed their rights to appointment village heads, but failed.

Ashar

The traditional institution *ashar* does not have a direct impacts on the processing of conflict, however it can increase potential for peace as well as for conflict. *Ashar* is a mechanism of collective construction or of any other work for the community or for particular member. In the case that two communities with divergent interests use *ashar* for collective work, it can play a conflict-preventing role, building confidence between them. However, *ashar* can have an unintended impact in the case if communities create projects that lead to disputes with neighbors or other groups. Thus, despite the fact that *ashar* does not have a direct impact on conflicts, the institution can be an instrument to create peace or conflict potential.

Networks

Clan networks between Kyrgyz of different communities

The clan solidarity is relatively strong in Batken region. For example in Aksay all Kirghiz belong to the clan “Awwat”, which is interlaced by other networks, such as friendship, kinship, etc., that permits to keep deeper solidarity between different villages of this region. This network permits to mobilize people from different villages at the moment of social activities or escalation of conflict. For example in the crisis of 1989, Kyrgyz from Aksay were mobilized by this network and supported inhabitants of Samarkandek.

The networks of aksakals

The networks of *aksakals* (white beards), which exist in all regions, can play a conflict-processing role. According to the principal of *urp-adat*, the local societies have to hold the old men – *aksakals* – in great respect. *Aksakals* from different villages and communities have ties, which are based on traditional values and mutual respect. This ties are practiced in everyday life in the *chaikhona* (tea house), on markets, on celebrations and funerals. At the moment of escalations of conflicts, *aksakals*, using their respect in the society and their connections with *aksakals* from other communities, can influence the public opinion and thus prevent or further promote the escalation.

The network of migrants

The demographical growth and lack of income alternatives force many people (especially the youth) to labour migration. The youth is leaving Kyrgyz villages for Kyrgyz cities in the north but they also go to Russia. In some cases, the money transfer of these labour migrants is the main sources of income for their relatives in the villages. There are networks of these labour migrants, which reach from villages in Central Asia as far as to the cities in Russia. Labour migration and the underlying networks play an extremely important role for the reduction of conflict potential, which exists due to the scarcity of resources at home. On the other hand these networks can be used for the mobilization of people from Bishkek till Batken.

Networks between cross border traders

As it was noted before, there is an active cross border trade in the region, which is taking place on the special markets directly on the border with RU (Adyr, Halmion) and also on

some sources of raw materials. The following goods are exchanged: from RU - oil, fertilizer and concrete; from KR – goods imported from China, Korea, Turkey, etc. This business connects people from both sides of the frontier and creates strong trans-border networks of people with the same aims and interests. The traders need stability for the prosperity of their business; any tensions in the region would have a negative impact on their activity. Thus, these networks play a peace potential role and promote stability.

Networks between border post employees

Employees of all border posts in the area have the common goal to control transit roads and especially the cross border trade for their own lucrative interests. They are using their official positions in order to get bribes from people. Moreover, the staff of border posts has strong connections with each other, what permits them to protect their “clients”, who have paid a bribe. According to some information, after 6 months of work, a chief of a border post is already able to buy a car for 3.000 dollars. Thus, these state services have been turned into a private business for a small circle of people. The existing routine is exerted on ordinary people too, who cross the border. These people cannot pay the bribe and usually these are the ones that start fraces at border posts. Thus, the corruption on these border posts and practicing of bribe brings new practices, principles and values to this region.

Networks between wrestlers

This network is based on the links between wrestlers of traditional Central Asian wrestling – Kurosh. These people are united by the common occupation, which is admired by local people. All wrestlers from this region, independently of nationality, know and meet each other at celebrations (Toi) and special competitions. Thus, they have a respect of people and broad relations, which help them regularize disputes. But in periods of violent conflicts this network can also help to mobilize and to organize people for collective action.

1.2.2 Bishkek

In the context of transition to the market economy, Bishkek is the most fast changing city of KR and one of the most fast changing cities of Central Asia. There are several reasons for this:

- 1) *Status*. Bishkek is the capital of KR. It has a population more than one million inhabitants⁵. There are many different ethnical groups living here. Moreover, Bishkek is a very open city for foreign presence. Traditionalism and conservatism are more difficult in these conditions.
- 2) *Historical particularities*. The Chui valley was the first region of KR, which came under the dominance of Russian imperia in the middle of 19 century, and also under dominance of Soviet power. Thus, Chui valley and especially Bishkek is the most externally influenced region of KR.

