

**Research Project: New and Ambiguous Nation-Building Processes
in South-Eastern Europe**

Working Paper Series

CONSTRUCTING THE NATIONALIST IMAGE AND CONFRONTATION
WITH MUSLIM NATIONALISTS – THE LAWSUIT AGAINST MUSLIM
INTELLECTUALS IN 1983

Dženita Sarač

http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/nation-building/resources/wp/sarac_03

The project is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF).



The logo for the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), consisting of the letters "FWF" in a bold, blue, sans-serif font.

Approach:

The lawsuit against certain Muslim intellectuals which took place in Sarajevo in 1983 has its pre-history - both the pre-history of the lawsuit and the lawsuit itself are difficult to understand without an overview of the historical context in which the occasion took place. In order to examine the historical circumstances in which the lawsuit took place, we have decided to modify the so-called constructivist model formerly developed by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, sociologists whose work falls within the framework of sociology of knowledge and the theory of the social construction of reality. They have namely discovered that there were situations when *people construct their consciousness of a certain social reality* which is then being placed within *the objective social reality* and thus reify the social and political context in line with their political or some other interests.¹ However, one should not believe that reification means degeneration of the genuine world. Berger and Luckmann claim:

Reification is possible on both the pretheoretical and theoretical levels of consciousness (...) It would (...) be an error to limit the concept of reification to mental constructions of intellectuals. Reification exists in the consciousness of the man in the street and, indeed, the latter presence is more practically significant. It would also be a mistake to look at reification as a perversion of an originally nonreified apprehension of the social world, a sort of cognitive fall from grace.²

This model – *reification of reality* is applicable for the analysis of the lawsuit against the Muslim intellectuals in Sarajevo in 1983. Bearing in mind the political and social context after Tito's death in 1980 and the changes that appeared on the Yugoslav political horizon, the BH ruling political elite of the time, attempting to save their own political positions, simply *constructed the consciousness* of the nationalist danger coming from the Muslim intelligence; the awareness construed in that manner was then "inserted" into *the realistic objective reality*, spread within the objective reality thus *reifying* that consciousness and then confronting it during the aforementioned lawsuit. Of course, *that was not a completely invented reality*, but it had been constructed in line with the political interests of the ruling elite and had a certain impact on the future development of the Muslim national identity.

¹ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge*. Translated by Srđan Dvornik, Zagreb:Naprijed, 1992.

² P. L. Berger and Th. Luckman, p. 112.

Applying this constructivist theory on a concrete case – the lawsuit against certain Muslim intellectuals in 1983, we wish to emphasise the difference between the *constructed* and *realistic* reality. The image of Bosnia as a *dark province* and *centre of the aggressive Muslim nationalism* would continue to be developed even after 1983, and the BH political elite, regardless of their belief that they would overcome the challenges of a new era by confronting *the aggressive Muslim nationalism* in 1983, were soon swept away from the historical scene by a number of constructed political affairs in the middle of the 1980's.

Constructing the Nationalist Image at the Beginning of the 1980's

The 1980's began with two significant milestones which had farfetched consequences on the entire socio-political situation in Yugoslavia. The first milestone was the deaths of Edvard Kardelj in 1979 and Josip Broz Tito in 1980.

The second event was the outburst of turmoil in Kosovo in the spring of 1981 and almost simultaneously we see the appearance of the "critical intelligence".

The Constitution from 1974 granted Tito an endless mandate and his actions were no longer subject to political verification, but at the same time, it prevented the appearance of a "new Tito" and thus, the detitoinisation of Yugoslavia began with this new Constitution itself, while Tito was alive, in order to continue even after his death.³

Tito's death caused the political centre to lose its power to effectively inhibit the centrifugal forces, i.e. to prevent the political parties to rely on traditional goals with reference to other communist parties in the republics.⁴

In March 1981, Albanians organised mass-demonstrations in Kosovo. The Communist League of Serbia and the Communist League of Yugoslavia marked the event as contra-revolutionary irredentist-nationalist attempts to create ethnically cleansed Albanian republic within Yugoslavia which had a perspective to subsequently unify itself with Albania.⁵

Additionally, Albanian communists have severely criticised the protests, pronounced them as being nationalist and emphasised the importance of the Yugoslav unity. As by a rule,

³ Dejan Jović, *Jugoslavija država koja je odumrla. Uspon , kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije* (Yugoslavia, a Country which Died out. The Rise and Fall of Kardelj's Yugoslavia) (1974-1990). Zagreb:Prometej 2003. p. 75

⁴ Duško Sekulić, *Sukobi i tolerancija. O društvenoj uvjetovanosti nacionalizma i demokracija*, (Conflicts and Tolerance. On Social Conditions of Nationalism and Democracy), Zagreb :Naklada Jesenski i Turk 2004. p. 66

⁵ Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945-2005. (A Closer Look at the Past. Memoirs 1945-2005)* Zagreb: Prometej, 2006. p. 70

communists were expected to fight nationalism most responsibly in their own nation. The example was also followed by Albanian communists.⁶

The events in Kosovo were significantly responded to and had negative reflections in the rest of Yugoslavia.⁷ The Party's leadership in Serbia imposes the issue of the revision of federalism, criticises its functioning, position and the roles of the federal centre, the existing inter-republic, regional and multi-national relationships, with the thesis that the Constitution and practice had taken a turn towards confederalism.⁸

Serbian authorities pointed at the destruction of nationalism, escalation of the Albanian, i.e. Muslim nationalism and warned that a similar thing might happen in other parts of the country as well. Federal authorities criticised the issues of "federating the federation", closing in into the state's own borders, creating a fatal national policy, economics, trade. Under a strong influence of the Serbian political authorities, the federal leadership soon issued a permission to the Communist League of Serbia to carry out a political analysis of Serbian regions.⁹

The issue of relationships in the Federation was brought up at the Serbian Communist League meeting held from 24th to 26th December 1981. Among other things, the thesis that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an anational republic and an artificial creation along with the negation of the identity of Muslim people had been imposed at that meeting. Other regions and the federation itself were accused of all the difficulties and events in Serbia in a most nationalist and great-Serbian manner. Although there had also been different points of view,

⁶ Dejan Jović, p. 286

⁷ Commenting on the events in Yugoslavia after the protests in Kosovo, Predrag Marković said: „National problems in Kosovo were discussed in public and at the meetings of the highest party's and state organs, particularly the issue of the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins. Federal and republican communist authorities emphasised the necessity of a better integration of Kosovo into the state's economy and culture, as well as the measures which should be taken in order to prevent Serbs and Montenegrins to emigrate from Kosovo. Since 1982, a public debate on a better centralisation of both the Party and the State was initiated in the Party's highest circles. The regime intensified its policy towards nationalists in all Federal republics, and so we witness the prohibition of the „nationalist“ play *Golubnjača* in Serbia (1982), the lawsuit against the „Muslim nationalists“ with Alija Izetbegović in the forefront in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1983). “

Predrag Marković, *Trajnost i promena. Društvena istorija socijalističke i postsocijalističke svakodnevnice u Jugoslaviji i Srbiji, (Continuity and Change. Social History of the Socialist and Post-socialist Everyday Life in Yugoslavia nad Serbia)* Beograd: Službeni glasnik 2007. p. 24

⁸ Dušan Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980-1985. (Yugoslavia after Tito 1980-1985)* Zagreb: Globus 1986. p. 145

⁹ Dušan Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980-1985. (Yugoslavia after Tito 1980-1985)* Zagreb: Globus 1986. p. 85

the Serbian Communist League did not distance itself from such claims. The meeting was utterly shocking, disturbing and caused a lot of concern in other republics and regions.¹⁰

Under a strong influence of the Serbian leadership, the *Federal centre* attempted to destabilise the respective republican elites, particularly in Croatia¹¹ and Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹² Compromising the republican elites was done by associating them with certain enemies, whereas in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the elite had been associated with nationalism. According to the theory of the existence of three types of communist party's strategies (1. political orthodoxy (communism with strong elements of Stalinism) which used nationalism to remain in power, 2. communist orthodoxy and a non-national party, 3. communist orthodoxy and extreme nationalism), the communist party of BH belonged to the second type.¹³

As opposed to other republics in which the domination of the most numerous nation could be felt, the BH conditions dictated the communist party to be "Bosnian", i.e. a party of Brotherhood and Unity, of all nations. In such specific circumstances of a multi-religious and multi-national republic, the Communist League of BH had to be completely loyal to the communist doctrine, i.e. to the communist balance, since every preference for a particular nation could lead to the destabilisation of the republic and the position of the authorities.