Resources

There are many different resources in Bishkek. In Batken we can quoted Land and Water as the main important resources, because of the few alternatives sources of income to agriculture. But, in Bishkek it is different, because of the multitude of sources of income.

State capacities

State capacities are relatively strong in Bishkek than in other parts of KR. Provision of public goods is quiet effectively organized. That can be seen first of all in relatively effective provision of medical assistance, security and education.

On the contrary to the situation in Batken oblast, the clan system has little impact on state capacities in Bishkek. The most important factor, which weakened state capacities in Bishkek, is the influence of the corrupt practices, like bribery. Some political decisions are taken not according to the political and socio-economical necessities but according to the logic of individual profit. This applies in particularly to the personnel policy.

As well as in Batken, some state capacities are used for personal enrichment of small circle of people. This is especially true for the stuff of the sanctioning institutions, taxes extraction institutions, and all administrative institutions.

Social control

Many different systems of social control play role in the social life of Bishkek. Different parts and stratas have different systems of social control : traditional, criminal, newcomers systems active in the business world, etc.

⁵ Officially population of Bishkek is , but there are many uncounted migrants and refugees.

In a difference to Batken or other regions of KR, *Urp-adat* does not play an important role in the social life of Bishkek. Nevertheless, some part of citizens, especially old Kyrgyz intelligentsia, pay much attention to the principles of *Urp-adat*. Also, *Urp-adat* plays relatively important role within the networks, based on clan or regional appurtenance. People from the center, which still have connections with their region of origin, afraid of the mechanism of the shame (Uiat). Nevertheless, today the effectiveness of this instrument has been reduced. People consider that personal material well-being is more important than prestige and people's respect.

Criminal system of social control, which was very active in the middle of 90's, is losing its power and has been reduced to the criminal world. It can be explained by the fact that the shadow economy has been legalized with the market economy, and by the fact that the police has took control over the security of legal business, but also the most of illegal business, such as drug trafficking.

There are also newcoming systems of social control, which came with the transition to the market economy. These systems are usual for the countries with the market economy. The sanction mechanisms can be the refuse and discrediting of the service of particular company. This mechanism took the form of privet announces on the TV screen with discrediting message on the company or firm. For example, announce with the message that one firm has a debt and does not pay it, was available on the TV screen during one month, than, new announce appeared with the message saying that now this firm has paid its debts. It seems that the scale of this system of social control is much larger than other's systems.

Informal Institutions

The traditional institutions

The traditional institutions does not play a significant role in the social life of Bishkek. It can be explained by the difficulty to keep traditionalism on the scale of cosmopolite Bishkek.

The institution of criminal world

This institution does not play such an important role as in 90's any more. During this period particular criminal system was established in KR. This system was not the same as in other parts of ex-USSR. *Vor v zakone* did not play a crucial role in the criminal world, on the

contrary network of sportsmen (with Yrysbek Atambekov as a leader) dominated this sphere. Sportsmen displaced criminal authorities: some of them, as Roustam Gabazov, *vor v zakone*, found refuge in Moscow and Almaty, others as famous *Osetin* were eliminated. At the end of 90's the police started take control over the sportsmen criminal network. Today, the police is successfully controlling the legal and illegal business. The domain of criminals is very limited.

No other informal institution of large scale has been identified so far.

Networks

Clan networks between Kyrgyz

The clan solidarity is weak in Bishkek. The networks based on clan/regional appurtenance still play some role in newcoming migrant communities, which live in compact areas and need a solidarity to survive in a new place. Nevertheless, this solidarity is almost absent among the citizens of Bishkek. The old traditional clan/regional solidarity has been replaced by the principles of individualism. People do not afraid of the shame (Uiat), traditional mechanism of social control, which often pushed people to help their kin. They think about their individual material gain. Notions of pragmatism are dominating people's relations.

Thus, the clan/regional solidarity has been replaced by the solidarity according to interests. The prosperous people try to keep rational solidarity with the similar people, and have quite strong networks based on mutual necessity, which permits them access to resources. The rest of population does not participate in this kind of networks, simply because of the absence of resources and potential, which can be shared within the network.