Hence, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a much more severe fight against all types of nationalism.¹⁴

¹⁰ Raif Dizdarević, *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije. Svjedočenja, (From Tito's Death to the Death of Yugoslavia. Testimonies)* Sarajevo: Oko 1999. p. 91

¹¹ Attempting to dethrone the Croatian political management and destabilise Croatia, the Federal centre resorted to the indoctrination of Croatia's most powerful company INA, which had been accused of helping the Croatian political management to become rich and cooperating with the Ustashi emigration. Following the accusations from the Federal Secretary of Home Affairs, Stane Dolanc, a committee whose task was to confirm the aforementioned facts was formed. However, the accusations could not be proved. Further reading: Tvrtko Jakovina, *Tko je Hrvatskoj htio slomiti kičmu. Plan Beograda: uništiti Inu optužbama za kriminal i ustaštvo*, u *Globus Zagreb* 19.12. 2008. 36 (Who wanted to break Croatia's Back. Belgrade's plan: destroy INA with accusations for criminal activities and Ustasism, in *Globus Zagreb*, 19th December 2008, p.36)

¹² By providing political support to the Bosniak, i.e. Muslim nation through the Federal Constitution of 1974 the unity of BH was guaranteed. In the 1970's, Bosnia was lead by Bosnians and strengthened as it was, the country managed to escape the Serbian domination. Further reading: Šaćir Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX stoljeću*. Sarajevo: Sejtarija 1998. p. 252. In accordance with Filandra's conclusion was the note by Dušan Bilandžić from November 1981. „BH has definitely built a powerful economic structure for which the federal centralism is no longer suitable. Energoinvest used to be a mere cheap store as opposed to Končar, but now it is three times more powerful. Vojvodina shall also resist the Serbian pressure.“ Dušan Bilandžić, *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945-2005*. Zagreb: Prometej, 2006, p. 226-227 We can conclude from what has been stated above that the Federal centre was concerned about the political and economic independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which simulataneously weakened its own strength and reputation.

¹³ Duško Sekulić, p. 47

¹⁴ The tendency to weaken Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate republic with a strong republican elite was discussed at the meetings of highest BH authorities. The following quotation relates to the introductory

The management reacted harshly to the “internal nationalism”, as well as to the actions and allusions from Belgrade and Zagreb which doubted the republican status and the policy of the BH authorities. A rigid political course and punishments for nationalist excesses was differently commented on in the rest of Yugoslavia: the reactions ranged from understanding and approval to criticisms which at times went to extremes labelling BH as a “dark province”.¹⁵

Following the events in Kosovo, the marginal political elites, as well as the intellectuals criticising the stream situation came into prominence. The “new forces” were known as “critical intelligence” in the public discourse.¹⁶

Bosnia and Herzegovina and its political authorities found themselves in the centre of “intelligence’s” criticism. Bosnian authorities were accused of a steel-hand policy, orthodox communism and Stalinism, conservatism and Titoism, preventing all kinds of artistic freedom. Bosnia and Herzegovina was presented as a *dark province* out of which all those who did not “think and act” in line with the instructions of the political elite were forced to move. “Critical intelligence” used printed media to express their opinion, and individuals who moved out of Bosnia and Herzegovina were used to confirm the thesis about the “dark province”. Accepting and promoting “Bosnians” in Belgrade’s intellectual circles created a paradox that “what had been nourished in one city was prohibited in the other; what had been rewarded in one republic, was labelled as “unfriendly” in the other; someone had been suspended at one University but was welcome at two others.”¹⁷

presentation held at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 16th September 1982. The presentation was held by Hamdija Pozderac, the President of the Committee. „Talking about the tendencies to abolish the republics and regions which are a negative consequence of this phase of our socio-economic development, and discussing those tendencies from the perspective of the centralist-unitarist concept of relationships within the Federation itself are two completely different issues.“ According to Hamdija Pozderac, the first was heading towards the development and upgrade of the AVNOJ (the Anti-Fascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia) principles in line with further strengthening of the autonomous position of common affairs and overall social relationships, and the second issue related to the destruction of AVNOJ and its gradual weakening with the aim to bring the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both as a state and as an autonomous socialist unit into question once again and with the same ideology as in the past, simultaneously jeopardising AVNOJ’s and Tito’s Yugoslavia. „At that very front, we have noticed attempts of malicious, untruthful and intriguing treatment of certain issues of life and work in our republic“, Dušan Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980-1985. (Yugoslavia after Tito 1980-1985)* Zagreb: Globus 1986. p. 170

¹⁵ Dušan Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980-1985. (Yugoslavia after Tito 1980-1985)* Zagreb: Globus 1986. p. 147

¹⁶ Dušan Bilandžić, *Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980-1985. (Yugoslavia after Tito 1980-1985)* Zagreb: Globus 1986. p. 178

¹⁷ Nenad Kecmanović, *Sve naše razlike (All our differences)*, in *Danas* No. 49 25.1 1983. „Polemike, reagovanja, tendencije u štampi“, *Odjeljenje za informacije i propagandu CK SK BiH*, januar 1983. p. 26 („Controversies, reactions and tendencies in the press“, Information and Propaganda Section – Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, January 1983, 26)

All the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina were in the focus of the press. Much had been written about nationalism in BH, its awakening and goals. “Nin” was basically struggling to present the real truth about the events in Bosnia, its example being followed by Zagreb newspaper “Danas” and Ljubljana’s “Večernji list”. However, their articles had already been marked as “writings of a doubtful political and ethical value.”¹⁸

Individuals, particularly intellectuals who were leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina were a constant motive for reporting on the situation in BH and the reason for criticising the activities of the communist League of BH.

Writings in other republics attempted to “present” “the aggression of Muslim nationalism in BH in the sphere of cultural life. Such “Muslim nationalism” produced works such as a book written by Muhsin Rizvić or a separate on BH in Yugoslav Encyclopaedia; all those who had acted or written differently were “excommunicated”. Writings about “Muslim nationalism” proved the actions of “militant Islam and pan Islamism in BH” which had found its ally and support in the Party or the individuals within the Party. The feature of nationalism of that kind was the religious element that was represented as a foundation of “Muslim nationalism”. Hence, BH saw a certain “Islamisation of the country” and “Islamisation of Muslims” and thus it came to be a dangerous ground for Serbian intellectuals in the first place. The most frequently used phrase was “the upcoming domination of the Bosnian spirit” which was “cooperating with a segment of the official structure”. The Communist League of BH was labelled as a “criminal organisation” and its individuals “all-time-attending theologians” “sadistic guardians of revolution” and “Party’s dervishes”. A unique media hunt after the so-called Sarajevo Circle rose out of the aforementioned issue with an “neostalinist assault squad in Yugoslavia”. The circle was also known as the “Intellectual lumpenproletariat” and “Vučko’s and Bosnian oligarchy’s loyal servants”.¹⁹

In general terms, writings on nationalism in BH were actually reports on Muslim nationalism which was, induced by the events in Kosovo (the escalation of Albanian Muslim nationalism), apparently jeopardising the existence of “others” in BH.

¹⁸BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, document: magnetic tape recording (authorised discussions) of the common session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist League of BH and the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 22nd January 1983. p. 113

¹⁹BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Congress Material 1984 box, Propaganda and Information Section, *Counselling material on idealist movements*, p.4

The Communist League of BH marked such reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ruling political elite as an attempt to “destroy the Yugoslav federal unit BH as a state and an autonomous socialist unit”.²⁰

The subject of great interest of the “critical circles” was a book written by a BH sociologist Esad Ćimić titled “Politics as a Destiny”, serving as a point in a wider interrepublican discussion on the “revival of evil spirits from the past” and “the faults of the system and its future”. “Oslobođenje” characterised the book as an attack on politics, particularly the politics of the Communist League of BH and on the socialist autonomy.²¹

The „critical circles“ in Belgrade represented the book as an intimate confession of the downfall of an intellectual “who refuses to think dogmatically, expelled from the Communist League, removed from his position as a professor at the University of Sarajevo”, and served as a “Contribution to the phenomenology of political hardships”.²²

The book served as an example of political repression, whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sarajevo were represented as “a dark province” in which “the iron fist of the Party was the sole ruler”. A real republican polarisation had been carried out and thus on the one hand, Serbian press was actually editing an ode to Ćimić’s book, while on the other, the BH press and to an extent in Croatia expressed serious objections to the writings and a general lack of scientific argumentation.”²³

The acceptance of dissidents from Bosnia and Herzegovina in other regions was seen by the BH authorities as an action of the “unitarist and nationalist circles” of Belgrade and Zagreb which emphasised the necessity of “democratisation” of the Socialist Republic of

²⁰ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, document: magnetic tape recording (authorised discussions) of the common session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist League of BH and the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 22nd January 1983. p. 3

²¹ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH „Polemike, reagovanja, tendencije u štampi“, Odjeljenje za informacije i propagandu CK SK BiH, januar 1983. 17 („Controversies, reactions and tendencies in the press“, Information and Propaganda Section – Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, January 1983, 17)

²² BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH „Polemike, reagovanja, tendencije u štampi“, Odjeljenje za informacije i propagandu CK SK BiH, januar 1983. 19 („Controversies, reactions and tendencies in the press“, Information and Propaganda Section – Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, January 1983, 19)

²³ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH „Polemike, reagovanja, tendencije u štampi“, Odjeljenje za informacije i propagandu CK SK BiH, januar 1983. 21 („Controversies, reactions and tendencies in the press“, Information and Propaganda Section – Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, January 1983, 21)

Bosnia and Herzegovina which was seen as a “Bastille of the iron fist”. The dissidents²⁴ were received as “victims of Stalinism” and were welcome to stay, publish their opinion in the media and “prepare books and articles in which they would discuss the situation in BH”.²⁵

Criticised by the federal centre, “the opposite critical circles” and faced with “disintegrational activities performed by enemies” within the republic, the Communist League of BH found itself in a very complex situation. Discussions, controversies were held, special commissions were appointed to analyse disputable and stream issues; however, a certain disunity of the Communist League of BH could be felt in the discussions on those issues. Within the Party there were different, even opposing opinions. A unique opinion about the further actions did not exist, i.e. about possible solutions to the existing state of affairs in which the republic and the Party found themselves.“. There is no clear attitude towards the question whether the “growing nationalism”, its causes and goals should be publicly discussed.

In order to avoid compromising and accusations for cooperation with “Muslim nationalism”, the BH authorities have endeavoured to find *enemies and nationalists* and to create a picture of *Muslim nationalism*. That picture was unified with the religious and worldly nationalism. The aim was to confront “Muslim nationalism” so that it could be shown that the political elite did not have anything to do with it and simultaneously confirm the strength and capabilities of the ruling elite.

The escalation of Muslim nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place on two different fronts; the first being the cooperation between culture and nationalism, i.e. nationalisation of culture and the second being the cooperation of nationalism and religion.

The documented analyses carried out by the Communist League of BH prove that the “Muslim nationalism”, which had the aim to create “an ethnically cleansed Bosnia”, had

²⁴ The term „Bosnian dissidents“ was introduced by Fuad Muhić. There is an interesting definition of „dissidents“ by Hamza Bakšić. *„The production technology for dissidents is generally well-known and practiced: creators of marginal values should be put in the focus of our attention by a number of excessive events of both public and private nature, bring them into conflict with the law, popularise them in the circle of local like-minded characters and those from abroad, and then, internationalise the whole case if possible. So far, Šešelj fitted this scheme perfectly, especially with the help of his friend Peter Hadžiristić, the correspondent of London’s „Observer“.*

(BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Propaganda and Information Section, Hamza Bakšić – The Limits of Patience overcrossed)

²⁵ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, document: magnetic tape recording (authorised discussions) of the common session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Communist League of BH and the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 22nd JANuary 1983. p. 9

frequently been discussed. “Muslim nationalists” imposed a thesis that the Serbs and Croats in BH had their homelands – Serbia and Croatia namely, that Muslims were sole autochthon inhabitants of BH and that BH was a national state for Muslims only.”²⁶

They were also associated with the claim that it was high time that “Muslims should be separated from Serbs and Croats” and that BH should exclusively belong to Muslims, and that they should organize meetings of Muslim youth. Among the most extreme cases were the “former members of the terrorist organization Young Muslims who, as the Muslim intellectual elite, worked in cooperation with the extremists from the Islamic Community as well as with the pan-Islamic circles abroad and the members of the terrorist organization called Muslim brothers who were studying at our universities at the time”. “Muslim nationalists” gathered around the Faculty of Islamic Theology took up several propagandist and publishing activities with the aim to spread pan-Islamism and turned the faculty into a centre for spreading their ideology across Europe; a similar attitude was noticed with the Islamic Centre in Zagreb. The documents stated that the clerics identified the religious and the national, while the Church was being turned into a tool of national politics, promoted the separation from other nations and prohibited girls to marry people belonging to “the other religion”.²⁷

At the beginning of the 1980’s, the attempts of cultural affirmation of Muslims were in the centre of Party’s criticisms, as well as of certain individuals and “opposing circles”. Such attempts were often presented as examples of cooperation between culture and the Muslim nationalism, i.e. as utilisation of culture for the achievement of Muslim national goals.

When Muhsin Rizvić’s book “*The Literary Life of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Period between the Two World Wars*” first appeared in 1980, it gained enormous attention from the public and served as an accusation for cooperation and support shown by the official BH politics for “Muslim nationalism”. Pero Šimunović, a professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo, published a review of the aforementioned book which would later serve as a pattern for the condemnation of “Muslim nationalism” and “Muslim fundamentalism”. The main objection to the book was its lack of the Marxist-Leninist perception of the world. The review characterised Rizvić and his book as a reflection of

²⁶ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, „Information on the activities of anti-socialist and anti-autonomous forces“ Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Presidency, Sarajevo 23rd February 1983, p. 2

²⁷BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, „Information on the activities of anti-socialist and anti-autonomous forces“ Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Presidency, Sarajevo 23rd February 1983, p.10

“Muslim nationalism”, pan-Islamism, Islamic fundamentalism, promotion of “Bosniachood”, Islamic socialism, Khomeini’s fundamentalism. Alongside Rizvić, Šimunović accused Enes Duraković and Muhamed Filipović of being advocates of the “Bosnian spirit”, Bosniachood which was the “ultimately conservative, clerical-nationalist, even clerical-fascist form of Muslim nationalism”.²⁸

Vojislav Šešelj also expressed his opinion and clearly accuse Professor Muhsin Rizvić of Muslim nationalism. His reactions were soon published in *Nin*, *Danas* and *Politika*. The newly-emerged discussion on Rizvić’s book as a work with a nationalist, pan-Islamist orientation included another person. The work of Muhamed Filipović, the creator of “the so-called Bosnian spirit and the plumes of Muslim nationalism” had frequently been discussed.²⁹

The book became the subject of manipulation; its contents and everything that could have been brought into connection with it served to prove the connection between the cultural and political authorities in BH and Muslim nationalism, i.e. to prove the claim that the nationalism was looked at benevolently by those authorities. This was particularly emphasised by the fact that the book was given the award for the book of the year by “Svjetlost” Association.³⁰

Šimunović and Šešelj, as well as some other critics of the union between “culture and nationalism”, and the “Party and the nationalists” published their works in Serbian magazines. Apart from the aforementioned cases, the activities of Lubarda had also been discussed in those magazines, as well as Atif Purivatra’s and Hasan Sušić’s participation at the Madrid

²⁸ Šaćir Filandra, *Bošnjačka politika u XX stoljeću*, Sarajevo: Sejtarija 1998. 300 Opširnije o tome n. d. 297-306 (Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo: Sejtarija 1998, p. 300; Further reading: p. 297-306)

²⁹ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Information and Propaganda Section, box Information 1981, 1982, 1983 Reactions to the book by Muhsin Rizvić *The Literary Life of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Period between the Two World Wars*, Sarajevo: Svjetlost 1981, 28th October 1982, 3

³⁰ „The Publishing Council „Svjetlost“ met on 13th October 1982 in order to „discuss certain, in political terms, extremely negative marks and pamphleteering disqualifications of Muhsin Rizvić’s book *The Literary Life of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Period between the Two World Wars*. The Publishing Council stressed the fact that the aforementioned work had gone through the customary publishing procedure which was regulated by law, that the book had been reviewed by renowned literary historians and critics (Midhat Begić, PhD and Radomir Vučković, PhD) and characterised as an undoubtedly significant scientific contribution to revealing a certain literary period and our cultural past. Stressing its scientific and research features, the jury for the annual award (Rade Petrović, PhD; Kemal Hrelja, PhD; Juraj Martinović, PhD) awarded Rizvić’s book with this significant title. Based on the meritory, professional remarks and insights into the work itself, the Publishing Council was of the opinion that the politicising evaluations resulting in the claim that Rizvić’s work was of a nationalist and pan-Islamist orientation were void of both sense and benevolence, as were the insinuations that Rizvić was promoting and glorifying the greatest war criminals in a political and literary sense.“ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Information and Propaganda Section, box Information 1981, 1982, 1983 Reactions to the book by Muhsin Rizvić *The Literary Life of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Period between the Two World Wars*, Sarajevo: Svjetlost 1981, 28th October 1982, 3

Symposium on Ghadafi's *Green Book*. The subject of numerous criticisms was also a report written by Arif Purivatra and presented at the international colloquium on Moammar Al-Ghadafi's *Green Book* held at the Autonomous University in Madrid from 1st to 4th December 1980.

Among other things which were presented in the report, Purivatra emphasised the necessity for a detailed analysis of the theory of the Lybian "socialist path" with the aim to introduce the two socialist paths of development to one another.³¹

This was reason enough for the Party in BH to be accused of cooperating with "Muslim nationalists", and Party members as Muslim nationalists under cover. Drašković. Lubarda and Šešelj³² were the most prominent persons who criticised the Communist League of BH for their "affection for Muslim nationalism".