Other networks

Other networks has been identified in Bishkek. For example:

- 1) different networks of prosperous people,
- 2) networks of migrants (Turks, Chinese, Afghans, etc.),
- 3) networks of believers of newcoming religions (Catholic, Protestants, Wahabits, etc.) and sects,
- 4) networks of drug traffickers and users,
- 5) and many different networks of traders.

1.2 Comparative analysis

The difference between centre and periphery is very significant. In the Table 1 we can see the summary of social situation in Batken and Bishkek.

Table 1.

	Batken	Bishkek
Resources	Limited	Abundant
State capacities	Weak	Strong
Informal institutions	Important	Unimportant
Traditional social control	Important	Less important
Networks	Based on clan/regional appurtenance	Based on individual interests, pragmatism

- 1) Resources are abundant in the capital and limited in Batken: one can make a conclusion that people in Batken have much more reasons for uprising than people in Bishkek.
 - 2) State capacities are weak in Batken and strong in Bishkek: in this situation it is more easier to organize people for an uprising in Batken than in Bishkek.
 - 3) Informal institutions and traditional social control play more important role in Batken than in Bishkek: we can conclude that population of Batken can be manipulated with the help of the Informal institutions and the Social control.
 - 4) Networks of Batken are based on clan/regional appurtenance - Networks of Bishkek are based on individual interests and pragmatism: the population of Batken can be easily manipulated and mobilized through these networks. In Bishkek it is more difficult, because the reason of existence of these networks is mutual pragmatic interests.
- Thus, we can see that the manipulation of people in Batken is easier than in Bishkek, also in Batken there is more possibility of mobilization of people for the conflict or uprising. This assumption can be also proved by several examples, when the mobilization of people for uprising started on periphery, then had an echo in the capital : Osh – Uzgen 1990, Talas 2000, Aksay 2002.

2 Preliminary results

2.1 Soviet period

During the period of Soviet union Kyrghyz traditional social structure was in the situation of “**Oppression**”. The state tried to control all social life of Kyrghyz society, therefore oppressed all traditional institutions, social mechanisms and networks based on clan/regional appurtenance (so cold *zemliachestvo*). Nevertheless, the Soviet state did not succeed. Traditional system continued to play some role in the society, but not explicitly and not very active. People tried to hidden the practice of traditional rules and norms in their every day life. There was a hidden competition between elites of different regions. Brief, networks based on clan/region appurtenance played some little role in access to resources, despite the oppression by the state.

2.2 The end of the USSR and the beginning of 90’s

After the collapse of the Soviet state and the begginig of 90’s, the clan/regional solidarity played openly an important role in people relations on the scale of KR. The practicing of traditional rules and norms became open and even demonstrative. The appurtenance to particular clan/region had a significance for access to resources, especially in the state institutions. There was also competition between different clan/region groups. The particular importance had a separation on North and South.

This phenomenon can be explained by the following factors:

- 1) after the collapse of Soviet union people tended to all traditional notions, which were oppressed by communists (especially clan/regional system of Kyrghyz people),
- 2) people tried to achieve a success with the help of clan/regional solidarity, because their potential was quite equal,
- 3) there is old traditional opposition between the North and the South of KR,
- 4) the elites needed the support of their clan/region group, and had relatively strong connections with them via the network.

At this moment, if one clan/regional group would capture all access to resources, and displace another group, then the risk of interregional conflict would be certainly high. That is what I call the situation of “**Capture**”. Nevertheless, the KR managed to escape this situation, which can lead to a conflict. There are several reasons for this:

- 1) the last first Secretary of the Communist party of KR was a Southern one, thus Southern Kyrgyzes were already present in key positions, and no one regional group was able to displace another one from the stake,
- 2) the wave of nationalism and trend to traditional notions came down, people did not pay so much attention to the clan/region appurtenance any more, as it was the case just after the collapse of the USSR,
- 3) the policy of the president A. Akaev, which chose the democratic way of development and avoided any autocratic methods till the end of 90's, was equally favourable for different clan/region groups. But on the other hand, this policy can be explained by the fact that the opposition of the president A. Akaev was from the same region as him – the North. With the aim to achieve the support of the people, he did not run the policy of exclusion of elites of other clan/region groups from the power.

2.3 The period of 90's – today

During the 90's and still today, two trends are dominating the social life of KR: first is the situation of “**Compromise**” and the second is the “**Stratification**”.

With the arrival of the market economy and principles of individualism, some part of population, especially the elite, started think about immediate personal material gain, the clan/regional appurtenance is not so important any more. The appurtenance to the clan/region is not the key important argument in personnel administration, the most and even the only important argument is a bribe. The corruption permeated all social structure from the top to the down. Old soviet networks, such a *blat*, do not work any more. People who worked in the state structures during the Soviet union and practiced *blat*, can not get any effect with this instrument today. For example: if someone call to *nachalnik* by *blat*, and ask him to help someone, the *nachalnik* will say : “Yes, certainly I will help. Just leave your papers to my subordinate and take it on the next week”. On the next week subordinate will find some excuse to not give the papers, and it can continue and continue, till the person will not give the bribe to the subordinate. Then, subordinate will give this bribe to his *nachalnik*, who will play a role that he knows nothing about this bribe and that he will punish his subordinate.

Traditional solidarities also do not work effectively. For example: if one wants to get a vacant post and will go for the help to his kin - *nachalnik*, the *nachalnik*-kin will promise the help, but will give the place to someone who has paid a bribe. Thus, the main part of the elite do not follow principles of clan/regional solidarity any more, or follow it only when they need it. The elite of different networks based on clan/regional appurtenance found a compromise for the access to resources. At the same time they started to detach from the ordinary members of their clan and to create links with the prosperous elite of other groups. These elites do not compete amongst them, but try to be solidier in their manipulation of the people. Some people do not believe to their elites and to the traditional principles of solidarity any more (that is especially true for cities such as Bishkek).

The corrupted elites use the networks based on clan/regional appurtenance for their own purpose. At the local level (ex. Batken) they manipulated the institution of *aksakals* with the aim to create a public opinion and get people's support. For example: they invites local aksakals to the banquet, presents them some gifts and promises, in order to get their support. Then, aksakals create public opinion in the framework of *Urp-adat*. The institution of *aksakals* was even formalized and included into constitution of KR. The presence of strong traditional social control (*Urp adat*) is in the interest of elite, that's why they organize *Kurultai* (international congress of all Kyrghyz people) every three years. On the other hand people do not believe to these principles any more, they even found a name for those aksakals who help manipulate the population – “*dejurnie aksakaly*”.

The president also demonstrated that the appurtenance to a specific clan does not mean a lot, what is important is the loyalty to the actual authority. He encircled himself with people from different clans, regions, ethnical groups, which were loyal to his governance. Thus, the state authorities did not pay much attention to the clan/region appurtenance, and showed that this fact is not important for access to resources.

Nevertheless, there is also new elites, which do not have an access to resources and compete with the authority. They manipulate people, again with the same mechanism, through networks based on clan/regional appurtenance, using aksakals as opinion makers and operating mechanisms of *Urp-adat*. That was happened in the Aksy events of 2002. The clear situation of “Compromise” has been obviously achieved after these events, because of the mistake of authorities. In this case, authorities did not follow their strategy, which led to the situation of “Stratification”.

In 2002, some southern leaders, which did not have access to resources, tried to mobilize people against the authorities. Authorities did not try to buy out, or found other compromise, with the leader of Aksy, but tried to punish them and to put to the prison. Here, they wanted to eliminate the key figures, which in fact could be used for manipulation of the people. As a consequence, some networks of the Southern elite mobilized people through the networks based on regional appurtenance and more specifically on clan appurtenance against the actual authorities. This movement was quickly jointed by the political opposition from the rest of KR. The authorities presented it as a confrontation between the North and the South.

After several months of confrontation between the authorities and the people, authorities had to cede and a compromise was found. Several people (Northens) were dismissed from their key positions and their posts were given to people from the South. For example: prosecutor, governor of Osh oblast, ombudsman.

Thus, today, there is a sharing of the power among the elite of different regions and clans, but also very intensive process of stratification of the society to different stratas: reach and poor.