In one of those texts, Lubarda classified the bearers of "Muslim nationalism" in Bosnia and Herzegovina into three categories: those who publicly expressed the idea of "Muslim nationalism" belonged to the first category (e.g. Rizvić and Filipović); those who were hidden promoters of nationalism, pan-Islamism and Ayatullahism belonged to the second, and those who were in the midst of the discrepancy between the Marxist doctrine and Islamic ideology belonged to the third category. According to Lubarda, Arif Purivatra represented the second category, i.e. as the member of the communist party he had been a disguised promoter of Muslim nationalism, pan-Islamism and Ayatullahism.³³

A special topic in the press was the organisation of the Winter Olympic Games which were mockingly commented on, with open doubts concerning their realisation.³⁴ The

³¹ Atif Purivatra, *Libyan Green Book. Certain Issues concerning the Third Universal Theory*. in *Odjek* No. 1.1981.17. Even though Purivatra praised Ghadafi's work and ideas he brought out in the *Green Book* to a great extent, he also expressed a certain reserve when it comes to the application of the basic principles of the book „bearing in mind the enormous Yugoslav experience in the theoretical design and practical realisation of the Yugoslav autonomous socialism which, despite certain difficulties and weaknesses, is successfully being developed as a specific feature of development of certain countries, a detailed and comprehensive argumentation, i.e. a scientific justification and elaboration of certain institutes of the *Green Book* would be useful. It is emphasised that the book was „the messenger pointing at the right path to all peoples.“; the statements that „every other system apart from that of People's Conferences was non-democratic“ and that the application of the third universal theory „solves the problem of democracy in the whole world“ and that, with its help, „the problem of democracy would be solved“ are brought into doubt, and hence, their theoretical elaboration would be most welcome!“

³² For more information on articles in Belgrade's press and BH responses to their „attacks“, see Petar Jović's (a journalist working for „Oslobođenje“) book titled *Omens of aggression and other Forebodings. Reactions and Controversies 1971.1991*, Sarajevo 2003.

³³ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo 1998, p.305

³⁴ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, „Controversies, reactions and tendencies in the press“, Information and Propaganda Section – Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, January 1983, p.30

organisation of the Winter Olympics was a great challenge for the BH authorities. A successful organisation had the aim to prove that BH was a stable republic and its authorities organised and successful to both those who expressed their *bona fides* and those who did not. Propaganda, i.e. the media that followed the organisation recorded numerous contributions of citizens and associations, from religious communities to workers' unions. That was supposed to be the way to represent the support of ordinary citizens to this enormous enterprise, i.e. to BH authorities. A successful organisation of the Winter Olympics was expected to enhance the socio-economic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The president of the Organisational Board of the Winter Olympics was Branko Mikulić. Bosnian authorities' criticism which had been expressed for cooperation with Muslim nationalists did not remain on the level of accusations, since Russell's Court and Vladimir Dedijer filed a lawsuit against Branko Mikulić; the indictment was 120 pages long. Branko Mikulić was accused of "supporting pan-Islamism in BH", creating a repressed atmosphere, particularly for Serbs and Croats, favourising and prioritising the Muslims and Muslim nationalists.³⁵

However, at a meeting held on 6th June 1983, BH authorities firmly denied the accusations expressed by anarchical liberals and nationalists in Sarajevo and supporters of the great-Serbian and great-Croatian politics" which were addressed to Branko Mikulić; the accusations were marked as having the sole aim to address the national politics in BH and re-open the question of Muslims and BH as a republic" as well as to "cause intra-national conflicts by interfering into BH home affairs".³⁶

Apart from that, due to merits gained for the successful organisation of the Winter Olympics, Branko Mikulić's career was prospering, heading towards the Federal centre.

Publishing the offprint on Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia Yugoslavia was another cause for critical assaults on individuals for emphasising "the Bosnian spirit" and "Muslim nationalism" as well as on the authorities who granted their support to the editorial board. The writings of the authors of the offprint were marked as advocating an ethnically cleansed Bosnia and Herzegovina, contra-revolutionary, clericalist, whereas authors themselves were labelled as bearers of zealous Islam and zealous Christianity.³⁷

³⁵ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 341-342

³⁶ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo, 1998. p.343-344

³⁷ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo, 1998, p. 291-293

Due to certain writers who had been mentioned in the offprint, it was marked as a “chauvinist and nationalist diversion”, contra-revolutionary action, a union of zealous Islam and Christianity and an attempt to have an ethnically cleansed Bosnia.

However, as opposed to the harsh criticism addressed to the authors of the offprint for propagating the “Bosnian spirit” and to the President of the editorial board Muhamed Filipović, there was a commonly accepted opinion that such criticism was not justified. The dispute about the offprint was actually a result of personal confrontations and not a matter of “constructive criticism”.³⁸

While Husein Tahmišćić³⁹ severely criticised the offprint, Hamdija Pozderac took the side of the authors refusing to justify criticism of any sort. The offprint on Bosnia and Herzegovina was the topic of the discussion on the justification of the existence of BH as a separate historical and political entity. The seriousness of this issue is reflected in the fact that the Offprint and reactions to its publication had been the topics of discussions held at meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist League of BH and its Presidency throughout 1983, as part of the broader discussion on “political tasks of the Communist League of BH in a broader socialist and autonomous transformation of culture”. While discussing the “ideological issues upon publishing the Offprint” at the 16th session of the Central Committee of the Communist League of BH held on 7th November 1983, it was pointed out that the negative reactions should be understood as a new “wave of a negative attitude towards Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unique cultural entity”. Such negative tendencies towards BH had the aim to “dispute the cultural identity of BH” as had previously been the case with the negative reactions to the establishment of Universities, the BH Academy of Science and Arts and eventually, the Winter Olympic Games (emphasised by Dž. S.).

³⁸ BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, box: hamdija Pozderac - list of documents, Hamdija Pozderac. Presentation held at the meeting of the Association of Sarajevo's Writers, sarajevo 11th november 1983, p.8

³⁹ On one of the meetings of the Association of Sarajevo's Writers and the Communist League the Offprint was the main topic for discussion. The most eloquent criticism for the contents of the Offprint came from the writer Husein Tahmišćić. In his own words, in BH there was a union between the bearers of zealous Islam and Christianity and that among writers, sociologists and philosophers who have been acting very shrewdly against the Communist League and this republic. It can be seen in the aforementioned text (meaning the Offprint; author's remark)... Bringing his lengthy presentation to an end which was uproariously applauded to by many, Husein Tahmišćić suggested that the Association of Writers or its branch in Sarajevo address the Council of Encyclopaedia's Editorial board in writing and demand a response to the question as to what logic lay behind the Offprint, regardless of the fact that it could be easily identified as a mere forgery.“ „“
BH Archives, Fund of Central Committee of the Communist League of BH, Propaganda and Information Section, D. Stefanović, Serious objections, in *Politikin ekspres*, Belgrade 1st October 1983

However, the cooperation between the “clericalists” from the Islamic Community and “Muslim nationalists” was, according to the ruling circles, a lot more fatal for the “stability and good intra-national relationships” in BH. It was therefore, that the lawsuit against a group of “Muslim nationalists “ in august 1983, should have represented a demonstration of determination of the Communist League of BH and the ruling elite to settle the accounts with nationalism, particularly the nationalism corresponding with clericalism, i.e. religion.

Lawsuit against the „Muslim Nationalists“in 1983

The Yugoslav and particularly the BH social discourse at the end of the 2970’s and beginning of 1980’s was full of so-called “ideal prototypes” who served the authorities and political elites for their generalisations and categorisations. Some “ideal prototypes” were presented as old forms while some of them “first came into being” in this period. The most frequent “ideal types” in this period were “nationalists” “clericalists” and “cleronationalists”. Their purpose was to complete a certain image of individuals or groups, but the whole issue was heading in such a direction that the ideal type should first be nominated, the discussion topic determined and only then its content assigned. It was very often the case that by putting an individual into a certain category, a certain “ideal type”, he would be ascribed all the other features of that “group” which he could either have had or not have at all.⁴⁰

Another feature of the Yugoslav, and particularly BH political engagement was a methodologically clear and completely applied “trial”. Such trials first defined the goals of the lawsuit, identified the target group of people and then made a selection as to who was to be persecuted. Commenting on the lawsuits in BH after Tito’s death, Rajko Danilović characterised the “Bosnian model”, which, according to the sentences, was much more severe than elsewhere in Yugoslavia, as being obedient to the “national code”, namely, almost simultaneously, enemies from all the three nationalities had been persecuted.⁴¹

The most important trial was the so-called lawsuit filed against “Muslim nationalists” which took place in Sarajevo from 18th July to 19th August 1983. In their attempt to find the enemies, “Muslim nationalism” seemed to be the most “affordable” rival of the political “system and good multi-national relationships” for the political elites. As has previously been stated, the goals were first set, i.e. Muslim nationalism had first been confronted in order to

⁴⁰ On the term „ideal types“ see Dejan Jović, *Yugoslavia, a Country which Died out*, Zagreb 2003, 97-101

⁴¹ Rajko Danilović, *Sarajevo Trial 1983*. Tuzla 2006. p. 71-72

show that the authorities did not support or protect Muslim nationalism. Derviš Sušić's Parergon, in a prophesising manner almost, pointed at events which would follow and talking about the Young Muslims, he says, *"The enemy has not given in. It is our task to do everything that is possible in order not to be surprised. Even the slightest extremes can make enormous harm. When it comes to Young Muslims, as in all other similar "forgotten" cases, the following fact is very surprising: how is it possible that a conservative, provincial dowry can turn itself into a bloodthirsty and paranoid ambition. I believe that Hitler was the greatest offspring of the narrow European path of the last couple of centuries. But every path seems to breed its own undestined Hitler. There isn't a nation or a religion which is spared from such maniac ambitions."*⁴²

The trial which took place in August 1983 was represented as a trial for Muslim nationalists, i.e. for the re-activated organisation "Young Muslims".