It has to be quoted, that, there is a huge difference in the situation of the capital and periphery. The features of the situation “Stratification” is very obvious in Bishkek, but weak in Batken. In Batken old traditional principles and norms still play an important role. The traditional social control, the institution and networks of aksakals are still relatively strong. That is why it is easier for Batken elite to manipulate the population.

Nevertheless, the very intensive economical and social development of Batken oblast, which has started after the incursions of 1999 and 2000, is changing the situation in this region, promoting the new principles of individualism and pragmatism, and making the manipulation of locals more difficult. This fact permits the faster transition of Batken society to the situation “Fusion”, which leads to the successful state building.

3. Methodology

The method of analysis – Cross Cutting Issues, was used within the project of GTZ “Batken capacities building: Food security, Regional cooperation and Stability”, which had a place in Batken oblast of KR from the beginning of September till the end of November 2003. This method was used by the group of 8 people as an instrument of analysis for conflict assessment in different localities, but also for general overview of conflict potential in Batken oblast.

The results of this analysis conduced to evaluation of recommendations for further activities of GTZ in Batken oblast. On the other hand, this empirical work was also a basis for critics and conclusions of methodological aspect of Cross Cutting Issues. These conclusions are evaluated in this chapter and are divided on two different categories : positive and negative points of Cross Cutting Issues.

1.1 Positive points

Full picture of social reality

Intricacy of societies, which have parallel informal structures, make it difficult to understand a particular social process or social reality in general. The presence of two social structures : formal and informal, and the fact that one of them exists in the shadow of other, make the analysis difficult. The analysis of formal social structure, without taking in consideration informal structure, does not permit to elaborate full and clear picture about the society. On the other hand, the analysis of only shadow social structure does not explicate the reality. Thus, a complete analysis necessities to take into consideration formal and informal or parallel system of society. Nevertheless, this is a very difficult task, since there is no elaborated method of analyzing of such a complex societies.

In this context, the method of Cross cutting issues is very useful for the analysis, because it takes into consideration both formal and informal social systems. This method permits to decompose the general social structure on its different elements and to analyze them separately, though without taking them out of the general context. The matrix is a kind of social map, which permits to see the social reality and its different elements not in narrative way, but in a structural and systematic way.

For example, the social reality of Kyrgystan has been developed in a vast literature, nevertheless, only the matrix can give a **fast and complete vision of social reality**.

- **Two dimensions**

The matrix has two dimensions : horizontal and vertical. Both of them can be used with different aims. Horizontally it can be used for collecting of data, vertically for analysis. In Batken fieldwork, the matrix was used differently according to these two dimensions. At the first stage (collecting of data), the matrix was used horizontally, without taking into account its vertical dimension. It means that all collected data, even that, which was not pertinent, was put into horizontal lines of the matrix. Then, when it was considered that collected data is enough for analysis, the second stage – analysis has been started. At this stage the role of the vertical dimension of the matrix was the essential. Questions, which have been asked at this stage, were put vertically. The analysis followed vertical direction and proceeded all horizontal data. At this stage it become clear which data is important for the analysis and which is not. It is possible to analyze only useful data and to delete the rest. Thus, **the matrix can be used for collecting of data (ex. Table 1), as well as for analysis of it (ex. Table 2).**

Table 1. Matrix using for collecting of data.

Conflict Arena :	Kyshtut AO							
1. Resources 1.1 type 1.2 control of 1.3 distribution of 1.4 dependence on 1.5 change of 1.6 Actual and eventual role in conflict	Land		Water		Information		Roads	
2. Networks 2.1 what is exchanged 2.2 size and scale 2.3 glue / reinforcing social ties (e.g. kin, friendship, zemliachestvo) 2.4 rational of investment in networking 2.5 asymmetry (patron-client relations) 2.6 Rules of inclusion and exclusion 2.7 Actual and eventual role in conflict	Clan networks	Networks between wrestlers.	Aksakals networks	Networks between border post employees	Networks between cross border traders	Networks between taxis drivers	Networks between drug traffickers	Network between migrants
3. Local informal institutions 3.1 conflict processing capacities 3.2 distribution of resources 3.3 scale / inclusiveness 3.4 sanctions and profit 3.5 clientalism / patronage 3.6 competition or integration with official institutions 3.7 Actual and eventual role in conflict	Aksakals institute		Ashar		Dervishana		Gap	