This organisation was formed in 1939, and by 1949 it had gone through three different phases of development. At the time when the Communist authorities were settling the accounts with the "civic streams" and all "kinds of nationalism, clericalists and fundamentalists", the organisation "Young Muslims" was gaining on its strength.

The opposing viewpoints of the Young Muslims and communists were obvious, and thus, the authorities reacted and organised the trials for Young Muslims in the period between 1946 and 1949.⁴³

The trial was held at the Military Court in the domain of the "Law on criminal acts against the people and the state". In 1949 the organisation ceased to exist due to numerous processes and prosecutions of Young Muslims who were sentenced to several years in prison, lost all their civic rights, forced to hard labour and four of them were sentenced to death.⁴⁴

The organisation was accused of being a terrorist, fundamentalist and enemy organisation oriented to act against the national government.⁴⁵

⁴² Derviš Sušić, Parergon (Notes attached to the novel Tale) Sarajevo 1980, p.141

The author defines the „Young Muslims“ as a group of „religious, fanaticised disciples, Muslims who were under a strong influence of a numebr of imams from Al-Azhar university“, who had decided to „organise and impose themselves on the Muslim youth with their radicalism and their fascist, pan-Islamist ideology, while anti-communism was ascribed as one of the central landmarks in both theory and practice.“ p. 136

⁴³ Šaćir Filandra, p.212

⁴⁴ Hasan Biber (1919-1949), Halid Kajtaž (1925-1949), Omer Stupac (1927-1949) i Nusret Fazlibegović (1927-1949) were sentenced to death. . For more details see Ismet Kasumagić, *Trinaest mladomuslimanskih šehida*, Sarajevo: Young Muslims 1999.

⁴⁵ The indictments and sentences are provided in the book by Sead Trhulj, Young Muslims, Sarajevo 1995. p 333-355

In the context of the development of the national awareness of Bosniacs, it is important to mention that the Organisation was ideologically oriented and that it had the aim to “direct the youth at Islam, raise the awareness about Islam, and to boost Muslims in a moral and social sense.” Hence, the organisation was not a political but an Islamic movement in a moral and scholarly sense“. We do not find any plans for a new regime in the Organisation’s documents, and the terms state and nation are not mentioned at all.⁴⁶

Religion and religious identify were of primary importance for Young Muslims who related the survival of religion and religious practice to their physical and moral survival. National identity, i.e. identity without religion was not the subject of their interest and intercession.

Towards the end of March, precisely on 23rd March 1983 numerous Muslim intellectuals and employees at the Islamic Community were being put in and arrested.

The first public notice about the arrest was made on 8th April 1983 on the second news Journal on TV Sarajevo, and on 9th April the same notice was published in *Oslobođenje*, the daily newspaper with the biggest number of editions.

The meeting of the Central Committee of BH at which the recently arrested “group” had been discussed and an evaluation of their activities made, which was to be confirmed only five months later, was held on 8th April 1983. As by an unwritten rule of the national code, and according to the position he occupied at the time, Hamdija Pozderac was the “Most precise” to give an assessment of the stream social movements and features of the arrested group. At the aforementioned meeting, he pointed at the obvious cooperation between the Clerical nationalism of the Islamic Community and the “nationalism of the Muslim structure”. He identified the group’s ideology with that of “the Young Muslims” from 1949 and accused them of pan-Islamism, anti-communism, terrorism, advocating an ethnically cleansed Bosnia”, establishing relationships with the Islamic world and Iranian revolution. Similar accusations came from other participants at the meeting. However, “the manner of confronting” this “clerical and nationalist group” was the subject of dispute between Hamdija Pozderac and Branko Mikulić. Pozderac advocated for a detailed public notification and a pompous trial, while Mikulić seemed more discreet and thought that a much better solution would be to issue the information concerning the arrest without any prejudices. He suggested

⁴⁶ Šaćir Filandra, p.214-215

that trials should be held in places where the “nationalists” had been arrested, i.e. several “closed trials” in order to reduce their publicity.⁴⁷

A confirmation of the existence of two waves within the Islamic community preceded the discussion on the work of Ahmed Smajlović, the President of the Islamic Community. In the end, due to “opposing opinions”, Smajlović was left out of the “enemy group”.

Šaćir Filandra claimed that Branko Mikulić, as the most powerful politician in BH, had the task to invent “Muslim nationalism” and Islamic fundamentalism. It is to him that Filandra ascribed the merit for condemning nationalism in his own nation, as Sušić did in his “Parergon” or Miroslav Jančić in his work titled “how I betrayed the National Cause”⁴⁸

After the interrogations, the group against which the lawsuit had been filed consisted of 13 members. The indictment “formed” the group and emphasised Alija Izetbegović as its leader. With this indictment, “the ideal type” of “Muslim nationalists and clerical nationalists” gained a proper content. The compatibility of this group for a public and “historical” arose from a number of facts. It contained all the features of the “enemy of the state”, which could be read in the documents issued by various state organs years ago. Five former convicts, “declared” members of the “terrorist organisation Young Muslims” also belonged to the group. It proved the revival of the old nationalism and a confirmation that “the enemy was never at rest”. Some new, unknown persons also belonged to the group. For the authorities, those were young intellectuals who were “indoctrinated” by the ideas of old nationalists and who represented the young forces of this “nationalist organisation”. Three of them were former students of the madrasa, while other two were active members of the Islamic Community. Hence, the theory of clerical nationalism which “identified the national and the religious and stressed that religion was the main pillar for Muslims” was confirmed with their activities and belonging to this “group”.

The indictment charged the group for cooperation with the enemy immigration. The journey of five members of this group to Iran in January 1983 served as a proof for that cooperation but also for their attachment and support for the Iranian revolution”. The indictment attempted to present the existing evidence in the light in which it suited the political leadership. Hence, it was often the case that the evidence was taken out of the context, exaggerated and interpreted differently. The indictment gave a “nationalist” dimension to what had really been happening, insisting upon an “enemy programme” which

⁴⁷ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo 1999. p.325-327

⁴⁸ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo 1999.p. 329-331

had been written by Alija Izetbegović thirteen years ago, labelling it as an ideological programme of “Muslim nationalism”.

In the documents issued by the Committee for the relations with religious communities, we find that the frequency of mass-religious manifestations, lectures and debates which stepped out of the religious frameworks and which identified the religious with the national had been emphasised. The “group” consisted of people who organised lectures and forums for students and pupils. The material which analyses the existence and work of “forums” that politicize the religious life mentions the Tabak Masjid is mentioned.⁴⁹

The issue of the function and organisation of the Tabak Masjid was one of the key issues in the trial against “Muslim nationalists” since, for the prosecution, its function represented the best example of their activities, the manner in which they applied the ideas of “Muslim nationalists”. Masjid’s activities were an indisputable fact, as opposed to all other activities carried out by this group for which they have been charged, and thus the prosecution only needed to “prove” that its function was other than “religious”.

Students of the Faculty of Islamic Theology held and organised lectures at the “Tabak Masjid”. Lectures were aimed at students and pupils as a kind of religious education. They were first organised and held at the University of Islamic Theology and then moved to the Tabak Masjid in February 1979. By June 1981 sixty lectures were held. Hasan Čengić was charged with accusations for his engagement at the Masjid as organiser and lecturer and Džemaludin Latić and Mustafa Spahić also for their engagement at the Masjid. The indictment stated that the lectures held at the Masjid had stepped out of the religious framework as well as out of the framework of Islamic theology and that their aim was the “islamisation of Muslims”. The Tabak Masjid was described as a Debate club which advocated for political goals whose aim was the common good for all Muslims.⁵⁰

The Masjid activities and those of “Muslim nationalists” within and outside the Masjid were marked as a politicized steering of Muslims as a nation and not as a religious group. This can be seen in the use of capitalized M in the indictment when talking about the target

⁴⁹ BH Archives, fund: Committee for the Relations with Religious Communities, document: „Information on organising „forums“ through which an attempt is being made by religious communities to politicize the religious life“ no. 09-128/84 Sarajevo 26th November 1984

⁵⁰Sarajevo Tral. Lawsuit against Muslim intellectuals in 1983, Zurich 1987. For more details see the „request for the protection of circumstances“ which was submitted to the prosecution authorities in Blegrade by Hasan Čengić in October 1985. It was obvious that Hasan Čengić was making an attempt to justify his engagement at the masjid as a religious engagement, while, in his own words, the indictment „pulled the issue out of its proper context“ and „produced Muslim nationalists“, p. 209

group for the lectures and discussions which was the “Muslim youth”, i.e. Bosniac (in a national sense). The Tabak Masjid was marked as one of the “forums” on which the religious life was being politicised, even more so since the lectures were attended by “other persons”, apart from religious officials and students of the Faculty of Islamic theology. In line with this fact, masjid was used as a medium, a means and had the task to present and promote the Islamic Declaration by Alija Izetbegović.⁵¹

In the context of the existence and renewal of the pan-Islamist stream within the Muslim population in the 1970’s, Xavier Bugarel stresses the importance of the Tabak Masjid which, according to Bugarel, contributed to the renewal of pan-Islamism with Alija Izetbegović at its forefront. However, he believes that the pan-Islamist stream had only had a marginal role within the Islamic Community and that it became subject of public interest only after the Iranian revolution in 1979 out of sheer fear of “Islamic fundamentalism”. This caused conflicts among the members of the Communist League who had decided to find “a sacrificing lamb”. They (the representatives of the pan-Islamist stream, X.B) paid the price for the internal disputes of the Yugoslav political elites, as the forbearers of the crisis which was appearing on the political horizon.”⁵²

The question arises as to what extents were the highest authorities of the Islamic Community familiar with the work of Tabak Masjid, i.e. what was their share in the whole affair. Even though the authorities emphasised the fact that the trial had not been directed against “Islam and the Islamic Community” but against individuals within the Islamic community, it must, however, have been acquainted with certain activities the individuals from the group had been carrying out. The lectures at the Tabak Masjid were held under its supervision. The precondition for the lectures to be held in the first place was for the Islamic Community to gain insight into their contents and texts. At a meeting which was held on 21st February 1979 and attended by Hasan Čengić, a number of students from the Faculty of Islamic theology and representatives of the Islamic Community Board, upon a request issued by the Seniority of the Islamic Community, it was agreed that all the lectures should be submitted in writing to the Islamic Community Board seven days before it was due to be held and that the discussion should be kept within the framework of the topic. Midhat Čelebić was one of the persons appointed for the analysis of the texts. On behalf of the Board, he was in

⁵¹ BH Archives, fund: Committee for the Relations with Religious Communities, document: „Information on organising „forums“ through which an attempt is being made by religious communities to politicize the religious life“ no. 09-128/84 Sarajevo 26th November 1984

⁵² Xavier Bougarel, *The New Balkan Islam*, p.8

charge of the analysis of the aforementioned texts and was committed to notify the Board and Seniority should there be any objections to their contents. As the person appointed for the task, he was also committed to attend the lectures and report on any “inconsistencies” with the regulations.⁵³

We can conclude herewith that the Islamic Community has been familiar with the activities of the Tabak Masjid and that it did not find anything “extra-religious in its engagement”.⁵⁴

The trial was held from 18th July to 19th August 1983 at the District Court in Sarajevo; the judge who sat at the trial was Rizah Hadžić (president) and three members of the jury of different nationalities; the representative of the District Attorney was Edina Rešidović. Solicitors were denied access to the suspects until the indictment was drawn up. The benchmark was that the whole investigation was carried out by the SDB and not the judge rapporteur. The trial was public, but for certain discussions the judge ordered closed sessions to be held. The audience needed special cards to attend the trial, three members of each family were allowed to attend, the rest of the audience was journalists.⁵⁵

The solicitors who were engaged on the case were appointed by families and came from other centres, namely Belgrade and Zagreb.⁵⁶

The suspects tried to prove that they were not an organised group, that some of them did not know each other in the first place, that they were not nationalists, that they had nothing against the communist rule, that they did not advocate for an ethnically cleansed Bosnia, that their journey to Iran was of a tourist nature, that the Islamic Declaration was not a programme and that it did not refer to Yugoslavia at all, that they did not advocate for a

⁵³ Sarajevo Trial. Lawsuit against Muslim intellectuals in 1983, Zurich 1986, p.141

⁵⁴ In an interview with Džemaludin Latić, which took place in July 2008, he said that the people who organised lectures at the Tabak Masjid were Hasan Čengić and himself. The lectures that were held there were only partly written by them since „Husein Đozo, Alija Izetbegović and other Young Muslims were in the background“. He pointed out that their engagement was not directed against the Yugoslav Constitution, they only attempted to save what could be saved. „We attempted to revive Islam since the Islamic Community was controlled by the communists and UDB. The lectures were not exclusively about religion, we discussed our culture, linguistics, islam and science, islamic movements in the world, Iran and Pakistan. In the three years of its existence, in the tabak Masjid hosted about 500 students, our goal was to return to ourselves.“

Omer Behmen says that Young Muslims were once again engaged (after their organisation had been silenced) in writing the lectures for the Tabak Masjid. Lectures were written by rušid Prguda, Munir Gavrankapetanović, salih Behmen and Alija Izetbegović, in *At the Bottom of the Bottom*, Sarajevo, 2006. p.229

⁵⁵ For more detailed information about the arrests, investigation, trial and the convicts see: Abid Prguda, Sarajevo Trial, Lawsuit against Muslim Intellectuals 1983, Sarajevo, 1990

⁵⁶ In his feuilleton in the magazine *Dani*, Nedžad Latić, brother of Džemaludin Latić, points out that the solicitors of the convicts came from other centres since the local ones would not be engaged, i.e. they refused to confront the authorities and because the „social climate“ was much more liberal and criticising in Belgrade than in Sarajevo. *Dani*, No. 125-121., Sarajevo 1st October 1999 do 22nd October 1999

zealous Islam, etc. however, the indictment clearly stated that the Islamic declaration represented a programme which was being promoted at the Tabak Masjid with the aim to conduct the “islamisation of Bh and create an ethnically cleansed BH which would later strive to become an Islamic republic.” 56 witnesses were called to court, who, in the majority of cases, altered their signed statements in favour of the “group”.

The verdict was made on 20th August 1983 and confirmed at the Supreme Court of BH on 14th March 1984 and at the federal Court in Belgrade on 31st May 1985.

In line with Articles 133 and 136 of the Criminal Law of the SFRY, Omer Behmen was sentenced to 15 years in prison, Alija Izetbegović to 14, Hasan Čengić and Ismet Kasumagić 10, Edhem Bičakčić 7, Živalj Husein 6, Salih Behmen, Mustafa Spahić, Melika Salihbegović and Derviš Đurđević 5. Džemaludin Latić was sentenced to 6.5 years and Đula Bičakčić to 6 months in prison.

The Supreme Court reduced the sentences later on. The Federal Court altered the verdict in December 1985, while the accusations in line with the Articles 136 and 114 of the Criminal Law of SFRY were annulled – accusations for the organized engagement and contra-revolutionary jeopardizing the regime. The accusations for verbal offences in line with Article 133 of the Criminal Law of SFRY were confirmed. The Federal Court renamed the “enemy engagement” into “enemy propaganda“ in line with the Criminal Law and Article 133, while the convicts no longer represented an organized group but individual propagators.⁵⁷

The role of the media in this whole process was crucial for the perception of “Muslim nationalism” among “ordinary citizens”. The media have taken on the role of “commentators” of the trial with the aim to create an image of “Muslim nationalism” in the public. At the aforementioned meeting of the central Committee of the Communist League of BH, held on 8th April 1983 it was decided that *Oslobođenje* should publish excerpts from Parergon so that the persistence of that phenomenon could be presented in the best manner possible and the actions of the authorities justified.⁵⁸

“Oslobođenje” published an article by Izudin Filipović on 10th April 1983 titled “Nationalist Delusions and Illusions” which discussed the arrests of this “group”. In this article we can notice two facts which constantly get in the way of one another. The first fact is

⁵⁷ Sarajevo Trial, Zurich 1987. p.170

⁵⁸ Šaćir Filandra, *Bosniac Politics in the 20th Century*, Sarajevo : Sejtarija, 1999. p.332

that the convicts represent a “group” which acted from “enemy, clerical and nationalist positions”, “the Muslim elite” which aspired to create an ethnically cleansed Bosnia and revive the “ideology and strategy of Young Muslims” from the 1940’s. Additionally, their engagement as the “Muslim elite” is not only related to the institutions of the Islamic Community, boards, masjids; they also used their positions at the Madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Theology to “gain the sympathies of youth for their hostile intentions”. What is particularly being disputed is the glorification of the Muslim intelligence in their affirmation of the Muslim nation “thus disputing the role and the deserts of the Communist League of Yugoslavia.”⁵⁹

Hence, it is being concluded that the “group” had already been convicted as a “clerical-nationalist organisation”, as “an attempt to revive the old, already convicted nationalism”. The second important fact found in this article which was aimed at a wider audience in order to create a public opinion, stresses the determination of the Communist League and the highest state authorities to “confront such tendencies with all means possible”, i.e. that the arrests testify that such activities were “within the scope of self-defence... and that they have already recognised the unity and determination of the Communist League...a firm pillar which broke their backs and which shall break all those who make similar attempts”.⁶⁰

The public was “bombed” with numerous articles about the convicts, “Muslim nationalism”, the trial. BH media wrote about it, but this case awakened the interest of people in other republics as well, and their media reported on it amply. The common feature of these articles is that they all reported on “Muslim nationalism” and not on the judicial proceedings. The contents of these articles were not in line with the Constitutional regulation which stated that nobody could be declared guilty until proven in court. Magazines gave detailed accounts on “the organised group which advocated an ethnically cleansed Bosnia, a terrorist and nationalist organisation which was cooperating with the extreme emigration and which aspired to establish an Islamist regime in BH”.