<p>4. Local state capacities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 5.1 provision of public goods 5.2 provision of network goods 5.3 Sanction capacities 5.4 clientelism / patronage 5.5 Legitimacy 5.6 Organisation and efficiency of extraction 5.7 Actual and eventual role in conflict 	<p>Medecine</p>	<p>Security</p>	<p>Education</p>
<p>5. Social Control</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6.1 value system 6.2 mutual threat 6.3 scale of control 6.4 information makers/takers 3.3 rules of inclusion and exclusion 3.4 Actual and eventual role in conflict 	<p>Urp adat</p>		

Table 2. Matrix using for analysis of data.

<p>Conflict Arena :</p>	<p>Kyshtut AO (Kyrgyzstan)</p>	
<p>1. Resources 1.1 type 1.2 control of 1.3 distribution of 1.4 dependence on 1.5 change of 1.6 Actual and eventual role in conflict</p>	<p>Land Land is the most important resource in this AO, due to the extended agricultural sector. Control and distribution of land belong to the state institutions such as Gosregistr, Fond of Land Redistribution and Akimiat. This resource is depended on irrigating water, which is necessary for land using. Changes on land possession, control or distribution may provoke tensions and even violent conflicts. Actually land is a disputed resource, which can become the cause of the violent conflict.</p>	<p>Water Water is the second important resource in this AO, because the usage of land depends on this resource. The control and distribution of this resource depends on the AO and its inhabitants. There is sufficient water in this region, nevertheless, this resource depends on effective management. Today, water is a source of disputes because of the ineffective management and land disputes.</p>