As a sole exception to this identical, Party’s reporting on the proceedings in court, Rajko Danilović mentions the texts written by *Politika*’s journalist Borko Gvozdenović; his texts revealed that the accused were claiming their innocence, that they never said all the

⁵⁹ Izudin Filipović, Nationalist Delusions and Illusions, in *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo 10. 4. 1983. 3

⁶⁰ Ibidem

incriminating statements with which they had been burdened, that the witnesses presented the events, circumstances and discussions in a different light than stated in the indictment”.⁶¹

However, Omer Behmen classified Boriko Gvozdenović in the same group of journalists who had the task to “explain” the judicial proceedings and prove the guilt of the group; other journalist in his classification were Nagorka Idrizović, Slobodan Primec, Fuad Dorić, Bahrudin Bijedić, Zlatko Dizdarević, Izudin Filipović, Nijaz Duraković, Hamza Bakšić and others.⁶²

The media took advantage of the limitations of an “open” trial, i.e. the limited number of spectators and in that manner they arbitrarily presented the image of the trial and accusations.⁶³

„Oslobođenje“ was diligently following the trial and published about 23 articles whose authors were B. Romano and Z. Buljugić. Articles were detailed accounts from the courtroom which, with their striking titles, created an atmosphere of a significant, epochal confrontation of the authorities with “Muslim nationalism” which was heading to destroy the current regime and create intra-national intolerance⁶⁴

The last article from the series was published a day after the sentence was pronounced, on 21st august 1983 and bore the title “Enemies sentenced to 90 years”⁶⁵ Following the maximum sentences which should have demonstrated the determination of the authorities, i.e. the Communist League, the interest for “Muslim nationalism” loses its momentum. The first degree verdict, as has previously been stated, was altered by the Federal Court in line with Article 113 of the Criminal Law of SFRY, i.e. only the verdict for antagonist propaganda was confirmed, but it did not draw the attention of the public.

⁶¹ Rajko Danilović, Sarajevo Trial 83, Tuzla: Bosanska riječ 2006.p.18-19

⁶² Omer Bahmen, At the Bottom of the Bottom, Sarajevo: Young Muslims 2004. P.255

⁶³ Alija Izetbegović, Islamic Declaration, Sarajevo: Bosna 1990. p.111-112

⁶⁴ Some of those titles were: „Sowing hatred during school lessons“ in *Oslobođenje* 5th August 1983, „Slandering during home visits“ in *Oslobođenje* 2nd August 1983. „Dangerous messages from the debate club“ in *Oslobođenje* 22nd July 1983, „Disguised protectors threatened witnesses“ in *Oslobođenje* 6th August 1983, „Revolutionary goals from a religious platform“ in *Oslobođenje* 19th July 1983., „Apparitions of the past in a terrorist veil“ in *Oslobođenje* 14th August 1983

⁶⁵ "Judge Rizah Hadžić presented the verdict in an hour and a half long presentation in which he gave a detailed account of how this group of nationalists acted in an organised manner and advocated for an ethnically cleansed BH with the aim to create a republic which was to be based upon the principles of Islam as „a unity of religion and law“, whose borders should fall within a great Islamic state – from Afghanistan to Slavonki Brod in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus connecting some parts of other republics and autonomous regions of our country. "The Islamic Declaration“, whose author was Alija IZetbegović, was the ideological platform almost identical to the programme of the former terrorist organisation „Young Muslims“ which represented an open invitation to Muslims to realise the plans, by changing the manner of upbringing in the first place, and finally by a political revolution.“ Source: *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo 21st August 1983, p.3

The media did not report on it, except Belgrade's *Nin* which commented briefly on the whole affair.⁶⁶

The Islamic Community organs did not reflect on the arrests and the whole process. Although the analyses of religious press which were prepared by the Commission for the Relations with Religious Communities still talked about the politisation of the press of the Islamic Community, the lawsuit against the "Muslim nationalists", regardless of the fact that two of the convicts were imams, is not mentioned.

It is difficult to determine whether the campaign in the media was sufficient for "ordinary people" to truthfully present and prove "Muslim nationalism" and its perils. However, it is a fact that no attempts were made to view the events in an objective manner, i.e. no attempts by either individual, group or institutions were made to defend the accused. Apart from a protest note issued by students of the Faculty of Islamic Theology and the attempts made by the students of the Madrasa in Sarajevo to defend their professor Latić, there were no public protests.

It is noteworthy that a number of students, together with Ismet Šljivo, launched a petition and sent it to the Islamic Community thereby demanding that the IC should intercede and help to free their innocent professor Latić. The students and madrasa's principle were taken in and interrogated. However, the petition was sent to "Glas Koncila" which published the petition.⁶⁷

Evaluation of the "Sarajevo trial"

The first public assessments of the "Sarajevo Trial" which were not in line with "the viewpoint of the Communist League and the Authorities" were expressed only a few years after the whole process. In the 1990's, when "new democratic processes in the society" had been taking place, harsh criticisms were uttered against the "socialist rule". In such a "new wave" of criticism directed at the BH political practice, first public condemnations were uttered because of the "staged trial" for "Muslim nationalists". Muhamed Filipović, in one of his interviews from 1990, states that the authorities treated everything that had to do with the research into the political and cultural being of Muslims, and particularly "the attempts to treat the Islamic foundations of their culture as equal to e.g. Orthodox foundation of the

⁶⁶ Alija Izetbegović, *Islamic Declaration*, Sarajevo: Bosna1990. p.107

⁶⁷ Džemaludin Latić, *Naša hodžinska sudbina*, in *Novi horizonti*, Zenica, November 2004, p.55

Serbian culture or the Catholic foundation of the Croatian culture or to treat Islamic art as a part of our overall heritage” as fundamentalism. The Sarajevo Trial was therefore an example of a political and psychological pressure on Muslims (Bosniacs).⁶⁸

Numerous authors agree today that the process against “Muslim nationalists” was staged. Communist authorities needed examples of “nationalist and contra-revolutionary engagement”, and even when there were none, the enemies were invented. By organizing staged processes and creating enemies, the communist rule had the aim to demonstrate the determination of the regime and the politics, to maintain the existing state of affairs and to warn the rest of the society. The best example of a staged process is exactly the lawsuit against “Muslim nationalists” who were accused of propagating the Sharia Law, and simultaneously, of advocating the Western democracy. The BH public remained mute to such a “staged process”⁶⁹

Inventing enemies proved to be an efficient way to remain in power and thus, the scope of the power exercised by the authorities was directly proportional to the amount of enemies whom the authorities were able to “detect” and “defeat”.⁷⁰

Throughout the socialist period there were no significant ethnical and interethnic disputes in BH. Things which could have “influenced brotherhood and unity” were mainly uttered in private circles and represented such verbal utterances of doubt or criticism of the system without any attempts to develop an organised opposition to communism. Despite that, the Party took “everything seriously” and continued to apply its policy of radical confrontation with “nationalist excesses” in the 1970’s and 1980’s.⁷¹ Bearing in mind “the permanent sensibility to nationalism which arises from the fact that there were three nations living in BH”, an unwritten rule was that the communist politicians were in charge of depicting and destroying nationalism from their own ethnic group.

⁶⁸ Muhamed Filipović, Yes, I am a Fundamentalist, in *Danas*, Zagreb 9th January 1990, p.14

⁶⁹ Neven Anđelić, Bosnia and Herzegovina between Tito and War, Belgrade 2003, p.69-70

⁷⁰ Muhamed Filipović, Yes, I am a Fundamentalist, in *Danas*, Zagreb 9th January 1990, p. 15

⁷¹ Branko Mikulić, one of the most important political figures, in an interview dating from 1972 states: „We have been determined to fight the enemy elites, nationalism and chauvinism in BH. With the aim to efficiently defend the developments of our revolution, we have conducted even harsher punishments for the bearers of such activities than in some other regions. This provoked the malicious conclusions that BH was governed by „a steel fist“ 137,“We shall henceforth try all those who act in a hostile manner towards self-government, brotherhood and unity, equity of all peoples in BH and Yugoslavia. It is a precondition for the development of a true, self-governing democracy.“ 146 Branko Mikulić, For what and against whom, Sarajevo, NIŠP Oslobođenje 1975.

The goal of BH politicians in this process, and later in their personal “nationalist” processes was to intimidate Muslims and their intellectual elite, but also to intimidate the communist opponents in other nations in BH.⁷²

We have already mentioned that, according to Šaćir Filandra, Branko Mikulić was given the task to invent “Muslim nationalism” and Islamic fundamentalism.⁷³

However, there is the opinion that other Muslim intellectuals should have been tried as well, e.g. Muhsin Rizvić, academian Muhamed Filipović, dr Enes Duraković, Nijaz Duraković et al. It is true, however, that some of them have been interrogated while the arrests were being made in 1983. However, it still remains a presumption that the “Izetbegović’s by then unknown group” had deliberately been chosen with the help of Hamdija Pozderac who was thus protecting his own political position.⁷⁴

Latić brothers, however, believe that the key person in the process of identification of nationalists and the one who “ordered the arrests” was Raif Dizdarević, i.e. the so-called “Dizdarević Clan”. They justify their claim with two facts: the first being that the chief investigator of the “Izetbegović group” was Amir Salihagić, Dizdarević’s close relative, who had been the result of a relationship and accord between Duško Zgonjanin and Raif Dizdarević. Nedžad Latić concludes that the “Trial 83” was “one of the tasks assigned to the Dizdarević Clan in Bosnia”. Another reason was the fear for their own position because they feared being compromised because of a close relative Sheih Halid Salihagić who could, according to Latić, rightfully bear the title “Bosnian Khomeini”.⁷⁵

Omer Behmen also commented on the socio-political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1983, “our Muslim Party members in BH wanted to prove themselves to Belgrade according to a well-known scheme – it was high time they found enemies who had gathered enough courage to step out and who were becoming more and more open and free, who “influence and poison masses with their ideology”... They should be repressed to the greatest extent possible. It was their decision to do what they decided to do. Our BH communists, particularly those bearing a Muslim name wanted to assign great significance to the whole affair, and especially to prosecute “fundamentalists”, i.e. “their own people”.⁷⁶

⁷² Rajko Danilović, Sarajevo Trial 83 Tuzla 2006.p. 30

⁷³ Šaćir Filandra.p. 329

⁷⁴ Nedžad Latić, Claim Justice at Milanko Renovica's, in *Dani*, Sarajevo 15th October.1999.

⁷⁵ Nedžad Latić, Claim Justice at Milanko Renovica's, in *Dani*, Sarajevo 15th October.1999

⁷⁶ Omer Behmen, At the Bottom of the Bottom, Sarajevo 2006.p. 259

Conclusion

„The Sarajevo Trial” was a product of different socio-political aspirations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia. Accused by the Federal top of supporting and cooperating with Muslim nationalists, the BH government “needed” a prove that they did not. Applying strict police and court measures, they managed to show that such cooperation “did not exist”. At the same time, in a situation where the socio-economic conditions were very complex, the BH political elite needed to prove and show all its power, confirm its unity and determination to BH citizens, but to other political authorities as well. However, the Federal government saw the trial as a real existence and revival of Muslim nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was a prove of “vampire nationalism” which, after the irredentist tendencies in Kosovo, demonstrated its contra-revolutionary aspirations in BH as well. The Federal government hence warned at the cooperation between Muslim nationalism in Kosovo and Muslim nationalism in BH which had the aim to create two Muslim states. Hence, as Stane Dolenc, one of the most powerful people in Yugoslavia at the time, pointed out, the Sarajevo Trial was a response of the authorities to the attempts to introduce “zealous Islam” and create an ethnically cleansed Kosovo and an ethnically cleansed Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁷⁷

It is noticeable that different “criticising circles” saw the growth of “Muslim nationalism” as one of the most significant destabilising factors; “Muslim nationalism” was perceived as a symbiosis of the national and cultural and as a symbiosis of the national and religious. The cooperation between religion, i.e. religious communities and “nationalism” seemed more dangerous and extreme in the eye of the BH authorities. Thus, in the documents of the state organs we see no demarcations between “clericalist and nationalist” activities. The condemnation of “Muslim nationalists” for their zealous Islam and islamisation of Muslims has additionally complicated the intricate relationship between religion and nation. The convicts were sentenced for both, which only served to confirm that the social discourse could not differentiate one from another. Constitutional recognition of the Muslim nation and a rapid, almost repressive process of secularisation and separation of Islam from Muslims resulted in Muslims becoming less religious and attached to the Islamic Community. However, without their own language, national institutions and culture, their religious orientation imposed itself as a specificum, even though it had been felt as a traditional affiliation during the 1980’s; an affiliation imposed on them by birth and not by their own spiritual experience.

⁷⁷ Alija Izetbegović, *Islamic Declaration*, Sarajevo 1990, p. 108

The question arises as to what extent has this “group” nationalist and to what extent has it been an advocate for national affirmation, emphasising the national particularity and how much has it contributed to the awakening of national awareness. The truth is that key evidence for the indictment containing accusations for acting “against the state and against good intra-national relations” was drawn from their activities in the sphere of “religious revival, islamisation, supporting the Iranian revolution, zealous Islam, revival of the Sheriah Law”, etc. We can conclude that their activities have indeed been directed at the revival of religious practice. It would be very difficult to prove that they were advocates of national affirmation and apologetics of strengthening the national identity.

However, the question arises whether religion was still in the focus of interest and intercession in the 1990’s, when many “Muslim nationalists” who were accused or suspected became national leaders of what is now known as Bosniacs!

Sources and bibliography:

BH Archives Sarajevo

Funds: Committee for the Relations with Religious Communities
Central Committee of the Communist League of BH

Newspapers: *Oslobođenje (Sarajevo)*
Dani (Sarajevo)
Danas (Zagreb)
Odjek (Sarajevo)
Novi horizonti (Zenica)

Andelić, Neven 2003: *Bosna i Hercegovina između Tita i rata (Bosnia and Herzegovina between Tito and War)*, Beograd.

Behmen, Omer 2004: *Na dnu dna (At the Bottom of the Bottom)*, Sarajevo: Mladi Muslimani.

Berger, Peter L. and Thomas **Luckman** 1992: *Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge*. Translated by Srđan Dvornik, Zagreb: Naprijed.

Bilandžić, Dušan 1986: *Jugoslavija poslije Tita 1980-1985. (Yugoslavia after Tito 1980-1985)*, Zagreb: Globus.

Bilandžić, Dušan 2006: *Povijest izbliza. Memoarski zapisi 1945-2005. (A Closer Look at the Past. Memoirs 1945-2005)*, Zagreb: Prometej.

Bougarel, Xsavier: *The New Balkan Islam*, unpublished manuscript.

Danilović, Rajko 2006: *Sarajevski proces 83 (Sarajevo Trial 83)*, Tuzla: Bosanska riječ.

Dizdarević, Raif 1999: *Od smrti Tita do smrti Jugoslavije. Svjedočenja, (From Tito's Death to the Death of Yugoslavia. Testimonies)*, Sarajevo.

Filandra, Šaćir 1998: *Bošnjačka politika u XX stoljeću*, Sarajevo: Sejtarija.

Filipović, Izudin 1983: *Nationalist Delusions and Illusions*. In: *Oslobođenje*, Sarajevo 10.4.1983, p. 3.

Filipović, Muhamed 1990: *Da, ja sam fundamentalista (Yes, I am a Fundamentalist)*. In: *Danas*, Zagreb, 09.01.1990.

Izetbegović, Alija 1990: *Islamska deklaracija (Islamic Declaration)*, Sarajevo: Bosna.

Jović, Dejan 2003: Jugoslavija država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Jugoslavije (Yugoslavia, a Country which Died out. The Rise and Fall of Kardelj's Yugoslavia) (1974-1990), Zagreb: Prometej.

Kasumagić, Ismet 1999: Trinaest mladomuslimanskih šehida, Sarajevo: Mladi Muslimani.

Kecmanović, Nenad 1983: Sve naše razlike (All our differences). In: Danas, Nr. 49, 25.1 1983.

Latić, Džemaludin 2004: Naša hodžinska sudbina. In: Novi horizonti, Zenica, November 2004.

Latić, Nedžad 1999: Po pravdu kod Milana Renovice (Claim Justice at Milanko Renovica's). In: Dani, Sarajevo, Oktobar 1999.

Marković, Predrag 2007: Trajnost i promena. Društvena istorija socijalističke i postsocijalističke svakodnevnice u Jugoslaviji i Srbiji, (Continuity and Change. Social History of the Socialist and Post-socialist Everyday Life in Yugoslavia nad Serbia), Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Mikulić, Branko 1975: Za šta protiv koga (For what and against whom), Sarajevo: NIŠP Oslobođenje.

Prguda, Abid 1990: Sarajevski poroces (Sarajevo Trial, Lawsuit against Muslim Intellectuals 1983), Sarajevo.

Purivatra, Atif 1981: Libijska zelena knjiga (Libyan Green Book. Certain Issues concerning the Third Universal Theory.). In: Odjek, No. 1.1981.17.

Sarajevski proces 1986: Suđenje muslimanskim intelektualcima 1983. (Sarajevo Trial. Lawsuit against Muslim intellectuals in 1983), Zurich.

Sekulić, Duško 2004: Sukobi i tolerancija. O društvenoj uvjetovanosti nacionalizma i demokracija, (Conflicts and Tolerance. On Social Conditions of Nationalism and Democracy), Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk.

Sušić, Derviš 1980: Parergon (Notes attached to the novel Tale), Sarajevo: Oslobođenje.

Trhulj, Sead 1995: Mladi Muslimani, Sarajevo: Oko.