<p>2. Networks</p> <p>2.1 what is exchanged</p> <p>2.2 size and scale</p> <p>2.3 glue / reinforcing social ties (e.g. kin, friendship, zemliachestvo)</p> <p>2.4 rational of investment in networking</p> <p>2.5 asymmetry (patron-client relations)</p> <p>2.6 Rules of inclusion and exclusion</p> <p>2.7 Actual and eventual role in conflict</p>	<p>Clan networks</p> <p>The clan solidarity is relatively strong in Batken region. For example in Aksay all Kirghiz belong to the clan “Awwat”, which is interlaced by other networks, such as friendship, kinship, etc., that permits to keep deeper solidarity between different villages of this region. This network permits to mobilize people from different villages at the moment of social activities or escalation of conflict. For example in the crisis of 1989, Kyrgyz from Aksay were mobilized by this network and supported inhabitants of Samarkandek.</p>	<p>Networks between wrestlers.</p> <p>This network is based on the links between wrestlers of traditional Central Asian wrestling – Kurosh. These people are united by the common occupation, which is admired by local people. All wrestlers from this region, independently of nationality, know and meet each other at celebrations (Toi) and special competitions. Thus, they have a respect of people and cross border relations, which help them regularize disputes between members of two communities. For example, one of them – Azamkhan played several times a role as a mediator between communities at the moment of escalation between communities. But in periods of violent conflicts this network can also help to mobilize and to organize particularly young people for collective action.</p>	<p>Aksakals networks</p> <p>These network is based on the exchange of information between aksakals of different villages, and communities. The size of this network transcend the boundaries of AO and links aksakals of Kyshtut AO with aksakals from the Sokh enclave. The glue of this network is a friendship between aksakals, which is based on passed experience and common traditional values and rules. Aksakals participating in this network have a high respect and authority within the society. More actively aksakals participate, more respect he will receive. Actual role in the latent conflict is preventing of escalations and increasing of peace potential. In the case of escalation the network can play a role of the mediating mechanism.</p>	<p>Networks between cross border traders</p> <p>As it was noted before, there is an active cross border trade in the region, which is taking place on the special markets directly on the border with RU (Adyr, Halmion) and also on some sources of raw materials. The following goods are exchanged: from RU - oil, fertilizer and concrete; from KR – goods imported from China, Korea, Turkey, etc. This business connects people from both sides of the frontier and creates strong trans-border networks of people with the same aims and interests. The traders need stability for the prosperity of their business; any tensions in the region would have a negative impact on their activity. Thus, these networks play a peace potential role and promote stability.</p>
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<p>3. Local informal institutions</p> <p>3.1 conflict processing capacities</p> <p>3.2 distribution of resources</p> <p>3.3 scale / inclusiveness</p> <p>3.4 sanctions and profit</p> <p>3.5 clientalism / patronage</p> <p>3.6 competition or integration with official institutions</p> <p>3.7 Actual and eventual role in conflict</p>	<p>Aksakals institute</p> <p>Institute of aksakals definitely has a conflict processing capacities as within one community as between two communities. Aksakals have the control over the traditional system of social control – Urp adat, where they have mechanisms of sanctions and awards. Via this mechanism they can mobilize people for peace and but also for conflict. This institution includes Aksakals only of the Kyshtut AO, nevertheless it has strong ties with the same institutions in other AO, but also in neighboring Tajik villages of Sokh. Today using its control over the society and network ties with the community of other side of the border, this institution promotes peace and stability, nevertheless, it has also capacities for violent mobilization of youth.</p>	<p>Ashar</p> <p>Inhabitants of Kyrgyz and Tajik communities clean the canal by the method of Ashar. The Ashar includes locals almost from each household of both communities. This institution has a high conflict processing capacities, because of the trust building between two communities at the moment of the collective work.</p> <p>This activity is profitable for all inhabitants of both communities.</p> <p>This institution plays an active role in increasing of peace potential.</p>
<p>4. Local state capacities</p> <p>4.1 provision of public goods</p> <p>4.2 provision of network goods</p> <p>4.3 Sanction capacities</p> <p>4.4 clientalism / patronage</p> <p>4.5 Legitimacy</p> <p>4.6 Organisation and efficiency of extraction</p> <p>4.7 Actual and eventual role in conflict</p>	<p>Local state capacities are particularly weak in this AO. For example state is not present at such sectors as water distribution or water sharing. It is all managed by the inhabitants of AO.</p> <p>Some goods provided by the state has been turned for well-being of some limited networks. For example control over the transit roads.</p> <p>Organization of local state is not efficient. There are several reasons for this, but one particular reason is the absence of non-transit roads connecting the villages of AO.</p> <p>State is promoting the growing of conflict potential by providing network goods, nevertheless, it can play a decisive role at the moment of escalations.</p>	
<p>5. Social Control</p> <p>5.1 value system</p> <p>5.2 mutual threat</p> <p>5.3 scale of control</p> <p>5.4 information makers/takers</p> <p>3.5 rules of inclusion and exclusion</p> <p>3.6 Actual and eventual role in conflict</p>	<p>Urp adat</p> <p>Urp adat is a traditional system of social control - traditional law. The control over this system belongs to the aksakals, which have special instruments for sanction (Uiat) or awards. The scale of Urp adat is transgress AO, republic and even CA region. It has a conflict processing capacities and play the crisis preventing role in this region. Nevertheless, such mechanisms of Urp adat as shame (Uiat) can be used for conflict promoting.</p>	

- **Flexibility**

The matrix is flexible, it means that according to different situations and needs, some categories, elements, questions can be deleted, and new can be add to it. It can work without some parts of it (for example : networks, or resources, etc), or with some new parts (for example: formal non-governmental organizations). These changes do not disturb the functioning of the matrix, but on the contrary, can ameliorate it by adapting it to the new requirements. **The matrix is not an unchangeable construction.**

- **Multifunctional**

With the help of the matrix we can analyze the whole conflict arena, but also we can analyze the logic and the importance of only one category of it. For example, if we are studying the whole conflict arena, then all categories of the matrix are equal amongst them and their role is analyzed accordingly to the whole conflict. But, if we are studying the role of only one category in the conflict, then, this category becomes the essential, is put on the top of the matrix, and the rest of categories are analyzed accordingly to this major category.

Thus, we can specify the research on the general issue of the conflict arena, but also on its separate elements.

1.2 Negative points

- Complex for outsider

One of the negative points is the complexity of the analysis for outsider. It is quite difficult to understand the results and the logic of the analysis without additional explanation. First of all, there is a need to explain concepts used in the research, than, to explain the logic of the matrix.

- Static

The matrix does not show any evolution in time. This is an assessment of the present situation and it is not possible to see the dynamics of the conflict. There is a need for additional instruments and analysis for the evaluation of dynamic of the conflict.